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Preface
My work on retirement wealth and retirement adequacy was originally
stimulated by two articles by Martin Feldstein (1974, 1976), which introduced
the concept of Social Security wealth and developed its methodology, and
considered the effects of Social Security wealth on the overall distribution
of wealth. The latter paper was based on the 1962 Survey of Financial
Characteristics of Consumers. My work up until that point focused on the
inequality of household wealth, beginning with a 1980 paper using the socalled Measurement of Economic and Social Performance (MESP) database,
a 1969 synthetic database on household wealth constructed from a statistical
match of the 1970 Decennial Census Public Use Microdata Sample and the
1969 Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income tax ﬁle.
Feldstein (1976) found that the inclusion of Social Security wealth had a
major effect on lowering the inequality of total household wealth (including
Social Security wealth). The Gini coefﬁcient—a measure of inequality that
ranges from zero (complete equality) to one (total inequality)—for the sum of
net worth and Social Security wealth among families in the age class 35–64
was 0.51, compared to a Gini coefﬁcient of 0.72 for net worth.
My ﬁrst article in this area, Wolff (1987b), followed up Feldstein (1976)
by examining the distributional implications of both Social Security and
deﬁned beneﬁt private pension wealth. I was particularly interested in whether
Feldstein’s results on the equalizing effects of Social Security wealth persisted
when private pension wealth was also included. Did retirement wealth as a
whole lower measured wealth inequality to the same degree that Feldstein
found for just Social Security wealth?
Wolff (1987b) used the 1969 MESP database. His was perhaps the ﬁrst
paper to add estimates of private pension wealth to standard household net
worth and examine its effects on the overall distribution of wealth. The
paper, like that of Feldstein (1976), showed that Social Security wealth had a
pronounced equalizing effect on the distribution of augmented wealth (the sum
of marketable wealth and retirement wealth). However, pension wealth had
a disequalizing effect on augmented wealth. In particular, while the addition
of Social Security wealth to net worth reduced the overall Gini coefﬁcient
from 0.73 to 0.48, the addition of pension wealth to the sum of net worth and
Social Security wealth raised the Gini coefﬁcient back to 0.66. The sum of
Social Security and pension wealth had, on net, an equalizing effect on the
distribution of augmented wealth but substantially less than did Social Security
wealth alone. I also followed up this work with Wolff (1992), which provided
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a discussion of some of the methodological issues involved in estimating both
Social Security and pension wealth.
In the early 1990s, I turned my attention to the redistributional effects of
the Social Security system. Wolff (1993a,b), using the 1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers and the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances,
examined the intra-cohort distributional effects of Social Security beneﬁts
relative to contributions into the Social Security system. The papers considered which groups were net gainers and which were net losers from the Social
Security system as a whole.
I ﬁrst divided Social Security beneﬁts into two components: 1) an annuity
component, which is the beneﬁt level that would be strictly determined by the
person’s contributions into the Social Security system, and 2) the remainder,
the transfer component. The transfer component, as its name indicates, is the
additional beneﬁt paid to retirees over and above the amount strictly justiﬁed
as an annuity payment. The results indicated that the Social Security system is
highly redistributive, paying out higher beneﬁts relative to accumulated contributions for lower- than for upper-income families. Moreover, the paper also
found that the transfer component of Social Security beneﬁts fell over time,
from an overall ratio of 0.85 in 1969 to 0.73 in 1973, and to 0.66 in 1983.
After an almost decade-long hiatus, I returned to the issue of retirement
wealth. In my presidential address to the Eastern Economics Association at its
2003 annual conference, held in New York, I called attention to the remarkable
transformation of the American pension system. In particular, I reported on the
rapid decline in pension coverage from traditional deﬁned beneﬁt plans and
the equally stunning rise in coverage from newer deﬁned contribution plans.
My main focus was again on the effects of pension wealth on overall wealth
inequality. Using data from the 1983, 1989, and 1998 Survey of Consumer
Finances, I charted changes in the share of households in the age group 47–64
with each type of pension coverage from 1983 to 1998, and reported that the
share with a deﬁned contribution pension plan climbed from 12 to 60 percent
while the share with a deﬁned beneﬁt plan fell from 69 to 46 percent. I also
found that deﬁned contribution wealth was distributed much more unequally
than deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth. As a result, the switchover in pension
systems raised the inequality of pension wealth overall, and the inequality of
total wealth, including pension wealth, advanced from 1983 to 1998 at a pace
greater than that of standard net worth alone. This work was later updated to
the year 2001 in Wolff (2007c).
In two books for the Economic Policy Institute, Wolff (2002b) and Weller
and Wolff (2005), I focused on time trends in pension wealth, retirement
wealth, and total or augmented wealth, which is the sum of standard net worth
and retirement wealth. I also investigated the issue of retirement income ad-
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equacy—that is, whether future retirees will have enough ﬁnancial resources to
provide an adequate standard of living. The results indicated strong growth in
pension wealth, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth from 1983 to 2001,
and an improvement in retirement adequacy as measured by expected retirement income. However, there were still some important gaps in this picture,
particularly for minorities and single females, who had much lower augmented
wealth and expected retirement income than their counterparts.
On a somewhat different topic, in Wolff (2007a) I compared the wellbeing of the baby boom generation (ages 40–55) in 2001 with the same age
group in 1983 to see how their fortunes had changed over time. The paper found
little evidence that their relative position had deteriorated over the period. By
some indicators, this generation actually saw an improvement. In terms of
income, the 40–55 age group was at about the same relative position in 2001
as in 1983, though in terms of conventional wealth, there was some slippage
over the period. In terms of mean augmented wealth (net worth plus pension
and Social Security wealth), their relative position improved somewhat, but
in terms of median augmented wealth there was again some relative decline.
The present volume both updates and expands my earlier work on these
issues. I once again look at time trends in pension coverage, the value of
pension plans, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth, as well as changes in
wealth inequality and retirement adequacy over time. I also look at differences
between demographic groups as deﬁned by age, race, marital status, and
education. My particular focus here is on the period from 2001 to 2009. As
we shall see, there was a marked reversal in the fortunes of most Americans
in regard to these factors in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century as
compared to the “booming” 1980s and 1990s.

xv
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1
Introduction
The last three decades have witnessed the radical transformation of
the American pension system. In Wolff (2003), I call attention to this
change which had been occurring since the early 1980s. I report that
the share of households in the age group 47–64 with a deﬁned contribution (DC) pension plan soared from 12 percent in 1983 to 60 percent in
1998, while the share with a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plan plummeted from
69 to 46 percent. Subsequently, in Wolff (2007c), I calculate that the
share with a DC plan rose to 62 percent in 2001, while the share with a
DB plan fell to 45 percent. I sometimes refer to this changeover as the
“great transformation.”
This volume focuses primarily on changes in the U.S. pension system from 1983 to 2009. However, attention is paid to the entire retirement system, including the role of Social Security. In earlier papers,
estimates were provided for the years 1983 to 2001 on the basis of the
Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) (see
Weller and Wolff 2005; Wolff 2002b, 2003, 2007a,b,c). With the availability of the 2004 and 2007 SCF, estimates of retirement wealth and
retirement adequacy are updated here to 2007.
The primary question of interest is who gained from and who was
hurt by the “great transformation.” Five major developments will be
addressed: First, how has the transformation affected the pension holdings of workers? Second, how has it impacted both the pension wealth
and the total retirement wealth (the sum of pension and social security
wealth) of the average median household? Third, which demographic
and income groups in particular gained in terms of pension and total
retirement wealth, and which lost out? Fourth, has the transformation of
the pension system led to greater overall inequality in pension wealth,
in total retirement wealth, and in augmented wealth (the sum of net
worth and retirement wealth)? Fifth, what implications does the transformation have for the adequacy of retirement income, as measured by
the absolute level of expected retirement income, its replacement rate of
preretirement income, and the expected poverty rate of future retirees?

1
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2 Wolff

Though the empirical analysis contained in the book concerns
exclusively the consequences of the transformation of the pension system on the wealth and retirement adequacy of U.S. households, it might
be useful to speculate on some of the causes behind this rapid transformation. There are three reasons why employers might prefer DC plans
to DB plans: 1) DC plans allow ﬁrms to shift the risk to workers, 2)
ﬁrms no longer have long-term pension liabilities, and 3) employers
generally make lower contributions to DC plans than DB plans.1
There were some pulls and pushes as well. With regard to the “pull,”
the main reason was the availability of DC plans. Individual Retirement
Accounts were ﬁrst established in 1974. This was followed by 401(k)
plans in 1978 for proﬁt-making companies (403[b] plans for nonproﬁts
are much older). Another reason was the option to convert DB pension plans to so-called cash balance plans (effectively, DC accounts). In
1999, a lawsuit was initiated by older IBM employees when IBM tried
to convert its DB pension plan to a cash balance plan. Though the court
initially ruled in favor of the employees, this decision was overturned
on appeal, and regulations issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
made such conversions legal. This probably helped to further expedite
the elimination of DB plans.2
With regard to the “push,” the ﬁrst reason for it was likely the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in
1974, which increased regulatory burdens on DB plans and made DB
plans more costly. ERISA put restrictions on how companies could
manage and administer their pension assets: it mandated that companies
must put money into pension funds to meet future liabilities and must
pay out beneﬁts. ERISA also required companies to pay premiums to
the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation, which was created in 1974
to insure their pension plans. A second was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, which established even tighter funding limits on
DB plans. A third push came from the decline of unions in the United
States. According to Current Population Survey data, the unionization
rate fell from 20 percent in 1983 to 13 percent in 2001. Unions had been
one of the bulwarks supporting the traditional DB pension system.3
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Introduction 3

A PRÉCIS OF THE BOOK
This section provides a brief synopsis of the book’s principal ﬁndings in order to help the reader navigate through the rather dense set
of empirical research presented in the ensuing chapters. There are six
major questions in the book:
1)

With the “great transformation,” did pension coverage expand
or contract over time?

2)

Did the value of pension wealth increase or decline?

3)

Did overall wealth inequality rise or fall?

4)

Did the retirement prospects of middle-aged Americans
improve or worsen?

5)

How did the “great transformation” affect different demographic groups?

6)

How did these effects vary between the 1980s, the 1990s, and
particularly the 2000s?

The results are very sensitive to time periods and particularly to
movements in the stock market. The stock market boomed during the
1980s and especially the 1990s but softened during the 2000s. The
elimination of DB plans in the 1980s hurt workers in terms of pension coverage, particularly among the elderly, but because of the rapid
growth of DC plans in the 1990s, overall pension coverage expanded.
In contrast, during the 2000s, pension coverage suffered a mild contraction. However, at least among current workers, the pension coverage
rate for females increased from 1989 to 2007, while the rate for men
declined.
The value of DC pension plans is especially sensitive to stock market developments, and the deﬁned contribution pension system works
very well when the stock market booms. DC pension wealth gained in
the 1980s and then grew enormously in the 1990s as coverage expanded
and the stock market roared. However, as coverage slackened in the
2000s and the stock market weakened, gains in DC pension wealth
slowed down. When the stock market tanked from 2007 to 2009, DC
pension wealth actually plummeted. The period 2001–2009 was indeed
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4 Wolff

a “lost decade” in terms of DC pension wealth, with absolutely no net
gains over the decade.
Despite the elimination of many DB plans, overall pension wealth
(the sum of DB and DC pension wealth) continued to grow in the 1980s,
1990s, and even during the years 2001–2007, though gains during the
early and mid-2000s were much smaller than those in the preceding
decades. However, overall pension wealth during the entire decade of
the 2000s showed a sizable decline. One group that did well over that
decade was the elderly, mainly because many of them remained “legacies” of the traditional DB pension system, in which by law their pension beneﬁts could not be reduced.
The story is not complete without considering the ancillary role of
the Social Security system. Social Security ﬁlls many holes in the rather
porous private pension system. Social Security wealth, like (private)
pension wealth, grew strongly in the 1990s. However, during the 2000s,
its gain slowed markedly. Retirement wealth, the sum of pension and
Social Security wealth, showed marked improvement in the 1990s but,
again, much slower advances in the 2000s.
When standard net worth is added to retirement wealth to produce
augmented wealth, this addition creates the most comprehensive measure of retirement resources. The results show that mean augmented
wealth grew very strongly in the 1990s but that gains were much
weaker in the 2000s. Indeed, median augmented wealth showed almost
no change among middle-aged and elderly households and actually
declined in absolute terms among younger households. Indeed, younger
households were found to be particularly vulnerable as a group, and
their retirement prospects appear to have faded over time.
In the case of inequality trends, there is not much differentiation
between the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. One notable ﬁnding is that DC
pension wealth is distributed much more unequally than traditional DB
pension wealth. As a result, the transition from the DB system to the
DC system resulted in higher levels of inequality of pension wealth,
retirement wealth, and augmented wealth. In particular, there was an
increase in the overall inequality of augmented wealth between 1989
and 2007. This result contrasts with almost no change in the inequality
of net worth over these years.
In 2007, there were large gaps in pension wealth, retirement wealth,
and augmented wealth between minority households and the white
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majority, between single females and married couples, and between college graduates and other educational groups. However, minority households generally showed strong progress in terms of pension, retirement,
and augmented wealth relative to white households. Likewise, single
female households generally showed gains relative to married couples
in these three dimensions. In contrast, less educated households generally lost out relative to college graduates in terms of pension, retirement, and augmented wealth.

CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter 2 provides an update of wealth trends on the basis of the
standard deﬁnition of net worth: marketable assets less debts. This sets
the stage for the remainder of the book. The chapter ﬁrst discusses the
sources and methods for the data used in this study. The data sources
used for this study are the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF conducted
by the Federal Reserve Board. Each survey consists of a core representative sample combined with a high-income supplement. The SCF
provides considerable detail on both pension plans and Social Security
contributions. The SCF also gives detailed information on expected
pension and Social Security beneﬁts for both spouses.
Chapter 2 then analyzes trends in median and mean wealth, the
inequality of wealth, wealth composition, stock ownership, and wealth
by race, ethnicity, and age group. An update of household wealth to
mid-2009 is also provided on the basis of movements in stock and housing prices. The chapter will thus serve as a backdrop to the analysis of
retirement wealth and enable us to see what differences in wealth trends
are engendered by the introduction of both pension wealth and Social
Security wealth to the deﬁnition of household wealth.
As will be seen, there was very strong growth in both mean and
median net worth during the 2000s (2001–2007), as there was during
the 1990s (1989–2001). There was a dramatic shift in the household
portfolio away from liquid assets like savings accounts and money market funds and into DC plans instead. The early and mid-2000s also witnessed sharply rising family indebtedness, as the debt-to-income ratio
by 2007 reached its highest level in almost 25 years, particularly among

Wolff.indb 5

11/21/2011 9:16:48 AM

6 Wolff

the middle class. In contrast, wealth inequality remained ﬂat during the
1990s as well as from 2001 to 2007. An update to mid-2009 indicates a
very sharp drop in mean net worth and, particularly, median net worth,
as well as a sharp rise in wealth inequality.
Chapter 3 reviews some of the relevant literature on pensions and
Social Security, which is important in order to provide a context for my
later empirical ﬁndings. It focuses on the evolution of pension coverage rates, pension and Social Security wealth, and replacement rates
for each. The chapter also discusses how pensions and Social Security wealth affect inequality, both overall and between different demographic groups.
The chapter is divided into six parts. The ﬁrst part reviews studies
that have documented changes in pension coverage in the United States,
particularly the decline in DB and the corresponding rise in DC pension
coverage among workers since the early 1980s. It asks, did the great
transformation raise or lower the level of pension wealth and retirement
wealth in general? The second part surveys work on trends in both the
level of retirement wealth as well as its degree of inequality.
One ongoing controversy is whether DC plans such as 401(k)
plans have, on net, added to total household savings, or whether they
have simply substituted for other forms of savings. These studies are
reviewed in the third part. Have workers saved enough (or will they
save enough) to meet their needs during retirement? The fourth section
delves into the literature on measuring retirement adequacy. In more
general terms, how have the elderly fared over time? The next section
reviews some of the studies that have attempted to measure the economic status of the elderly. How did families fare during the “great
recession” of 2007–2009? The ﬁnal part of Chapter 3 reviews studies
that have tried to measure the effects of the 2007–2009 recession on the
pension wealth holdings of households and their anticipated retirement
behavior.
In Chapter 4 I turn to the empirical analysis of pension and Social
Security wealth. How did the great transformation affect pension coverage in general? I ﬁrst analyze how pension coverage developed over
the period 1989–2007 among individual workers and then investigate trends in pension coverage on the household level over the more
extended time interval, 1983–2007. If we now add pension wealth
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to standard net worth to obtain what I call “private accumulations,”
how has the level of private accumulations and its degree of inequality
changed over time?
In Chapter 5, I extend the empirical results reported in Chapter 4 by
considering Social Security wealth, retirement wealth in general, and
augmented wealth. Did Social Security wealth grow over time? What
happened to total retirement wealth, the sum of pension and Social
Security wealth? These are the ﬁrst two topics considered in the chapter.
I next introduce the concept of total (augmented) household wealth,
the sum of net worth, pension wealth, and Social Security wealth.
While net worth is a limited measure of resource availability, augmented wealth provides the most comprehensive measure of the full
set of resources available to families for retirement. When I later consider retirement adequacy, I shall once again rely on the concept of
augmented wealth. How then did augmented wealth and its degree of
inequality change from 1983 to 2007? This is the next set of topics to
occupy us in the chapter. Finally, what happened to pension wealth and
augmented wealth during the great recession? The last section of Chapter 5 provides an update on these estimates to mid-2009 on the basis of
changes in stock and housing prices.
The results of Chapters 4 and 5 show a huge increase in pension
wealth during the 1990s despite the collapse of the DB pension system,
mainly because of the enormous take-up rate in DC pension plans (as
discussed above) and extremely robust gains in the stock market (as we
see in Chapter 2). However, in the 2000s, there was a marked slowdown
in advances in pension wealth, as both the share of households with
pensions declined a bit and stock prices advanced more slowly. Private accumulations, which also showed substantial gains in the 1990s,
showed smaller increases in the 2000s. Social Security wealth, likewise, jumped in the 1990s but was largely unchanged in the 2000s. As
a result, both total retirement wealth and augmented wealth climbed
sharply in the 1990s but showed only very modest gains in the 2000s.
Finally, while the inequality of net worth remained largely unchanged
from 1989 to 2007, the inequality of augmented wealth rose over the
period, as more unequal DC wealth replaced more equal DB wealth.
How did different demographic groups fare with regard to relative
gains in pensions, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth? Chapter
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6 investigates these issues for the period 1989–2007. For purposes of
analysis, three divisions of the population are made: 1) race/ethnicity,
2) marital status, and 3) educational attainment. As will be seen in this
chapter, there was a remarkable turnaround in the relative fortunes of
minorities, though signiﬁcant gaps between them and the white majority still remained in 2007. Differentials in retirement wealth and augmented wealth also generally narrowed between single females and
married couples, though once again very large gaps remained in 2007.
In contrast, differences in retirement and augmented wealth by educational group splayed out over the years, with college graduates in particular increasing their lead over the other educational groups.
What was the level of retirement adequacy among households close
to retirement in 2007, and how did this change over time from 1989
to 2007? These are the subjects of Chapter 7. Retirement adequacy is
measured in three different ways: 1) by calculating the stream of retirement income that today’s older workers can expect at retirement from
their accumulated wealth at the time of retirement, 2) by comparing
their expected retirement income to the poverty line in order to measure
the expected poverty rate at retirement, and 3) by the so-called replacement rate, which calculates the ratio of expected retirement income to
preretirement income. All three measures of retirement adequacy are
computed for individual age groups and by race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment.
The results of Chapter 7 show strong gains in expected retirement
income for the age group 47–64 during the 1990s but a marked slowdown in its growth from 2001 to 2007, even before the ﬁnancial meltdown of 2007–2009. These ﬁndings are consistent with the pronounced
decline in the rate of advance of augmented wealth between the 1990s
and the 2000s (see Chapter 5). Households in this age group also saw a
large reduction in their expected poverty rate at retirement from 1989 to
2001. However, there was no further reduction in the expected poverty
rate from 2001 to 2007. In contrast, the percentage of households with
at least a 75 percent replacement rate rose somewhat more in the 2000s
than it had in the 1990s, though the gains were quite modest in both
periods.
The last chapter, Chapter 8, presents a summary of the principal
ﬁndings of this study, considers the policy implications of the study,
and offers pertinent policy recommendations. I argue in favor of uni-
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versal pension coverage. For current workers, I propose guaranteed
employer pension coverage for all workers in the company. For nonworkers below the age of retirement, I advocate a mixture of Individual
Retirement Accounts and Individual Development Accounts supported
by the federal government. I also make the case that the current Social
Security system should be left largely intact.

Notes
1. Ghilarducci, Sun, and Nyce (2004) estimate that DC plans, on average, cost the
employer less than traditional DB pension plans. They investigate the pension
choices of over 800 ﬁrms between 1988 and 1996 using data on pension plan
ﬁnances from the Internal Revenue Service Form 5500 and on ﬁrm ﬁnances from
Compustat. They calculate that a 10 percent increase in the use of 401(k) plans
reduced pension costs per worker by 1.8 to 2.0 percent. However, it is not clear
whether this reduction in pension costs could be reﬂected in higher wages paid to
workers. See also Wolman and Colamosca (2002) for more discussion of these
points.
2. However, Gustman and Steinmeier (1992), examining the 1977–1985 period, conclude that regulatory changes could account for no more than half of the shift from
DB to DC plans, at least over this period.
3. Another factor that has been mentioned is greater worker mobility in the 1990s
than in the 1980s. The argument is that because DB pensions are not portable
between employers, workers who switch jobs may prefer DC to DB plans. Such
an argument is made by Friedberg and Owyang (2004) using a contract-theoretic
matching model with moral hazard. In their work, they show that a decline in the
value of existing jobs relative to new jobs reduces the expected match duration
and therefore the desirability of DB pensions. They ﬁnd that this explanation is
consistent with observed trends in DB pension coverage. However, according to
Farber (2001), there was virtually no change, on average, in the degree of job tenure between the 1980s and the 1990s, casting some doubt on the increased worker
mobility argument.
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2
Recent Trends in
Household Wealth, 1983–2009
Robust Growth Followed by Collapse
It is useful to begin the empirical part of the book with a presentation of wealth trends based on the standard deﬁnition of wealth. This
will serve as a backdrop for the rest of the book. In particular, we will
see how our basic ﬁndings on wealth trends change when we include
retirement wealth in the deﬁnition of household wealth. Moreover, we
will be able to see some of the reasons for the plunge in wealth during
the “great recession” of 2007–2009.
The 1990s witnessed some remarkable events: the stock market
boomed, stock ownership spread, and real wages, after stagnating for
many years, ﬁnally grew. The prices of stocks listed on Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index surged 171 percent between 1989 and 2001,
and by 2001 over half of U.S. households owned stock either directly or
indirectly. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) ﬁgures, real
mean hourly earnings gained 8.3 percent between 1995 and 2001 (Council of Economic Advisers 2009a).1
However, 2001 saw a recession, albeit a short one. Moreover, the
stock market, which had peaked in 2000, dropped steeply from 2000 to
2003 but recovered in 2004, so that between 2001 and 2004 the S&P
500 was down by “only” 12 percent in real terms (Council of Economic
Advisers 2009b).2 Real wages rose very slowly from 2001 to 2004: the
BLS real mean hourly earnings rose by only 1.5 percent, while median
household income dropped in real terms by 1.5 percent (Council of
Economic Advisers 2009c). On the other hand, housing prices rose
steeply. The median sales price of existing one-family homes rose by
18 percent in real terms nationwide (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). The
other big story was household debt, particularly that of the middle class,
which skyrocketed during these years, as we shall see below.

11
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From 2004 to 2007, the stock market rebounded. The S&P 500 rose
19 percent in real terms. Over the period 2001–2007, the S&P 500 was
up 24 percent (6 percent in real terms). Real wages remained stagnant,
as the BLS real mean hourly earnings rose by only 1.0 percent. Median
household income in real terms showed some growth over this period,
rising by 3.2 percent. From 2001 to 2007 it gained 1.6 percent. From
2004 to 2007, housing prices slowed, as the median sales price of existing one-family nationwide advanced only 1.7 percent over these years
in real terms. Over the years 2001 to 2007, real housing prices gained
19 percent.
Updating previous studies (Wolff 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2002a,
2007d), I ﬁnd that median net worth, the wealth of the average household, demonstrated robust growth over the years 1983–2007. In fact, the
growth rate of median wealth accelerated from the 1980s to the 1990s
and into the 2001–2007 period. However, the gains of that period were
based largely on rising home prices ﬁnanced by increasing mortgage
debt. This growth came to an abrupt end in 2007 with the collapse in
home prices, and median wealth plummeted from 2007 through 2009.
Household wealth inequality increased sharply between 1983 and
1989. However, in a surprising development, this increase was followed
by a period of almost no change in household wealth inequality from
1989 to 2007. This trend during those years was unexpected because
the two factors normally associated with wealth inequality, income
inequality and the ratio of stock prices to home prices, both showed a
marked rise over the same years.
Between 1983 and 2007, and particularly from 1989 to 2001, there
was a striking shift in the portfolio composition of household wealth:
out of liquid assets like savings accounts and money market funds and
into DC pension accounts. There was also a noticeable expansion of
stock ownership from 1989 to 2001, followed by a mild contraction
between 2001 and 2007. Furthermore, DC pension accounts became
more heavily invested in equities, making them vulnerable to the stock
market downturn in 2007–2009.
Moreover, despite the buoyant economy over the 1980s and 1990s,
overall indebtedness continued to rise among American families and
then skyrocketed in the early and mid 2000s. Among the middle class,
the debt-income ratio reached its highest level in 24 years. The high
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level of indebtedness made the middle class particularly vulnerable to
the collapse of the housing market.
The ratio of mean wealth between African American and white
families was very low in 1983, at 0.19, and barely budged over the
years from 1983 to 2007. However, Hispanics did show some relative
gains over the 2001–2007 period. Young households (those with a head
of household under the age of 45), after some relative gains from 1983
to 1989, saw their relative wealth position deteriorate between 1989 and
2007. This development made young households particularly exposed
to the joint collapse of the stock and housing markets.
These results on traditional net worth will set the stage for later
analysis of trends in what I call augmented wealth, the sum of net
worth, DB pension wealth, and Social Security wealth. How did average pension wealth and augmented wealth grow over the period from
1983 to 2007 (Chapters 4 and 5)? What happened to the inequality of
augmented wealth over this period? Is the racial divide smaller or larger
once retirement wealth (the sum of pension and Social Security wealth)
is included in household wealth (Chapter 6)? How did different age
groups fare with regard to augmented wealth? Did young households,
in particular, see their relative wealth position deteriorate once retirement wealth was added to net worth (Chapter 5)? What were the relative developments in augmented wealth by income class and wealth
class (Chapter 6)? Moreover, I will also look at trends in net worth,
retirement wealth, and augmented wealth by marital status, particularly
between female-headed households and married couples, and by level
of educational attainment (Chapter 6).
I begin the next section with a discussion of the measurement of
household wealth and a description of the data sources used for this
study. After that I present results on time trends in median and average wealth holdings, changes in the concentration of household wealth,
and the composition of household wealth. I then investigate changes in
wealth holdings by race and ethnicity, and report on changes in the agewealth proﬁle. The last three sections of the chapter provide details on
stock ownership, a partial update of household wealth trends to 2009,
and a summary of results.

Wolff.indb 13

11/21/2011 9:16:53 AM

14 Wolff

DATA SOURCES AND METHODS
The data sources used for this study are the 1983, 1989, 2001, and
2007 SCF conducted by the Federal Reserve Board.3 Each survey consists of a core representative sample combined with a high-income
supplement. In 1983, for example, the supplement was drawn from the
Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income data ﬁle. For the 1983
SCF, an income cutoff of $100,000 of adjusted gross income was used
as the criterion for inclusion in the supplemental sample. Individuals
were randomly selected for the sample within predesignated income
strata. In later years, the high-income supplement was selected as a list
sample from statistical records (the Individual Tax File) derived from
tax data by the Statistics of Income Division of the IRS (SOI). This second sample was designed to disproportionately select families that were
likely to be relatively wealthy (see, for example, Kennickell [2001] for
a more extended discussion of the design of the list sample in the 2001
SCF). The advantage of the high-income supplement is that it provides
a much richer sample of high-income (and therefore potentially very
wealthy) families. However, the presence of a high-income supplement
creates some complications, because weights must be constructed to
meld the high-income supplement with the core sample.4
The principal wealth concept used here is marketable wealth (or
net worth), which is deﬁned as the current value of all marketable or
fungible assets less the current value of debts. Net worth is thus the difference in value between total assets and total liabilities or debt. Total
assets are deﬁned as the sum of
• the gross value of owner-occupied housing;
• other real estate owned by the household;
• cash and demand deposits;
• time and savings deposits, certiﬁcates of deposit, and money
market accounts;
• government bonds, corporate bonds, foreign bonds, and other
ﬁnancial securities;
• the cash surrender value of life insurance plans;
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• the cash surrender value of pension plans, including IRAs,
Keogh, and 401(k) plans;
• corporate stock and mutual funds;
• net equity in unincorporated businesses; and
• equity in trust funds.
Total liabilities are the sum of
• mortgage debt;
• consumer debt, including auto loans; and
• other debt.
This measure reﬂects wealth as a store of value and therefore a
source of potential consumption. I believe that this is the concept that
best reﬂects the level of well-being associated with a family’s holdings. Thus, only assets that can be readily converted to cash (that is,
those that are fungible) are included. As a result, consumer durables
such as automobiles, televisions, furniture, household appliances, and
the like are excluded here, since these items are not easily marketed,
with the possible exception of vehicles, or their resale value typically
far understates the value of their consumption services to the household. Another justiﬁcation for their exclusion is that this treatment is
consistent with the national accounts, where purchase of vehicles is
counted as expenditures, not savings. Also excluded here is the value of
future Social Security beneﬁts the family may receive upon retirement
(usually referred to as Social Security wealth), as well as the value of
DB pension beneﬁts from private pension plans (DB pension wealth).
In Chapters 4 and 5, we shall add these two components to standard
wealth to create a concept I call augmented wealth.
Another concept that we will make use of later on is housing wealth.
This is deﬁned as net home equity, the difference between the (gross)
market value of a home and its outstanding mortgage debt.
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MEDIAN WEALTH ROSE BRISKLY DURING THE 2000s
Table 2.1 documents a robust growth in wealth during the 1990s
(also see Figure 2.1). After rising 7 percent between 1983 and 1989,
median wealth (the wealth of a household in the middle of the distribution) was 16 percent greater in 2001 than in 1989. As a result, median
wealth grew slightly faster between 1989 and 2001, 1.3 percent per
year, than between 1983 and 1989, at 1.1 percent per year. However,
between 2001 and 2007, median wealth grew even faster, by 19 percent
overall or 2.9 percent per year. Most of the increase (63 percent) in
median net worth emanated from the pronounced rise in home prices.
Mean net worth also showed a sharp increase of 15 percent from
1983 to 1989 and then, buoyed largely by rising stock prices, surged
44 percent by 2001. There was an additional rise of 20 percent in 2007.
Overall, its 2007 value was almost double its value in 1983 and about
three quarters larger than in 1989. Mean wealth grew quite a bit faster
between 1989 and 2001 (3.0 percent per year) than between 1983 and
1989 (2.3 percent per year). There was then a slight increase in wealth
growth from 2001 to 2007 (3.1 percent per year). This modest acceleration was largely due to rapid increase in housing prices of 19 percent
Table 2.1 Mean and Median Household Wealth and Income, 1983–2007
(in thousands, 2007$)
Percentage change
1983– 1989– 2001– 1983–
Wealth concept 1983 1989 2001 2007
1989 2001 2007 2007
Net worth
Median
69.5 74.3 86.1 102.5
7.0 15.8 19.1 47.5
Mean
270.4 309.8 445.1 536.1
14.6 43.7 20.4 98.2
Incomea
Median
43.5 48.3 49.4 50.2
11.2
2.3
1.6 15.5
Mean
52.9 61.1 68.1 67.6
15.5 11.6 −0.8 27.9
Source for household income data: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Surveys.
Available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/
index.html (accessed April 2011).
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. Wealth
ﬁgures are deﬂated using the Consumer Price Index. See Appendix A for sources and
methods.

a
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Figure 2.1 Mean and Median Household Wealth, 1983–2007
(in thousands, 2007$)
600
Median

Mean

500

400

300

200

100

0
1983

1989

2001

2007

SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

in real terms over the six years, counterbalanced by a reduced growth
in stock prices between 2001–2007 and 1989–2001, and to the fact that
housing comprised 28 percent and (total) stocks made up 25 percent
of total assets in 2001. Another point of note is that mean wealth grew
about twice as fast as the median between 1983 and 2007, indicating
widening inequality of wealth over these years.
Median household income (based on Current Population Survey
[CPS] data), after gaining 11 percent between 1983 and 1989, grew
by only 2.3 percent (total) in 1989–2001 and by another 1.6 percent in
2001–2007, for a net change of 16 percent in 1983–2007. In contrast,
mean income rose by 16 percent from 1983 to 1989, by another 12 percent from 1989 to 2001, and then fell by 0.8 percent from 2001 to 2007,
for a total change of 28 percent from 1983 to 2007. Between 1983 and
2007, mean income grew about twice as fast as median income.
In sum, while household income virtually stagnated for the average
American household over the 1990s and 2000s, median net worth grew
strongly over this period. In the 2000s in particular, mean and median
income changed very little, while mean and median net worth grew
strongly.
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WEALTH INEQUALITY SHOWS LITTLE CHANGE OVER
THE EARLY AND MID-2000s
The ﬁgures in Table 2.2 also show that wealth inequality, after
rising steeply between 1983 and 1989, remained virtually unchanged
from 1989 to 2007. The share of wealth held by the top 1 percent rose
by 3.6 percentage points from 1983 to 1989, and the Gini coefﬁcient
increased from 0.80 to 0.83. Between 1989 and 2007, the share of the
top percentile actually declined sharply, from 37.4 to 34.6 percent,
though an increase in the share of the next four percentiles more than
compensated for the drop. As a result, the share of the top 5 percent
increased from 59.0 percent in 1989 to 61.9 percent in 2007, and the
share of the top quintile rose from 83.5 to 85.0 percent. The share of the
fourth and middle quintiles each declined by about a percentage point
from 1989 to 2007, while that of the bottom 40 percent increased by
almost one percentage point. Overall, the Gini coefﬁcient was virtually
unchanged—0.832 in 1989 and 0.834 in 2007.
The top 1 percent of families (as ranked by income on the basis of the
SCF data) earned 21 percent of total household income in 2006, and the
top 20 percent accounted for 61 percent—large ﬁgures but lower than
the corresponding wealth shares.5 The time trend for income inequality also contrasts with that of net worth. Income inequality increased
sharply between 1982 and 1988, with the Gini coefﬁcient rising from
0.48 to 0.52 and the share of the top one percent from 12.8 to 16.6
percent. There was again a pronounced increase in income inequality
between 1988 and 2000, with the share of the top 1 percent rising from
16.6 to 20.0 percent, that of the top quintile from 55.6 to 58.6 percent,
and the Gini coefﬁcient from 0.52 to 0.56.6
The years between 2000 and 2006 saw a slight abatement in the rise
of income inequality. Over these years, the Gini coefﬁcient for income
rose from 0.56 to 0.57, the share of the top 1 percent from 20.0 to 21.3
percent, and that of the top quintile from 15.2 to 15.9 percent. All in
all, the 2000s witnessed a moderate increase in income inequality and a
very slight rise in wealth inequality.7
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Table 2.2 The Size Distribution of Wealth and Income, 1983–2007
Percentage share of wealth or income held by:
Year
Net worth
1983
1989
2001
2007
Income
1982
1988
2000
2006

Gini
coefﬁcient

Top
1.0%

Next
4.0%

Next
5.0%

Next
10.0%

Top
20.0%

4th
20.0%

3rd
20.0%

Bottom
40.0%

All

0.799
0.832
0.826
0.834

33.8
37.4
33.4
34.6

22.3
21.6
25.8
27.3

12.1
11.6
12.3
11.2

13.1
13.0
12.9
12.0

81.3
83.5
84.4
85.0

12.6
12.3
11.3
10.9

5.2
4.8
3.9
4.0

0.9
−0.7
0.3
0.2

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

0.480
0.521
0.562
0.574

12.8
16.6
20.0
21.3

13.3
13.3
15.2
15.9

10.3
10.4
10.0
9.9

15.5
15.2
13.5
14.3

51.9
55.6
58.6
61.4

21.6
20.6
19.0
17.8

14.2
13.2
12.3
11.1

12.3
10.7
10.1
9.6

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

NOTE: For the computation of percentile shares of net worth, households are ranked according to their net worth; and for percentile shares
of income, households are ranked according to their income. Totals may not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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HOUSEHOLD PORTFOLIOS SHOW A PRONOUNCED SHIFT
INTO DC PENSION ACCOUNTS
The portfolio composition of household wealth shows the forms in
which households save. This aspect is important when we try to understand how wealth changes over time and the exposure of household
wealth to asset price changes.
In 2007, owner-occupied housing was the most important household asset in the breakdown shown in Table 2.3, accounting for 33 percent of total assets. However, net home equity—the value of the house
minus any outstanding mortgage—amounted to only 21 percent of total
assets. Real estate, other than owner-occupied housing, comprised 11
percent, and business equity another 20 percent.
Demand deposits, time deposits, money market funds, CDs, and the
cash surrender value of life insurance made up 7 percent and pension
accounts 12 percent. Bonds and other ﬁnancial securities amounted to
2 percent; corporate stock, including mutual funds, to 12 percent; and
trust equity to 2 percent. Debt as a proportion of gross assets was 15
percent, and the debt-equity ratio (the ratio of total household debt to
net worth) was 18 percent.
There have been some notable changes in the composition of
household wealth over the period 1983–2007. From the point of view
of this work, the most important is the pronounced growth of DC pension accounts, which rose moderately from 1.5 percent of total assets
in 1983 to 2.9 percent in 1989 and then shot up to 12 percent in 2001,
where they remained in 2007. This increase largely offset the decline
in the share of liquid assets in total assets, from 17 percent in 1983 to 7
percent in 2007, so it is reasonable to conclude that households have to
a large extent substituted tax-deferred DC pension accounts for taxable
savings deposits.
A second notable change is that the share of (gross) housing wealth
in total assets, after ﬂuctuating between 28 and 30 percent from 1983
to 2001, jumped to 33 percent in 2007. There were two factors behind
this. The ﬁrst was the rise in the homeownership rate, which, according
to the SCF data, climbed from 63 percent in 1983 to 69 percent in 2007.
The second was the sharp rise in housing prices, noted above. Between
2001 and 2004, the median house price for existing one-family homes
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Table 2.3 Composition of Total Household Wealth, 1983–2007
(percentage of gross assets)
1983
1989
2001
Wealth component
Principal residence (gross value)
30.1
30.2
28.2
a
Other real estate (gross value)
14.9
14.0
9.8
Unincorporated business equityb
18.8
17.2
17.2
Liquid assetsc
17.4
17.5
8.8
Pension accountsd
1.5
2.9
12.3
Financial securitiese
4.2
3.4
2.3
Corporate stock and mutual funds
9.0
6.9
14.8
Net equity in personal trusts
2.6
3.1
4.8
Miscellaneous assetsf
1.3
4.9
1.8
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
Debt
Debt on principal residence
6.3
8.6
9.4
All other debtg
6.8
6.4
3.1
Total debt
13.1
15.0
12.5
Selected ratios in percent
Debt/equity ratio
15.1
17.6
14.3
Debt/income ratio
68.4
87.6
81.1
Net home equity/total assetsh
23.8
21.6
18.8
Principal residence debt/house value
20.9
28.6
33.4
Stocks, directly or indirectly owned/
11.3
10.2
24.5
total assetsi

2007
32.8
11.3
20.1
6.6
12.1
1.5
11.8
2.3
1.7
100.0
11.4
3.9
15.3
18.1
118.7
21.4
34.9
16.8

NOTE: Totals may not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.
a
In 2001 and 2007 this equals the gross value of other residential real estate plus the net
equity in nonresidential real estate.
b
Net equity in unincorporated farm and nonfarm businesses and closely held corporations.
c
Checking accounts, savings accounts, time deposits, money market funds, certiﬁcates of
deposit, and the cash surrender value of life insurance.
d
IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, the accumulated value of deﬁned contribution pension
plans, and other retirement accounts.
e
Corporate bonds, government bonds (including savings bonds), open-market paper, and
notes.
f
Gold and other precious metals, royalties, jewelry, antiques, furs, loans to friends and
relatives, future contracts, and miscellaneous assets.
g
Mortgage debt on all real property except principal residence; credit card, installment,
and other consumer debt.
h
Ratio of gross value of principal residence less mortgage debt on principal residence to
total assets.
i
Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual funds,
trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, and other retirement accounts.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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rose by 19 percent in real terms. The rise in housing prices by itself
would have caused the share of housing in total assets to rise by 5.3
percentage points, compared to the actual increase of 4.6 percentage
points.
A third and related trend is that net equity in owner-occupied housing (the difference between the market value and outstanding mortgages on the property), after falling from 24 percent in 1983 to 19 percent in 2001, picked up to 21 percent in 2007. The difference between
the two series (gross versus net housing values as a share of total assets)
is attributable to the changing magnitude of mortgage debt on homeowners’ property, which increased from 21 percent in 1983 to 35 percent in 2007. Moreover, mortgage debt on a principal residence climbed
from 9.4 to 11.4 percent of total assets between 2001 and 2007. The
fact that net home equity as a proportion of assets increased during that
period reﬂected the strong gains in real estate values over these years.
Fourth, the debt-equity ratio fell slightly, from 15 percent in 1983
to 14 percent in 2001; however, it then jumped to 18 percent in 2007.
In contrast, the ratio of debt to total income increased from 68 percent
in 1983 to 81 percent in 2001 and then skyrocketed to 119 percent in
2007, its high for this period. If mortgage debt on principal residence
is excluded, then the ratio of other debt to total assets fell off from 6.8
percent in 1983 to 3.9 percent in 2007. One implication is that over
the 1990s and 2000s, families used tax-sheltered mortgages and home
equity loans rather than consumer loans and other forms of consumer
debt to ﬁnance consumption.
Fifth, the share of corporate stock and mutual funds in total assets
rose rather briskly, from 9 percent in 1983 to 15 percent in 2001, before
plummeting to 12 percent in 2007. If we include the value of stocks
indirectly owned through mutual funds, trusts, IRAs, 401(k) plans, and
other retirement accounts, then the value of total stocks owned as a
share of total assets more than doubled, from 11 percent in 1983 to 25
percent in 2001, and then tumbled to 17 percent in 2007. The rise during the 1990s reﬂected the bull market in corporate equities as well as
increased stock ownership, while the decline in the 2000s was a result
of the relatively small rise in the stock market over this period (particularly relative to housing prices), as well as a drop in stock ownership (see Table 2.10a). The change in stock prices by itself would have
caused the share of stocks in total assets to rise by 1.4 percentage points
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between 2001 and 2007, compared to the actual decline of 7.6 percentage points. The decline in the share of stocks in total assets was due to
sales of stocks and withdrawals from stock funds.

PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION BY WEALTH CLASS
Table 2.3 provides a picture of the average holdings of all families
in the economy, but there are marked class differences in how middleclass families and the rich invest their wealth. These differences in
portfolio composition are important because they affect how wealth
changes over time for different parts of the wealth distribution and thus
how overall wealth inequality develops.
As shown in Table 2.4, the richest 1 percent of households (as ranked
by wealth) invested over three-quarters of their savings in investment
real estate, businesses, corporate stock, and ﬁnancial securities in 2007.
Corporate stocks, either directly owned by the households or indirectly owned through mutual funds, trust accounts, or various pension
accounts, comprised 21 percent by themselves. Housing accounted for
only 10 percent of their wealth (and net equity in housing only 9 percent), liquid assets another 5 percent, and pension accounts another 6
percent. Their ratio of debt to net worth was only 3 percent, their ratio
of debt to income was 39 percent, and the ratio of mortgage debt to
house value was 15 percent.
Among the next richest 19 percent of U.S. households, housing
comprised 32 percent of their total assets (and net home equity 24 percent), liquid assets another 7 percent, and pension assets 16 percent.
Forty-four percent of their assets took the form of investment assets—
real estate, business equity, stocks, and bonds—and 19 percent was in
the form of stocks directly or indirectly owned. Debt amounted to 12
percent of their net worth and 110 percent of their income, and the ratio
of mortgage debt to house value was 26 percent.
In contrast, almost two-thirds of the wealth of the middle three
wealth quintiles of households was invested in their own home in 2007.
However, home equity amounted to only 35 percent of total assets,
a reﬂection of their large mortgage debt. Another 21 percent went
into monetary savings of one form or another and pension accounts.
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Table 2.4 Composition of Household Wealth by Wealth Class, 2007
(percent of gross assets)
All
Middle
households Top 1% Next 19% 3 quintiles
Asset
Principal residence
32.8
10.2
31.8
65.1
Liquid assets (bank deposits,
6.6
4.5
7.3
7.8
money market funds, and
cash surrender value of
life insurance)
Pension accounts
12.1
5.8
15.9
12.9
Corporate stock, ﬁnancial
15.5
25.2
15.0
3.6
securities, mutual funds,
and personal trusts
Unincorporated business
31.3
52.3
28.5
9.3
equity, other real estate
Miscellaneous assets
1.7
2.0
1.6
1.3
Total assets
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Selected ratios (%)
Debt/equity ratio
18.1
2.8
12.1
61.1
Debt/income ratio
118.7
39.4
109.8
156.7
Net home equity/total assetsa
21.4
8.7
23.6
34.8
Principal residence debt/
34.9
15.2
25.6
46.6
house value
All stocks/total assetsb
16.8
21.4
18.6
7.0
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into wealth class according to their net worth. Brackets
for 2007 are as follows:
• Top 1%: Net worth of $8,232,000 or more.
• Next 19%: Net worth between $473,000 and $8,232,000.
• Quintiles 2–4: Net worth between $200 and $473,000.
a
Ratio of gross value of principal residence less mortgage debt on principal residence to
total assets.
b
Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual funds,
trusts, and IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, and other retirement accounts.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF.
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Together, housing, liquid assets, and pension assets accounted for 86
percent of the total assets of the middle class. The remainder was about
evenly split among nonhome real estate, business equity, and various
ﬁnancial securities and corporate stock. Stocks directly or indirectly
owned amounted to only 7 percent of their total assets. The ratio of debt
to net worth was 61 percent, substantially higher than for the richest 20
percent, and their ratio of debt to income was 157 percent, also much
higher than for the top quintile. Finally, their mortgage debt amounted
to almost half the value of their principal residences.
The rather staggering debt level of the middle class in 2007 raises
the question of whether this accumulation of debt is a recent phenomenon or whether it has been going on for some time. The overall debtequity ratio in 2007 was only slightly above its level in 1989, while the
overall debt-income ratio has generally trended upward since 1983 and
actually took a big jump from 2001 to 2007.
Table 2.5 compares the wealth composition of the three wealth
classes in 1983 and 2007. There is remarkable stability in the composition of wealth by wealth class between 1983 and 2007. The most notable
exception is a substitution of pension assets for liquid assets—a transition that occurred for all three wealth classes but that was particularly
marked for percentiles 81–99 and for the middle three quintiles. The
debt-equity ratio actually fell for the top 1 percent from 1983 and 2007,
as did the debt-income ratio. The debt-income ratio increased slightly
for the next 19 percent, while the debt-income ratio rose sharply, from
73 to 110 percent.
Among the middle three wealth quintiles, pension accounts rose
as a share of total assets by almost 12 percentage points (and the proportion of households with a pension account surged by 41 percentage
points) from 1983 to 2007, while liquid assets declined as a share by 14
percentage points. This set of changes paralleled that of all households.
The share of all stocks in total assets mushroomed from 2.4 percent in
1983 to 13 percent in 2001, and then fell off to 7 percent in 2007 as
stock prices stagnated.
Changes in debt, however, were much more dramatic. There was a
sharp rise in the debt-equity ratio of the middle class, from 37 percent
in 1983 to 61 percent in 2007. The rise was much steeper than at the
aggregate level. The debt-income ratio skyrocketed over this period,
more than doubling. Here, too, much of the increase happened between
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Table 2.5 Composition of Household Wealth by Wealth Class, 1983 and
2007 (percent of gross assets)
Middle 3
Top 1%
Next 19%
quintiles
Component
1983 2007
1983 2007
1983 2007
Principal residence
8.1 10.2
29.1 31.8
61.6 65.1
Liquid assets (bank deposits, 8.5
4.5
21.4
7.3
21.4
7.8
money market funds, and
cash surrender value of
life insurance)
Pension accounts
0.9
5.8
2.0 15.9
1.2 12.9
Corporate stock, ﬁnancial
29.5 25.2
13.0 15.0
3.1
3.6
securities, mutual funds,
and personal trusts
Unincorporated business
52.0 52.3
32.8 28.5
11.4
9.3
equity, other real estate
Miscellaneous assets
1.0
2.0
1.6
1.6
1.3
1.3
Total assets
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Debt/equity ratio
Debt/income ratio

5.9
86.8

2.8
39.4

10.9 12.1
72.8 109.8

37.4 61.1
66.9 156.7

NOTE: Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983 and 2007 SCF.

2001 and 2007. Moreover, the increase was much steeper than in the
aggregate. In fact, in 1983, the debt-income ratio was about the same
for middle-class as for all households, but by 2007 the ratio was much
larger. As for all households, net home equity as a percentage of total
assets fell for the middle class from 1983 to 2007, and mortgage debt as
a proportion of house value rose. Middle-class households were using
their homes as a virtual ATM, withdrawing equity to sustain their normal consumption.
The rising indebtedness of the middle class, particularly in the form
of mortgage debt, made it very vulnerable to the home price collapse
of 2007–2009. As we shall see below, there was a large reduction in
median wealth over this period, as well as a substantial increase in the
share of homeowners whose mortgage debt was greater than their home
values (so-called underwater mortgages). Though the rich were more
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heavily invested in stocks than the middle class, stocks did not constitute nearly as high a percentage of their wealth as homes did for the
middle class, and the stock market meltdown of 2007–2009 did not hurt
the rich as much as the home price collapse hurt the middle class.

THE RACIAL DIVIDE REMAINS LARGELY UNCHANGED
OVER TIME
Striking differences are found in the wealth holdings of different
racial and ethnic groups. In Tables 2.6 and 2.7, households are divided
into three groups: 1) non-Hispanic whites, 2) non-Hispanic African
Americans, and 3) Hispanics.8 In 2007, while the ratio of mean incomes
between (non-Hispanic) white and (non-Hispanic) black households
was an already-low 0.48 and the ratio of median incomes was 0.60, the
ratios of mean and median wealth holdings were even lower, at 0.19 and
0.06, respectively.9 The homeownership rate for black households was
49 percent in 2007, a little less than two-thirds the rate among whites,
and the percentage of black households with zero or negative net worth
stood at 33.4, more than double the corresponding percentage among
whites.
Between 1982 and 2006, while the average real income of nonHispanic white households increased by 42 percent and the median by
10 percent, the former rose by only 28 percent for non-Hispanic black
households but the latter by 18 percent. As a result, the ratio of mean
income slipped from 0.54 in 1982 to 0.48 in 2006, while the ratio of
median income rose from 0.56 to 0.60.
Between 1983 and 2001, average net worth (in 2001 dollars) rose
by a whopping 73 percent for whites but only by 31 percent for black
households, so that the net worth ratio fell from 0.19 to 0.14. Most of
the slippage occurred between 1989 and 2001, when white net worth
surged by a spectacular 46 percent and black net worth advanced by
only a respectable 24 percent. Indeed, mean net worth growth among
black households was actually much higher in the 1989–2001 years
than in the years from 1983 to 1989 (only a 5 percent gain). The difference in the 1989–2001 period was the huge increase in household
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Table 2.6 Household Income and Wealth by Race, 1983–2007
(in thousands, 2007$)
Means
Medians
NonNonNonHispanic
NonHispanic
Hispanic African
Hispanic African
Year
whites Americans Ratio
whites Americans
Income
1982
64.8
34.9
0.54
45.6
25.4
1988
71.0
31.6
0.45
47.3
17.9
2000
88.9
43.0
0.48
51.5
29.3
2006
92.3
44.6
0.48
50.0
30.0
Net worth
1983
316.0
59.5
0.19
91.0
6.1
1989
373.9
62.7
0.17
108.1
2.8
2001
545.3
77.7
0.14
124.6
12.5
2007
652.1
122.7
0.19
143.6
9.3
Homeownership rate (%)
1983
68.1
44.3
0.65
1989
69.3
41.7
0.60
2001
74.1
47.4
0.64
2007
74.8
48.6
0.65

Ratio
0.56
0.38
0.57
0.60
0.07
0.03
0.10
0.06

NOTE: Households are divided into four racial/ethnic groups: 1) non-Hispanic whites,
2) non-Hispanic blacks, 3) Hispanics, and 4) American Indians, Asians, and others.
For 1995, 1998, and 2001, the classiﬁcation scheme does not explicitly indicate nonHispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks for the ﬁrst two categories, so some Hispanics may have classiﬁed themselves as either whites or blacks.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

wealth among white households. However, between 2001 and 2007,
mean net worth among black households gained an astounding 58 percent while white wealth advanced only 29 percent, so that by 2007 the
net worth ratio was back to 0.19, the same level as in 1983.
It is not clear how much of the sharp increase in the racial wealth
gap between 1989 and 2001 and the turnaround between 2001 and 2007
is due to actual wealth changes in the African American community and
how much is due to sampling variability (since the sample sizes of nonHispanic African Americans are relatively small in all years). However,
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Table 2.7 Family Income and Wealth for Non-Hispanic Whites and
Hispanics, 1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
Means
Medians
NonNonHispanic
Hispanic
Year
whites Hispanics Ratio
whites Hispanics Ratio
Income
1982
64.8
39.2
0.60
45.6
30.2
0.66
1988
71.0
32.4
0.46
47.3
22.7
0.48
2000
88.9
44.0
0.50
51.5
28.1
0.55
2006
92.3
46.4
0.50
50.0
35.0
0.70
Net worth
1983
316.0
51.4
0.16
91.0
3.5
0.04
1989
373.9
61.5
0.16
108.1
2.3
0.02
2001
545.3
93.8
0.17
124.6
3.5
0.03
2007
652.1
170.4
0.26
143.6
9.1
0.06
Homeownership rate (%)
1983
68.1
32.6
0.48
1989
69.3
39.8
0.57
2001
74.1
44.3
0.60
2007
74.8
49.2
0.66
NOTE: Households are divided into four racial/ethnic groups: 1) non-Hispanic whites,
2) non-Hispanic blacks, 3) Hispanics, and 4) American Indians, Asians, and others.
For 1995, 1998, and 2001, the classiﬁcation scheme does not explicitly indicate nonHispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks for the ﬁrst two categories, so some Hispanics may have classiﬁed themselves as either whites or blacks.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

one salient difference between the two groups is the much higher share
that stocks constituted in the white portfolio and the much higher share
that homes constituted in the portfolio of black households. In 2001, the
gross value of principal residences formed 46 percent of the gross assets
of black households and only 27 percent that of white households, while
(total) stocks were 25 percent of the total assets of whites and only 15
percent that of black households.10 Moreover, while the debt-to-asset
ratio was higher for black than white households in 2001 (0.32 versus 0.12), the ratio among black households rose to 0.36 in 2007. For
whites the debt-to-asset ratio increased slightly, to 0.13, in 2007.
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In the case of median wealth, the black-white ratio ﬁrst increased
from 7 to 10 percent between 1983 and 2001 but then slipped to 6 percent in 2007. In this case, median wealth for white households grew by
15 percent between 2001 and 2004 but median wealth dropped by 26
percent among black households, reﬂecting in part the rising share of
black households with zero or negative net worth.
The homeownership rate of black households grew from 44 to 47
percent between 1983 and 2001, but, relative to white households, the
homeownership rate fell off a bit, from a ratio of 0.65 in 1983 to 0.64
in 2001. The change over these years primarily reﬂected a big jump—6
percentage points—in the white homeownership rate. However, from
2001 to 2007, the black homeownership rate gained 1.2 percentage
points and the white homeownership rate 0.7 percentage points, so by
2007 the homeownership rate ratio had recovered a bit, to 0.65.
The picture is somewhat different for Hispanics (see Table 2.7).
The ratio of mean income between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites
in 2007 was 0.50, almost the same as that between African American
and white households. However, the ratio of median income was 0.70,
much higher than the 0.60 ratio between black and white households.
The ratio of mean net worth was 0.26, compared to a ratio of 0.19
between blacks and whites. However, the ratio of medians was 0.06,
almost identical to the ratio between blacks and whites. The Hispanic
homeownership rate was 49 percent, almost identical to that of nonHispanic black households.
Developments among Hispanic households over the period from
1983 to 2007 were generally a positive story. Mean household income
for Hispanics grew by 18 percent and median household income by 16
percent, so that while the ratio of mean income between Hispanics and
non-Hispanic whites slid from 60 to 50 percent, that of median income
advanced from 66 to 70 percent. In fact, from 2001 to 2007 median
income for Hispanics grew by an astonishing 25 percent while that for
non-Hispanic whites declined by 3 percent.
Between 1983 and 2001, mean wealth almost doubled for Hispanic
households, and the ratio of mean net worth between Hispanics and
non-Hispanic whites improved slightly, from 16 percent in 1983 to 17
percent in 2001. However, from 2001 to 2007, mean net worth among
Hispanics climbed by another 82 percent, while that of whites gained
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20 percent, so the corresponding wealth ratio advanced to 26 percent,
quite a bit higher than that between black and white households.
On the other hand, from 1983 to 2007, median wealth among Hispanics remained extremely low and largely unchanged, so the ratio of
median wealth between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites stayed virtually the same. The homeownership rate among Hispanic households
climbed from 33 to 44 percent between 1983 and 2001, and the ratio
of homeownership rates between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites
likewise rose from 0.48 to 0.60. Between 2001 and 2007, the Hispanic
homeownership rate rose once again, to 49 percent, about the same as
for black households, and the homeownership ratio surged to 0.66.
Despite some progress from 2001 to 2007, the respective wealth
gaps between blacks and whites and between Hispanics and nonHispanic whites were still much greater than the corresponding income
gaps in 2007. While mean income ratios were on the order of 50 percent, mean wealth ratios were on the order of 20 to 25 percent. While
blacks and Hispanics were left out of the wealth surge of the years 1989
to 2001 because of relatively low stock ownership (see the subsequent
section on stock ownership), they actually beneﬁted from this (and the
relatively high share of houses in their portfolio) in the 2001–2007
period.11

WEALTH SHIFTS FROM THE YOUNG TO THE OLD
As shown in Table 2.8, the cross-sectional age-wealth proﬁles of
1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 generally follow the predicted hump-shaped
pattern of the life-cycle model (see, for example, Modigliani [1954]).
Mean wealth increases with age up through age 65 or so and then falls
off (see Figure 2.2). Homeownership rates also have a similar proﬁle,
though the falloff after the peak age is much more attenuated than for
the wealth numbers. In 2007, the wealth of elderly households (age 65
and over) averaged 75 percent higher than that of the nonelderly, and
their homeownership rate was 21 percentage points higher.
Despite the apparent similarity in the proﬁles, there have been notable shifts in the relative wealth holdings of age groups between 1983
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Table 2.8 Age-Wealth Proﬁles and Homeownership Rates by Age,
1983–2007
Age
1983
1989
2001
2007
Mean net worth (ratio to overall mean)
Overall
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Under 35
0.21
0.29
0.19
0.17
35–44
0.71
0.72
0.64
0.58
45–54
1.53
1.50
1.25
1.19
55–64
1.67
1.58
1.86
1.69
65–74
1.93
1.61
1.72
1.86
75+
1.05
1.26
1.20
1.16
Homeownership rate (%)
Overall
63.4
62.8
67.7
68.6
Under 35
38.7
36.3
40.2
40.8
35–44
68.4
64.1
67.6
66.1
45–54
78.2
75.1
76.1
77.3
55–64
77.0
79.2
83.2
80.9
65–74
78.3
78.1
82.5
85.5
75+
69.4
70.2
76.2
77.0
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed according to the age of the householder.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

and 2007. The relative wealth of the youngest age group, under 35,
expanded from 21 percent of the overall mean in 1983 to 29 percent
in 1989 but then collapsed to only 17 percent in 2007. In 2007, the
mean wealth of the youngest age group was $91,200, which was only
slightly more than the mean wealth of this age group in 1989 ($88,500).
The mean net worth of the next-youngest age group, 35–44, relative
to the overall mean showed a slight increase from 1983 to 1989 and
then tumbled from 0.72 in 1989 to 0.58 in 2007. The relative wealth
of the third-youngest age group, 45–54, also declined rather steadily
over time, from 1.53 in 1983 to 1.19 in 2007. The relative wealth of
age group 55–64, after falling between 1983 and 1989, advanced from
1.58 in 1989 to 1.69 in 2007. The relative net worth of age group 65–74
plummeted from 1.93 in 1983 to 1.61 in 1989 but then regained most
of the lost ground, reaching 1.86 in 2007. The wealth of the oldest age
group, aged 75 and over, advanced from a ratio of 1.05 in 1983 to 1.16
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Figure 2.2 Age-Wealth Proﬁles, 2007 (ratio to overall mean wealth by
age group)
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.4
Ratio

1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Under 35

35–44

45–54

55–64

65–74

75+

Age group

SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF.

in 2007. At least over the period from 1989 to 2007, there was a clear
shift in relative wealth holdings away from younger households (under
age 55) and toward those in age group 55–64.
Changes in homeownership rates tend to mirror these trends. While
the overall ownership rate increased by 5.2 percentage points, from 63.4
to 68.6 percent, between 1983 and 2007, the share of households in the
youngest age group owning their own home increased by only 2.1 percentage points. The homeownership rate of households between ages
35 and 44 actually fell by 2.3 percentage points, and that of age group
45–54 declined by 0.9 percentage points. Big gains in homeownership
were recorded by the older age groups: 3.9 percentage points for age
group 55–64, 7.1 percentage points for age group 65–74, and 7.6 percentage points for the oldest age group. By 2007, homeownership rates
rose monotonically with age up to age group 65–74 and then dropped
for the oldest age group. The statistics point to a relative shifting of
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homeownership away from younger toward older households between
1983 and 2007.
Changes in the relative wealth position of different age groups
depend in large measure on differences in asset composition and relative asset price movements. The latter are highlighted in Table 2.9 for
the year 2007. The gross value of the principal residence comprised
over half the value of total assets for age group 35 and under, and its
share of total assets fell off with age to about a quarter for age group
55–64 and then rose to 30 percent for age group 75 and over. Liquid
assets as a share of total assets remained relatively ﬂat with age group
at around 6 percent except for the oldest group, for whom it was 11 percent, perhaps reﬂecting the relative ﬁnancial conservativeness of older
people. Pension accounts as a share of total assets rose from 4 percent
for the youngest group to 16 percent for age group 55–64 and then fell
off to 5 percent for the oldest age group. This pattern likely reﬂects the
buildup of retirement assets until retirement age and then a decline as
these retirement assets are liquidated.12 Corporate stock and ﬁnancial
securities showed a steady rise with age, from a 4 percent share for the
youngest group to a 26 percent share for the oldest. A similar pattern
was evident for total stocks as a percentage of all assets. Unincorporated business equity and nonhome real estate was relatively ﬂat as a
share of total assets with age, at about 30 percent.
There was a pronounced falloff of debt with age. The debt-to-equity
ratio declined from 93 percent for the youngest group to 2 percent for
the oldest, the debt-income ratio from 168 percent to 30 percent, and
principal residence debt as a share of house value from 65 to 5 percent.
As a result of the latter, net home equity as a proportion of total assets
rose from 19 to 29 percent from the youngest to the oldest age group.
Younger households were thus more heavily invested in homes and
more heavily in debt, whereas the portfolio of older households was
more heavily skewed to ﬁnancial assets, particularly corporate stock.
As a result, younger households beneﬁt relatively when housing prices
rise and inﬂation is strong, while older households beneﬁt relatively
from rising stock prices. Conversely, younger households were much
more exposed to the home price collapse of 2007–2008 than older ones,
while older households were more vulnerable to the stock market crisis
of 2007–2009 than younger ones. Changes in the relative net worth
position of age groups over the 1983–2007 period were thus largely due
to these relative asset price movements.
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Table 2.9 Composition of Household Wealth by Age Class, 2007 (percentage of gross assets)
All
Under 35 35–44
45–54
55–64
Asset
Principal residence
32.8
54.3
43.7
33.8
25.6
Liquid assets (bank deposits, money market
6.6
5.7
5.4
6.4
6.3
funds, and cash surrender value of life
insurance)
Pension accounts
12.1
6.0
10.7
13.0
15.8
Corporate stock, ﬁnancial securities, mutual
15.5
4.2
8.6
13.1
16.4
funds, and personal trusts
Unincorporated business equity, other real
31.3
28.7
30.1
32.0
34.4
estate
Miscellaneous assets
1.7
1.2
1.5
1.7
1.5
Total assets
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Selected ratios (%)
Debt/equity ratio
18.1
92.7
41.3
20.2
11.9
Debt/income ratio
118.7
167.5
156.5
118.2
100.0
Net home equity/total assetsa
21.4
18.8
21.3
20.9
18.1
Principal residence debt/house value
34.9
65.4
51.4
38.3
29.2
All stocks/total assetsb
16.8
5.9
11.2
15.1
19.4

65–74

75+

28.2
6.1

30.2
10.5

12.9
20.5

5.0
25.6

30.2

27.1

2.1
100.0

1.6
100.0

7.1
79.7
23.4
16.9
21.5

2.1
29.9
28.7
4.9
20.0
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NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age class according to the age of the household head. Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding.
a
Ratio of gross value of principal residence less mortgage debt on principal residence to total assets.
b
Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual funds, trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, and
other retirement accounts.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF.
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STOCK OWNERSHIP FIRST RISES AND THEN FALLS
Table 2.10a reports on overall stock ownership trends from 1989 to
2007.13 The years 1989–2001 saw a substantial increase in stock ownership. The share of households with direct ownership of stock climbed
from 13 percent in 1989 to 21 percent in 2001, while the share with
some stock owned either outright or indirectly through mutual funds,
trusts, or various pension accounts surged from 32 to 52 percent. Much
of the increase was fueled by the growth in pension accounts like
IRAs, Keogh plans, and 401(k) plans (see Chapter 4 for more details
on this). Between 1989 and 2001, the share of households owning
stock through a pension account more than doubled, accounting for the
bulk of the overall increase in stock ownership. Indirect ownership of
stocks through mutual funds also greatly expanded over the 1989–2001
period, from 6 to 17 percent, as did indirect ownership through trust
funds, from 1.6 to 5.1 percent. All told, the share of households with
indirect ownership of stocks doubled, from 24 percent in 1989 to 48
percent in 2001.
In contrast, the next six years, 2001–2007, saw a retrenchment in
stock ownership. This trend probably reﬂected the sharp drop in the
stock market from 2000 to 2001, its rather anemic recovery through
2004, and its modest rebound from 2004 to 2007. Direct stock ownership
plummeted from 21 percent in 2001 to 18 percent. Indirect stock ownership fell by 3.3 percentage points from 2001 to 2007. This decrease
was largely due to a sharp decline in stock ownership through mutual
funds (down by 6 percentage points). Stock ownership through pension
accounts was down by 1.2 percentage points from 2001 to 2007.
By 2007 the share of households who owned stock directly or indirectly dipped below half, down to 49 percent from its peak of 52 percent
in 2001. Moreover, many of these families had only a minor stake in the
stock market in 2007: only 35 percent owned total stock holdings worth
$5,000 (in 1995 dollars) or more, down from 40 percent in 2001; only
30 percent owned $10,000 or more of stock, down from 35 percent in
2001; and only 22 percent owned $25,000 or more of stock, down from
27 percent six years earlier.
Direct plus indirect ownership of stocks as a percentage of total
household assets more than doubled, increasing from 10 in 1989 to 25
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Table 2.10a Stock Ownership, 1989, 2001, and 2007 (percentage of
households holding stocks)
Stock type
1989
2001
2007
Direct stock holdings only
13.1
21.3
17.9
Indirect stock holdings only
23.5
47.7
44.4
Through mutual funds
5.9
16.7
10.6
Through pension accounts
19.5
41.4
40.2
Through trust funds
1.6
5.1
4.1
a
All stock holdings
Any holdings
31.7
51.9
49.1
Stock worth $5,000 or moreb
22.6
40.1
34.6
Stock worth $10,000 or moreb
18.5
35.1
29.6
b
Stock worth $25,000 or more
10.5
27.1
22.1
Direct plus indirect stocks as a
10.2
24.5
16.8
percentage of total assets
Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual
funds, trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, and other retirement accounts.
b
1995 dollars.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
a

in 2001. This increase may reﬂect in large measure the 171 percent
surge in stock prices over these years. However, between 2001 and
2007, the share plummeted to 17 percent. This change is a result not
only of the relative stagnation of the stock market over these years but
also of the withdrawal of many families from the stock market.
Table 2.10b shows the distribution of total stocks owned, by vehicle of ownership. Here there are very marked time trends. Direct stock
holdings as a share of total stock holdings fell almost continuously over
time, from 54 percent in 1989 to 37 percent in 2007. In contrast, stock
held in mutual funds as a share of total stock rose almost continuously
over time, from 9 percent in 1983 to 21 percent in 2007, while that held
in trust funds declined by 6 percentage points.
The most interesting pattern is with regard to stock held in DC pension accounts (including IRAs). Its share of total stocks ﬁrst increased
from 24 percent in 1989 to 34 percent in 2001 but then fell off to 31 percent in 2007. The trend from 2001 to 2007 seems to reﬂect a substitution
of stock holdings in mutual funds for those in pension plans as investors
looked for safer retirement accounts (see below). Likewise, the share of
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Table 2.10b Distribution of Stock Ownership by Asset Type, 1989–2007
(percentage of total stock held in each asset type)
Stock type
Direct stock holdings
Indirect stock holdings only
Through mutual funds
Through pension accounts
Through trust funds
Stocks held in pension accounts/
total value of pension accounts

1989
54.0
46.0
8.5
24.4
13.2
32.6

2001
38.5
61.5
16.0
33.5
12.0
66.3

2007
37.1
62.9
21.3
31.4
7.2
43.6

1989–
2007
−16.9
16.9
12.8
7.0
−6.0
11.1

Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual
funds, trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, and other retirement accounts.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

a

the total value of pension plans held as stock doubled between 1989 and
2001, from 33 to 66 percent, and then plummeted to 44 percent in 2007.
The sharp tail-off in stock ownership in pension plans after 2001 likely
reﬂects both the lethargic performance of the stock market over this
period and the search for more secure investments among plan holders.
Stock ownership is also highly skewed by wealth and income class.
As shown in Table 2.11a, 93 percent of the very rich (the top 1 percent)
reported owning stock either directly or indirectly in 2007, compared
to 48 percent of the middle quintile and 16 percent of the poorest 20
percent. While 88 percent of the very rich also reported stocks worth
$10,000 or more, only 22 percent of the middle quintile and 2 percent
of the bottom quintile did so. The top 1 percent of households owned 38
percent of all stocks, the top 5 percent 69 percent, the top 10 percent 81
percent, and the top quintile over 90 percent.
Stock ownership also tails off by income class (see Table 2.11b).
Whereas 94 percent of households in the top 3.6 percent of income
recipients (those who earned $250,000 or more) owned stock in 2007,
39 percent of the middle class (incomes between $25,000 and $50,000),
23 percent of the lower middle class (incomes between $15,000 and
$25,000), and only 11 percent of poor households (income under
$15,000) reported stock ownership. The comparable ownership ﬁgures
for stock holdings of $10,000 or more are 91 percent for the top income
class, 19 percent for the middle class, 12 percent for the lower middle
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class, and 4 percent for the poor. Moreover, 84 percent of all stocks were
owned by households earning $75,000 or more (the top 30 percent) and
92 percent by those earning $50,000 or more in terms of income.
Another notable development in the 2000s was an increase in the
concentration of stock ownership, as shown in the last column of Tables
2.11a–b. The share of total stock owned by the richest 1 percent in terms
of wealth increased from 34 percent in 2001 to 38 percent in 2007, and
that of the richest 5 percent from 62 to 69 percent. In terms of income,
the share of total stock owned by the top income class jumped from 41
to 54 percent (though it should be noted the top income class’s share
of total households also rose, from 2.7 to 3.6 percent) and that of the
top two income classes from 69 to 75 percent. One result of the stock
market bust of the early 2000s was a withdrawal from the market by
middle-class families.
Thus, in terms of wealth or income, substantial stock holdings have
still not penetrated much beyond the reach of the rich and the upper
middle class. The big winners from the stock market boom of the late
1990s (as well as the big losers in the early 2000s) were these groups,
while the middle class and the poor did not see sizable beneﬁts from
the bull market (or losses when the stock market tanked in 2000–2002).
It is also apparent which groups were most exposed to the 2007–2009
stock market crash.

AN UPDATE TO 2009
A complete update of the wealth ﬁgures to 2009 is beyond the scope
of the present study. However, it is possible to provide a partial update
of the wealth ﬁgures to July 1, 2009, based on two notable developments. The ﬁrst is that house prices fell by 24 percent in real terms, and
the second is that the S&P 500 index was down by 41 percent in real
terms.14 A somewhat rough update, based on the change in housing and
stock prices, shows a marked deterioration in middle-class wealth.15
According to my estimates, while mean wealth (in 2007 dollars) fell
by 17.3 percent between 2007 and 2009 to $443,600, median wealth
plunged by an astounding 36.1 percent to $65,400 (about the same level
as in 1992!).
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NOTE: Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual funds, trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans,
and other retirement accounts.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF.
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Table 2.11a Concentration of Stock Ownership by Wealth Class, 2007 (in 2007$)
Percentage of households
owning stock worth more than
Percentage of stock owned
Wealth class
Zero
$4,999
$9,999
Shares
Cumulative Cumulative—2001
Top 1%
92.6
89.1
88.4
38.3
38.3
33.5
Next 4%
92.2
90.7
89.5
30.8
69.1
62.3
Next 5%
86.8
85.0
81.4
12.1
81.2
76.9
Next 10%
82.1
77.1
71.2
9.9
91.1
89.3
Second quintile
65.4
54.3
47.1
6.4
97.5
97.1
Third quintile
47.7
28.9
22.1
1.9
99.4
99.3
Fourth quintile
30.3
12.3
8.7
0.5
99.9
99.8
Bottom quintile
16.3
3.5
2.0
0.1
100.0
100.0
All
49.1
36.3
31.6
100.0
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Table 2.11b Concentration of Stock Ownership by Income Class, 2007 (in 2007$)
Percentage of households
owning stock worth more than
Percentage of stock owned
Share of
Income level ($)
households
Zero
$4,999
$9,999
Shares
Cumulative Cumulative—2001
250,000 or more
3.6
95.4
93.4
91.3
53.7
53.7
40.6
100,000–249,999
15.5
84.5
71.0
63.7
21.5
75.2
68.6
75,000–99,999
10.4
71.1
55.6
49.6
9.0
84.3
77.4
50,000–74,999
17.5
58.1
40.7
34.9
7.7
92.0
89.3
25,000–49,999
27.1
39.3
23.6
19.0
5.7
97.7
97.6
15,000–24,999
12.7
23.1
15.7
11.9
1.1
98.8
98.9
Under $15,000
13.3
11.2
5.0
4.3
1.2
100.0
100.0
All
100.0
49.1
36.3
31.8
100.0
NOTE: Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual funds, trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans,
and other retirement accounts.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF.
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Trends in inequality are also important. According to previous
research (Wolff 2002a), wealth inequality is very sensitive and positively related to the ratio of stock prices to housing prices, since the
former is heavily concentrated among the rich and the latter is the chief
asset of the middle class (see the following section). The fact that stock
prices fell more than housing prices, at least from 2007 to mid-2009,
should lead to a decline in wealth inequality over these two years. However, instead, the results show a fairly steep rise in wealth inequality,
with the Gini coefﬁcient climbing from 0.834 to 0.865. The share of
wealth for the top 1 percent advanced from 34.6 to 37.1 percent, that of
the top 5 percent from 61.8 to 65.0 percent, and that of the top quintile
from 85.0 to 87.7 percent, while that of the second quintile fell from
10.9 to 10.0 percent, that of the middle quintile from 4.0 to 3.1 percent,
and that of the bottom two quintiles from 0.2 to −0.8 percent. There was
also a large expansion in the share of households with zero or negative
net worth, from 19 to 24 percent.
On the surface, these results appear somewhat surprising in light
of the earlier regression results. However, while stock prices fell more
than house prices, houses were a much larger share of the gross assets
of the middle class than stocks were of the rich. As shown in Table 2.5,
homes comprised 65 percent of the gross assets of the three middle
wealth quintiles in 2007, whereas stocks made up 21 percent of the
gross assets of the top 1 percent and 19 percent of the gross assets of
the next richest 19 percent of households. As a result, the middle class
took a bigger relative hit from the decline in home prices on their net
worth than the top 20 percent did from the stock market decline. This is
also reﬂected in the fact that median wealth dropped much more in percentage terms than mean wealth. Moreover, the rapid decline in house
prices over these two years left 17 percent of homeowners “underwater,” with greater mortgage debt than the value of their homes.

A WEALTH INEQUALITY PUZZLE
A puzzle about wealth inequality trends was encountered in my
earlier work (Wolff 2002a). In particular, the share of total household
wealth held by the richest 1 percent of households increased only a bit
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between 1989 and 1998, and the Gini coefﬁcient for total household
wealth actually declined slightly. I expected both the share of the top 1
percent and the Gini coefﬁcient to have shown a considerable increase.
I expected wealth inequality to increase because in this work I identify two factors that seem to underlie much of the change in the share of
wealth held by the top 1 percent. The ﬁrst is the change in basic income
inequality, and the second is the change in the ratio of stock prices to
housing prices (see Figure 2.3). In a simple regression of the share of
the top 1 percent on these two factors, both variables proved positive
and statistically signiﬁcant, and the goodness of the ﬁt of the equation was quite high.16 Over the period 1989–1998, income inequality, as
measured by the share of the top 5 percent, increased by 2.8 percentage
points, and the ratio of share prices to housing prices surged by a factor
of 2.5. Extrapolating on the basis of the regression estimates, I would
have expected a 9.9 percentage point increase in the share of the top
1 percent between 1989 and 1998, compared to its actual gain of 0.7
percentage points (see Figure 2.4).17
Figure 2.3 Wealth Inequality, Income Inequality, and the Ratio of Stock
Prices to House Prices, 1922–1998
70
60

Top 1% wealth
Top 5% family income
Ratio of S&P 500 index to median house price
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SOURCE: Wolff (2002a).
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Figure 2.4 Predicted versus Actual Wealth Inequality, 1922–1998
60
Share of top 1%—actual
Share of top 1%—predicted
50

Percentage

40

30

20

10

0

SOURCE: Wolff (2002a).

We shall see in Chapter 5 that this puzzle is largely resolved once we
extend the concept of household wealth to include DB pension wealth.
Once we include DB pension wealth in our measure, we ﬁnd that the
inequality of this extended measure does, in fact, show an increase
between 1989 and 1998 (and indeed through 2007). The reason, as we
shall see later, is that DB pension wealth is more equally distributed
than conventional household wealth, and its shrinkage over time led to
a rise in wealth inequality. This is discussed more in Chapter 5.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Median net worth showed robust gains over the period 1983–2007.
In fact, the growth rate of median wealth accelerated from the 1980s
to the 1990s and into the 2001–2007 period. However, the gains of the
2001–2007 period were based largely on rising home prices ﬁnanced by
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increasing mortgage debt. This growth came to an abrupt end in 2007
with the collapse in home prices, and median wealth plummeted from
2007 through 2009.
Household wealth inequality showed a sharp increase from 1983 to
1989. However, from 1989 to 2007 there was almost no change in the
degree of wealth inequality. This trend was surprising because the two
factors normally positively associated with wealth inequality, income
inequality and the ratio of stock prices to home prices, both showed a
marked rise over the same years, 1989 to 2007. However, according to
my projections, there was a fairly steep rise in wealth inequality from
2007 to 2009, as the collapse in housing prices hurt the middle class
more than the decline in stock prices affected the rich.
A striking shift occurred in the portfolio composition of household
wealth out of liquid assets and into DC pension accounts over the years
1989–2001, though pension accounts as a share of total assets also fell
off a bit from 2001 to 2007. There was also a noticeable expansion of
stock ownership from 1989 to 2001, but this was followed by a mild
contraction between 2001 and 2007. Deﬁned contribution pension
accounts, moreover, became more heavily invested in equities, making them vulnerable to the stock market downturn of 2007 to 2009. We
shall see more about this in Chapters 4 and 5.
Moreover, despite the buoyant economy over the 1980s and 1990s,
overall indebtedness continued to rise among American families and
then shot up in the 2000s. Among the middle class in particular, the
debt-income ratio reached its highest level in 24 years. Mortgage debt
on middle-class homeowners’ property exploded from 29 percent in
1983 to 47 percent in 2007 (and among all homeowners from 21 to
35 percent). The high level of mortgage indebtedness made the middle
class particularly vulnerable to the collapse of the housing market at
the end of the decade of the 2000s. In fact, I estimate that 17 percent of
homeowners were “underwater” by 2009.
The mean wealth of African Americans was only 19 percent that of
white families in 1983, and that ratio barely budged during 1983–2007.
The black homeownership rate did climb from 44 percent in 1983 to
49 percent in 2007, but relative to white households it was the same in
2007 (a ratio of 0.65) as in 1983. The mean wealth of Hispanic households was also very low compared to non-Hispanic whites in 1983, a
ratio of 0.16, but Hispanics did show some gains in mean wealth rela-
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tive to non-Hispanic whites, particularly in 2001–2007, and the ratio
advanced to 0.26. The homeownership rate among Hispanic households
also ascended, from a meager 33 percent in 1983 to 49 percent in 2007,
the same level as African Americans, and the ratio of homeownership
rates between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites advanced from 48
percent in 1983 to 66 percent in 2007.
Young households (under the age of 45), after some relative gains
from 1983 to 1989, saw their relative wealth position deteriorate
between 1989 and 2007. This development made young households
particularly exposed to the joint collapse of the stock and housing markets at the end of the decade of the 2000s.
These results on traditional net worth will set the stage for the later
analysis of wealth trends once we include DB pension wealth and Social
Security wealth in the deﬁnition of (augmented) wealth. In Chapters 4
and 5, we will see how pension wealth and augmented wealth grew
over the years 1983–2007 and how the inequality of augmented wealth
changed over this period. In Chapter 6, we will also reexamine the racial
divide and age class differences once retirement wealth is included in
household wealth. In the same chapter we will also look at relative
developments in augmented wealth by income class and wealth class.

Notes
1. These ﬁgures are based on the BLS hourly wage series. The BLS wage ﬁgures are
converted to constant dollars on the basis of the CPI-U.
2. The Census Bureau uses the newer CPI-U-RS series to convert to constant dollars.
However, for this period, there is virtually no difference between the CPI-U and
the CPI-U-RS.
3. I choose these years to be consistent with the later chapters on pension and Social
Security wealth. However, the SCF was also conducted in the years 1992, 1995, and
2004.
4. For a discussion of some of the issues involved in developing these weights, see, for
example, Kennickell and Woodburn (1999) for the 1989 SCF, or Kennickell (2001)
for the 2001 SCF.
5. It should be noted that the income in each survey year (for instance, 2007) is for
the preceding year (2006 in this case).
6. The SCF data show a much higher level of income inequality than the CPS data.
In the year 2000, for example, the CPS data show the share of the top 5 percent as
being 22.1 percent and the Gini coefﬁcient as being 0.462. The difference is primarily due to three factors. First, the SCF oversamples the rich (as noted above),
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7.

8.
9.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
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while the CPS is a representative sample. Second, the CPS data are top-coded (that
is, there is an open-ended interval at the top, typically at $75,000 or $100,000),
whereas the SCF data are not. Third, the income concepts differ between the two
samples. In particular, the SCF income deﬁnition includes realized capital gains
whereas the CPS deﬁnition does not. However, the CPS data also show a large
increase in inequality between 1989 and 2000, with the share of the top 5 percent
rising from 18.9 to 22.1 percent and the Gini coefﬁcient from 0.431 to 0.462.
Further analysis of the difference in income ﬁgures between the two surveys is
beyond the scope of this chapter.
The slight rise in wealth inequality between 2001 and 2007 appears to be due
to two offsetting effects. As shown in my previous work (Wolff 2002a), wealth
inequality is positively related to both income inequality and the ratio of stock
prices to house prices (also see the section titled “A Wealth Inequality Puzzle”).
Between 2001 and 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient for household income, as noted
above, rose modestly, from 0.562 to 0.574, while the ratio of the S&P 500 stock
index to the median sales price of existing one-family homes fell from 8.1 to 7.1.
These two effects generally offset each other, resulting in a small rise in wealth
inequality.
The residual group, American Indians and Asians, is excluded here because of its
small sample size.
It should be stressed that the unit of observation is the household, which includes
families (two or more related individuals living together) as well as single adults. As
is widely known, the share of female-headed households among African Americans
is much higher than that among whites. This difference partly accounts for the relatively lower income and wealth among African American households.
Also, see Gittleman and Wolff (2004) for additional evidence from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
One important reason for the wealth gap is differences in inheritances. According
to my calculations from the SCF data, 24.1 percent of white households in 1998
reported receiving an inheritance over their life time, compared to 11.0 percent of
black households, and the average bequest among white inheritors was $115,000
(present value in 1998) and only $32,000 among black inheritors. Thus, inheritances appear to play a vital role in explaining the large wealth gap, particularly
in light of the fact that black families appear to save more than white families at
similar income levels (see, for example, Blau and Graham [1990]; Oliver and
Shapiro [1997]; and Gittleman and Wolff [2004]).
This pattern may also be partly a cohort effect, since 401(k) plans and other DC
plans were not widely introduced into the workplace until after 1989.
The 1983 data do not permit an estimation of indirect stock ownership, so I
exclude 1983 from the table.
This ﬁgure is based on the National Association of Realtors Median Sales Price
of Existing Single-Family Homes for Metropolitan Areas. In Chapter 5 we will
examine the implications of the recent stock market crash on pension wealth
holdings.
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15. I assume that there are no additional savings (or dissavings) and no portfolio
adjustments (except those caused by price changes of homes and stock).
16. A regression of a wealth inequality index, measured by the share of marketable
wealth held by the top 1 percent of households (WLTH), on income inequality,
measured by the share of income received by the top 5 percent of families (INC),
and the ratio of stock prices (the S&P index) to housing prices (RATIO), with 21
data readings between 1922 and 1998, yields
WLTH = 5.10 + 1.27 INC + 0.26 RATIO, R2 = 0.64, N = 21 ,
(0.9) (4.2)
(2.5)
with t-ratios shown in parentheses. Both variables are statistically signiﬁcant (INC
at the 1 percent level and RATIO at the 5 percent level) and carry the expected
(positive) sign. Also, the ﬁt is quite good, even for this simple model.
Sources are as follows:
•

Share of income of the top 5 percent: The basic data source is the Current
Population Report series on shares of income held by families that runs from
1947 to 1998. The data are available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/
histinc. The earlier data, from 1922 to 1949, are from Kuznets’s (1953) series
on the percentage share of total income received by the top percentiles of tax
units. This series is benchmarked against the census ﬁgure for 1949.

•

S&P 500 Composite Stock Index: From 1922 to 1969: U.S. Census Bureau
(1975a, p. 1004). From 1970 to 1998: Council of Economic Advisers (2001,
Table B-93, p. 406).

•

Median house prices: From 1922 to 1969: U.S. Census Bureau (1975b, Series
N 259 and 261, p. 647). From 1970 to 1998: U.S. Census Bureau (1999, Table
No. 1203, p. 725).

17. Kopczuk and Saez (2004), using U.S. estate tax data from 1916 to 2000, also
ﬁnd very little change in the shares of wealth held by the top wealth groups in the
1990s. Indeed, they ﬁnd very little change in the 1980s as well. The share of the
top 1 percent was 21.1 percent in 1983 and 20.8 percent in 2000, according to their
data.
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3
Review of the Literature
on Retirement Wealth
and Retirement Adequacy
We now turn our attention to the main topic of the book: retirement
wealth and retirement adequacy. Before showing my own results on
the subject, it is helpful to see what previous research has found. This
review of the previous literature on these topics will provide a context
for my later empirical ﬁndings.
I divide the survey into six parts. My own work will cover much
of the same ground. The survey begins with a focus on trends in pension coverage. As will be seen, several previous studies have reported
on the “great transformation” of the pension system away from DB
plans and toward DC plans, which is a focus of the present volume. Has
the pension transformation improved or worsened the level of pension
wealth in the U.S. and its degree of inequality? The next section will
present a review of studies on the level of retirement wealth as well as
its distribution. Have pensions, particularly DC pension plans, added
to household savings and wealth and, if so, by how much? After that I
will survey the studies that have considered the effects of pensions on
household savings.
Retirement adequacy is a key subject in this ﬁeld. Has the great
transformation improved or worsened the adequacy of savings for
retirement? How have replacement rates (the ratio of retirement income
to prior income) been affected? This part of the chapter examines previous estimates of retirement adequacy and replacement rates. How have
elderly households in general fared recently and in the past? The last
two sections review the literature on the economic status of the elderly
and consider the impact of the recent recession on pension holdings.
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DID PENSION COVERAGE RISE?
How has the great transformation affected actual pension coverage?
This is a topic that will occupy a large portion of Chapter 4. Has the
replacement of DB plans with DC plans improved or worsened pension
coverage among U.S. workers?
Several previous studies have documented changes in pension coverage in the United States, particularly the decline in DB pension coverage and the corresponding rise of DC coverage among workers since the
early 1980s. Before this, Laurence Kotlikoff and Daniel Smith (1983)
provide one of the most comprehensive treatments of pension coverage
and show that the proportion of U.S. private-wage and salary workers
covered by (traditional DB) pensions more than doubled between 1950
and 1979. However, David Bloom and Richard Freeman (1992), using
the CPS for 1979 and 1988, were among the ﬁrst to call attention to the
decline in DB pension coverage. They report that the percentage of all
workers aged 25–64 covered by these plans fell from 63 to 57 percent
over this period. Among male workers in this age group, the share covered dropped from 70 to 61 percent, while among females the share
remained almost constant, at 53 percent.
Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1992) were among the ﬁrst
to document the changeover from DB plans to DC plans between 1977
and 1985 on the basis of IRS 5500 ﬁlings. They decompose the switch
from DB to DC plans into two effects: the ﬁrst from the decline in DB
coverage associated with (that is, conditional on) industry, size, and
union status, and the second from shifts in the employment mix away
from ﬁrms with industry, size, and union status historically associated
with high DB coverage rates and toward those with low DB coverage.
They estimate that each effect contributed about half to the replacement
of DB plans by DC plans. Other studies include those by William Even
and David Macpherson (1994a,b,c,d). The 1994c study in particular
shows a pronounced drop in DB pension coverage among workers with
low levels of education, and Even and Macpherson (1994d) show a
convergence in pension coverage rates among female and male workers
between 1979 and 1998.
A U.S. Department of Labor (2000) report ﬁnds that a large proportion of workers, especially low-wage, part-time, and minority workers,
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were not covered by private pensions. The coverage rate of all private
sector wage and salary workers was 44 percent in 1997. Coverage of
part-time, temporary, and low-wage workers was especially low. This
appears to be ascribable to the proliferation of 401(k) plans and the
frequent requirement of employee contributions to such plans. It also
ﬁnds important ethnic differences: 47 percent of white workers participated, but only 27 percent of Hispanics. Another important ﬁnding is
that 70 percent of unionized workers were covered by a pension plan,
compared to only 41 percent of nonunionized workers. Pension participation was found to be highly correlated with wages: while only 6
percent of workers earning less than $200 per week had a pension plan,
76 percent of workers earning $1,000 per week participated.
Using CPS data, Munnell and Perun (2006) report a sharp dropoff in pension coverage between 1980 and 2004. In fact, participation
dropped between 1979 and 1988, rebounded from 1988 to 1999, and
then fell off again between 1999 and 2004. In 1979, 51 percent of nonagricultural wage and salary workers in the private sector aged 25–64
participated in a pension plan. By 2004, that ﬁgure was down to 46 percent. The authors also ﬁnd that the decline in pension coverage occurred
for all ﬁve earnings quintiles, though it was particularly pronounced for
the middle quintile.1
In general, these studies report an overall increase in pension coverage during the 1980s and 1990s despite the collapse of DB plans
because of an offsetting rise in DC plans. However, they also indicate a
drop-off in pension coverage during the 2000s. I look at this issue again
in Chapter 4 and ﬁnd a rise in overall pension coverage among households from 1989 to 2001, but this was followed by a modest decline
from 2001 to 2007.

DID PENSION AND RETIREMENT WEALTH INCREASE?
Did the transformation of the pension system out of DB plans and
into DC plans improve or worsen the level of pension wealth and retirement wealth in general? Was the great transformation beneﬁcial or hurtful in terms of actual dollar amounts? This topic will be a major focus
of Chapters 4 and 5.
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In one of the most important studies on this topic, Poterba et al.
(2007) consider whether the switchover from DB to DC plans helped or
hurt workers in terms of expected retirement wealth. As they note, the
American private pension system was once dominated by DB plans and
is now currently divided between DC and DB plans. Wealth accumulation in DC plans depends on participants’ contribution behavior and
on ﬁnancial market returns, while accumulation in DB plans is dependent on participants’ labor market experiences and on plan parameters.
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Poterba et
al. simulate the distribution of retirement wealth under representative
DB and DC plans. In particular, they investigate how asset returns,
earnings histories, and retirement plan characteristics contribute to the
variation in retirement wealth outcomes. For DC plans they randomly
assign individuals a share of wages that they and their employers contribute to the plan. Asset returns are drawn from the historical return
distribution. The DB plan simulations draw earnings histories from the
HRS and randomly assign each individual a pension plan drawn from
a sample of large private and public DB plans. The simulations yield
distributions of both DC and DB wealth at retirement. They ﬁnd that
average retirement wealth accruals under current DC plans exceeded
those under private sector DB plans, although DC plans were also more
likely to generate very low retirement wealth outcomes. The comparison of current DC plans with public sector DB plans was less deﬁnitive,
because public sector DB plans were more generous on average than
their private sector DB counterparts.
What is the effect of pension and retirement wealth in general on
the inequality of wealth? The seminal paper on this subject is one by
Feldstein (1974), whose main interest was in the Social Security system rather than the private pension system. In it, Feldstein introduces
the concept of Social Security wealth and develops its methodology.
His main interest in this paper is in the aggregate level of Social Security wealth and its effect on aggregate savings and retirement patterns.
However, in a follow-up paper, Feldstein (1976) considers the effects
of Social Security wealth on the overall distribution of wealth. He uses
the 1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (SFCC), a
survey performed by the Federal Reserve Board of Washington and a
precursor of the SCF. The paper ﬁnds that the inclusion of Social Security wealth had a major effect on lowering the inequality of total house-
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hold wealth (including Social Security wealth). The Gini coefﬁcient for
the sum of net worth and Social Security wealth among families aged
35–64 was 0.51, compared to a Gini coefﬁcient of 0.72 for net worth.
I followed up this study by examining the distributional implications
of both Social Security and private pension wealth. Wolff (1987b) uses
the 1969 Measurement of Economic and Social Performance (MESP)
database, and is the ﬁrst to add estimates of private pension wealth to
Social Security wealth and to examine their joint effects on the overall distribution of wealth. The paper shows that while Social Security
wealth had a pronounced equalizing effect on the distribution of augmented wealth (the sum of marketable wealth and retirement wealth),
as Feldstein (1976) ﬁnds, pension wealth had a disequalizing effect on
augmented wealth. In particular, the addition of Social Security wealth
to net worth reduced the overall Gini coefﬁcient from 0.73 to 0.48 in
1969, but the addition of pension wealth to the sum of net worth and
Social Security wealth raised the Gini coefﬁcient back to 0.66. The sum
of Social Security and pension wealth had, on net, an equalizing effect
on the distribution of augmented wealth but substantially less than that
of Social Security wealth alone.2
Relatively similar effects are reported in later papers. McGarry and
Davenport (1997) use the 1992 wave of the HRS to estimate private
pension wealth. They ﬁnd that pension wealth is only slightly more
equally distributed than net worth, and that adding pension wealth to
net worth had a modest effect on reducing inequality (the wealth share
of the top decile declined from 53 to 45 percent with the addition of
pension wealth). Kennickell and Sundén (1999) use the 1989 and 1992
SCF to analyze the effects of Social Security and pension wealth on
the overall distribution of wealth. They also ﬁnd a large net equalizing effect from the inclusion of these two forms of retirement wealth.
In particular, the inclusion of pension and net Social Security wealth
reduced the share of total wealth held by the top 1 percent of nonelderly
households in 1992 from 31 percent to 16 percent.3
Brown, Coronado, and Fullerton (2009) examine the redistributional
effects of Social Security using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) data for the period 1968–1993. They focus on whether the poor
beneﬁted from Social Security beneﬁts relative to the middle class and
rich. Their main ﬁnding is that the degree of redistribution of Social
Security fell as the measure of resources used for a basis of compari-
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son became more expansive. In particular, as they expand the deﬁnition
from current annual income, the measure used in most studies, to lifetime income, the measured effect of the Social Security system became
less progressive. In fact, when they use potential labor earnings at the
household level as the basis of comparison rather than actual earnings
at the individual level, they ﬁnd that Social Security had virtually no
effect on overall inequality.
Brown, Coronado, and Fullerton (2009) also ﬁnd that even though
there were some small positive net transfers to those at the bottom of the
lifetime income distribution, this result was driven largely by the lack
of redistribution across the middle and upper part of the income distribution. Moreover, in situations where redistribution did occur, they
ﬁnd that many high-income households received positive net transfers,
while many low-income households paid net taxes.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I elaborate on how pension wealth and Social
Security wealth affect measured wealth inequality. Moreover, I will also
consider how the redistributional effects of these two forms of retirement wealth have changed over time, from 1983 to 2007.4 I also ﬁnd, as
do many of these studies, that Social Security wealth is distributed much
more equally than conventional net worth, and its addition to household
wealth substantially lowers measured wealth inequality. Private pension wealth, on the other hand, is distributed less equally than Social
Security wealth but more equally than net worth, and its addition to net
worth leads to only a modest reduction in measured wealth inequality.
Moreover, the “equalizing” effect of pension wealth dissipated between
1983 and 2007 as the more equally distributed DB pension wealth was
replaced by the less equally distributed DC pension wealth.
A related topic is the makeup or composition of total (augmented)
household wealth; in particular, how much of it is composed of pension
wealth, Social Security wealth, and standard net worth? Gustman et al.
(1997), for example, using the 1992 HRS, estimate that, collectively,
pensions, Social Security, and health insurance accounted for about half
of the wealth held by all households aged 51–61. However, the proportion varied by wealth level. They ﬁnd that these three components made
up 60 percent of total wealth of wealth percentiles 45–55, but only 48
percent of wealth percentiles 90–95. They conclude that pension wealth
and Social Security wealth (as well as health insurance) were more
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important for middle-class households than the rich. I shall report very
similar results in Chapter 6.
In a follow-up study, Gustman and Steinmeier (1998), using the
HRS again, focus on the role of pensions in forming retirement wealth.
They ﬁnd that pension coverage was widespread, covering two-thirds
of households and accounting for one-quarter of accumulated wealth on
average. Social Security beneﬁts accounted for another quarter of total
wealth. The remainder consisted of traditional net worth. Here, again,
my ﬁndings in Chapter 6 are quite similar.

DO PENSIONS REDUCE OTHER FORMS OF SAVINGS?
One ongoing controversy is whether DC pension plans like 401(k)
plans have, on net, added to total household savings or whether they
have simply substituted for other forms of savings. Some circumstantial
evidence on this score was presented in Chapter 2, where we saw a clear
displacement of liquid assets by DC pension accounts (see Table 2.3,
for example).
On one side of the issue is a series of papers by Poterba, Venti, and
Wise. In their 1992, 1993, and 1995 papers, using SIPP data for 1984
and 1991; in their 1998 paper, using HRS data for 1993; and in their
2001 paper, using both macro national accounting data and micro HRS
data, Poterba, Venti, and Wise conclude that the growth of IRAs and
401(k) plans did not substitute for other forms of household wealth, and
in fact raised household net worth relative to what it would have been
without these plans. They ﬁnd no substitution of DC wealth for either
DB wealth or other components of household wealth.
On the other side of the issue is the work of Gale, who, in a series
of papers both by himself and with colleagues, ﬁnds very little net savings emanating from DC plans. Gale (1995) concludes that when biases
in estimation procedures in the previous literature on the subject are
corrected, the offset of pension wealth on other forms of wealth can be
very high. Gale and Scholz (1994) use the 1983 and the 1986 SCF, the
latter of which contains a reinterview of 2,822 households out of the
4,262 households that were ﬁrst interviewed in the 1983 SCF. Their
main ﬁnding is that raising the annual IRA contribution limit between
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1983 and 1986 would have resulted in little, if any, increase in national
savings. These results, they maintain, are consistent with new evidence
they present, indicating considerable potential among IRA holders to
shift substitutable forms of savings into IRAs.
Using data from the 1984, 1987, and 1991 SIPP, Engen and Gale
(1997) estimate that, at best, only a small proportion of 401(k) contributions represented net increments to household savings. In later work,
Engen and Gale (2000) reﬁne their analysis to look at the substitution
effect by earnings groups. Using data from the 1987 and 1991 SIPP,
they ﬁnd that 401(k)s held by low earners are more likely to represent
additions to net worth than 401(k)s held by high earners, who hold the
bulk of this asset. Overall, only between 0 and 30 percent of the value
of 401(k)s represented net additions to private savings.
Kennickell and Sundén (1999) also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative effect
of both DB plan coverage and Social Security wealth on nonpension
net worth but conclude that the effects of DC plans, such as 401(k)
plans, on other forms of wealth were statistically insigniﬁcant. In contrast, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004), using data from the 1990
SIPP, ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect of 401(k) plan
participation on net ﬁnancial assets over the entire range of the asset
distribution. Moreover, the increase in the lower tail of the distribution
of 401(k) wealth translated almost completely into an increase in net
wealth. Thus, the authors conclude that 401(k) accumulations added
to the net worth of households in general and particularly those in the
lower wealth groups. However, there was signiﬁcant evidence of substitution of 401(k) accumulations for other asset types in the upper tail
of the distribution.
In later work, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2007b) document the transition from the DB to the DC system that occurred in the United States
from the early 1980s on. They report, ﬁrst, that the total value of assets
in retirement accounts has increased substantially since 1980. As a
percentage of National Income and Product Accounts wage and salary earnings, it rose from 71 percent in 1980 to 261 percent in 2006.
Second, the share of employees covered by at least one pension plan
remained about constant from 1980 to 2005, but the share covered by
more than one plan rose substantially. Third, Poterba, Venti, and Wise
project that 401(k) assets will increase “enormously” over time and that
by 2040, assets of retirees will be at least twice as large in real dollars
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as in 2000. Moreover, the increase in retirement assets will occur along
the whole distribution of Social Security wealth.
Engelhardt and Kumar (2007) use data from the 1991 wave of
the HRS. They are particularly interested in how employer matching
of employee 401(k) contributions affects retirement savings. Using
detailed administrative contribution, earnings, and pension-plan data
from the HRS, they estimate that an increase in the match rate (that is,
the percentage of employee contributions to these plans that were met
by a similar contribution from the employer) by 25 cents per dollar
of employee contribution raised 401(k) participation by ﬁve percentage points. They also estimate that an increase in the match rate by 25
cents per dollar of employee contribution raised 401(k) savings by $365
(in 1991 dollars). Overall, they conclude that employer matching did
increase 401(k) savings, but the effect was not very large.
Overall, previous studies that consider whether accumulations in
DC pension plans add to net household wealth or merely substitute for
other forms of household savings have been inconclusive. Reported
results on this issue have been quite mixed, with some ﬁnding a strong
displacement effect and others little or none. Though this is an important issue to address, it is beyond the scope of the present work.

HAS RETIREMENT ADEQUACY IMPROVED OVER TIME?
Retirement adequacy is a very important issue. It addresses the
question of whether working individuals have saved enough (or will
save enough) to meet their needs during retirement. Pension accumulations, Social Security wealth, and savings in nonretirement assets all
play a role in determining whether accumulated wealth at retirement is
(or will be) sufﬁcient to meet retirement needs.
Measuring retirement adequacy is usually done by comparing predicted income at time of retirement with previous income (the so-called
replacement rate). It should be noted that estimates of the replacement
rate are quite sensitive to the choice of denominator. Some studies use
family income at the time of the survey, others use a measure of permanent income, and still others use actual (or predicted) income as of the
age just before retirement.
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Measurement of adequacy also depends on the standard used for
adequacy. Calculations of retirement income adequacy typically relate
retirement consumption to preretirement consumption in three possible
ways. First, a household may be considered adequately prepared for
retirement if it can maintain a similar real level of consumption as during its working years. Usually, 80 percent of preretirement income is
thus considered adequate since the income needs of retirees are likely
to be lower than those of workers (Aon Consulting 2001). Households
no longer need to save for retirement, taxes are lower, work-related
expenses disappear, the family size of retirees is smaller than that of
workers, and households eventually pay off their debt (McGill et al.
1996). Second, retirement income adequacy may be deﬁned as a constant nominal level of consumption during retirement as during working years. This means that consumption needs are expected to decline
during retirement over time, but in a somewhat arbitrary fashion. Third,
real consumption may decline if the marginal utility of consumption
is held constant and uncertainty about income and life expectancy is
introduced (Engen, Gale, and Uccello 1999). As households must consider an uncertain future, their marginal utility of certain consumption
today is higher than the marginal utility of uncertain consumption in
the future.
Several studies have documented that household consumption generally falls after retirement compared to the time when the household
is working. Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) use data from the British Family Expenditure Survey covering the years 1968–1992. They
ﬁrst document a signiﬁcant decline in consumption among British
households right after retirement. Moreover, they also ﬁnd that this
drop in consumption could not be fully explained by a forward-looking
consumption-smoothing model, such as the life-cycle model, that takes
into account expected demographic changes and mortality risk. Fisher
et al. (2005) use data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey covering the years 1984–2003. They ﬁrst show that as the deﬁnition of
consumption is expanded from food expenditures only to more comprehensive deﬁnitions, the recorded decline of consumption at retirement
decreases by more than half. However, even with the most comprehensive deﬁnition, they ﬁnd that consumption expenditures fall by 2.5
percent when individuals retire and continue to decline at about a rate
of 1 percent per year after that.
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The decline in spending after retirement for the average household
is sometimes called the “retirement consumption puzzle.” The reason is
that in a standard life cycle model of savings, it is typically shown that
household welfare is maximized when consumption remains constant
over the person’s lifetime (see Modigliani [1954] for the classic work
on this topic). Thus, the drop in consumption just after retirement is
viewed as a puzzle.
Hurst (2008), after summarizing the recent literature on consumption behavior during retirement, argues that collectively there is no
puzzle with respect to the spending patterns of most households as they
transition into retirement. In particular, the literature shows that there
is substantial heterogeneity in spending changes at retirement across
consumption categories. The declines in spending after retirement for
the average household were limited to the categories of food and workrelated expenses. Spending in nearly all other categories of nondurable
expenditure remained constant or even rose. Moreover, even though
expenditures on food went down after retirement, actual food intake
(including food prepared in the home) tended to remain more or less
constant. The literature also shows that there was substantial heterogeneity across households in the change in expenditure associated with
retirement. However, much of the research on this subject shows that
this heterogeneity can be fairly well explained by households involuntarily retiring due to deteriorating health. Overall, the literature shows
that the standard life-cycle model of consumption augmented with
home production and uncertain health shocks has done an adequate job
in explaining the consumption patterns of the average household after
retirement.
Scholz and Seshadri (2009) argue that the choice of replacement
rates should be theory-based—not the common advice of ﬁnancial
planners, who typically call for a 70 percent replacement rate of average preretirement income. They use an augmented life-cycle model of
household behavior to examine optimal replacement rates for a representative set of retired U.S. households and related optimal replacement
rates for observable household characteristics. They ﬁrst note that target
replacement rates are usually thought to be less than 100 percent for
three main reasons. First, upon retirement, households typically face
lower taxes than they face during their working years, if for no other
reason than Social Security is more lightly taxed than wages and sala-
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ries. Second, households typically save less in retirement than they do
during their working years, so saving is a smaller claim on available
income. Third, work-related expenses generally fall in retirement.
Scholz and Seshadri (2009) also note that low-income households
are thought to need higher replacement rates than high-income households. Prior to retirement, tax rates are lower for low-income households than they are for high-income households. As a result, low-income
households’ reduction in taxes in retirement is smaller than the reduction experienced by high-income households. Moreover, low-income
households save less than high-income households, so the reduction
in saving in retirement will be smaller for low-income households.
The fact that taxes and saving fall less in retirement for low-income
households than for high-income households suggests that their target
replacement rate should be higher.
Scholz and Seshadri (2009) suggest that there are different choices
of the preretirement income that can be used to compute replacement
rates. The usual choice is average income over preretirement years, but
replacement rates are sometimes deﬁned using average income over the
last ﬁve (or fewer) years of the preretirement period, with the idea that
living standards may ratchet upward as people age. The authors argue
that a natural alternative to replacement rates can be drawn from the
life-cycle model, augmented to account for fundamental factors affecting most households, such as demographic changes and uncertainty
about future earnings, medical expenses, and longevity.
Using HRS data, Scholz and Seshadri (2009) compute an average
optimal replacement rate of 0.68 for the population as a whole on the
basis of income averaged over the lifetime as the point of comparison
and 0.57 on the basis of income averaged over the top ﬁve earnings
years. Optimal replacement rates exhibited a U-shaped relation with
respect to the lifetime income decile—highest at the top and the bottom
and lowest in the middle. They also compute that optimal replacement
rates were highest for those who graduated college and lowest for those
with less than a high school degree.
As in the literature on the effects of DC accumulations on other
forms of household savings, which I review in the last section of this
chapter, the studies on retirement savings adequacy have produced differing results. Using the HRS, Gustman and Steinmeier (1998) ﬁnd that
the average household could replace 60 percent of preretirement income
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in real terms and 86 percent of preretirement income in nominal terms.
The ﬁnding for the nominal replacement ratio led the authors to conclude that households on average were adequately prepared for retirement. Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999), using the SIPP and the SCF,
estimate that about half of households fell short of what they needed
for adequate retirement income but the other half could be expected to
meet the target retirement savings. Despite this, they calculate an average replacement ratio for the median income household of 72 percent,
a result that led the authors to conclude that households were close to
being adequately prepared for retirement.
In a later study, Engen, Gale, and Uccello (2005) ﬁnd that the
upswing in stock prices from 1995 to 1998 did not substantially alter
their earlier ﬁndings on retirement income. This suggests that much of
the increase in retirement wealth was concentrated among households
that were already adequately prepared for retirement. Further, Haveman
et al. (2003), using Social Security’s New Beneﬁciary Data System,
ﬁnd that retired beneﬁciaries had a median replacement ratio of about
80 percent, and that only 30 percent of households had a replacement
ratio of less than 70 percent in 1982. These four studies all appear to
indicate that households in the main had saved enough to be adequately
prepared for retirement.
In contrast, several studies conclude that households were inadequately prepared for retirement. Moore and Mitchell (2000) ﬁnd, using
the 1992 HRS, that the median wealth household would have to save
an additional 16 percent annually of earnings if it were to retire at age
62, and an additional 7 percent annually for retirement at age 65, to
ﬁnance an adequate real replacement ratio. Their estimate of a savings
rate of 7.3 percent for households wishing to retire at age 65 was three
times as much as what households actually saved (Mitchell and Moore
1998). This meant that households had on average between 75 and 88
percent—depending on marital status—of what they needed when retiring at age 65 in 1992.
Similarly, Bernheim (1997) calculates that on average baby boomer
households were saving only at 34 percent of what their target savings
rate should be. In addition, Gustman and Steinmeier’s (1998) ﬁgures
show that, based on real replacement ratios, the average household had
28 percent less than what it needed for adequate retirement savings.
Last, Wolff (2002b) concludes that 61 percent of households could not
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replace 75 percent of their preretirement income in retirement, based
on data from the 1998 SCF, and this ﬁgure was up from 56 percent of
households in 1989.
One issue to consider, though, is what a shortfall relative to adequate
savings means. In some cases, a shortfall will still allow households to
ﬁnance most of their expected consumption. Engen, Gale, and Uccello
(1999) point out that the households used in Mitchell and Moore (1998)
could still ﬁnance more than 90 percent of the consumption prescribed
by their model with no additional savings. Similarly, Haveman et al.’s
(2003) study shows that about 20 percent of households had a replacement ratio of between 70 and 80 percent. In other words, one-ﬁfth of
households had more than 90 percent, but less than 100 percent, of
what is generally assumed to be necessary for retirement income adequacy—80 percent of preretirement earnings.
As wealth is unequally distributed, there may be a large share of
households for which the shortfalls are larger. Engen, Gale, and Uccello
(1999) calculate that households in the 75th percentile—the closest
income percentile for average (not median) income—had 121 to 172
percent of what they needed for retirement. For the median household,
the same ratios ranged from 47 to 124 percent. Thus, the median household reached only 62 percent of the preparedness of the average household in 1992. Moreover, Wolff (2002b) documents that the gap between
average wealth and median wealth to income ratios increased further
by 1998. Because of the unequal distribution of wealth, a large share of
households was likely to experience retirement consumption shortfalls.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) ﬁnd that households in the bottom
quartile had nominal replacement ratios of 50 percent and real replacement rates of 33 percent, compared to nominal replacements of 121
percent and real replacement rates of 81 percent for the top quartile.
Also, Wolff (2002b) ﬁnds that 16 percent of households could replace
less than 25 percent of their preretirement income and that 43 percent
of households could replace less than half of their preretirement income
during retirement in 1998.
Shortfalls in retirement savings vary with household demographics.
Mitchell, Moore, and Phillips (2000) and Engen and Uccello (1999)
ﬁnd that black and Hispanic married households experienced a larger
shortfall in retirement income adequacy than whites, and that less educated households had lower retirement income adequacy. Mitchell and
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Moore (1998) also ﬁnd that single households were less adequately prepared than married ones. Haveman et al. (2003) ﬁnd that single men
were more likely be inadequately prepared than single women, who
were in turn less likely than married couples to be adequately prepared
for retirement.
In comparing these ﬁgures with ﬁndings of other studies, it needs to
be kept in mind that, for instance, Haveman et al. (2003) consider only
Social Security earnings for their replacement ratio calculations, thus
understating the level of household income. Also, Wolff (2002b) considers the wealth of households nearing retirement, whereas Haveman
et al. consider wealth for those who were already retired. Obviously
households can increase their savings before entering retirement and
occasionally while in retirement.
To make ends meet in retirement, when facing an income shortfall,
households will have to curtail their retirement consumption. In fact,
one of the distinguishing features between studies that conclude that
households are adequately prepared for retirement and those that do
not is the hypothesized consumption pattern in retirement. For instance,
Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1999)
conclude that households were adequately prepared for retirement on
the basis of the assumption that real retirement consumption declines
with age. Similarly, Haveman et al. (2003) base their conclusions on the
assumption of declining consumption in retirement, albeit at a slower
pace than Gustman and Steinmeier.
A number of studies have also looked at the changes in retirement income adequacy over time. Wolff (2002b) ﬁnds that the share of
households between the ages of 47 and 64 that could replace less than
75 percent of their current income in retirement rose from 56 percent in
1989 to 61 percent in 1998. In comparison, Engen, Gale, and Uccello
(2005) ﬁnd that retirement income adequacy changed little from 1995
to 1998. James Smith (2003), using data from the PSID and the CPS,
ﬁnds that median after-tax income replacement ratios in retirement have
been increasing, particularly since the early 1990s. Sorokina, Webb,
and Muldoon (2008), using data from the HRS for age group 51–56,
calculate that both pension wealth and replacement rates fell between
1992 and 2004.
An alternative approach to measuring retirement adequacy comes
from Munnell, Webb, and Delorme (2006) of the Center for Retirement
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Research, who developed what they call a new national retirement risk
index (NRRI). The construction of this new NRRI involves two steps.
The ﬁrst is to project replacement rates for each household and to determine a target replacement rate. The second step is to compare the projected replacement rates to the targets to determine the NRRI results.
The index covers all working-age U.S. households. The original study
used the 2004 SCF. Projected retirement income was based on income
from ﬁnancial assets, including those in DC plans, net of nonmortgage
ﬁnancial debt, housing net of mortgage debt, DB pension plans, and
Social Security. The index did not include earnings from work.
Because elderly households generally consume less than workingage households, as Munnell, Webb, and Delorme (2006) indicate, a
replacement rate of less than 100 percent is used in the calculation of the
target replacement rate. However, the report argues that the projected
replacement rate should be higher for low-income than high-income
households because low-income households save very little before
retirement and enjoy less in the way of tax savings (see Scholz and
Seshadri [2009] for a similar argument). Munnell, Webb, and Delorme
follow this approach. For example, they use a target replacement rate
of 81 percent for couples in the bottom third of the income distribution,
72 percent for couples in the middle third, and 67 percent for couples
in the top third. By their calculations, 43 percent of households were
at risk in 2004 of having inadequate retirement income. In later work,
Munnell et al. (2007) ﬁnd a sizable increase in the share of households
at risk according to the NRRI from 1983 to 2004. Among the bottom
third of the income distribution, the share at risk increased from 47 to
53 percent, while among the top two-thirds the proportion rose from 24
to 38 percent.5
As in the literature on the effects of DC accumulations on other
forms of household savings, the studies on retirement savings adequacy
have been relatively inconclusive. Several conclude that retirement savings were adequate and expected replacement rates were generally high,
whereas others ﬁnd that expected replacement rates were relatively low
and a large number of households near retirement age were at risk of
inadequate income at retirement. I shall return to the subject of retirement adequacy among working-age households in Chapter 7. I will
look at their indicators of retirement adequacy—projected retirement
income, projected replacement rates, and the projected share of retirees
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above the poverty line. My results show a very large projected gain in
retirement income from 1989 to 2001 but much smaller advances from
2001 to 2007. Expected replacement rates showed improvement from
1989 to 2001 and again from 2001 to 2007, though over the later period
at least, gains were due more to a reduction in preretirement income
than to advances in projected income at retirement. The share of near
retirees at risk of falling below the poverty line at retirement declined
from 1989 to 2001 but remained unchanged from 2001 to 2007.

ARE THERE ALSO IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC
STATUS OF THE ELDERLY?
Though retirement adequacy by itself is extremely important, its
focus is typically on the share of preretirement income replaced at
retirement. Equally important is how the elderly have fared in absolute
terms and how these indicators have changed over time. The literature
on the overall economic status of the elderly deals with these issues.
In one of the earlier studies on this topic, Hurd (1994) shows that
the mean income of households aged 65 and over increased sharply
between 1970 and 1975 but only moderately from 1975 to 1987. As a
fraction of the overall mean household income, average elderly income
rose from 54 percent in 1970 to 61 percent in 1975 and then to only
63 percent by 1987. Smith (1997), using 1994 HRS data, ﬁnds that
median ﬁnancial wealth among white households aged 70 and over was
only $15,600; for white households aged 51–61 it was $23,400, and for
black and Hispanic households in the two age groups it was zero. Venti
and Wise (1998), using HRS data for 1992, estimated a high degree of
wealth dispersion among persons aged 51–61, even after controlling for
lifetime earnings.
Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) also report a large variation in household wealth at retirement on the basis of data from the
PSID and the Consumer Expenditure Survey. In this study, they seek
to determine whether the standard life-cycle model could explain this
large dispersion. In particular, they test whether differences in time
preference rates, risk tolerance, exposure to uncertainty, relative tastes
for work and leisure at older ages, and income replacement rates might
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be responsible for the large inequality observed in the data. In each
case, the authors reject these factors as possible explanatory factors.
Purcell (2009c) presents some recent estimates of the income of
elderly Americans on the basis of CPS data. In almost all cases, the
results show major gains made by the elderly from 1968 to 2008. The
mean annual income in 2008 dollars of persons aged 65 and older rose
by 84 percent from 1968 to 2000 and by another 9.2 percent from 2000
to 2008. The median annual income in real terms of individuals aged
65 and above showed a similar pattern, rising by 89 percent from 1968
to 2000 and then by 7.3 percent from 2000 to 2008. On the household
level, the real median annual income of elderly households (deﬁned as
husband or wife aged 65 or older) gained 91 percent from 1968 to 2000
and an additional 4.5 percent from 2000 to 2008. Moreover, the ratio of
the median income of elderly households to nonelderly ones progressed
from a ratio of 0.38 in 1968 to 0.49 in 2000 and then to 0.54 in 2008.
The gains during the 2000s were primarily due to the sharp fall in the
median income of the nonelderly, by 6.7 percent. In fact, on the basis of
“scaled” or “equivalent” income, the ratio of elderly to nonelderly mean
household income advanced from 0.47 in 1968 to 0.57 in 2000 and then
to 0.63 in 2008.6 The poverty rate of people aged 65 and older fell from
25 percent in 1968 to 9.9 percent in 2000 and then declined a bit more
to 9.7 percent in 2008.
In a related study, Purcell (2009b) provides a breakdown of the
sources of income of households aged 65 and older. For the bottom
quartile, Social Security was by far the major source of income, accounting for 84 percent of the total income of households in that quartile.
Pensions were a very small portion, only 5 percent of their income, as
was income from assets, 3 percent. For households in the second quartile, Social Security was also the overwhelming source of their income,
comprising 67 percent. Pensions were larger, at 14 percent, as was asset
income, at 6 percent. Among the third quartile, Social Security dropped
to 42 percent as a share of total income, pensions were up to 23 percent, and asset income was up to 8 percent. For the top quartile, Social
Security plummeted to 17 percent of income, pensions fell a bit to 16
percent, and asset income was up to 16 percent. Their major source of
income was labor earnings, which made up 49 percent of their total
income. I shall report somewhat similar ﬁndings on the composition of
augmented wealth by wealth group in Chapter 6.
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Wolff and Zacharias (2009) ﬁnd that the relative well-being of the
elderly was even greater than that measured by gross money income.
They examine the economic well-being of the elderly using the Levy
Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being (LIMEW), which is is a
comprehensive measure that incorporates broader deﬁnitions of income
from wealth, government expenditures, and taxes than standard income,
and also includes the value of household production. Wolff and Zacharias ﬁnd that, according to LIMEW, the elderly were much better off
relative to the nonelderly. The main reason is that income from wealth
and net government expenditures for the elderly was much higher than
for the nonelderly. Both mean and median LIMEW also grew much
faster for the elderly than the nonelderly over the 1989–2001 period.
In contrast, growth rates of money income were actually greater for the
nonelderly than the elderly over this period. Wolff and Zacharias also
ﬁnd that the degree of inequality in LIMEW was substantially higher
among the elderly than among the nonelderly. In contrast, inequality in
money income was virtually identical between the two groups. Inequality in the LIMEW grew for both the elderly and the nonelderly, while
the inequality in standard money income grew only for the latter group.
Butrica, Murphy, and Zedlewski (2008) also use an expanded measure of well-being, as well as alternative deﬁnitions of resource availability and poverty thresholds, to measure poverty among the elderly.
They use the 2004 wave of the HRS. Their main ﬁnding is that alternative poverty measures that account for spending on health produced
higher poverty rates than the ofﬁcial poverty measure, even when the
value of housing and ﬁnancial assets were included in the measure of
resource availability. They also ﬁnd that poverty remained concentrated
among single women, blacks, Hispanics, and adults aged 85 and older
regardless of how poverty was measured, because these populations
have relatively little in the way of housing equity or ﬁnancial assets.
Several studies have also considered whether households have
accumulated an adequate amount of wealth for retirement. Gustman
and Steinmeier (2000), using the 1992 wave of the HRS, estimate that
by 1992, pensions and retiree health insurance represented one-quarter
of the wealth of families on the verge of retirement. Their simulations
suggested that between 1969 and 1992, after controlling for the effects
of changes in wages and years of covered work on pension beneﬁt
amounts, changes in pension coverage and changes in pension plan
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provisions would have raised the total wealth of each household in the
HRS by $67,000 in 1992 dollars. This would have increased the wealth
from employer-provided pension beneﬁts per household by 150 percent
in real terms. Changes in retiree health beneﬁts, which were only about
7 percent of the value of pensions, experienced similar real growth,
increasing in value by $3,700 in 1992 dollars. Most of the increase
in pension values and in the value of retiree health insurance was due
to improvements in real beneﬁts among covered workers. All classes
of wealth holders enjoyed increased wealth from employer-provided
retirement plans, but those in the top half of the wealth distribution
enjoyed increases that were much larger in absolute terms and were also
larger in relation to their total wealth than were the gains received by
those in the bottom half of the wealth distribution.
Using data from the 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 SCF,
Engen, Gale, and Uccello (2005) examine the relation between ﬂuctuations in the aggregate value of equities (stocks) and the adequacy
of households’ saving for retirement. They ﬁnd that many and perhaps
most households appeared to be saving adequate amounts for retirement, and that there was almost no link between stock values and the
adequacy of retirement saving. Historical variation in equity values and
ownership had little correlation with the historical variation in the adequacy of saving. Even a simulated 40 percent decline in stock values
had little effect on the adequacy of saving. These results are explained
by the fact that equities are highly concentrated among households with
signiﬁcant amounts of other wealth (as was shown in Tables 2.11a and
2.11b in Chapter 2). Middle-class and poorer households, on the other
hand, did not accumulate enough stocks in their portfolios to be very
exposed to downturns in the stock market. As a result, stock market
downturns do not appear to be a cause of an inadequate level of retirement savings for the vast majority of households.
In two related working papers, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2007a,
2008) argue that over the past two and a half decades there was a fundamental change in retirement saving, with a rapid shift from employermanaged DB pensions to DC saving plans that are largely controlled by
employees. To understand how this change will affect the well-being of
future retirees, they project the future growth of 401(k) assets at age 65
for cohorts attaining age 65 between years 2000 and 2040. Using data
from the HRS and the SIPP, they estimate that cohorts that attain age
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65 in future decades will have accumulated much greater retirement
savings (in real dollars) than the retirement savings of current retirees.
They also consider how the change in the pension system will affect the
wealth of future retirees. The personal retirement account system is not
yet mature. A person who retired in 2000, for example, could have contributed to a 401(k) for at most 18 years, and the typical 401(k) participant had only contributed for a little over 7 years. Nonetheless, current
401(k) assets are quite large. Poterba, Venti, and Wise consider in this
paper the implications of rising 401(k) savings through the year 2040.
In particular, they focus on the growth of the sum of Social Security
wealth and 401(k) assets for families in each decile of the Social Security wealth distribution. Their projections show a substantial increase
between 2000 and 2040 in the sum of these retirement assets in each
wealth decile.
Love, Smith, and McNair (2008), using data from the 1998–2006
waves of the HRS, construct two measures of the current wealth adequacy of older (aged 51–61 in 1992) American households. The ﬁrst is
the ratio of what they call comprehensive wealth—deﬁned as net worth
plus expected future income streams—that would be needed to generate
expected poverty-line income in future years. According to this index,
they estimate that the median older American household was reasonably well situated, with a poverty ratio of about 3.9 in 2006. However,
they also ﬁnd that about 18 percent of households had less wealth than
would be needed to generate 150 percent of poverty-line income over
their expected future lifetime.
Love, Smith, and McNair’s (2008) second measure was the ratio
of the annuitized value of comprehensive resources to preretirement
earnings. On the basis of this index, they estimate a median replacement rate of about 105 percent, with about 13 percent of households
experiencing replacement rates of less than 50 percent. Comparing the
leading edge of the baby boomers in 2006 to households of the same
age in 1998, they also ﬁnd that the baby boomers showed slightly less
wealth in real terms than the corresponding age group in 1998, and
single boomers showed a bit higher incidence of inadequacy than did
their elders. Nonetheless, the median single boomer appeared to have
adequate resources. Finally, they found a rising age proﬁle of annualized wealth within households over time even after controlling for
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other factors, suggesting that older households were not spending their
wealth as quickly as their survival probabilities were falling.
Smith, Soto, and Penner (2009) use the 1998–2006 waves of the
HRS to investigate how U.S. households changed their asset holdings at
older ages. They ﬁnd a sizable increase in the net worth of older households between 1998 and 2006, with most of the growth due to increases
in the value of housing. They also ﬁnd that, at least through 2006, older
households did not consume the total amount of their capital gains. This
asset accumulation provided older households with a ﬁnancial cushion for the turbulence experienced after 2007. The wealth distribution
was also highly skewed, and the age patterns of asset accumulation and
deaccumulation varied considerably by income group. High-income
elderly households increased their assets at older ages. Middle-income
elderly households reduced their assets in retirement, but at a rate that
for most seniors will not deplete assets within their expected life. Many
low-income elderly households accumulated fewer assets and spent
their ﬁnancial assets at a rate that will mostly deplete them at older ages,
leaving low-income seniors with only Social Security and DB pension
income at older ages.
Although there is some variance in reported results on this topic as
well, the general upshot is that the economic status of elderly households improved over the last few decades. This ﬁnding held in terms
of income, wealth, and the poverty status of these households. We have
already seen some evidence of this in Chapter 2 in terms of the wealth
holdings of elderly households. In Chapter 4 and particularly in Chapter
5, we shall see further evidence of this in the improvement of senior
households in terms of augmented wealth (standard net worth plus
retirement wealth) over the years 1983–2007.

WHAT WERE THE EFFECTS OF THE 2007–2009 RECESSION
ON PENSION WEALTH?
In Chapter 2 we saw evidence that the collapse of the housing and
stock prices in 2007–2009 lowered both average and median household
wealth. However, different groups of households had different degrees
of vulnerability to these price shocks, depending on their asset holdings.
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The sharp decline in the stock market in 2007–2009 put many
Americans nearing retirement in a difﬁcult ﬁnancial situation. Although
the market had almost fully rebounded as of November 2010 after hitting a low point in March 2009, important losses did occur. The Urban
Institute and the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College
were both involved in trying to predict the effects of the stock market
crash on the retirement readiness of older Americans. As we shall see,
the elderly were particularly hard hit by the stock market downturn.
Butrica and Issa (2010) of the Urban Institute analyze the impact of
the recession on DC retirement accounts and IRAs. They use data from
the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds to do the updating. From
the third quarter of 2007 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, retirement accounts
declined from a peak of $8.6 trillion to $5.9 trillion, for a loss of $2.8
trillion, or 31 percent of their value in nominal terms. In real terms,
the loss was even greater, at 34 percent. However, the value of these
accounts did come back, and by the fourth quarter of 2009, their value
was $7.6 trillion, though still 15 percent below their peak value (and at
the same level as the ﬁrst quarter of 2006 in real terms).
According to a study done by Sass, Monk, and Haverstick (2010) at
the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, the stock market
crash of 2008 signiﬁcantly dimmed the retirement prospects of many
workers who were approaching retirement. These workers are, in general, heavily dependent on 401(k) plans (as opposed to traditional DB
pensions) as a source of retirement income. During the economic downturn, these plans lost about one-third of their value. Even before the
crash, many older workers lacked the assets needed to enjoy a comfortable retirement. The rational response to a sharp decline in retirement
wealth is to “spread the pain” by saving more, working longer, and consuming less in retirement. The extent to which workers are absorbing
a portion of the loss by saving more and working longer is thus critical
for assessing their economic prospects at retirement.
To address these questions, the Center for Retirement Research
in the summer of 2009 surveyed a nationally representative sample
of 1,317 workers approaching retirement, aged 45–59, on changes in
retirement saving and expected retirement age. The survey also collected data on the ﬁnancial and employment characteristics, emotional
reactions to the downturn, and enhanced ﬁnancial literacy. The major
ﬁndings were that two-thirds of working people in this age group said
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that they now had less retirement savings than they did before the recession, 40 percent expected to retire later than they had planned (by an
average of 4 additional years), and many reported experiencing a level
of distress equal to or even greater than that caused by the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001.
However, two-thirds of the workers in the sample reported that
they had not changed their saving behavior for their 401(k)s, IRAs,
and other retirement accounts. In contrast, 60 percent of the workers
reported having changed their spending levels. The main conclusion of
the Center for Retirement Research study was that there was a signiﬁcant increase in expected retirement ages but not much change in retirement saving. The study found no differences in behavior by race or sex.
The study also provided some evidence that if credible ﬁnancial advice
were more widely available, we might have seen more alterations in
savings behavior to offset the effects of the Great Recession.
Two surveys conducted by Bank of America (2010) in 2008 ﬁnd
similar results regarding unchanged savings behavior. The ﬁrst survey
was conducted in March and the second survey in November by Braun
Research via telephone using a random digit dial methodology between
the dates of November 5 and 12, 2008. Braun surveyed 750 nationally
representative Americans, plus 250 individuals with investable assets of
between $100,000 and $3 million. The sample size was about 1,000 in
each of the two months.
The survey ﬁnds that a growing number of Americans were concerned that the current economic crisis was threatening to leave them
further behind on their retirement plans. As a result, 6 in 10 Americans
were spending less than they were three months prior. However, even
with this decreased spending, 51 percent of the general public and 40
percent of afﬂuent Americans were also saving less than they had been
three months earlier, and approximately one in ﬁve said that they were
saving “much less.”
The ﬁndings underscore how deeply troubled Americans were
about their retirement savings and ﬁnancial well-being, with 23 percent
of respondents indicating that the impact of economic turbulence on
their retirement savings was the ﬁnancial issue that concerned them
most. Based on this survey, it appears that many Americans were not
fully able to save what was needed to retire as they had planned, and
some were tapping into their ﬁnancial savings to meet more immediate

Wolff.indb 72

11/21/2011 9:17:33 AM

Review of the Literature 73

ﬁnancial needs. Although the majority of respondents (68 percent) with
at least one retirement account said that they had not had to withdraw
assets from their accounts prematurely, recent economic conditions had
caused 18 percent to withdraw assets prematurely. The main reasons
for these early withdrawals were near-term ﬁnancial obligations, such
as credit card debt (26 percent) and mortgage payments (22 percent),
with an additional 22 percent citing recent job loss. The article argues
that if the economy should continue to worsen, these numbers may
increase signiﬁcantly. The possibility of many more Americans dipping
into their retirement savings could have profound implications for the
country’s future economic well-being.
In light of the recent economic turbulence, many Americans (43
percent) believe they now face more years in the workforce than they
expected a couple of years ago. This will clearly affect baby boomers
the most, or those approaching retirement who may not have time to
recover the ﬁnancial losses incurred during the ﬁnancial crisis. For this
reason, it is not surprising that 36 percent of afﬂuent respondents said
current economic conditions had pushed back their expected retirement
age.
According to responses to the Bank of America Retirement survey
(2010) conducted in March, 53 percent of the general public and 36
percent of afﬂuent Americans were either behind schedule or had not
started their retirement planning efforts. Comparatively, according to
ﬁndings from the later survey conducted in November, 62 percent of
the general public and closer to half (44 percent) of afﬂuent Americans
were either behind schedule or had not started their retirement planning
efforts. Despite the recent market turmoil, 68 percent of respondents
had not changed the way they save, invest, or manage their retirement
assets in the prior three months. The article notes that this lack of change
could be a sign that Americans do not exactly know what to do besides
reducing spending and continuing to watch as their retirement assets
diminish. This later survey further conﬁrmed that Americans need better
guidance and education regarding how best to plan for retirement and
manage their retirement assets. In fact, 59 percent of the general public and 52 percent of afﬂuent Americans did not know how much they
would need to save in order to maintain their current standard of living
in retirement, according to this survey. Nearly half of retired Americans
indicated that they do not believe or are unsure whether their retirement
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assets would cover their ﬁnancial needs throughout their remaining lifetime. According to this survey, 25 percent of the general public and 33
percent of afﬂuent Americans still had at least one 401(k) or 403(b)
plan with a former employer. Of those who had a plan with a former
employer, close to half (48 percent for the general public, and 46 percent for the afﬂuent) intended to keep their assets in the existing plan.
The upshot of this survey is that Americans probably do not know how
to meet the impending retirement crisis other than to cut their spending.
Rich Morin (2009) of the Pew Research Center reaches similar conclusions based on a national survey by the center’s Social and Demographic Trends Project. During the recession of 2007–2009, which took
a heavy toll on household wealth, just over half of all working adults
aged 50–64 said that they might delay their retirement, and another
16 percent said that they never expect to stop working. The survey’s
ﬁndings are based on a telephone survey of a nationally representative
sample of 2,969 adults conducted from February 23 through March 23,
2009. Overall, 37 percent of full-time employed adults of all ages said
that they had thought in the past year about postponing their eventual
retirement. This proportion increased to 52 percent among full-time
workers aged 50–64 (the so-called threshold generation). They were
twice as likely as younger workers to say they never planned to retire
(16 percent vs. 8 percent). Moreover, those in the threshold generation
who did plan to retire someday said that they planned to keep working,
on average, until they were 66 years old, which would make them four
years older than the average age at which current retirees 65 or older
reported that they had stopped working.
Investment losses appeared to play more of a role in the decision
of when to retire. Among the threshold generation as well as among
other age groups, higher-income earners were only slightly less likely
than lower-income adults to have considered postponing retirement.
But regardless of income or age, those who lost 40 percent or more
of their retirement account were roughly twice as likely as those who
had not lost money in the market meltdown to say that they thought
about delaying their eventual retirement from the workforce. The rising
inclination to delay retirement was driven in part by the recession of
2007–2009, but it was also in conformity with longer-term labor market
trends. Morin reported that the labor force participation rate of those
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aged 65 and older had already increased from 13 percent in 2000 to 17
percent in 2008.
There were also gender and racial differences in the decision of
when to retire. Among all age groups, 46 percent of full-time employed
women said that they thought about delaying retirement in the past
year, compared with 31 percent of all working men. Also, 40 percent of
whites thought about extending their working lives, compared with 32
percent of blacks and 34 percent of Hispanics. Income differences mattered less in the retirement decision. Among those with family incomes
of less than $30,000, 44 percent thought about postponing their retirement, compared with 37 percent of those earning $100,000 or more.
Similarly, 36 percent of those making $30,000–$50,000 and 38 percent
in the $50,000–$100,000 income bracket considered working longer as
the recession developed from 2007 to 2009.
Moreover, among adults aged 50–64 who were employed full time,
61 percent of women working full time in this age group said they had
reconsidered when they would retire, compared with 45 percent of men.
This gender gap is consistent with other research showing that older
women approaching retirement have fewer economic resources to draw
on than do men. But among this age group, there was little difference in
plans to delay retirement by income. Working adults who were closer
to age 65 (the traditional retirement age) were even more likely than
younger members of the threshold generation (50–64) to have considered delaying their retirement. Over two-thirds of those aged 57–64
said they had thought about delaying retirement, compared with 44 percent of those aged 50–56.
Working members of the threshold generation were the least conﬁdent of any age group that they would have enough money to last
through their retirement years. Only 21 percent of those aged 50–64
said that they were “very conﬁdent” that they had enough income and
assets to tide them over, compared with 37 percent of full-time workers
younger than age 30 and 40 percent of those aged 65 and older. Most
Americans, young or old, said that the recession made it harder to take
care of their ﬁnancial needs in retirement. However, working adults in
the threshold generation were more inclined than any other age group to
feel this way. Among those aged 50–64 with full-time jobs, 78 percent
said that the recession made it more difﬁcult to take care of their ﬁnan-
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cial needs in retirement, compared with 66 percent of those younger
than 50. Income differences played little role in fueling the recessiondriven ﬁnancial worries of the threshold generation. Similarly, there
was little difference by gender, by level of education, or by race.
It is also the case that among all adults, the threshold generation saw
the value of their investments shrink the most, with 76 percent saying
that they had lost money in mutual funds, individual stocks, or retirement accounts, compared with 54 percent of those younger than age 50.
Working members of this generation who lost money on investments
were also more likely than those who did not suffer losses to say that
they had considered delaying retirement (54 vs. 45 percent), and they
were more likely to have considered taking this step than were adults
below the age of 50 who had lost money in the market (54 vs. 34 percent). Investment losses also affected ﬁnancial conﬁdence, as 82 percent of working members of the threshold generation who lost money
in the past year said that the recession would make it harder for them
to meet their ﬁnancial needs in retirement, compared with 66 percent
of those aged 18–49. The degree of loss also mattered in this regard:
among all adults employed full time, those who had lost 40 percent or
more on their investments were twice as likely as those who had lost
nothing to say that they thought about delaying their retirement.
Butrica, Smith, and Toder (2009a,b) from the Urban Institute show
that delaying retirement even by a year might greatly help offset the
effects of the recession. The beneﬁts of delaying retirement would be
greatest for the late boomers, less for middle boomers, and least for
preboomers, although it would be beneﬁcial to all. Moreover, while
people with lower incomes had less to lose in the stock market crash,
they would be the ones to beneﬁt the most from an additional year of
working life.
Butrica, Smith, and Toder (2009a,b) also show possibilities for
the future after the stock market crash. They ﬁrst note that the sharp
decline in the stock market in 2008 placed the retirement security of
many Americans at risk (although the market rebounded sharply after
its trough in March 2009). They simulate and compare various fast and
slow recovery scenarios to a “no-crash” scenario that shows what the
long-term trend in retirement assets would have been if the stock market had not collapsed in 2008 but instead had continued to increase at
its historical rate from the 2007 level. The three scenarios they consider
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are 1) a “no recovery” scenario in which the stock market does not
rebound but instead resumes its long-term historical rate after 2008; 2) a
“repeat 70s” scenario in which real stock prices continue to decline for
a number of years after the 2008 crash, as they did between 1974 and
1982; and 3) a “full recovery” scenario in which the stock market fully
rebounds after 10 years to the projected no-crash level in 2017.
According to calculations by Butrica, Smith, and Toder (2009a,b),
if stocks remain depressed, as after the 1974 crash, 20 percent of preboomers born in 1941–1945 and 22 percent of late boomers born in
1961–1965 would see their retirement incomes drop 10 percent or
more. Working another year would reduce the share of these big losses
to 14 percent for late boomers. Because most preboomers were already
retired, their share of big losses would decline slightly to 19 percent.
Delaying retirement would disproportionately beneﬁt low-income people because their additional earnings exceed their stock market losses.
Another ﬁnding indicates that the effect of the market crash on
retirement incomes varied by age, income level, and assumptions about
future market performance. About 63 percent of boomers were estimated to have owned stocks in 2008, but those in the higher income
quintiles were affected much more than others because they were more
likely to have retirement accounts and other ﬁnancial assets, and to hold
larger shares of their ﬁnancial wealth in stocks. Those farthest from
retirement age fared better than older people because they had less
wealth when the market crashed because of fewer years of accruals
(even though they were more likely to have retirement accounts and
invest in equities), and because they had more time to restore their lost
wealth through new stock acquisitions and future appreciation before
retirement.
Preboomers lost in all scenarios, and all cohorts lost under the norecovery scenario. Middle boomers and late boomers experienced net
income losses under the no-recovery scenario but retirement income
gains under the full-recovery scenario. For example, the highest income
quintile of middle boomers experienced on average a 14 percent loss in
income at age 67 if the market failed to recover, but a 4 percent gain
on average if the market fully recovered to its previous path by 2017.
Gains and losses also varied depending on the individual’s portfolio
allocations and the market performance of their investments.
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In contrast, Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2009) offer a
much more sanguine view of the effects of the stock market crash on
retirement preparedness. Their ﬁndings indicate that although the consequences of the decline in the stock market were serious for those
approaching retirement, the average person approaching retirement age
was not likely to suffer a life-changing ﬁnancial loss from the recession
of 2007–2009. Likewise, the probable effects of the stock market downturn on retirement resources have been greatly exaggerated. If there is
any postponement of retirement due to stock market losses, on average
it will be a matter of a few months rather than years. Counting layoffs,
retirements may be accelerated rather than reduced.
Using HRS data, Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2009) calculate trends in pensions among three cohorts: those aged 51–56 in 1992,
called the HRS cohort; those 51–56 in 1998, called the war baby cohort;
and those 51–56 in 2004, called the early boomer cohort. They ﬁnd that
pension coverage was much more extensive than was usually recognized. Over three-quarters of the households with a person aged 51–56
in 2004 were either currently covered by a pension or had had pension
coverage in the past. Pension wealth accounted for 23 percent of the
total wealth (including Social Security wealth) of those on the verge of
retirement. For those nearing retirement age, DC plans remained small.
As a result, 63 percent of pension wealth held by those aged 51–56
in 2004 was in the form of a DB plan.7 The ﬁgures were even higher
for the older cohorts. Three-quarters of the pension wealth of the HRS
cohort was from DB plans, as was 65 percent of the pension wealth of
the war baby cohort. The fact that such a higher share of pension wealth
was in the form of DB pension wealth should cushion the drop in overall pension wealth from the stock market crash.
In general, these papers (with the exception of Gustman, Steinmeier,
and Tabatabai [2009]) indicate that the 2007–2009 recession wreaked
ﬁnancial havoc on workers close to retirement age. On the basis of
direct survey questions, it appears that many of these workers suffered
large declines in DC plan pension wealth and on their net worth overall.
As a consequence, a large number of them plan to postpone retirement
and/or to decrease their future consumption spending. In Chapter 5, I
shall also investigate the effects of the crisis of 2007–2009 on the pension wealth holdings of those on the verge of retirement. I also ﬁnd a
large plunge in pension wealth from 2007 to 2009 and, indeed, report

Wolff.indb 78

11/21/2011 9:17:36 AM

Review of the Literature 79

that DC pension wealth had remained virtually unchanged from 2001
to 2009. However, I will not investigate the effects of the recession on
either retirement behavior or spending plans.

Notes
1. A related topic of interest is whether DC pension plans have substituted for DBtype plans. Popke (1999), using employer data (IRS 5500 ﬁlings) for 1992, ﬁnds
that, indeed, 401(k) and other DC plans substituted for terminated DB plans, and
that offering a DC plan raised the chance of a termination in DB coverage.
2. See Wolff (1992) for a discussion of some of the methodological issues involved
in estimating both Social Security and pension wealth.
3. Net Social Security wealth is deﬁned as the discounted present value of future
Social Security beneﬁts less future taxes paid into the Social Security (OASI)
system. Estimates were not provided separately for pension wealth and Social
Security wealth.
4. There are a host of studies that examine the intra-cohort redistributional effects of
Social Security beneﬁts relative to contributions into the Social Security system.
They consider which groups are net gainers and which net losers from the Social
Security system as a whole. These authors include Wolff (1993a,b), who uses the
1962 SFCC and the 1983 SCF; Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (2000), who derive
their estimates from the PSID; Smith, Toder, and Iams (2001), who base their
work on the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data matched
with Social Security administrative data and the microsimulation MINT model;
Liebman (2002), who matches Social Security Administration earnings and beneﬁt records to the 1990 and 1991 panels of the SIPP; and Leimer (2003, 2004),
who bases his analyses on Social Security administrative data.
5. Also see Jonathan Skinner (2007) for a review of the literature on savings
adequacy.
6. Equivalent or scaled income adjusts household income for household size. The
formula used in this study for equivalent income is household income / (number
of adults + number of children under 18)0.5. The higher ratios of equivalent income
in comparison to normal household income are due to the fact that average household size is smaller among elderly households than the nonelderly.
7. These proportions seem a lot larger than the ones I compute from the SCF. For
example, DB wealth as a share of total pension wealth among the age group 47–64
was 47 percent in 2001 and only 41 percent in 2007.

Wolff.indb 79

11/21/2011 9:17:37 AM

Wolff.indb 80

11/21/2011 9:17:37 AM

4
The Slowdown in Pension
Wealth Growth in the 2000s
As I discuss in Chapter 1, one of the most dramatic changes in
the retirement income system over the last three decades has been the
replacement of many traditional DB pension plans with DC pensions.
Has this transformation been beneﬁcial to most American households?
This is the principal focus of the chapter. Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(1998) ﬁnd that the transition from DB to DC type plans increased
mean pension wealth dramatically in the 1990s, at least. I ﬁnd that the
transformation was largely beneﬁcial to American families during the
1980s and 1990s, particularly the latter decade, when the stock market boomed. However, during the period 2001–2007 (and before the
meltdown in the ﬁnancial markets), pension wealth growth slowed substantially. Moreover, overall pension coverage itself, after rising rapidly
from 1989 to 2001, fell in 2007.
A secondary interest is the effect of pension wealth on overall
wealth inequality. Feldstein (1976), in a seminal paper on this subject,
ﬁnds that adding Social Security wealth to marketable net worth led to
a sharp reduction in measured wealth inequality (see Chapter 3). Is this
also true for pension wealth? Does retirement wealth in total (the sum
of Social Security and pension wealth) help to equalize the distribution
of household wealth? This chapter will show that the addition of pension wealth to marketable net worth does reduce overall wealth inequality, but the equalizing effect is much smaller than that of Social Security
wealth (discussed in Chapter 5). Moreover, the evidence of both this
chapter and Chapter 5 will show that the equalizing effect of retirement
wealth dissipated over time, particularly after 2001.
The results of this and the next chapter will also clear up the “puzzle”
discussed in Chapter 2—that (marketable) wealth inequality remained
largely unchanged from 1989 to 2007, while both income inequality
and the ratio of stock prices to housing prices increased. In contrast, I
do ﬁnd an increase in the inequality of augmented wealth (the sum of
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net worth, pension and Social Security wealth) from 1989 to 2007 (see
Chapter 5).
The next section of the chapter develops the accounting framework
used in the analysis. How has the change in the pension system affected
pension coverage for individual workers? In this regard, the section
after that presents results on pension coverage for workers both overall
and by demographic characteristic for the period 1989–2007.
The chapter then moves on to discuss the change in the pension
system and the effects it had on pension coverage and pension values
on the household level, and to investigate changes in pension coverage,
pension wealth, and private accumulations—i.e., the sum of net worth
and (private) pension wealth—on the household level over the more
extended time interval, 1983–2007. The ﬁnal section contains a provisional summary of the results.
A full treatment of the retirement system would not be complete
without consideration of the Social Security system. Chapter 5 introduces Social Security wealth and presents results on its movement on
the household level from 1983 to 2007. It presents summary measures
on total (augmented) household wealth, the sum of net worth, pension
wealth, and Social Security wealth. The chapter will show alternative
pension wealth calculations and present an update of the pension wealth
estimates to 2009 (July 1, 2009, to be exact) on the basis of changes in
stock prices.

ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK
The standard wealth concept is marketable wealth (or net worth),
which was deﬁned in Chapter 2. It should be noted that the standard
deﬁnition of net worth includes the market value of DC pension plans.
Deﬁned contribution plans include a variety of ﬁnancial instruments. There are two types: individually provided plans and employerprovided plans. Individually provided plans are IRAs and Keogh plans.1
Standard employer-provided DC plans are 401(k), 403(b), SRA (supplemental retirement account), and 457 plans. Firms also provide a variety
of other plans, such as proﬁt-sharing, tax-deferred annuities, portable
cash option plans, IRA-SEP (simpliﬁed employee pension) or IRA-
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SIMPLE (simpliﬁed incentive match plan for employers), SARSEP
(salary reduction simpliﬁed employee pension), TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association/College Retirement Equity
Fund), money purchase plans, deferred compensation plans, cash balance plans, stock purchase/ESOP (employee stock option plan), thrift/
savings plans, and the like. I have combined all of these as DC plans.
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans include (but are not limited to) state, local,
and federal government plans, PERS (public employees retirement
system), employer-provided annuity plans, and traditional DB plans.
Some employer-provided plans are a mixture of the two. Following the
SCF protocol, I have divided DC plans from DB plans on the basis of
whether they are “account-type” plans, with a balance or cash value, or
whether they are “formula-type” plans, with no cash balance and the
beneﬁt determined by such variables as years of service and earnings
history.
My principal data source, as indicated in Chapter 2, is the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF). While the SCF provides considerable detail
on marketable assets and liabilities held by the household, it does not
provide estimates of pension or Social Security wealth. These variables
have to be estimated by the user.2
Before proceeding to the actual empirical results, it is necessary
to make imputations of both DB pension wealth and Social Security
wealth. The reason for the imputations is that, with the exception of
the 1983 SCF, estimates of these two variables are not provided in the
SCF data because their estimation requires making assumptions about
several parameters, as indicated below.3 Since researchers may differ in
what they believe are the best assumptions to make, the Federal Reserve
Board believes it would be inappropriate for them to arbitrarily make
speciﬁc assumptions.
The imputation of DB pension wealth and Social Security wealth
involves a large number of steps, which are summarized below. Greater
details are shown in Appendix B.
DB Pension Wealth
For retirees (r) the procedure is straightforward. Let PB be the pension beneﬁt currently being received by the retiree. The SCF questionnaire indicates how many pension plans each spouse is involved in and
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what the expected (or current) pension beneﬁt is. The SCF questionnaire also indicates whether the pension beneﬁts remain ﬁxed in nominal terms over time for a particular beneﬁciary or are indexed for inﬂation. In the case of the former, DB pension wealth is given by
109 − A

(4.1a)

DBr = ∫ 0

PB(1 − mt)e−δtdt ,

and in the latter case,
109 − A

(4.1b)

DBr = ∫ 0

PB(1 − mt)e−δ*tdt ,

where A is the current age of the retiree; mt is the mortality rate at time t
conditional on age, gender, and race; δ* is the real annual discount rate,
set to 2 percent; γ is the inﬂation rate and is assumed to be 3 percent per
year; δ = δ* + γ is the nominal annual discount rate, equal to 5 percent;
and the integration runs from zero to the number of years when the
retiree reaches age 109.4
Estimates of DC pension wealth (as well as Social Security wealth)
are quite sensitive to the choice of inﬂation rate and discount rate.
I choose a 3 percent inﬂation rate since it is very close to the actual
annual change of the CPI-U index from 1983 to 2007 (see Table D.1).
Moreover, I choose a 5 percent nominal discount rate because it likewise is close to the actual average annual rate of return on liquid assets
over the same period (see Appendix Table D.1). These two choices lead
to a 2 percent real discount rate (the difference between the two rates).
A higher real discount rate will lead to lower estimates of DB pension wealth (and likewise Social Security wealth), and conversely, a
lower discount rate will lead to higher estimates of these two variables.
I also use a 3 percent real discount rate to estimate both DB pension and
Social Security wealth. The general results in this book are not materially altered by the use of this higher discount rate.5
Among current workers (w) the procedure is more complex. The
SCF provides detailed information on pension coverage among current
workers, including the type of plan; the expected beneﬁt at retirement
or the formula used to determine the beneﬁt amount (for example, a
ﬁxed percentage of the average of the last ﬁve years’ earnings); the
expected retirement age when the beneﬁts are effective; the likely
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retirement age of the worker; and vesting requirements. Information is
provided not only for the current job (or jobs) of each spouse but for up
to ﬁve previous jobs as well. On the basis of the information provided in
the SCF and on projected future earnings (see Appendix B for details),
future expected pension beneﬁts (EPBw) are then projected to the year
of retirement or the ﬁrst year of eligibility for the pension. Then the
present value of pension wealth for current workers (w) is given by
109 − A

(4.2)

DBw = ∫ LR EPB(1 − mt)e−δtdt ,

where RA is the expected age of retirement and LR = A − RA is the
number of years to retirement. The integration runs from the number of
years to retirement, LR, to the number of years when the retiree reaches
age 109.6
It should be noted that the calculations of DB pension wealth for
current workers are based on employee response, including his or her
stated expected age of retirement (see Appendix B), not on employerprovided pension plans.7
Social Security Wealth
For current Social Security beneﬁciaries (r), the procedure is again
straightforward. Let SSB be the Social Security beneﬁt currently being
received by the retiree. Again, the SCF provides information for both
husband and wife. Since Social Security beneﬁts are indexed for inﬂation, Social Security wealth is given as
109 − A

(4.3)

SSWr = ∫ 0 SSB(1 − mt)e−δ*tdt,

where it is assumed that the current Social Security rules remain in
effect indeﬁnitely.8
The imputation of Social Security wealth among current workers is
based on the worker’s actual and projected earnings history estimated by
regression equation (see Appendix B). The steps are brieﬂy as follows.
First, coverage is assigned based on whether the individual expects
to receive Social Security beneﬁts and on whether the individual was
salaried or self-employed. Second, on the basis of the person’s earn-
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ings history, the person’s average indexed monthly earnings (AIME)
is computed. Third, on the basis of the rules current at the time of the
survey year, the person’s primary insurance amount (PIA) is derived
from AIME. Then,
109 − A

(4.4)

SSWw = ∫ LR PIA(1 − mt)e−δ*tdt.

As with pension wealth, the integration runs from the number of years
to retirement, LR, to the number of years when the retiree reaches age
109.9
Here, too, it should be noted that estimates of Social Security wealth
are based on reported earnings at a single point in time. These estimates
are likely to be inferior to those based on longitudinal work histories of
individual workers (see, for example, Smith, Toder, and Iams [2001]),
whose estimates are based on actual Social Security work histories. In
fact, actual work histories do show much more variance in earnings
over time than one based on a human capital earnings function projection. Moreover, they also show many periods of work disruption that
I cannot completely capture here. In contrast, I do have retrospective
information on work history provided by the respondent (see “Questions on Work History” in Appendix B for details). In particular, each
individual is asked to provide data on the total number of years worked
full time since age 18, the number of years worked part time since age
18, and the expected age of retirement (both from full- and part-time
work). On the basis of this information, it is possible to approximate the
total number of full- and part-time years worked over the individual’s
lifetime and use these ﬁgures in the estimate of the individual’s AIME.10
I can now deﬁne the different accounting measures to be used. Let
NWX be marketable household wealth excluding DC wealth and nonpension wealth. Then
(4.5)

NW = NWX + DC.

Total pension wealth, PW, is given by
(4.6)
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Private accumulations, PA, is then deﬁned as the sum of NWX and total
pension wealth:
(4.7)

PA = NWX + PW.

The term private accumulations is used to distinguish contributions to
wealth from private savings and employment contracts with both private and government employers from those of social insurance provided by the state, notably, Social Security.
Retirement wealth, RW, is then given as the sum of pension and
Social Security wealth:
(4.8)

RW = PW + SSW.

Finally, augmented household wealth, AW, is given by
(4.9)

AW = NWX + RW.

Employer Contributions to DC Pension Plans
To complete the accounting framework, I consider the contributions
employers make to DC pension plans. So far I have treated DC and DB
pension wealth (as well as Social Security wealth) on a comparable
footing, but there is an important difference between them in their deﬁnitions. In particular, I deﬁne DB wealth as the discounted future stream
of DB pension beneﬁts on the assumption that the employee remains at
his or her ﬁrm of employment until the person’s expected retirement
date. The computation of Social Security wealth is also based on the
assumption that the worker remains at work until the person’s expected
retirement date. On the other hand, the valuation of DC pension wealth
is based solely on the current market value of DC plans. There is no
added value in the calculation of DC wealth from the employee remaining at work (until the expected date of retirement).
What if we put DC wealth on an equal footing with DB wealth? To
do this, we could add into DC wealth a projection of the future stream
of employer contributions to DC accounts like 401(k) plans until the
expected year of retirement. Luckily, the SCF does provide information on employer contribution to DC plans (see Appendix B). If we
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assume, as in the case of DB pensions, that workers remain at their
company until retirement and that the terms of their DC contract with
their employer stay the same, then it is possible to do this. In most
cases, the employer contribution is a ﬁxed percentage of the employee’s
salary. On the basis of the estimated human capital earnings functions
for each worker and the “ongoing concern” assumption, it is possible to
calculate the annual stream of future employer contributions to the DC
plan until retirement, which I call DCEMP.11 Adding DCEMP to DC
would then put DC wealth on the same footing as DB wealth, since both
would reﬂect the available retirement wealth at time of retirement due
to employer contributions to retirement plans.12
The SCF questionnaire indicates how many DC pension plans each
spouse has (up to three per spouse).13 Information on the employer
contribution to DC pension plans is recorded in two ways. First, in
some cases, the contribution is given as a ﬂat dollar amount. Though
it is not indicated in the survey data whether the dollar contribution is
indexed to inﬂation over time, I assume that it is indexed to the CPI,
which seems the more likely arrangement.14 Let EMPAMT be the dollar amount of the employer contribution to the DC plan. Then, in the
case where employer contributions are recorded as a dollar amount, the
present value of the stream of future employer contributions, DCEMPa ,
is given by
LR

(4.10) DCEMPa = ∫ 0 EMPAMT (1 − mt)e−δ*tdt ,
where mt is the mortality rate at time t conditional on age, gender, and
race; and δ* is the real annual discount rate, set to 2 percent.15 The
integration runs from the current year to LR, where RA is the expected
age of retirement and LR = A – RA is the number of years to retirement.
Second, in most cases the employer contribution is given as a percentage of earnings. If we assume that the proportion, EMPPER, is
ﬁxed over time, then in the case where the respondent records employer
contributions as a percentage of earnings, DCEMPb, is given by
LR

(4.11)

DCEMPb = ∫ 0 EMPPER × E*t (1 − mt)e−δ*tdt,

where E*t is the predicted earnings of the worker at time t in constant
dollars (see Appendix B for details).
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The basic accounting framework can then be modiﬁed as follows:
DCEMP = DCEMPa + DCEMPb
DC* = DC + DCEMP
PW* = DB + DC*
PA* = NWX + PW*
RW* = PW* + SSW
AW* = NWX + RW* .
I shall return to a consideration of DCEMP in Chapter 5.

PENSION COVERAGE ON THE EMPLOYEE LEVEL
Here I address the question of whether the transformation of the
pension system increased or lowered pension coverage among individual workers. Though most of the analysis in the book will be conducted
on the household level, I ﬁrst look at pension coverage at the level of
the individual worker. In the SCF, almost all of the wealth variables are
provided only on the household level. However, one exception is information on pension plans, which is provided for both husband and wife.
Both husband and wife list their DC plans separately. Moreover, each
is asked about coverage from DB plans. Work history data and earnings
are also provided separately for each spouse, so that we can construct
estimates of DB pension wealth for each.
The story that will unfold is that DB pension coverage plummeted
over time. DC coverage increased sharply and picked up some of the
slack from the collapse of DB plans. However, this was true for only
certain occupations and industries. For other groups, overall pension
coverage diminished.
Table 4.1 begins the statistical portrait by showing pension coverage by type of pension plan for currently employed male and female
workers in 1989, 2001, and 2007.16 I ﬁnd that while male pension coverage fell over these years, female coverage increased, so that by 2007
virtual parity had been reached between the two genders. In 2007, 62
percent of male workers under the age of 65 had some type of pension coverage.17 Deﬁned contribution coverage was more prevalent: 28
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Table 4.1 Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Type of
Pension and Gender, 1989, 2001, and 2007
Age group
All workers (under age 65)
IRA or Keogh accounts
Employer-provided DC
accounts
All DC accounts
Current job DB plans
Past job DB plans
Current and past job DB
plans
DC and/or DB plans
All workers aged 46 and under
IRA or Keogh accounts
Employer-provided DC
accounts
All DC accounts
Current job DB plans
Past job DB plans
Current and past job DB
plans
DC and/or DB plans
All workers aged 47–64
IRA or Keogh accounts
Employer-provided DC
accounts
All DC accounts
Current job DB plans
Past job DB plans
Current and past job DB
plans
DC and/or DB plans

1989
Male Female

2001
Male Female

2007
Male Female

28.2
31.3

22.4
25.6

29.7
44.1

25.6
36.0

27.8
42.6

25.8
38.9

46.5
33.5
4.5
36.3

40.8
26.9
2.5
28.9

59.6
19.2
6.3
24.7

50.6
15.4
3.1
18.2

56.4
13.0
6.8
18.5

53.9
13.0
3.4
15.9

65.0

54.8

68.1

58.7

61.7

60.4

21.3
29.1

17.6
26.0

23.2
44.6

19.9
34.9

21.1
38.7

19.5
35.6

40.9
31.4
3.3
33.6

37.2
23.7
1.9
25.2

56.0
15.5
2.5
17.3

45.4
13.6
1.0
14.5

49.5
10.4
3.1
12.8

47.2
10.4
1.5
11.8

59.7

49.8

62.2

52.6

53.1

53.0

46.0
37.2

34.2
24.5

42.2
43.0

37.4
38.2

38.4
48.8

36.0
44.2

61.0
38.9
7.4
43.4

49.8
34.8
4.0
38.2

66.6
26.5
13.7
39.1

61.2
19.1
7.3
25.7

67.3
17.0
12.5
27.5

64.5
17.3
6.6
22.4

78.5

67.1

79.7

71.2

75.2

72.3

NOTE: The table includes only current workers aged 64 and under.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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percent of these workers had an IRA or Keogh account, 43 percent had
an employer-provided DC account, and together, 56 percent had some
type of DC account. However, only 13 percent were covered by a DB
plan from their current job and only 7 percent still had DB entitlements
(a “legacy” DB plan) from a past job.18 Altogether, 19 percent of male
workers in 2007 had some form of DB entitlement. Corresponding ﬁgures for female workers were only slightly lower than those for men.
Not surprisingly, pension coverage was lower for younger workers than for older ones. Among male workers under the age of 47, 53
percent had some pension coverage, mainly DC plans, while 75 percent
of male workers between the ages of 46 and 64 had coverage, again
primarily DC plans. Here again, ﬁgures for female workers were very
similar to those for men.
There were some substantial changes in coverage from 1989 to
2007. From 1989 to 2001, overall coverage rose moderately, by 3.2 percentage points for male workers and 3.9 percentage points for females.
However, trends were very different for DC coverage and DB coverage. DC coverage expanded by 13 percentage points for men and 10
percentage points for women, while DB coverage dwindled by 12 and
11 percentage points, respectively. Almost all of the losses in the DB
coverage were in current job plans. These were almost exactly offset by
increased coverage in employer-provided DC plans. Here, the substitution between DC and DB plans is very evident.
While changes in coverage were very similar for men and women
during the 1990s, they were quite different during the 2000s. Male pension coverage dropped substantially from 2001 to 2007, by 6.4 percentage points. There was again a marked decrease in DB coverage, by 6.2
percentage points, but even a loss in DC coverage, by 3.2 percentage
points. Losses in coverage were much greater for younger male workers, 9.1 percentage points, than among the older age group, 4.5 percentage points. Younger male workers, in particular, saw a sharp drop in
employer-provided DC plans of 6.5 percentage points, as well as in
current job DB plans of 5.1 percentage points. (This trend for younger
households will reemerge in the next section of the chapter.) Older male
workers also saw current job DB plan coverage plummet by 9.5 percentage points but DC plan coverage rise slightly.
In contrast, female workers saw a modest increase in pension coverage from 2001 to 2007, of 1.7 percentage points. This occurred among
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both younger and older female workers. The main reason was increased
access to employer-provided DC plans. As a result, whereas in 1989
and 2001 there was about a 10 percentage point gap in pension coverage between male and female workers, by 2007 almost complete convergence had been achieved.19
Pension Coverage by Race and Ethnicity
Table 4.2 shows coverage by race and ethnicity, as well as by educational attainment.20 The results will show sizable gaps in pension coverage between whites, blacks, and Hispanics. In 2007, 61 percent of
white male workers reported some kind of DC account, in contrast to 46
percent of African American workers and only 32 percent of Hispanic
workers. Differences in the share with DB entitlements were much
smaller between black and white male workers in 2007—virtually
zero—while there was a 13 percentage point gap between white male
and Hispanic male workers in favor of the former. Altogether, 66 percent of white male workers had some form of pension wealth in 2007,
compared to 54 percent of black male workers and only 36 percent of
Hispanic male workers. Differences in pension coverage by race and
ethnicity were very similar among female workers.
The share of male workers with a DC account advanced more for
blacks than whites from 1989 to 2001 but then fell more for the former
than the latter from 2001 to 2007. Declines in DB coverage were similar for the two racial groups. As a result, the gap in pension coverage
between white and African American male workers declined noticeably between 1989 and 2001, from 11 to 7 percentage points, and then
spiked upward between 2001 and 2007 to 12 percentage points, higher
than in 1989.
The time trends were different for female workers. In 1989, DB
pension coverage was much greater among black female workers than
among white female workers, 41 versus 28 percent. However, DB coverage declined much more among black females than among white
females from 1989 to 2007, so that by 2007 the DB coverage rate was
greater for white than black females. The share reporting a DC account
rose about the same for white females and black females from 1989 to
2007. As a result, the share of white female workers with pension coverage advanced from 57 percent in 1989 to 65 percent in 2007, while
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Table 4.2 Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Race,
Education, and Gender, 1989, 2001, and 2007
1989
2001
2007
Male Female Male Female Male Female
By racea
Non-Hispanic whites
All DC accounts
51.3 45.3
63.4 54.2
61.0 58.9
All DB plans
38.2 27.9
26.0 19.3
20.6 17.1
DC and/or DB plans
69.5 57.2
71.6 62.3
66.3 65.3
(Non-Hispanic) African
Americans
All DC accounts
34.9 28.6
49.9 47.1
45.6 41.8
All DB plans
36.9 40.6
25.9 16.8
20.5 14.0
DC and/or DB plans
58.8 53.3
65.0 55.6
54.2 48.5
Hispanics
All DC accounts
20.0 18.8
32.9 27.3
32.3 29.9
All DB plans
24.5 25.9
14.7 14.2
7.8
9.3
DC and/or DB plans
37.8 38.7
38.6 36.3
36.2 36.3
By educational attainment
No high school diploma
(or GED)
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
High school diploma
(or GED)
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Some college
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
College degree
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans

26.6
27.0
46.0

24.2
23.6
42.6

25.5
17.3
37.5

20.4
6.4
26.8

19.8
3.2
22.4

22.3
2.9
24.2

40.6
34.2
60.9

33.0
26.3
49.0

51.8
20.4
60.4

40.6
13.2
49.0

43.4
17.6
50.6

42.8
13.7
49.7

47.9
36.7
67.1

40.8
27.6
52.7

53.6
23.4
63.5

46.9
14.2
52.2

57.2
17.9
62.1

50.6
13.3
56.4

59.3
41.9
75.6

57.3
35.2
68.2

76.2
30.3
83.2

66.5
26.5
76.1

74.5
23.2
79.2

67.2
20.4
74.7

NOTE: The table includes all current workers aged 64 and under.
a
Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of their small sample size.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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the coverage rate for black females fell from 53 to 49 percent, and the
racial gap in coverage grew from 4 to 17 percentage points.
The gap in pension coverage remained very high between nonHispanic white and Hispanic white male workers from 1989 to 2007—a
little over 30 percentage points. Among female workers, the difference
widened from 19 percentage points in 1989 to 29 percentage points
in 2007, mainly due to the greater reduction in the DB coverage rate
among Hispanic female workers. In fact, the pension coverage rate
among Hispanic females actually fell by 2.4 percentage points from
1989 to 2007.21
Pension Coverage by Educational Attainment
The principal ﬁnding here is that the gap in pension coverage
between college graduates and the other educational groups expanded
substantially over the period 1989–2007 (see Table 4.2). The main
reason is not that pension coverage advanced dramatically among college graduates but rather that it dwindled among the other educational
groups.
In 2007, a mere 22 percent of male workers without a high school
degree had some form of pension coverage, compared to 51 percent
of those with a high school degree (or GED), 62 percent of those with
some college, and 79 percent of those who were college graduates.22
As a result, there were considerable gaps in pension coverage between
college graduates and the other groups. These differences were largely
a reﬂection of the gap in the proportion with a DC account, though there
was also a considerable difference in DB coverage between those without a high school degree and college graduates. The pattern of results is
very similar for female workers.
Pension coverage showed an absolute decline among the three lesseducated groups of workers. For male workers without a high school
degree (or GED), DC coverage declined from 27 percent in 1989 to
20 percent in 2007, DB coverage plummeted from 27 to 3 percent, and
overall pension coverage from 46 to 22 percent. For male high school
graduates, DC coverage rose slightly, from 41 to 43 percent, DB coverage contracted from 34 to 18 percent, and overall coverage fell from 61
to 51 percent. Among those with some college, DC coverage grew by 9
percentage points, DB coverage fell, and overall coverage dipped from
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67 to 62 percent. Among college graduates, the overall coverage rate
rose moderately, from 76 to 79 percent.
As a result, the gaps in pension coverage considerably widened
over time. The difference in the overall pension coverage rate between
the lowest educational group and college graduates mushroomed from
30 to 57 percentage points, the difference between high school and college graduates expanded from 15 to 29 percentage points, and the difference in overall pension coverage between those with some college
and college graduates climbed from 8 to 17 percent. Here, too, results
are similar among female workers.
Pension Coverage by Industry, Occupation, and
Employment Status
There are also marked differences in pension coverage by industry, occupation, and employment status (see Table 4.3). Of particular note are the sizable losses in pension coverage among male bluecollar workers. In 2007, the highest pension coverage among male
workers was found in public administration, 87 percent, followed by
nongovernmental services, 69 percent, wholesale and retail trade, 55
percent, and goods-producing industries, 50 percent.23 Among female
workers, the highest pension coverage was also found in public administration, 89 percent, also followed by nongovernmental services, 63
percent, but then followed by goods-producing industries, 61 percent,
and ﬁnally wholesale and retail trade, 44 percent. The share of workers
reporting a DC account was roughly similar to the proportion with any
pension coverage, and the rank order was almost identical. By far, the
highest proportion of workers with DB coverage was found in public
administration—57 percent for men and 55 percent for women. Deﬁned
beneﬁt coverage was quite low in goods-producing industries, 13 and 7
percent, respectively—surprising since this sector includes such heavily unionized industries as autos.
There were also some notable gender differences in coverage. In the
goods-producing sector, overall pension coverage was 61 percent for
women and only 50 percent for men. These differentials reﬂect the relatively large concentration of white-collar jobs among the women and
of blue-collar jobs among the men employed in this sector. In contrast,
overall pension coverage was higher for men than for women in trade
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Table 4.3 Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Industry,
Occupation, and Employment Status, 1989, 2001, and 2007
1989
2001
2007
Male Female Male Female Male Female
By industry of employmenta
Goods-producing industries
All DC accounts
45.5 39.8
55.2 53.5
45.8 58.2
All DB plans
33.6 24.7
23.3 15.1
12.7
7.4
DC and/or DB plans
62.1 52.7
64.7 57.9
50.3 60.5
Wholesale and retail trade
All DC accounts
39.8 28.5
49.8 39.1
53.1 38.6
All DB plans
15.4 14.8
12.6
7.4
9.4
6.4
DC and/or DB plans
49.0 37.6
54.1 42.5
55.0 41.1
Nongovernmental services
All DC accounts
49.9 44.2
64.9 52.1
63.4 56.1
All DB plans
42.7 31.0
26.1 19.9
19.5 16.7
DC and/or DB plans
70.4 58.4
72.7 61.5
68.8 63.1
Public administration
All DC accounts
49.7 47.0
75.5 58.6
72.6 66.1
All DB plans
73.9 62.0
59.0 41.9
56.8 54.5
DC and/or DB plans
96.3 74.9
95.9 75.8
87.4 88.8
By occupation of employment
Professional and managerial
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Technical and clerical
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Service workers
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Craft, operative, and
agricultural
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
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63.3
45.1
80.1

57.9
35.6
70.0

72.8
26.9
79.2

61.8
24.4
71.4

73.0
21.9
77.6

61.5
20.0
69.3

46.5
24.1
59.7

41.3
29.4
56.4

63.5
20.0
68.3

50.4
14.9
56.9

59.1
15.3
62.7

56.7
12.9
61.9

30.2
44.3
63.2

19.4
20.3
33.6

41.3
33.5
57.7

26.8
11.3
34.3

43.6
31.4
55.4

26.4
11.5
32.4

36.2
33.6
56.0

26.0
22.4
39.4

48.6
22.8
59.2

41.5
13.4
49.6

42.0
12.8
46.9

41.9
8.8
47.0
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Table 4.3 (continued)

By employment statusb
Part-time, full-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Full-time, part-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Part-time, part-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Full-time, full-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Self-employed workers
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans

1989
Male Female

2001
Male Female

2007
Male Female

30.7
24.6
46.6

26.1
13.2
34.7

36.3
20.2
45.6

37.1
11.2
42.9

47.1
9.3
48.8

39.4
8.9
42.8

46.0
30.2
59.6

46.9
52.5
73.6

55.9
22.9
64.2

51.7
38.5
73.2

41.7
16.8
47.5

58.1
25.7
70.4

34.0
11.7
37.8

41.0
11.5
47.3

47.7
26.7
54.1

42.5
12.5
47.5

51.8
21.0
59.7

43.4
13.0
47.6

47.7
38.1
67.1

44.5
33.4
59.7

61.8
25.1
70.3

54.4
17.8
61.6

58.3
19.1
63.6

57.7
16.6
64.6

41.5
10.8
45.4

49.0
20.5
57.1

52.3
13.7
57.4

48.0
16.8
56.2

43.2
6.4
45.5

42.9
16.4
46.6

NOTE: The table includes all current workers aged 64 and under.
a
Industries are grouped into four classiﬁcations: 1) Agriculture, mining, and manufacturing; 2) wholesale and retail trade; 3) communications, information services,
ﬁnance, insurance, real estate, repair services, transportation, utilities, professional
services, and personal services; and 4) public administration.
b
Part-time is less than 35 hours per week; part-year is less than 50 weeks per year. Selfemployment may be part-time or full-time.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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and in nongovernmental services. The overall coverage rate was about
the same for men and women in public administration.
Over time, pension coverage fell off sharply for male workers in
goods-producing industries, from 62 percent in 1989 to 50 percent in
2007. This change is traceable to a huge drop in DB coverage, from
34 to 13 percent. On the other hand, overall pension coverage climbed
for women, from 53 to 61 percent, as DC coverage expanded. In the
trade sector, pension coverage rose from both men and women, because
of a rise in coverage from DC plans. There was a precipitous drop in
DB coverage in nongovernmental services over this period, from 43 to
20 percent among male employees and from 31 to 17 percent among
female employees. Despite this, overall pension coverage remained
largely unchanged for men and increased moderately for women
over the period because of the sharp rise in DC coverage. In 1989, an
astounding 74 percent of male employees in public administration had
a DB plan, as did 62 percent of female employees. Overall coverage
rates were (an equally astounding) 96 percent for men and 75 percent
for women. Deﬁned beneﬁt coverage fell off for both, but DC coverage
rose so that while overall pension coverage declined from 96 to 87 percent for male employees, it increased from 75 to 89 percent for female
employees, resulting in women having a slightly higher percentage of
coverage than did men.
By occupation of employment, pension coverage in 2007 was highest among professional and managerial workers, 78 percent for males
and 69 percent for females, and second highest among technical and
clerical workers, 63 and 62 percent, respectively. Among male workers,
service workers ranked third at 55 percent, while blue-collar jobs (craft,
operative, and agricultural) ranked last, at 47 percent. Among women,
the rank order was reversed, with a 47 percent coverage rate among
blue-collar workers and a 32 percent rate among service workers. As
with industry of employment, DC coverage rates were almost as high
as overall pension coverage rates, and the rank order was identical to
that of the overall coverage rate. Deﬁned beneﬁt coverage rates were
relatively small among technical and clerical workers and, surprisingly,
among blue-collar workers as well. However, the DB coverage rate was
31 percent among male service workers and 22 and 20 percent among
male and female professional and managerial workers, respectively.
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The latter result reﬂects the large proportion of workers in this occupational group who are employed by the government sector.
Pension coverage rates were almost identical for male and female
workers in technical and clerical jobs, as well as in blue-collar work.
They were slightly higher for men than for women in professional
and managerial jobs because of the higher share of men with a DC
plan. Among service workers, 55 percent of male employees reported
pension coverage compared to only 32 percent of female employees
because of the higher rate of both DC and DB plan coverage.
There was little change in the overall pension coverage rate among
professional and managerial workers between 1989 and 2007. Deﬁned
beneﬁt coverage declined and DC coverage increased to offset the
decline in DB coverage. Over the period, overall pension coverage fell
from 80 to 78 percent for male employees but stayed the same for female
employees at about 70 percent. Among technical and clerical workers,
there was a slight increase in overall coverage for both men and women
because of the rise in DC coverage rates. In contrast, among service
workers, the overall pension coverage rate for male employees tailed
off from 63 to 55 percent, mainly because of the decline of DB coverage, while it remained largely unchanged for female employees. Likewise, overall pension coverage slid from 56 to 47 percent among male
workers because of the shrinkage of DB coverage, while it increased
among female workers from 39 to 47 percent because of the expansion
of DC coverage.
The third panel of Table 4.3 shows pension coverage by employment status. I have divided workers into four groups based on hours
and weeks worked in the preceding year: part-time, full-year; full-time,
part-year; part-time, part-year; and full-time, full-year.24 I have also
separated out self-employed workers. The results do not show dramatic
differences by work status. In 2007, the pension coverage rate among
male workers was highest among full-time, full-year employees, 64
percent; surprisingly, it was second highest among part-time, partyear employees, 60 percent;25 next highest among part-time, full-year
employees, 49 percent; and lowest among full-time, part-year workers,
48 percent. Among female workers, the rank order was ﬁrst for fulltime, part-year workers; second among full-time, full-year employees;
third among part-time, part-year employees; and last among part-time,
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full-year employees. Self-employed workers ranked lower than any of
these groups for male workers and second lowest for female workers.
Despite a drop in DB coverage, part-time, full-year workers saw a
modest increase in their overall pension coverage rate between 1989 and
2007 because of an increasing share with a DC account. Full-time, partyear workers saw a modest drop in overall pension coverage because of
a sharp decline in DB coverage. Pension coverage climbed among parttime, part-year male workers because of a large jump in DC plan coverage but remained the same among female workers. Deﬁned beneﬁt plan
coverage plummeted among both male and female full-time, full-year
workers from 1989 to 2007. However, the proportion with a DC plan
expanded, and as a result overall pension coverage fell modestly among
men but increased modestly among women so that women, though with
a lower coverage rate than men in 1989, had a slightly higher coverage
rate in 2007 than men. The pension coverage rate remained about the
same for self-employed men in 2007 as in 1989, but fell among selfemployed women because of a decline in the share with DC accounts.
Pension Coverage by Earnings Quintile
I next divide workers (excluding the self-employed) into earnings
quintiles on the basis of their annual earnings to see how pension coverage varies by earnings level (see Table 4.4).26 As expected, the pension
coverage rate was much higher for higher-income workers. I also ﬁnd
that the gap in coverage spread out over time, particularly among male
workers, as pension coverage slipped sharply among lower-earning
workers.
In 2007, among men, the pension coverage rate varied directly by
earnings quintile, from a high of 94 percent for the top quintile to a low
of 39 percent for the bottom quintile. Among female workers, there was
very little variation in pension coverage among the top three earnings
quintiles: it was somewhat lower for the second quintile, and, again,
quite a bit lower for the bottom quintile. Pension coverage rates were
higher for female employees than for male employees among the bottom three quintiles, particularly the middle one, but were lower for the
top two quintiles.
Over time, from 1989 to 2007, pension coverage fell off markedly
among the bottom three quintiles for male workers and declined slightly
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Table 4.4 Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Earnings
Quintile, 1989, 2001, and 2007
1989
2001
2007
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Bottom earnings quintile
All DC accounts
37.6 38.1
43.4 41.6
34.2 40.1
All DB plans
30.9 26.8
16.2 14.1
9.9 10.5
DC and/or DB plans
56.7 52.3
51.6 49.2
38.9 46.0
Second earnings quintile
All DC accounts
74.9 74.8
67.9 71.7
62.1 67.4
All DB plans
52.1 65.7
28.1 28.1
21.8 24.7
DC and/or DB plans
92.7 89.2
77.4 81.5
69.3 78.1
Third earnings quintile
All DC accounts
73.8 98.1
76.6 80.8
73.1 85.6
All DB plans
62.7 46.6
40.7 35.4
25.0 24.6
DC and/or DB plans
92.5 99.8
89.6 90.1
79.0 90.5
Fourth earnings quintile
All DC accounts
91.5 100.0
89.8 95.0
84.9 83.6
All DB plans
41.3 13.3
34.0 15.2
31.9 26.7
DC and/or DB plans
91.5 100.0
90.8 95.0
89.4 86.5
Top earnings quintile
All DC accounts
72.7 99.5
90.9 58.2
94.0 86.0
All DB plans
66.1 96.5
27.1 28.8
20.3
8.3
DC and/or DB plans
97.0 100.0
92.8 78.4
94.3 86.0
NOTE: The table includes all current workers aged 64 and under. Self-employed are
excluded from this table. Earnings quintiles are based on the combined distribution of
annual earnings for men and women.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

for the top two quintiles. Among female employees, there was a falloff
of pension coverage in each earnings quintile. In the bottom earnings
quintile, the overall pension coverage rate diminished by 18 percentage
points for men and 6 percentage points for women. In the second earnings quintile, the DB coverage rate collapsed for both male and female
workers and the DC coverage rate also fell, but more modestly. Overall,
the pension coverage rate lessened by 23 percentage points for men and
by 11 percentage points for women.
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In the middle quintile, DB coverage again plummeted for male and
female workers, the share with DC plans remained almost unchanged
for men but slipped for women, and, as a result, the overall pension
coverage rate slid by 14 percentage points for men and by 9 percentage
points for women. Among the top two earnings quintiles, overall pension coverage rate slipped a bit for men and went down by about 14
percentage points for women.27
Among male employees, there was a growing cleavage in pension
coverage between the top of the earnings distribution and the bottom
three earnings quintiles. This was, in turn, mainly due to a growing gap
in the proportion with DC plans. Among female workers, the differentials in pension coverage between the top quintile and the bottom three
actually lessened over the period 1989–2007.28
Pension Wealth on the Household Level
We now turn our attention to household level wealth. Table 4.5
highlights trends in pension coverage over the 1983–2007 period. In
this and the subsequent tables, it should be noted that the unit of observation is the household, not the individual worker. Moreover, I have
divided households into three age groups: under 47, 47–64, and 65 and
older. The valuation of DB pension rights among younger workers has
to be interpreted cautiously. In fact, data for the youngest group are the
most problematic, since estimates of DB pension wealth are based on
projected beneﬁts in 20–40 years and depend on projecting future work
life and future job tenure with the same employer. In the case of the
1983 SCF, the data needed to calculate DB pension wealth are available
only for individuals 40 years and older, so I cannot make corresponding
estimates of DB wealth for the 46 and under group. Data for retirees
are the most secure, since both pension and Social Security beneﬁt levels are already determined. Estimates of both DB and Social Security
wealth for the middle-aged group lie in between in terms of reliability.
Individuals close to retirement have a fairly good idea of their expected
pension beneﬁts and their expected age of retirement and have a high
likelihood of remaining with their current employer (see Farber [2001]
for some evidence).
The picture that unfolds is a precipitous drop in DB coverage largely
compensated for by a sizable increase in DC coverage. Moreover, while
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Table 4.5 Percentage of Households with Pension Wealth, 1983–2007
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
DC accounts
11.1
24.0
52.2
52.6
DB plans
—
45.6
34.4
34.0
Pension wealth
—
56.0
65.6
64.1
Aged 46 and under
DC accounts
13.7
31.2
53.8
49.9
DB plans
—
37.9
22.8
22.6
Pension wealth
—
52.2
60.7
54.7
Aged 47–64
DC accounts
12.3
28.3
62.0
63.8
DB plans
68.5
56.8
45.3
38.8
Pension wealth
70.3
67.5
75.9
74.1
Aged 65 and over
DC accounts
2.0
1.3
35.0
40.8
DB plans
67.0
51.3
46.5
50.6
Pension wealth
67.8
51.8
62.6
68.5
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Pension wealth = DB + DC.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

mean pension wealth gained rapidly in the 1990s, its growth slowed
down considerably in the 2000s. Among young households in particular, pension coverage dropped sharply in the 2000s and mean pension
wealth stagnated.
The share of all households with DC pension accounts skyrocketed
during the 1983–2001 period, from 11 to 52 percent, or by 41 percentage points. The story is very similar for the three different age groups
shown in Table 4.5, even among the elderly. The proportion holding
pension accounts advanced by 40 percentage points in age group 46 and
under, by 50 percentage points among households in age group 47–64,
and by 33 percentage points among elderly households. In 2001, 62
percent of households in the age range of 47–64 held some form of DC
account, compared to 35 percent of elderly households and 54 percent
of younger households. Most of the gains occurred after 1989.
The picture changes during the 2000s. Among all households, there
is virtually no change in the DC coverage rate. For the younger age
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group, the share actually dropped by 4 percentage points. For the middle age group, there was a slight increase of 2 percentage points, and
among elderly households an increase of 6 percentage points.
Trends are also different for DB pension wealth. The share of
all households with DB pension wealth fell by 11 percentage points
between 1989 and 2001. Among households in age group 47–64, the
decline was about the same, 12 percentage points from 1989 to 2001.
However, the fall was even more precipitous—by 24 percentage
points—from 1983 to 2001. Among elderly households the proportion
fell by 5 percentage points from 1989 to 2001 and by 20 percentage
points from 1983 to 2001, while among young households the share
was down by 15 percentage points from 1989 to 2001. In 2001, while
47 percent of elderly households held some form of DB pension wealth,
45 percent of households in age group 47–64 and only 23 percent of
young households recorded DB entitlements. Most of the loss in coverage again occurred after 1989.
The trend moderated after 2001. Among households under age 47,
the share with DB coverage remained unchanged. For middle-aged
households, the share was down another 6.5 percentage points in 2007.
Elderly households bucked the trend, as the share with DB coverage
rose by 4.1 percentage points.
The percentage of all households covered by either a DC or a DB
plan increased from 56 to 66 percent between 1989 and 2001. Among
the 47–64 age group, the proportion rose by 8 percentage points, and
among the elderly, the share increased by 11 percentage points. However, comparing 2001 to 1983 shows a smaller rise in pension coverage
among the 47–64 age group (6 percentage points) and an actual decline
among elderly households (5 percentage points). Among younger
households the proportion rose by 10 percentage points from 1989 to
2001. The share of households covered by some form of pension in
2001 was 76 percent among the middle-aged, compared to 63 percent
among the elderly and 61 percent among the youngest age group.
The story once again changes from 2001 to 2007. The share of
households with some form of pension coverage actually declined by
1.4 percentage points. The decline was particularly precipitous among
younger households, whose coverage rate fell by 6.1 percentage points.
Among the middle-aged, the fall was 1.8 percentage points, whereas
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among the elderly pension coverage rose by 5.9 percentage points. As
shown in Table 4.6, there were huge increases in the average holdings
of DC pension accounts. Among all households, the average value of
these accounts increased almost fourteenfold between 1983 and 2001,
to $52,800 (all dollar ﬁgures are in 2007 dollars, unless otherwise
noted). Among age group 46 and under the increase was by a factor of
11, and among age group 47–64 the gain was by a factor of 12. Among
elderly households, the rise was by a factor of 31. In 2001, mean DC
pension wealth was greatest among age group 47–64, at $113,000, second highest among elderly households, at $63,000, and lowest among
the youngest age group, at $33,000.
The rise in DC wealth slowed down from 2001 to 2007. Among all
households, mean DC wealth increased by (only) 22 percent. Middleaged households saw their mean DC wealth increase by 18 percent and
Table 4.6 Mean Household Pension Wealth, 1983–2007 (in thousands,
2007$)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
DC pension wealth
4.6
10.6
62.8
76.8
DB pension wealth
—
56.5
58.0
61.2
Pension wealth
—
67.1
120.8
138.0
Aged 46 and under
DC pension wealth
3.0
9.2
33.1
30.7
DB pension wealth
—
25.1
20.3
24.6
Pension wealth
—
34.3
53.4
55.3
Aged 47–64
DC pension wealth
9.7
20.4
113.1
133.8
DB pension wealth
90.1
100.3
98.9
91.4
Pension wealth
99.7
120.7
211.9
225.3
Aged 65 and over
DC pension wealth
2.1
2.3
62.7
84.5
DB pension wealth
73.6
82.4
89.2
91.2
Pension wealth
75.7
84.7
151.9
175.8
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Pension wealth = DB + DC.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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elderly households by 35 percent. On the other hand, younger households actually experienced a decline in DC wealth, by 7 percent, to
$31,000 in 2007.
Opposite trends are again evident for DB pension wealth. Among
all households, the mean value rose by only 3 percent between 1989
and 2001. Losses occurred for younger households, down by 19 percent, and for age group 47–64, down by 1.4 percent. However, the average value of DB plans among the elderly rose by 8 percent over the
period—a reﬂection of their legacy status with respect to DB plans.
The years 2001–2007 saw continued slow growth in DB pension
wealth; among all households, it rose by 5.5 percent. A 21 percent gain
was recorded among young households, though the actual level was still
quite low, but among middle-aged households mean DB fell by 7.5 percent. Elderly households saw a moderate gain of 2.3 percent. By 2007,
mean DB wealth was about the same among elderly and middle-aged
households ($91,000), but only $24,600 among younger households.
I can now consider one of the issues raised in the beginning of this
chapter: Has the spread of DC-type pension plans adequately compensated for the decline in traditional DB pension coverage? The answer
is a resounding “yes” for the period from 1989 to 2001 (and 1983 to
2001), but a “perhaps” for the period 2001–2007. Average pension
wealth (the sum of DC and DB pensions) increased for all age groups
between 1989 and 2001. Among all households, the mean value of total
pension wealth climbed by 80 percent. Among those in age groups 46
and under and 47–64, the mean value increased by 56 and 76 percent,
respectively, while among elderly households the mean value jumped
by 79 percent.
However, the growth in pension wealth slowed down markedly
from 2001 to 2007. Mean pension wealth among all households rose by
14 percent, compared to an 80 percent gain during the 1980s. It inched
up by only 4 percent among young households and by 6 percent among
middle-aged ones, though it did gain 16 percent among the elderly. By
2007 mean pension wealth was $225,300 among age group 47–64,
$175,800 among the elderly, and only $55,300 for young households.
With the transition in the pension system, has the inequality of pension wealth increased or declined? We will see that pension inequality
among DC plan holders is considerably greater than that among DB
plan holders. As a result, the transition to DC plans raised overall pen-
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sion inequality. This was true despite a decline in inequality in both DC
wealth and DB wealth by themselves.
Table 4.7 records the inequality of pension wealth among pension holders only within age group. The inequality of holdings of DC
accounts generally declined over the years from 1989 (or 1983) and
2007. This was true among all DC pension holders, young households
who held DC plans, and middle-aged ones as well. The drop in the
Gini coefﬁcient from 1989 to 2007 was 0.022 among all households,
0.038 among those under age 47, and 0.045 among middle-aged ones.
In contrast, the inequality of DC holdings spiked upward among elderly
households, with the Gini coefﬁcient rising by 0.101 points from 1989
to 2007. This change reﬂected the entry into the ranks of the elderly of
newer and newer cohorts of elderly households with large holdings of
DC wealth.
Table 4.7 Inequality of Pension Wealth among Pension Holders, 1983–
2007 (Gini coefﬁcients)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All pension holders
DC accounts
—
0.750 0.741
0.728
DB plans
—
0.606 0.582
0.549
Pension wealth
—
0.641 0.676
0.661
Pension holders: aged 46 and under
DC accounts
—
0.731 0.719
0.693
DB plans
—
0.576 0.552
0.511
Pension wealth
—
0.635 0.672
0.653
Pension holders: aged 47–64
DC accounts
0.732 0.726 0.714
0.681
DB plans
0.507 0.537 0.571
0.519
Pension wealth
0.524 0.577 0.637
0.617
Pension holders: aged 65+
DC accounts
0.687 0.635 0.703
0.736
DB plans
0.458 0.605 0.541
0.556
Pension wealth
0.466 0.607 0.607
0.642
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Pension wealth = DB + DC.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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Despite the reduction of inequality in DC wealth, the level of
inequality in DC pension wealth was still very high in 2007. The Gini
coefﬁcient among all DC pension account holders was 0.728 in 2007.
This compares to a Gini coefﬁcient for net worth of 0.834. Inequality
among DC account holders within age group was almost as great as
among all DC account holders.29
The inequality of DB wealth also fell over these years. The Gini
coefﬁcient for DB wealth among all households who held DB plans fell
by 0.058 points from 1989 to 2007. It declined by 0.065 points among
young households, 0.018 among middle-aged ones, and by 0.048 points
among elderly ones.
However, when we consider total pension wealth, we ﬁnd just the
opposite story, despite the declines in both DC and DB wealth inequality. Pension wealth inequality overall increased by 0.020 Gini points
among all pension holders from 1989 to 2007, by 0.018 Gini points
among young households, by 0.039 Gini points among middle-aged
ones, and by 0.036 Gini points among elderly ones. On the surface,
these results may appear rather paradoxical. However, the explanation
emanates from the fact that DC wealth inequality is considerably higher
than DB wealth inequality. In 2007, for example, the Gini coefﬁcient
for DC wealth among all households with DC plans was 0.728, compared to only 0.549 for DB plan holders. Similar differences exist for
the individual age groups.
Not surprisingly, the switchover from DB pension plans to DC pension plans resulted in a rise in overall pension wealth inequality. The
reason is that the Gini coefﬁcient for the sum of DB and DC wealth
is equal to a weighted sum of the Gini coefﬁcients for DC and DC
individually (plus an interaction term), where the weight is equal to the
share of each component in total pension wealth. The rising share of DC
wealth in total pension wealth over time, from 1989 to 2007, thus led to
a rise in the Gini coefﬁcient in overall pension wealth, despite the fact
that the Gini coefﬁcient for both DC wealth and DB wealth declined
over time individually.30
Figure 4.1a gives dramatic evidence of how differently DC and DB
wealth are distributed and about how much more unequal DC wealth
is than DB wealth. In this case, I divide pension wealth into its DB and
DC components and show the distribution of each among account holders only by their corresponding percentile level in 2007. Here it is clear
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that DB dominates DC values at least up to the 95th percentile, and
then at the very upper reaches of the respective distributions the reverse
is true. This pattern reﬂects the small accumulations of DC plans like
IRAs and some 401(k) plans and the more substantial values of most
DB plans. For example, at the 25th percentile the value of DC plans was
$11,000 versus $44,000 for DB plans. However, at the 95th percentile
the value of the former was $1.5 million while that of the latter was $1.0
million. The contrasting distributions also illustrate why DC inequality
is higher than DB inequality, since there is a larger share of DC holders
with both small and large amounts of pension wealth than DB holders.
The percentage difference declined with percentile level, from 88
percent at the 5th percentile to 15 percent at the 90th. At the 99th percentile, DC exceeded DB by 43 percent, a reﬂection of the fact that the
DC system has particularly beneﬁted the high end of the pension (and
wealth) distribution. A similar pattern is evident for age group 47–64
(see Figure 4.1b). However, here the crossover point was between
the 90th and 95th percentiles. At the 95th percentile and above, DC
exceeded DB. Indeed, at the 99th percentile, DC exceeded DB by a
sizable 54 percent.
Figures 4.2a and 4.2b provide a slightly different perspective on the
distribution of pension wealth by considering its distribution among all
households (not just pension holders). The story that emerges is different from when we consider only pension holders. In fact, the inequality of pension wealth among all households remained fairly unchanged
over the years 1989–2007. The reason is that the disequalizing effect
of rising pension wealth inequality among pension holders alone was
offset by the equalizing effect of a rising share of households holding
pension wealth.
As shown in Figure 4.2a, there were large gains in pension wealth
over the 1989–2001 period at all percentiles, reﬂecting the increase in
the share of households with a pension plan and the rising value of pension wealth. However, the overall pattern is U-shaped. The percentage
gain declined from 214 percent at the 50th percentile to 72 percent at
the 75th percentile, and then increased to 86 percent at the 99th percentile. These results illustrate that the largest growth of pension wealth
occurred at both the bottom and the top of the pension wealth distribution. As a result, overall pension wealth inequality remained almost
unchanged over these years.
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Figure 4.1a Percentage Difference between DC and DB Pension Wealth
among Account Holders by Pension Percentile, All
Households, 2007
60
40

Percentage difference

20
5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

0
99
í20
í40
í60
í80

í100
Percentile

Figure 4.1b Percentage Difference between DC and DB Pension Wealth
among Account Holders by Pension Percentile, Aged 47–64,
2007
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SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF.
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Figure 4.2a Percentage Change in Pension Wealth by Percentile, All
Households, 1989, 2001, and 2007
250
1989–2001
2001–2007

Percentage change

200

150

100

50

0
50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

99

Percentile

Figure 4.2b Percentage Change in Pension Wealth by Percentile, Aged
47–64, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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From 2001 to 2007, pension wealth showed much more modest
gains at all percentiles. Moreover, the largest gains were in the middle part of the pension wealth distribution (averaging about 20 percent
from the 60th to the 90th percentile) and much smaller at the bottom
and top. This result too is in accordance with the ﬁnding that the Gini
coefﬁcient for pension wealth changed very little over this period, since
the largest increase in pension wealth occurred in the middle of the pension wealth distribution.
Results were quite similar among middle-aged households (see
Figure 4.2b). Relative gains in pension wealth had a U-shaped pattern
between 1989 and 2001, declining from 139 percent at the 40th percentile to 49 percent at the 70th percentile in the ﬁrst period and then rising
to 139 percent at the 99th percentile. As among all households, overall
pension wealth inequality changed very little over these years. Over
the later period, percentage advances were fairly uniform and small
(around 10 percent) across percentiles, and inequality again remained
relatively unchanged.31

TRENDS IN PRIVATE ACCUMULATIONS
How has the radical makeover of the retirement system affected
trends in both the level and the inequality of private accumulations?
Recall that private accumulations are deﬁned as the sum of net worth
and DB. It thus represents the resources available to households for
retirement from private sources—their own wealth accumulations and
private (as opposed to public) pension funds. The results indicate that
with the dismantling of the DB pension system, private accumulations
generally grew slower than household net worth. Moreover, inequality
in the distribution of private accumulations increased more than that of
net worth.
As noted in Chapter 2, there was very strong growth in net worth
during the 1990s and 2000s. Mean net worth rose 73 percent from 1983
to 2007, while the median rose 38 percent (see Table 4.8).32 When DB
wealth is added to net worth to obtain private accumulations, I ﬁnd that
its mean value was up by 63 percent between 1989 and 2007, lower
than that of net worth, while its median value increased by 25 percent,
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Table 4.8 Mean and Median Net Worth and Private Accumulations,
1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
Mean net worth
270.4
309.8
445.1
536.1
Mean private accumulations
—
366.1
503.2
597.5
Median net worth
69.5
74.3
86.1
102.5
Median private accumulations
—
114.0
118.3
142.8
Aged 46 and under
Mean net worth
126.6
171.2
205.0
209.9
Mean private accumulations
—
196.3
225.3
234.5
Median net worth
30.4
27.8
24.2
21.8
Median private accumulations
—
40.5
38.5
35.0
Aged 47–64
Mean net worth
437.5
477.0
700.5
803.2
Mean private accumulations
526.3
577.3
799.4
894.7
Median net worth
126.8
156.0
161.1
206.5
Median private accumulations
215.3
226.9
249.4
283.8
Aged 65+
Mean net worth
434.2
454.1
652.8
809.1
Mean private accumulations
505.9
536.5
742.0
900.4
Median net worth
122.5
128.1
176.5
211.1
Median private accumulations
191.9
187.7
258.5
277.1
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

again slower than that of net worth. The differences reﬂect the much
slower growth (and for households under age 65, the absolute decline)
in the value of DB plans over these years.
The pattern is repeated among middle-aged and elderly households.
Mean private accumulations among the former rose by 55 percent from
1989 to 2007, compared to a 68 percent increase in net worth, whereas
median private accumulations were up by 25 percent, compared to a 32
percent gain in median net worth. Among elderly households, mean private accumulations advanced 68 percent, less than the 78 percent gain
in new worth, and median private accumulations grew by 48 percent,
again less than the 72 percent increase in median net worth. Among
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households under age 47, the story is somewhat different: Mean private
accumulations were up by 19 percent, compared to a 23 percent growth
in net worth. This result is similar to the other age groups. However,
median private accumulations actually dropped by 14 percent in absolute terms, compared to a 22 percent decline in median net worth. This
ﬁnding that the fortunes of young households deteriorated during the
1990s and 2000s will be a recurrent theme in this book.
Generally speaking, households fared worse in terms of private
accumulations than in terms of conventional net worth between 1989
and 2007 (except for young households, for whom median private accumulations declined in absolute terms less than did median net worth).
This ﬁnding indicates that the explosive growth of DC plans after 1989
did not fully compensate for the collapse of DB plans, at least in terms
of the growth of household wealth.
I also ﬁnd that the attrition of DB plans led to a rise in wealth
inequality (see Table 4.9). The reason is that DB wealth is fairly equalizing, as discussed earlier, and its disappearance helped fuel a rise in
wealth inequality. In 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth among all
households was 0.834, while that for private accumulations was 0.805.
The higher level of inequality in the distribution of net worth than in
private accumulations reﬂects the fact that DB pension wealth is distributed much more equally than net worth.
It was also the case that the equalizing effect of DB pension wealth
lessened with the passage of time. Whereas the Gini coefﬁcient for net
worth among all households increased by a very modest 0.002 points
over the years from 1989 to 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient for private accumulations advanced even more, by 0.012 points. Alternatively, adding
DB wealth to net worth resulted in a 0.039 decline in the Gini coefﬁcient in 1989 but only a 0.029 decrease in 2007.
The results are even stronger for middle-aged households and over
the longer time span, 1983–2007. For this group, the Gini coefﬁcient for
net worth increased by 0.033 points between 1983 and 2007, while the
Gini coefﬁcient for private accumulations ballooned by 0.070 points.
Here we see even stronger evidence that the equalizing effect of DB
pension wealth wore off over time. Adding DB wealth to net worth
caused the Gini coefﬁcient to decline by 0.073 in 1983, 0.053 in 1989,
0.043 in 2001, and 0.036 in 2007. These results help solve the puzzle
discussed in Chapter 2 of why traditional wealth inequality remained
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Table 4.9 Inequality of Net Worth and Private Accumulations, 1983–
2007 (Gini coefﬁcients)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
Net worth
0.799
0.832
0.826
0.834
Private accumulations
—
0.793
0.796
0.805
Aged 46 and under
Net worth
0.797
0.887
0.859
0.880
Private accumulations
—
0.851
0.830
0.850
Aged 47–64
Net worth
0.761
0.775
0.798
0.795
Private accumulations
0.688
0.721
0.756
0.758
Aged 65+
Net worth
0.778
0.778
0.762
0.784
Private accumulations
0.708
0.738
0.724
0.748
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

relatively static from 1989 to 2007, while both income inequality and
the ratio of stock prices to housing prices rose. The reason is that traditional wealth fails to include DB wealth. Once this is included, the
results show a much sharper increase in wealth inequality from 1989 to
2007. In Chapter 5 we will see whether this pattern of results holds up
when Social Security wealth is also included in total household wealth.
Results are similar for elderly households. Among the elderly, private accumulations inequality increased by 0.040 points from 1983
to 2007, whereas net worth inequality remained virtually unchanged.
However, the pattern is different for younger households. Among them,
the Gini coefﬁcient for private accumulations changed by −0.001 from
1989 to 2007, slightly more than the −0.007 change in the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth.33
Figure 4.3a provides an alternative picture of the change in the size
distribution of private accumulations, among all households between
1989–2001 and 2001–2007. Over the earlier period, the major gains
were made by households at the high end of the private accumulations
distribution, while households at the bottom of the distribution experienced an absolute decline. Between these two extremes, relative gains
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Figure 4.3a Percentage Change in Private Accumulations by Percentile,
All Households, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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Figure 4.3b Percentage Change in Private Accumulations by Percentile,
Aged 46 and Under, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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Figure 4.3c Percentage Change in Private Accumulations by Percentile,
Aged 47–64, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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Figure 4.3d Percentage Change in Private Accumulations by Percentile,
Aged 65 and Over, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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showed no discernible pattern, which is consistent with the ﬁnding of
a slight increase in the Gini coefﬁcient over these years. From 2001
to 2007, the highest growth in private accumulations occurred roughly
in the middle of the private accumulations distribution, with sharp
declines at the bottom end. This pattern also seems consistent with the
modest increase in the Gini coefﬁcient for private accumulations over
these years.
Among young households (Figure 4.3b), percentage changes in private accumulations were negative up to the 75th percentile and then
positive above this during the earlier period. The pattern was very similar during the later period. The results for the later period are consistent
with an increase in the Gini coefﬁcient over these years, but those for
the earlier period seem inconsistent with a decline in the Gini coefﬁcient. However, further investigation shows that the reason for the
decline in inequality in the earlier period is that private accumulations
for households in the bottom 20 percent of the private accumulations
distribution became more negative over the period (this also happened
from 2001 to 2007).
Among middle-aged households, the percentage change in private
accumulations was negative up at the 45th percentile and then positive after that over the earlier period (see Figure 4.3c). Over the second
period, the percentage growth in private accumulations was positive at
all percentiles but with no discernible pattern. These results are consistent with the ﬁnding of a rising Gini coefﬁcient over the earlier period
and little change over the second. In contrast, among elderly households (Figure 4.3d), private accumulations showed positive growth at
all percentile levels in the earlier period, though percentage gains were
greater at the bottom than the top, and as a result there was a modest decline in private accumulations inequality. During the later period,
changes in private accumulations were negative up to the 20th percentile and generally positive above that, leading to a rise in the inequality
of private accumulations.
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DC EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS (DCEMP) TO DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PENSION PLANS
To complete the picture of pension wealth, I look at trends in
DCEMP. Recall that DCEMP is deﬁned as the present discounted value
of future employer contributions to DC plans. I will reserve a discussion of the effects of DCEMP on private accumulations (and augmented
wealth) until the next chapter.
The share of all households reporting an employer contribution rose
swiftly in the 1980s and 1990s, from 5 percent in 1983 to 28 percent
in 2001, and then stayed at this level in 2007 (see Table 4.10). In contrast, the share of DC plan holders reporting an employer contribution
climbed from 45 percent in 1983 to 63 percent in 1989, and then in 2001
fell to 54 percent, where it remained in 2007. The results indicate that
employer matching contributions to DC pension plans (the employer
“take-up rate”) fell off over the last 20 years or so. This retrenchment
likely reﬂects general cutbacks in employee compensation.
Likewise, the mean value of DCEMP, the present discounted value
of future employer contributions to DC plans, among all households rose
from virtually zero in 1983 to $34,300 (in 2007$) in 2001 but then fell
off by 13 percent to $29,900 in 2007. Among those reporting employer
contributions, the median value of DCEMP climbed from $18,900 in
1983 to $68,900 in 2001 but then fell by 16 percent to $57,900 in 2007.
By all four measures, employer contributions to DC plans peaked in the
early 2000s and then retreated in the mid- and late 2000s.
Younger workers were hit particularly hard during the 2000s. The
share of all households in this age group reporting employer contributions grew rapidly, from 9 percent in 1983 to 24 percent in 1989
and then 38 percent in 2001. However, employers pulled back in the
2000s and their share fell to 34 percent. Likewise, the mean value of
DCEMP mushroomed from $3,100 in 1983 to $47,900 in 2001 before
slipping 22 percent to $37,400 in 2007. The share of DC plan holders who reported an employer contribution climbed from 63 percent in
1983 to 77 percent in 1989 and then fell off to 70 percent in 2001 and
67 percent in 2007. In a slightly different pattern, the median value of
DCEMP among recipients only rose rather steadily, from $20,400 in
1983 to $78,000 in 2001, and then plunged by 14 percent to $66,800.
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Table 4.10 Employer Contributions to DC Plans (DCEMP), 1983–2007
(in thousands, 2007$)
1983 1989 2001 2007
All households
Percent of households with DCEMP
4.9
15.0
28.4
28.4
Percent of DC plan holders with DCEMP 45.0
62.7
54.3
53.9
Mean DCEMP
1.9
14.3
34.3
29.9
Median DCEMP (recipients only)
18.9
41.1
68.9
57.9
Aged 46 and under
Percent of households with DCEMP
8.6
24.1
37.8
33.6
Percent of DC plan holders with DCEMP 62.9
77.1
70.3
67.4
Mean DCEMP
3.1
22.2
47.9
37.4
Median DCEMP (recipients only)
20.4
41.7
78.0
66.8
Aged 47–64
Percent of households with DCEMP
1.4
9.1
32.3
36.0
Percent of DC plan holders with DCEMP 11.4
32.0
52.1
56.5
Mean DCEMP
0.5
10.2
36.0
37.7
Median DCEMP (recipients only)
13.2
37.8
53.0
51.8
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

Middle-aged households fared better during the 2000s. The share
of all households in this age group reporting an employer contribution
rose steadily, from virtually zero in 1983 to 36 percent in 2007. The
percent of DC plan holders with DCEMP also increased more or less
steadily, from 11 percent in 1983 to 57 percent in 2007. Mean DCEMP
surged upward from virtually zero in 1983 to $36,000 in 2001 and then
inched up by 4.7 percent to $37,700 in 2007. Median DCEMP among
plan holders also gained rapidly from 1983 to 2001, from $13,200 to
$53,000, but then slipped to $51,800 in 2007. All in all, there appeared
to be much smaller gains in employer contributions to DC plans among
middle-aged households after 2001.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the unraveling of the traditional DB
pension system in favor of DC pension coverage. Have U.S. households
in general gained from this transformation? Have particular groups
been hurt? Has the devolution of the DB system lowered or raised overall inequality? In general, there was a marked turnaround in the fortunes
of U.S. households in the 2000s as compared to the 1980s and 1990s.
The analysis in this book began with pension coverage rates among
workers currently employed. So far I have looked at both changes over
time and differences in coverage rates by gender, age group, race, educational attainment, and employment status. In 2007, 56 percent of male
workers under the age of 65 had some type of DC account, 19 percent
had some form of DB entitlement, and altogether, 62 percent had some
type of pension coverage. Not surprisingly, pension coverage was lower
for younger workers (under age 47) than older ones (aged 47–64): 53
versus 75 percent.
Over time, DB coverage dropped considerably while DC coverage
expanded. This systemic change beneﬁted female workers but hurt male
workers. From 1989 to 2001, expanded DC coverage more than compensated for dwindling DB coverage, and overall coverage rose by 3
percentage points for male workers and 4 percentage points for female
workers. However, from 2001 to 2007, male pension coverage actually dropped substantially, by 6 percentage points, and there was even
a decrease in DC coverage. In contrast, female workers saw a modest
increase of 2 percentage points in pension coverage from 2001 to 2007.
As a result, the male coverage rate declined from 65 percent in 1989 to
62 percent in 2007, while the female coverage rate advanced from 55
to 60 percent. Moreover, whereas in 1989 and 2001 there was about a
10 percentage point gap in pension coverage between male and female
workers, by 2007 almost complete convergence had been achieved.
The pension transformation also harmed younger male workers
more than older ones. The coverage rate for younger male workers fell
by 7 percentage points from 1989 to 2007, while that for older ones
declined by only 3 percentage points.
Black workers were more adversely affected by the pension makeover than white workers. In 2007, there was a large gap in pension
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coverage (12 percentage points) between black male workers and (nonHispanic) white male workers, and a huge gap (30 percentage points)
between Hispanic male workers and non-Hispanic white male workers.
Between 1989 and 2007, the pension coverage rate fell more for black
male workers (4.6 percentage points) than for white male workers (3.2
percentage points). The decline for Hispanic male workers was less (1.6
percentage points) but was much lower than for whites or blacks. Black
female workers saw their pension coverage rates plummet by 4.8 percentage points, while that for white female workers climbed by 8.1 percentage points (there was also a small decline among Hispanic female
workers), and the gap in pension coverage between white females and
black females advanced from 4 to 17 percentage points.
Pension coverage among the college-educated was helped by the
pension transformation, but that among less-educated male workers was damaged. In 2007, only 22 percent of male workers without
a high school degree had some form of pension coverage, compared
to 51 percent of those with a high school degree, 62 percent of those
with some college, and 79 percent of college graduates. Pension coverage showed an absolute decline among the three less-educated groups
of male workers between 1989 and 2007, while among male college
graduates the overall coverage rate rose moderately. As a result, the
gap in pension coverage between college graduates and the other three
educational groups expanded substantially over the 1989–2007 period.
Male blue-collar workers were also adversely affected by the
changeover in the pension system. The pension coverage rate among
male workers plummeted 12 percentage points in goods-producing
industries in 1989–2007, while it fell considerably less in nongovernmental services and public administration and even expanded somewhat in the trade sector. Likewise, pension coverage fell 9 percentage
points among craft, operative, and agricultural male workers, and 8
percentage points among male service workers. It contracted much less
among male professional and managerial workers, and even gained a
bit among technical and clerical male workers.
Similarly, lower-paid workers were hurt more by the pension makeover than higher-paid ones. In 2007, pension coverage among male
workers was highest for the top quintile, 94 percent; second highest
for the fourth quintile, 89 percent; third for the middle quintile, 79 percent; fourth for the second quintile, 69 percent; and markedly lower
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for the bottom quintile, 39 percent. Over time, pension coverage fell
off markedly among the bottom three quintiles for male workers while
declining only slightly among the top two quintiles between 1989 and
2007. Indeed, among male employees in 1989, overall pension coverage rates were over 90 percent among the top four earnings quintiles.
This, in turn, was due to the concentration of DB plans in the middle
of the earnings distribution. During the 1980s, the DB pension system
helped shore up the middle class. However, with the unraveling of DB
pensions, the overall pension coverage rate plunged among the bottom
three earnings quintiles.
What did the pension transformation mean for pension coverage
and pension wealth at the household level? I ﬁnd that after phenomenal
growth in the share of all households covered by DC plans from 1983 to
2001, the coverage rate leveled off from 2001 to 2007. In contrast, the
DB coverage rate plummeted from 1989 to 2001, and though it leveled
off during the new century, the overall pension coverage rate slipped by
1.4 percentage points from 2001 to 2007.
Mean DB pension wealth remained steady from 1989 to 2007.
Buoyed by the stock market boom and rising DC coverage, average
DC pension wealth skyrocketed from 1989 to 2001. It continued to rise
from 2001 to 2007 but at a much slower pace. As a result, mean pension wealth climbed by 80 percent from 1989 to 2001 but then rose by
only 14 percent from 2001 to 2007. Gains were particularly low among
nonelderly households during the 2000s.
Younger households experienced smaller gains in both pension
coverage and pension wealth as a result of the transition from the DB
to the DC system. Many middle-aged people were still protected under
the older DB system. Moreover, the elderly were by and large fully
protected from the transition of the pension system since those with DB
pensions were almost fully protected because of “grandfather” provisions. As a result, among households aged 46 and under, overall pension coverage advanced by only 2 percentage points from 1989 to 2007,
compared to a 7 percentage point gain for middle-aged households and
a 17 percentage point gain for elderly ones. Average pension wealth
grew by 61 percent over this period, compared to an 87 percent gain for
middle-aged ones and a 108 percent gain for the elderly.
In general, as was discussed in Chapter 2, U.S. households saw
marked improvements in both mean and median marketable net worth
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over the period 1989–2007. However, mean private accumulations
among all households grew slower than mean net worth, as did median
private accumulations in comparison to median net worth. This pattern also held for middle-aged and elderly households. Among young
households, mean private accumulations also grew slower than mean
net worth. However, both median net worth and median private accumulations actually declined in absolute terms over these years.
How did the transformation of the pension system affect overall
wealth inequality? Even though inequality in the distribution of both
DC wealth and DB wealth fell among households that held that form of
pension wealth, overall pension wealth inequality among pension holders actually rose from 1989 to 2007. The switchover from DB to DC
plans was the main reason behind the rise in pension wealth inequality.
Despite the decline in both DC and DB wealth inequality, the higher
level of DC pension inequality coupled with its rising share in total
pension wealth was the main factor accounting for the rise in pension
wealth inequality.
Correspondingly, the pension transformation led to the increased
inequality of private accumulations. First, it is of note that the Gini
coefﬁcient for private accumulations is lower than that for net worth (a
0.030-point difference among all households in 2001, for example). This
difference is due to the smaller level of inequality in DB pensions than in
net worth. Moreover, while the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth among all
households increased by 0.002 from 1989 to 2007, that for private accumulations increased more, by 0.012. In other words, the “inequalityreducing” effect of DB pensions declined from 0.039 in 1989 to 0.029
in 2007, largely because of the declining share of DB wealth in total
private accumulations. This effect is most notable among middle-aged
households, the group that was most subject to the transition of the pension system. Among them, the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth rose by
0.033 from 1983 to 2007, while that for private accumulations surged
by 0.070. Correspondingly, the difference in Gini coefﬁcients between
net worth and private accumulations tumbled from 0.073 in 1983 to
0.036 in 2007. Thus, the inequality of private accumulations rose much
more than that of traditional net worth.
These results also help unravel the “puzzle” noted at the end of
Chapter 2 and at the beginning of this chapter, namely that while
income inequality surged in the 1990s and 2000s, (traditional) net worth
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inequality remained largely unchanged. We can see that if we expand
the deﬁnition of net worth to include DB pension wealth, then there is a
rise in wealth inequality during the 1990s and the 2000s.

Notes
1. This group also includes Roth IRAs and rollovers from pension accounts.
2. An alternative data source often used in these studies is the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). This data source has an advantage over the SCF in that it has
relatively complete data on earnings histories and has employer-provided information on individual DB pension plans of each employee covered by these plans.
However, the SCF has three advantages over the HRS. First, the SCF provides
much better data on the assets and liabilities that constitute marketable net worth.
Second, the SCF data date from 1983, whereas the HRS data start in 1992. Since
the transformation of the pension system dates from the late 1980s, the SCF data
allow us to better track this change over the transition period. Third, the age coverage of the HRS is limited, whereas the SCF covers the whole population. This is
important since young households were particularly hurt by the pension transformation, and these households are not covered in the HRS.
3. As I discuss in Appendix B, even though estimates of both DB pension and Social
Security wealth are provided in the 1983 SCF, I reestimate the values of both to be
consistent with later years.
4. I use age 109 somewhat arbitrarily as the last possible year of living. Moreover,
the difference between the two formulas is that in the ﬁrst the nominal discount
rate δ is used whereas in the latter the real discount rate δ* is used.
5. The results using the 3 percent real discount rate are not shown in this volume
because reporting these results would vastly increase the number of tables in the
book. Another crucial choice is the selection of which mortality rates to use in the
calculation of DB and Social Security wealth. I have used here the standard ones
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States based on age, gender, and race.
However, there are also available unofﬁcial life expectancy estimates for individuals by age, gender, and income class (and even by educational attainment). As is
well known, higher-income (and more-educated) individuals live longer on average than lower-income (or less-educated) ones. The use of mortality rates conditional on income (or education) will have the effect of increasing estimates of DB
pension wealth and Social Security wealth of higher-income (and better-educated)
individuals relative to lower-income (and less-educated) individuals.
6. Technically speaking, the mortality rate mt associated with the year of retirement
is the probability of surviving from the current age to the age of retirement.
7. A couple of studies have looked at the reliability of employee-provided estimates
of pension wealth by comparing self-reported pension beneﬁts with estimates
based on provider data. Using data from the 1992 wave of the HRS, Gustman
and Steinmeier (1999) and Johnson, Sambamoorthi, and Crystal (2000) ﬁnd that
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individual reports of pension beneﬁts tend to differ from those based on provider
information. However, the latter also calculate that the median values of DB plans
from the two sources were quite close (about a 6 percent difference). As a result,
for average values of pension wealth, employee-provided estimates of expected
pension wealth seem to be fairly reliable.
It should also be noted that my deﬁnition of DB wealth is based on a socalled ongoing concern treatment. It is assumed in this that employees continue
to work at their place of employment until their expected date of retirement (this
is also true for Social Security wealth). The alternative is to use the accrual value
in which DB wealth (and Social Security wealth) is valued as of the current year
on the basis of work experience up to that date only. I elect the ongoing concern
method because it is consistent with my calculations of retirement adequacy in
Chapter 7. The accrual method will produce lower values of both DB and Social
Security wealth. Indeed, the accrual method and the ongoing concern treatment
represent two extremes in the valuation of both DB and Social Security wealth.
The latter treatment in particular relies on the assumptions that the ﬁrm or organization remains in existence over time and the employee continues working at the
enterprise.
Separate imputations are performed for husband and wife and an adjustment in the
Social Security beneﬁt is made for the surviving spouse. See Appendix B for details.
As with pension wealth, the mortality rate mt associated with the year of retirement is the probability of surviving from the current age to the age of retirement.
Though I can approximate the number of years of full- and part-time work for a
given worker, I cannot determine when in his or her work history periods of nonemployment occurred.
As explained in Note 5, I have opted for the ongoing concern method rather than
the accrual method. In the latter method, it is assumed that the worker stops working as of the year of the survey—say, 2007. One can then compute the expected DB
pension entitlements as of 2007. One can also make such a calculation for Social
Security wealth. I choose the ongoing concern method because this approach is
consistent with my later estimates of retirement adequacy (see Chapter 7).
I do not include future employee contributions to DC plans (which I will later call
DCEMPW) here, since this represents additional savings by the employee in the
same vein as investments in other assets like housing, stocks, and bonds. In Chapter 7, however, when I treat retirement adequacy, I include the value of DCEMPW
in projections of future retirement income. Likewise, I do not provide for a full
projection of total wealth accumulation over time. This process would require a
household microsimulation model, such as the MINT model, which the Urban
Institute and the Social Security Administration use (see, for example, Smith,
Toder, and Iams [2001]). However, in Chapter 7 I do provide for a simple projection of nonpension wealth to date of retirement.
This approach also avoids the difﬁculty of determining whether or not DC
contributions add to net savings over time. As discussed in Chapter 3, the evidence
is rather mixed, with Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2001) concluding that the growth
of IRAs and 401(k) plans do not substitute for other forms of household wealth,
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and Engen and Gale (2000) ﬁnding that DC plans do not add to net savings but
rather substitute for other forms of savings. Moreover, it is also possible that participation in a DB plan might reduce future savings (see, for example, Munnell
[1996] and Kennickell and Sundén [1999]).
Although the addition of DCEMP to DC wealth makes DC wealth more comparable to DB wealth, some differences still remain between the two. In particular,
there is greater risk associated with DC wealth. The beneﬁt levels in DB plans are
already set by the terms of the plans—that is why these are called deﬁned beneﬁts.
Deﬁned beneﬁt wealth depends only on future labor force participation in the
company and future earnings. The establishment of the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation in 1974 does, at least, insure the pension beneﬁts (up to a ﬁxed
amount) in the event of the bankruptcy of a company. In comparison, DC wealth
depends not only on future labor force participation and future earnings but also
on future employee contributions, future employer contributions, and future rates
of return. Indeed, the stock market experience of the 2000–2003 and 2007–2009
periods shows how difﬁcult it would have been to project the future value of DC
wealth even over these short periods. The beneﬁts from DB plans are more certain
than DC beneﬁts. Indeed, the shifting of the risk from employer to employee is
one of the reasons behind the rise of DC plans (see Wolff [2007c] for a discussion
of this issue).
The SCF records DC plans only for the main job of each respondent. No information on DC plans is provided for secondary employment. This does not appear to be
a signiﬁcant problem because in 2001, 99.4 percent of the total labor earnings of the
head and 98.8 percent of that of the spouse came from the person’s primary job.
This will, if anything, bias upward the estimated employer contribution to the DC
pension plan.
It should be noted that past employer contributions to DC plans are already
included in the current market value of DC wealth.
Because of differences in methodology, it is not possible to include 1983 in this
and the next three tables.
Part-time, temporary, and teenage workers are included in this tabulation. DC coverage is deﬁned to include only workers with a positive balance in a DC plan and
therefore excludes workers who are covered by a 401(k) plan but do not participate in such a plan, as well as people who have a pension account but do not contribute to that account. The 62 percent ﬁgure for men might seem high compared
to previous estimates (see Chapter 3, for example, as well as Note 19, below) but
this seemingly high estimate is explained by the fact that my ﬁgure includes individuals with an IRA or Keogh plan and individuals with a DB plan from a past job.
This means that the employee had worked long enough to become vested. By law,
such entitlements remain in effect even after the employee leaves a company.
Munnell and Quinby (2009) also ﬁnd a decline in the share of workers who participated in pension plans. They use the CPS as their data source, and the years covered were 1979 and 2008. Their sample consisted of workers aged 25–64. They
report that in 2008, 42 percent of male workers and 39 percent of female workers
participated in a pension plan. These ﬁgures are quite a bit lower than my calcula-
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tions for 2007 (62 and 60 percent for male and female workers, respectively). The
differences in results are attributable to different deﬁnitions of pension coverage.
Munnell and Quinby include in their pension coverage estimates only workers
who are covered in a plan by their current employers, while my ﬁgures include
DB pension entitlements from past jobs, as well as IRA and Keogh holdings. They
ﬁnd that the coverage rate for male workers declined from 56 percent in 1979 to
42 percent in 2008, while for female workers the rate actually increased from 36
to 39 percent. These results are consistent with my ﬁndings reported here. As a
consequence, Munnell and Quinby ﬁnd that the coverage gap between male and
female workers fell from 20 percentage points in 1979 to only 3 percentage points
in 2008, results also similar to mine. They note that among full-time, full-year
workers in 2008, women actually had a slightly higher level of pension coverage
than men.
Also, see Sanzenbacher (2006) for an illuminating comparison of different
estimates of pension coverage from the CPS, SCF, SIPP, and the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics.
Purcell (2009a), also using CPS data, ﬁnds a slight decline in the overall share
of workers who participated in employer-sponsored retirement plans between
2007 and 2009, from 52.0 to 51.1 percent. He also reports that the share of workers whose employer sponsored a retirement plan also fell slightly, from 59.9 to
59.0 percent. Purcell found that year-round, full-time female workers had reached
virtual parity with their male counterparts, with pension coverage rates of 51.0 and
51.2 percent, respectively. This is very similar to my results on gender differences.
20. I combine the two age groups since differences between younger and older workers are very similar within each demographic grouping, as they are among all
workers (see Appendix Tables B.1–B.3 for details by age group).
A breakdown of pension wealth by demographic characteristic is also shown
for households in Chapter 6.
21. Several studies have examined racial differences in pension coverage. Mok and
Siddique (2009) also report a substantial gap in pension coverage between African
Americans and whites on the basis of data from the CPS and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) over the period 1997–2008. On average they ﬁnd
that 75 percent of white male workers had a pension plan compared to 68 percent
of black male workers. However, the racial gap was reversed among females, as
77 percent of black female workers had a pension plan compared to 75 percent of
white female workers.
Munnell and Sullivan (2009) also ﬁnd racial and ethnic gaps in the share of
workers with a 401(k) plan. Using the 2001, 2004, and 2007 SCF, they calculate
that 57 percent of white workers were eligible for a 401(k) plan on average over
these years, compared to 55 percent of black workers and only 37 percent of Hispanic workers. The take-up rate was also higher among white workers. On average, 78 percent of white workers eligible for a 401(k) plan elected to participate,
compared to 70 percent of black workers and 70 percent of Hispanic workers.
However, because of differences in deﬁnitions of pension coverage, it is not possible to provide a direct comparison between these two sets of results and mine.
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Purcell (2009a) also ﬁnds that white workers had higher coverage rates than
minority workers. In 2008, the pension coverage rate for employer-sponsored
retirement plans was 57 percent for non-Hispanic whites, 46 percent for nonHispanic blacks, and 30 percent for Hispanic workers. These results are similar to
mine.
GED refers to the General Educational Development test, given in lieu of a high
school degree.
The industries are grouped into four categories: 1) agriculture, mining, and manufacturing; 2) wholesale and retail trade; 3) communications, information services,
ﬁnance, insurance, real estate, repair services, transportation, utilities, professional services, and personal services; and 4) public administration. The classiﬁcation scheme is dictated by the industry groupings provided in the SCF data.
The question of hours worked in the 2007 SCF is: How many hours (do you/does
[he/she]) work on (your/her/his) main job in a normal week?
This can be traced to the high share of part-time workers with an IRA or Keogh
account.
In the case of married couples, the husband’s and wife’s earnings are treated as
separate earnings.
The very high DB coverage rate for women in the top quintile in 1989 can be
traced to the high concentration of government employees in this group.
One similar analysis was conducted by Karamcheva and Sanzenbacher (2010)
on the basis of CPS data over the period 1979–2008. They divide the earnings
distribution into three equal tiers for private sector male workers in the age group
25–64. They ﬁnd that on average over this period only about one-third of workers in the bottom third worked for an employer that sponsored a pension plan, in
comparison with over 70 percent of the top third. Moreover, while the pension
participation rate of the top third was near 100 percent and constant over time,
that of the middle third fell from 94 to 86 percent over this period and that of the
bottom third from 85 to 69 percent. As a result, the overall share of workers in the
top third who participated in a pension plan averaged about 70 percent over the
period and remained fairly constant, while the overall share in the middle third
averaged about 60 percent and fell by 22 percent over the period, and that of the
bottom third averaged about 30 percent and fell 29 percent. Purcell (2009a) likewise reports on the basis of CPS data that only 28 percent of workers in the lowest
quartile in terms of annual earnings in 2008 participated in a retirement plan at
work, compared to 69 percent of workers in the top quartile.
I also report large differentials in pension coverage between the bottom,
middle, and top earnings quintile of male workers under the age of 65. Moreover, I ﬁnd that pension coverage had slipped among the bottom and middle earnings quintiles from 1989 to 2007 but had remained roughly constant for the top
quintile. However, it is not possible to directly compare actual estimates between
my work and the two studies cited above, since the deﬁnition of pension coverage differs between the three studies. For example, I include past DB pension in
my deﬁnition of coverage, whereas Karamcheva and Sanzenbacher do not. This
makes my estimate of DB coverage rates higher than those of Karamcheva and
Sanzenbacher.
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29. This result is in accordance with media accounts of a large divide in the value of
401(k) plans between executives and staff workers in large corporations (see, for
example, Leonhardt [2002]).
30. This relationship can perhaps be seen most clearly by a decomposition of the coefﬁcient of variation. As derived in Wolff (1987b), for any variable X = X1 + X2 ,
CV 2(X) = p12CV 2(X1)+ p22CV 2(X2) + 2CC(X1,X2),
where CV is the coefﬁcient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the
mean), CC is the coefﬁcient of covariation, deﬁned as the ratio of the covariance
to X 2, p1= X1/X, and p2 = X2 /X. The interaction term principally reﬂects the correlation coefﬁcient between DC and DB wealth. The correlation coefﬁcient also
rose over time (from 0.07 in 1989 to 0.24 in 2007 among all households). The
rising interaction term as a result also made a positive contribution to the growth
in overall pension wealth inequality.
31. The Gini coefﬁcient for PW among all households was 0.799 in 1989 and 0.783
in 2007, while that for PW among middle-aged households was about 0.715 in the
two years.
32. When I exclude DC wealth to obtain nonpension net worth, I ﬁnd that mean nonpension wealth rose by a lesser amount from 1989 to 2007, 54 percent, while
median nonpension net worth was up by only 6 percent. It is at once clear how
important DC plans were to the growth of net worth. This is not to say, of course,
that households would not have accumulated wealth in alternative instruments in
the absence of the existence of DC plans. However, the accumulations were likely
to have been less for two reasons. First, savings in DC plans are tax-sheltered,
which means that they accumulate at a higher rate in DC plans, ceteris paribus,
than in taxable investments. Second, the value of employer-provided DC plans,
like the 401(k), also incorporates the contributions made by employers. Employer
contributions would not likely have occurred in alternative investments. A comparison of trends in net worth with those in NWX suggests that households substituted savings in 401(k) and other DC plans for other forms of private savings.
This result is more in accord with the arguments of Gale (1995) and Engen and
Gale (2000) than Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2001). (See Chapter 3 for a review of
the pertinent literature).
33. The use of a higher (lower) discount rate in the calculation of DB pension wealth
would have lowered (raised) the value of DB pension wealth and consequently
increased (decreased) the measured inequality of private accumulations. Correspondingly, the use of a higher (lower) discount rate would have led to a lower
(higher) increase in the Gini coefﬁcient for private accumulations between 1989
(or 1983) and 2007.
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5
Stagnation of Retirement
Wealth in the 2000s
One of the main topics to be addressed in this book is retirement
adequacy. A full picture of retirement resources would not be complete
without a consideration of expected Social Security beneﬁts and Social
Security wealth (SSW). This chapter ﬁlls in that gap.
We pick up the story from Chapter 4 by focusing on SSW, retirement wealth in general, and augmented wealth. As discussed in Chapter
1, over the last three decades traditional DB pension plans were largely
replaced with DC pensions. We focused on two major issues in the previous chapter. First, has this transformation been beneﬁcial to most U.S.
households? Second, has it led to a rise or a decline in inequality?
I ﬁnd that mean augmented wealth (the sum of net worth, pension
and SSW), after rising dramatically during the 1990s, showed much
smaller gains in the new century. Moreover, median augmented wealth
by age group was generally stagnant over the years 2001 to 2007. Furthermore, the inequality of augmented wealth showed an increase from
1989 to 2007, while the inequality of net worth remained unchanged.
The next section of the chapter looks at time trends in SSW on the
household level from 1983 to 2007. I then present summary measures
on total (augmented) household wealth. After that, alternative pension wealth calculations are treated, followed by an update on pension
wealth and augmented wealth to July 1, 2009, on the basis of changes
in the stock market. The ﬁnal section provides a summary and concluding remarks.

SOCIAL SECURITY AND TOTAL RETIREMENT WEALTH
I ﬁrst look at how SSW compares to pension wealth. Is it greater or
smaller than pension wealth—and, correspondingly, is it a more or less
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important source of retirement income than pension wealth? Has SSW
grown faster or slower than pension wealth?
Social Security wealth among all households averaged $165,300
in 2001 (see Table 5.1); this compared to an average pension wealth of
$138,000. Thus, even as of 2007, SSW was a more important retirement
asset than pension wealth. Median SSW in 2007 was $139,300—close
to that of mean SSW—and eight times greater than median pension
wealth.1 The fact that mean and median SSW were so close was due
to a normal or nearly normal distribution of SSW. Mean SSW among
middle-aged households was 26 percent greater than that among elderly
households, and median SSW 39 percent larger. The greater SSW
among middle-aged relative to elderly households largely reﬂected the
higher lifetime earnings of the former. Mean and median SSW among
young households was about 40 percent lower than among age group
47–64. This discrepancy was mainly due to the greater discount factor
applied to future Social Security beneﬁts among young earners (from
the larger number of years left before retirement).
During the 1980s, SSW gained less than pension wealth. Mean
SSW among all households rose by 46 percent between 1989 and 2001,
in comparison to an 80 percent gain in mean pension wealth, the sum
of DB and DC wealth. Mean SSW gained 56 percent among middleaged households, 38 percent among young households, and 35 percent
among elderly households. The increase in median SSW was very close
to that of mean SSW—a reﬂection of both the low degree of inequality
in SSW and the relative constancy in SSW inequality over time.2 The
rise in SSW over these years reﬂected primarily increasing real wages,
particularly in the late 1990s, and rising longevity. This was offset, in
part, by the increase in the age (65 to 67) at which full Social Security
beneﬁts were received for persons born after 1938 and the rising share
of minorities in the labor force, whose life expectancy is shorter than
that of whites.
In contrast to the 1990s, the years 2001–2007 witnessed almost no
growth in SSW. Indeed, mean and median SSW fell slightly among
young, middle-aged, and elderly households. This turnaround was
largely attributable to the wage stagnation of this decade, as well as to
the increasing age at which full Social Security beneﬁts were received.
Another factor was the increasing share of minorities in the workforce.
Additional factors were the higher unemployment rates of the 2000s
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Table 5.1 Mean and Median Retirement Wealth, 1983–2007 (in thousands,
2007$)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
Mean pension wealth
—
67.1
120.8
138.0
Mean Social Security wealth
—
111.9
163.3
165.3
Mean retirement wealth
—
179.0
284.1
303.3
Median pension wealth
—
5.6
17.6
19.0
Median Social Security wealth
—
100.5
141.3
139.1
Median retirement wealth
—
126.0
184.5
187.6
Aged 46 and under
Mean pension wealth
—
34.3
53.4
55.3
Mean Social Security wealth
—
92.9
128.5
125.7
Mean retirement wealth
—
127.2
181.9
181.0
Median pension wealth
—
0.8
4.7
1.8
Median Social Security wealth
—
87.7
119.9
112.5
Median retirement wealth
—
100.4
136.4
130.5
Aged 47–64
Mean pension wealth
99.8
120.7
211.9
225.3
Mean Social Security wealth
158.5
138.4
216.0
215.7
Mean retirement wealth
257.8
259.1
427.9
440.9
Median pension wealth
46.8
37.4
69.1
75.4
Median Social Security wealth
149.1
138.1
206.4
195.8
Median retirement wealth
205.7
189.5
298.3
301.9
Aged 65 and over
Mean pension wealth
75.7
84.7
151.9
175.8
Mean Social Security wealth
140.0
127.6
171.7
169.6
Mean retirement wealth
215.6
212.3
323.6
345.4
Median pension wealth
43.0
5.7
35.1
47.4
Median Social Security wealth
129.1
105.9
148.6
132.6
Median retirement wealth
184.4
153.6
218.8
211.8
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Computations are for all households in the group. Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned
contribution + deﬁned beneﬁt. Retirement wealth = pension wealth + Social Security
wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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compared to the 1990s and the drop in the median retirement age compared to the 1990s. Both of these led to fewer years of employed work
life. Moreover, though longevity increased over this period, the rate of
increase slowed down relative to the 1990s. Pension wealth also grew
slowly during the 2000s but faster than SSW.
The inequality of SSW was much lower than that of pension wealth
(or even net worth). As shown in Table 5.2, in 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient
for SSW among all households was 0.36, compared to 0.78 for pension wealth (and 0.83 for net worth).3 The inequality of SSW among
all households fell slightly, by 0.007 Gini points, over the 1989–2007
period. The inequality of SSW also fell slightly among middle-aged
households but rose modestly among young households. Among the
elderly, there was a substantial drop in the inequality of SSW, reﬂecting
primarily an increase in Social Security coverage over these years.4
Table 5.2 Inequality of Retirement Wealth, 1983–2007 (Gini coefﬁcients)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
Pension wealth
—
0.799
0.788
0.783
Social Security wealth
—
0.370
0.344
0.363
Retirement wealth
—
0.485
0.493
0.514
Aged 46 and under
Pension wealth
—
0.810
0.801
0.810
Social Security wealth
—
0.306
0.320
0.327
Retirement wealth
—
0.405
0.430
0.440
Aged 47–64
Pension wealth
0.666
0.715
0.724
0.716
Social Security wealth
0.297
0.314
0.297
0.305
Retirement wealth
0.378
0.454
0.464
0.470
Aged 65+
Pension wealth
0.638
0.796
0.754
0.755
Social Security wealth
0.412
0.463
0.356
0.415
Retirement wealth
0.378
0.529
0.486
0.535
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁned beneﬁt wealth. Retirement
wealth = pension wealth + Social Security wealth. — = data not available.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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Another look at the change in the distribution of SSW is provided
in Figures 5.1a–5.1d. Among all households there was strong growth
in SSW at all percentiles over the 1989–2001 period (see Figure
5.1a). Moreover, in contrast to the U-shaped pattern of pension wealth
growth, the largest gains were made by the lowest percentiles, resulting
in a decline in the Gini coefﬁcient. The pattern was different over the
2001–2007 period, during which percentage gains in SSW were negative at lower percentiles and positive at higher percentiles, and the Gini
coefﬁcient rose as well.
Among younger households, the percentage gains in SSW were
all positive but U-shaped over the 1989–2001 period, corresponding
to a slight rise in SSW inequality (Figure 5.1b). Over the 2001–2007
period, there were generally small losses in SSW across the board and
a very slight rise in inequality. The pattern among middle-aged households was very similar to that among all households (Figure 5.1c). Over
the 1989–2001 period, percentage gains were positive at all percentiles
but higher at the lower ones, and the Gini coefﬁcient declined. Over
the years 2001–2007, the pattern was one of very small changes, both
positive and negative, over the percentiles, and inequality remained
fairly constant. In contrast, among elderly households (Figure 5.1d),
changes in SSW were all positive but much greater at the bottom end,
and inequality fell as well. During the second period, changes in SSW
were negative at the bottom and positive at the top, and the Gini coefﬁcient for SSW rose as well.
When we put together DC pensions, DB pension wealth, and SSW,
how has total retirement wealth changed over time? Among all households, mean retirement wealth grew by 59 percent from 1989 to 2001
(see Table 5.1). The percentage gain was, not surprisingly, lower than
that of pension wealth but higher than that of SSW. Moreover, mean
retirement wealth was up strongly among each of the three age groups
over these years—43 percent among young households, 65 percent
among middle-aged ones, and 52 percent among the elderly. Median
retirement wealth also climbed sharply—46 percent among all households, 36 percent among young households, 58 percent among middleaged ones, and 43 percent among the elderly.
In contrast, from 2001 to 2007 mean retirement wealth was up by
only 7 percent among all households. This ﬁgure was once again about
midway between the growth in pension wealth and that of SSW. By age
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Figure 5.1a Percentage Change in Social Security Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, All Households, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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Figure 5.1b Percentage Change in Social Security Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, Aged 46 and under, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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Figure 5.1c Percentage Change in Social Security Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, Aged 47–64, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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Figure 5.1d Percentage Change in Social Security Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, Aged 65 and over, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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group, mean retirement wealth was down by 1 percent among young
households, up by a very modest 3 percent among middle-aged ones,
and up 7 percent for the elderly. Median retirement wealth was basically unchanged among all households, down 4 percent among young
ones, unchanged among middle-aged ones, and down 3 percent among
the elderly.
In the last chapter we saw a very high level of pension wealth
inequality. However, SSW exerted a moderating inﬂuence so that the
inequality of retirement wealth was substantially lower. In fact, the
inequality of retirement wealth, not surprisingly, lay between that of
pension and SSW (Table 5.2). In 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient for retirement wealth among all households was 0.51, compared to 0.36 for SSW
and 0.78 for pension wealth.
The inequality of retirement wealth increased by 0.029 Gini points
from 1989 to 2007 among all households, despite a reduction in the
inequality of both pension wealth and SSW. There are two reasons.
First, the share of pension wealth in total retirement wealth rose over
the period (from 37 to 45 percent). Since pension wealth was more
unequally distributed than SSW, this change had the effect of raising
the inequality of retirement wealth (the sum of the two components).
Second, the correlation between the two rose substantially over these
years (from 0.26 to 0.38). In other words, households with large pension wealth holdings tended to have increasing levels of SSW over
time, thus leading to greater skewness in the distribution of retirement
wealth.5
Among young households, the Gini coefﬁcient for retirement
wealth rose by 0.034 Gini points, largely because of the rising inequality of SSW. Among middle-aged households, the Gini coefﬁcient was
up by 0.017 points, despite little change in the inequality of both pension and SSW. In this case, the main reason is the rising share of pension
wealth in total retirement wealth over the period. Among the elderly, the
inequality of retirement wealth remained virtually unchanged, despite
drops in the inequality of both pension wealth and SSW. The explanation in this case is a sharp rise in the correlation between these two
components.
Figures 5.2a–5.2d give a clearer picture of changes in the distribution of retirement wealth by subperiod, covering 1989–2001 and 2001–
2007. Among all households (Figure 5.2a), percentage gains in retire-
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ment wealth were all positive over the 1989–2001 period and formed
a U-shaped pattern. The strong growth in retirement wealth among the
lowest percentiles reﬂected the large increases in SSW at the bottom,
while the sharp gains among the top percentiles were due to the substantial gains of pension wealth at the top (primarily DC wealth). The
decline in the middle was a reﬂection of the losses in pension wealth in
this part of the distribution. There was a modest gain in inequality over
these years as well. However, from 2001 to 2007, changes in retirement wealth were much smaller. They were also negative up to the 40th
percentile or so and then generally positive above that. These changes
reﬂected declines in SSW in the bottom percentiles and increases of
pension wealth in the middle and upper percentiles. This period, not
surprisingly, was characterized by an increase in the Gini coefﬁcient for
retirement wealth.
Similar patterns are evident among the younger, middle-aged, and
elderly age groups. Among the former (Figure 5.2b), the gains in retirement wealth were all positive over the 1989–2001 period, and the pattern of gains was again U-shaped, bottoming out at the 60th percentile.
Over the later period, changes in retirement wealth were again negative at the bottom (up to the 70th percentile) and then positive. The
pattern of percentage gains was also U-shaped among middle-aged
households over the ﬁrst period (Figure 5.2c). Over the second period,
retirement wealth recorded losses in the bottom percentiles (up to the
40th) and then generally positive gains after that. Among the elderly
(Figure 5.2d), the percentage changes in retirement wealth were once
again all positive and formed a U-shaped pattern for the 1989–2001
period, bottoming out at the 65th percentile. In contrast, from 2001 to
2007, retirement wealth declined at the lower percentiles (up through
the 55th percentile) and rose at the upper ones. Percentage gains were
almost directly related to percentile level, rising from −17 percent at the
10th percentile to 22 percent at the 99th percentile. This pattern almost
directly mirrored changes in SSW among the elderly over the period.
Another perspective is afforded by Figure 5.3, which shows changes
in retirement wealth by nonpension net worth percentile among all
households in 1989, 2001, and 2007. It is apparent that there is a strong
correlation between nonpension net worth and retirement wealth. In
2007, retirement wealth ranged from a low of $184,000 for the bottom vintile (the bottom 5 percent) to $940,000 for the top vintile—a
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Figure 5.2a Percentage Change in Retirement Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, All Households, 1989, 2001, and 2007 (2007$)
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Figure 5.2b Percentage Change in Retirement Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, Aged 46 and Under, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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Figure 5.2c Percentage Change in Retirement Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, Aged 47–64, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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Figure 5.2d Percentage Change in Retirement Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, Aged 65 and Over, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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SOURCE: Author’s computation from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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Figure 5.3 Percentage Growth of Retirement Wealth in 2007$, All
Households, by Nonpension Wealth Vintile, 1989, 2001,
and 2007
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SOURCE: Author’s computation from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

ﬁvefold difference. It also appears that the correlation became stronger
over time between 1989 and 2001 and then weakened from 2001 to
2007. And, it is evident that between 1989 and 2001 retirement wealth
displayed positive gains for all vintiles, though the pattern was a bit
uneven. From 2001 to 2007, there was a mixture of positive and negative changes in retirement wealth by nonpension net worth vintile, and
once again no clear pattern emerged. These results will be useful when
we consider changes in the inequality of augmented wealth.

AUGMENTED WEALTH
I now turn to an appraisal of what happened to augmented wealth,
the sum of net worth, pension wealth, and SSW. Augmented wealth is
the most comprehensive measure of the full set of resources available
for retirement, and so its change over time is of interest when consider-
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ing trends in retirement adequacy. I ﬁnd that whereas there was rapid
growth in augmented wealth during the 1990s, a marked slowdown
occurred during the 2000s. Indeed, median augmented wealth barely
moved at all for the older age groups and actually fell in absolute terms
among young households.
I noted above that mean net worth among all households rose by 44
percent between 1989 and 2001, while median net worth increased by
16 percent (see Table 5.3 as well). If DB pension wealth is now added
in, then the mean value of private accumulations was up by 37 percent
and its median value by 4 percent. Finally, if SSW is now included, then
the mean value of augmented wealth rose by 39 percent and its median
Table 5.3 Augmented Wealth, 1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
Mean net worth
270.4
309.8
445.1
536.1
Mean augmented wealth
—
478.0
666.5
762.8
Median net worth
69.5
74.3
86.1
102.5
Median augmented wealth
—
225.0
277.5
309.2
Aged 46 and under
Mean net worth
128.1
171.2
205.0
209.9
Mean augmented wealth
—
289.2
353.8
360.2
Median net worth
30.8
27.8
24.2
21.8
Median augmented wealth
—
140.5
165.3
155.8
Aged 47–64
Mean net worth
436.8
477.0
700.5
803.2
Mean augmented wealth
684.3
715.7 1,015.3 1,110.3
Median net worth
126.8
156.0
161.1
206.5
Median augmented wealth
364.6
373.2
475.4
485.4
Aged 65+
Mean net worth
436.3
454.1
652.8
809.1
Mean augmented wealth
645.9
664.0
913.7 1,070.0
Median net worth
119.3
128.1
176.5
211.1
Median augmented wealth
342.3
310.7
426.5
435.5
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + pension wealth + Social Security
wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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value by 23 percent. The rapid growth of SSW over the 1990s made
up, in part, for the slower growth of pension wealth in the middle of
the distribution, thus explaining the more rapid increase in augmented
wealth than in private accumulations.
Patterns vary by age group. Among young households, mean augmented wealth increased by 22 percent, compared to a 20 percent rise in
net worth, and median augmented wealth rose by 18 percent, compared
to a 13 percent drop in net worth. Among middle-aged households,
mean augmented wealth grew by 42 percent, compared to a 47 percent
increase in net worth, and median augmented wealth gained 27 percent,
compared to a 3 percent rise in net worth. The elderly experienced a
38 percent gain in mean augmented wealth, compared to a 44 percent
growth in mean net worth, and median augmented wealth advanced by
37 percent, about the same as the 38 percent gain in median net worth.
The years 2001–2007 again look different. The growth in mean augmented wealth slowed down, registering a 14 percent gain among all
households compared to a 39 percent increase in 1989–2001. Median
augmented wealth advanced by only 11 percent, in comparison to a 23
percent rise in 1989–2001. Evidence of the slowdown in the growth of
augmented wealth is evident for each of the three age groups as well.
Mean augmented wealth remained virtually unchanged, and median
augmented wealth declined in absolute terms for young households in
the 2001–2007 period, whereas both rose at about 20 percent during
the 1990s. Mean augmented wealth grew by only 9 percent for middleaged households in the later period, whereas it increased by 42 percent in the 1989–2001 period, and median augmented wealth showed
almost no change in the 2000s, compared to a 27 percent growth in the
1990s. For the elderly, mean augmented wealth advanced by 17 percent
in the 2000s, compared to 38 percent in the 1990s, and median augmented wealth remained virtually unchanged in the later period, though
it gained 37 percent in the earlier period.
We saw in the last chapter that adding DB wealth to net worth to
create private accumulations resulted in a modest reduction in measured inequality. Here, it will become apparent that also including SSW
results in a fairly sizable decrease in measured inequality.
In 2007 the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth among all households
was 0.834. Adding DB wealth to net worth to obtain private accumulations resulted in a 0.030 decline of the Gini coefﬁcient to 0.805. This
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decrease in inequality was due to the relatively small level of inequality in DB wealth. In contrast, adding SSW to nonpension net worth
caused an even more sizable reduction in the Gini coefﬁcient of 0.141
points, from 0.834 to 0.693. This drop in inequality reﬂected both the
much lower level of inequality in SSW than in marketable wealth, as
well as its relatively low (though positive) correlation with net worth.
Finally, adding both DB wealth and SSW to net worth produced only
a very modest further diminution of the Gini coefﬁcient, to 0.684. As a
consequence, it is apparent that the main equalizing effect of retirement
wealth comes from Social Security, not private pensions. Results are
very similar for the three individual age groups.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the inequality of net worth
among all households was essentially unchanged over the years 1989–
2007. In contrast, the inequality of augmented wealth showed a sizable increase over these years, rising by 0.021 Gini points (see Table
5.4). This is tantamount to saying that the equalizing effect of retirement wealth mitigated over the 1989–2007 period. While the addition of retirement wealth to net worth reduced the Gini coefﬁcient by
0.169 points in 1989, the difference was only 0.150 in 2007. Thus, the
inequality-reducing effects of adding retirement wealth to net worth fell
over the years 1989–2007.6
Among young households, the inequality of both net worth and
augmented wealth declined slightly from 1989 to 2007. Among middleaged households the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth increased by 0.020
from 1989 to 2007, whereas that for augmented wealth advanced by
0.031 points. Indeed, over the full 1983–2007 period, while the Gini
coefﬁcient of net worth was up by 0.033 points, that for augmented
wealth gained 0.076 points. Among the elderly, the inequality of net
worth rose by a slight 0.006 Gini points and that of augmented wealth
increased a little more, by 0.013 Gini points. In fact, from 1983 to 2007,
the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth was almost unchanged, while that for
augmented wealth climbed 0.066 points. Thus, for both middle-aged
and elderly households, the same pattern ensued as that for all households, namely, that the inequality of augmented wealth rose more than
that of net worth.
Why did the inequality of augmented wealth increase while that
of net worth remained unchanged from 1989 to 2007? The main reason is that the inequality of retirement wealth increased. This was the
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Table 5.4 Inequality of Augmented Wealth, 1983–2007 (Gini coefﬁcients)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
Net worth
0.799
0.832
0.826
0.834
Private accumulations
—
0.793
0.796
0.805
Nonpension wealth + Social
—
0.676
0.665
0.693
Security wealth
Augmented wealth
—
0.663
0.661
0.684
Aged 46 and under
Net worth
0.797
0.887
0.859
0.880
Private accumulations
—
0.851
0.830
0.850
Nonpension wealth + Social
—
0.650
0.612
0.636
Security wealth
Augmented wealth
—
0.642
0.616
0.636
Aged 47–64
Net worth
0.761
0.775
0.798
0.795
Private accumulations
0.688
0.721
0.756
0.758
Nonpension wealth + Social
0.607
0.644
0.655
0.673
Security wealth
Augmented wealth
0.574
0.619
0.637
0.650
Aged 65+
Net worth
0.778
0.778
0.762
0.784
Private accumulations
0.708
0.738
0.724
0.748
Nonpension wealth + Social
0.638
0.670
0.637
0.678
Security wealth
Augmented wealth
0.599
0.652
0.626
0.665
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. Key: Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth. Augmented
wealth = nonpension wealth + pension wealth + Social Security wealth. — = data not
available.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

case for all households except elderly households. A secondary reason
is the increased correlation between nonpension wealth and retirement
wealth (see Figure 5.3 and the pertinent discussion above). The correlation coefﬁcient between the two advanced from 0.18 to 0.25 among all
households and from 0.16 to 0.22 among middle-aged ones.7
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Figures 5.4a–5.4d give a graphical depiction of changes in the
distribution of augmented wealth in 1989, 2001, and 2007. Among all
households (Figure 5.4a), percentage changes in augmented wealth over
the 1989–2001 period, like those of retirement wealth, were all positive
and formed a U-shaped pattern, bottoming out at the 50th percentile.
The pattern seems to mirror rather closely the pattern of percentage
gains in retirement wealth. In contrast, from 2001 to 2007, changes in
augmented wealth were negative at the bottom of the distribution (up
through the 30th percentile) and generally positive above this. Moreover, percentage gains are positively correlated with the initial augmented wealth level. These results are consistent with the ﬁnding of
little change in the inequality of augmented wealth from 1989 to 2001
and an increase in inequality from 2001 to 2007.
Among young households (Figure 5.4b), a similar pattern unfolded.
Over the ﬁrst period, augmented wealth rose at all percentiles and there
was a U-shaped pattern in percentage gains. Over the later period,
changes in augmented wealth were uniformly negative up to the 60th
percentile and then generally positive thereafter. The pattern of percentage gains was largely repeated among middle-aged households (Figure
5.4c) in the earlier period. Over the second period, changes were almost
all positive but the pattern was quite uneven. In contrast, among the
elderly (Figure 5.4d), the percentage gains in augmented wealth were
all positive in the ﬁrst period but tended to decline with percentile level.
Over the second period, changes in augmented wealth were generally
negative at the bottom part of the distribution (up to the 15th percentile)
and then generally positive above. These results are consistent with the
ﬁnding that the inequality of augmented wealth fell over the 1989–2001
period and then rose over the 2001–2007 period.

ALTERNATIVE PENSION WEALTH CALCULATIONS
How robust are the ﬁndings reported in Chapters 4 and 5 to alternative measures of pension wealth? I consider two modiﬁcations to the
deﬁnition of pension wealth here. First, as discussed in Chapter 4, I
include DCEMP, an estimate of future employer contributions to DC
pension plans in the deﬁnition of pension wealth (the sum of DCEMP
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Figure 5.4a Percentage Change in Augmented Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, All Households, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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Figure 5.4b Percentage Change in Augmented Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, Aged 46 and Under, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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Figure 5.4c Percentage Change in Augmented Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, Aged 47–64, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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Figure 5.4d Percentage Change in Augmented Wealth in 2007$ by
Percentile, Aged 65 and Over, 1989, 2001, and 2007
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SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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with another variable is noted with an asterisk, e.g., DC + DCEMP is
shown as DC*). Second, as discussed below, DC accumulations are
tax-deferred savings, and I consider how my estimates would change if
I use a net (after-tax) measure of deﬁned contribution wealth.
DC Employer Contributions to Deﬁned Contribution Pension Plans
How does the inclusion of employer contributions to DC plans
affect time trends in augmented wealth AW* and its other components? I ﬁrst consider how the inclusion of DCEMP affects the level
of measured wealth. Recall from Chapter 4 that DCEMP is deﬁned as
the present discounted value of future employer contributions to DC
plans. In 2007, the average value of DCEMP among all households
was $29,900, or 39 percent of mean DC. This represented a substantial
addition to the value of DC wealth and, in earlier years, such as 2001,
put total DC wealth at a value far greater than DB wealth. The addition
of DCEMP in 2007 increased the mean value of pension wealth by 22
percent, mean private accumulations by 5 percent, the mean value of
retirement wealth by 10 percent, and mean augmented wealth by 4 percent (see Table 5.5). Among younger households, the net effect of adding DCEMP was much larger. It raised mean DC wealth by 122 percent
(since DC accumulations among young workers are relatively small),
mean pension wealth by 68 percent, mean private accumulations by 16
percent, mean retirement wealth by 21 percent, and mean augmented
wealth by 10 percent. Among age group 47–64, the effect of adding
DCEMP to other components of retirement wealth was smaller, since
DC accumulations among older workers were already relatively high.
The inclusion of DCEMP enlarged mean DC wealth by 28 percent,
mean pension wealth by 17 percent, mean private accumulations by
4 percent, mean retirement wealth by 9 percent, and mean augmented
wealth by only 3 percent.
The inclusion of DCEMP actually has a larger effect on median
values than on mean values. In 2007, adding DCEMP increased the
median value of private accumulations by 17 percent, the median value
of retirement wealth by 9 percent, and the median value of augmented
wealth by 8 percent among all households; median private accumulations by 65 percent, median retirement wealth by 12 percent, and
median augmented wealth by 17 percent among younger households;
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Table 5.5 Augmented Wealth, Including Employer Contributions to
Deﬁned Contribution Plans, 1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
Mean values
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth*
6.4
29.4
97.1
106.7
Pension wealth*
—
86.0
155.1
167.9
Private accumulations*
—
384.3
537.5
627.4
Retirement wealth*
—
197.8
318.4
333.2
Augmented wealth*
—
496.2
700.8
792.7
Median values
Pension wealth*
—
12.0
39.5
38.1
Private accumulations*
—
127.3
148.8
166.4
Retirement wealth*
—
133.9
208.5
205.4
Augmented wealth*
—
237.2
311.1
335.2
Aged 46 and under
Mean values
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth*
Pension wealth*
Private accumulations*
Retirement wealth*
Augmented wealth*
Median values
Pension wealth*
Private accumulations*
Retirement wealth*
Augmented wealth*
Aged 47–64
Mean values
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth*
Pension wealth*
Private accumulations*
Retirement wealth*
Augmented wealth*

6.0
—
—
—
—

38.4
63.5
224.0
156.3
316.9

80.9
101.2
273.2
229.8
401.7

68.1
92.7
271.8
218.4
397.6

—
—
—
—

5.0
63.3
111.0
159.3

21.1
68.4
155.8
196.5

7.0
57.8
146.0
182.0

10.2
100.3
526.8
258.7
684.8

33.9
134.3
590.1
272.5
728.5

149.1
171.6
248.0
263.0
835.4
932.4
463.9
478.7
1,051.3 1,148.1
(continued)
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Table 5.5 (continued)
Aged 47–64
Median values
Pension wealth*
Private accumulations*
Retirement wealth*
Augmented wealth*

1983

1989

2001

2007

46.8
215.3
206.1
365.5

48.5
231.2
194.0
374.7

91.3
274.5
318.4
500.2

98.2
310.0
318.8
510.7

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Key: Pension wealth* = deﬁned beneﬁt + deﬁned contribution* = deﬁned beneﬁt +
deﬁned contribution + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution plans. Private
accumulations* = nonpension wealth + pension wealth*. Retirement wealth* = pension wealth* + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth* = nonpension wealth +
pension wealth* + Social Security wealth. — = data not available.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

and median private accumulations by 9 percent, median retirement
wealth by 6 percent, and median augmented wealth by 5 percent among
age group 47–64.
How does the inclusion of employer contributions to DC plans
affect the measured growth in the various components of wealth? In
Chapters 4 and 5, we saw that there was a marked slowdown in the
growth of pension wealth, private accumulations, retirement wealth,
and augmented wealth between the 1990s (1989 to 2001) and the 2000s
(2001 to 2007). This was the case for both mean and median values.
Because the ratio of DCEMP to DC jumped from 0.38 in 1983 to
1.79 in 1989 among all households (reﬂecting the initiation of many
ﬁrm-level deﬁned contribution plans), the growth of DC* wealth (the
sum of DC wealth and DCEMP) over this period was much higher than
that of DC wealth (361 percent versus 129 percent). However, after
1989, DCEMP fell as a share of DC wealth to 0.55 in 2001 and then to
0.39 in 2007, so that relative gains in mean DC* were lower than that of
mean DC after 1989. As a consequence, we still ﬁnd sharp slowdowns in
the growth of both mean and median pension wealth, private accumulations, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth between the 1990s and
the 2000s. In fact, the slowdowns are even greater when employer contributions to DC plans are included in the deﬁnition of wealth. While,
for example, median augmented wealth (without employer contribu-
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tions) gained 11 percent from 2001 to 2007, median AW* advanced by
only 8 percent.
The pattern is very similar for age group 47–64, though the differences are somewhat smaller. DCEMP as a share of DC ﬁrst surged
from 0.05 in 1983 to 0.66 in 1989 and then fell off to 0.28 in 2007. As
a result, mean DC* grew much faster than mean DC from 1983 to 1989
but the opposite was true after 1989, and the slowdown in percentage
increase of both mean and median pension wealth, private accumulations, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth between the 1990s and
the 2000s became even greater. In fact, median RW* remained virtually unchanged over the later period and median AW* grew by only 2
percent.8
Three ﬁndings are particularly noteworthy. First, median AW*
among all households had much lower gains in the 2001–2007 period
in comparison to the 1989–2001 period. This remained true with or
without the inclusion of employer contributions to DC plans. Second,
among younger households, both mean and median PA* and AW*
declined in absolute terms in the later period. Third, among age group
47–64, median PA* showed almost no change over the 2001–2007
period. Thus, the main results derived in Chapters 4 and 5 without the
inclusion of DCEMP remain largely unaltered.
The story is very similar when we consider trends in inequality (see
Table 5.6). As we saw above, the inequality of both private accumulations and augmented wealth advanced from 1989 to 2007, while that of
traditional net worth remained largely unchanged.
It is ﬁrst of interest that adding employer contributions, DCEMP,
reduces overall pension wealth inequality (from a Gini coefﬁcient of
0.783 to 0.758 among all households in 2007). Results are similar by
individual age groups. The reason is that DCEMP was distributed more
equally than pension wealth (PW). The equalizing effect of DCEMP
on PW* was offset to a modest extent by the fact that the correlation
of DCEMP and standard pension wealth was positive though quite low
(0.21 among all households in 2007).9 Thus, the addition of DCEMP
to standard pension wealth tended to even out the distribution of PW*
among households. Likewise, the inclusion of DCEMP lowered the
inequality of private accumulations and augmented wealth. The reasons are similar—a lower level of inequality of DCEMP than either net
worth or augmented wealth, despite a positive though low correlation
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Table 5.6 Inequality of Augmented Wealth*, Including Employer
Contributions to Deﬁned Contribution Plans, 1983–2007 (Gini
coefﬁcients)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
Pension wealth*
—
0.787
0.749
0.758
Private accumulations*
—
0.776
0.773
0.789
Retirement wealth*
—
0.502
0.498
0.521
Augmented wealth*
—
0.658
0.650
0.677
Aged 46 and under
Pension wealth*
—
0.809
0.748
0.775
Private accumulations*
—
0.818
0.782
0.813
Retirement wealth*
—
0.471
0.470
0.479
Augmented wealth*
—
0.643
0.608
0.631
Aged 47–64
Pension wealth*
0.666
0.716
0.709
0.706
Private accumulations*
0.688
0.715
0.746
0.750
Retirement wealth*
0.379
0.466
0.473
0.483
Augmented wealth*
0.574
0.618
0.633
0.647
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Key: Pension wealth* = deﬁned beneﬁt + deﬁned contribution* = deﬁned beneﬁt +
deﬁned contribution + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution plans. Private
accumulations* = nonpension wealth + pension wealth*. Retirement wealth* = pension wealth* + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth* = nonpension wealth +
pension wealth* + Social Security wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

of DCEMP with net worth (0.11 in 2007 among all households) and of
DCEMP with augmented wealth (0.12 among all households in 2007).
Nonetheless, we still ﬁnd that the inequality of both PA* and AW*
among all households advanced over the years from 1989 (or 1983) to
2007, while that of net worth remained essentially unchanged. Among
middle-aged households, we likewise ﬁnd that the inequality of PA*
and AW* increased more than that of net worth.10
Future Tax Liability on Pension Wealth
I have so far applied a pretax valuation to pension wealth. However,
as many of us are painfully aware, contributions to DC plans are tax
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sheltered or tax-deferred when they are made but subject to income tax
on withdrawal.11 Because of this, their posttax value is lower (usually
quite a bit) than their stated (pretax) market value. In contrast, most
other assets in the household portfolio, such as mutual funds, are not
subject to income taxes on withdrawal. As a result, when we include
the market value of DC plans as a part of net worth, we are adding an
asset with an attached tax liability to other assets that do not have this
liability.
Thus, in principle, the posttax value of DC plans should be used
when computing net worth. Likewise, DB pension beneﬁts (and lumpsum distributions) are taxable on receipt, so that, in principle, the posttax value of DB pension wealth should also be used instead of its pretax
value when computing total pension wealth.12
I make a somewhat rough adjustment to the values of DB and DC
pension wealth for future taxes on income receipt. In principle, to make
a proper calculation we would have to predict future income (and its
composition), future tax deductions and exemptions, and the future tax
schedule as well at retirement. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that
for current workers income at retirement equals 80 percent of the preretirement income.13 In the case of current beneﬁciaries, I assume that
their (postretirement) income remains ﬁxed over their remaining life. I
assume that marital status remains unchanged and that couples ﬁle joint
returns. I assume that the tax schedule remains ﬁxed over the remaining
lifetime of the individual.14 I also treat the taxation of Social Security
beneﬁts according to the tax code current at the time of the survey.15
How does the use of net (after-tax) DB and DC pension wealth
affect trends in the level of and the degree of inequality in augmented
wealth and its various components? Do the results reported above still
hold up? I ﬁnd that the slowdown in pension wealth and augmented
wealth between the 1990s and the 2000s holds up when net pension
wealth is used instead of gross pension wealth. Moreover, I ﬁnd that
augmented wealth becomes more unequal over the period 1989–2007
irrespective of whether net or gross pension wealth is used.
Results for 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 are shown in Table 5.7. For
2007, the average tax rate on pension wealth was 11.8 percent among
all households, and that on SSW was 9.4 percent. The mean tax rate on
pension wealth fell from 15.5 percent in 1983 to 11.8 percent in 1989,
rose a bit to 13.4 percent in 2001, and then fell off again to 11.8 percent
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Table 5.7 Augmented Wealth, Net of Federal Income Taxes on Receipt,
1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
Mean values
Net pension wealth
—
53.8
93.4
108.5
Net private accumulations
—
352.9
475.8
568.0
Net retirement wealth
—
156.5
235.7
253.4
Net augmented wealth
—
455.5
618.1
712.9
Median values
Net pension wealth
—
5.0
14.9
16.7
Net private accumulations
—
109.6
113.0
136.4
Net retirement wealth
—
116.1
164.3
168.5
Net augmented wealth
—
213.9
255.7
289.3
Aged 46 and under
Mean values
Net pension wealth
Net private accumulations
Net retirement wealth
Net augmented wealth
Median values
Net pension wealth
Net private accumulations
Net retirement wealth
Net augmented wealth
Aged 47–64
Mean values
Net pension wealth
Net private accumulations
Net retirement wealth
Net augmented wealth
Median values
Net pension wealth
Net private accumulations
Net retirement wealth
Net augmented wealth

Wolff.indb 156

—
—
—
—

27.0
189.0
111.7
273.7

40.9
212.8
152.2
324.1

44.2
223.3
155.0
334.1

—
—
—
—

0.6
39.7
95.5
133.7

3.8
36.0
122.0
152.7

1.6
32.3
119.0
147.3

74.9
502.8
233.5
661.3

96.8
553.3
222.0
678.5

161.6
175.6
749.0
845.0
346.7
361.3
934.1 1,030.7

39.1
202.6
196.1
357.6

31.3
211.6
170.7
364.0

57.1
234.0
261.6
430.1

64.9
270.9
260.6
444.4

11/21/2011 9:18:37 AM

Stagnation of Retirement Wealth in the 2000s 157
Table 5.7 (continued)
Aged 65+
Mean values
Net pension wealth
Net private accumulations
Net retirement wealth
Net augmented wealth
Median values
Net pension wealth
Net private accumulations
Net retirement wealth
Net augmented wealth

1983

1989

2001

2007

60.1
492.3
200.1
632.2

69.3
521.0
189.7
641.5

121.5
139.3
711.6
863.9
276.9
291.7
867.0 1,016.4

39.9
181.9
175.8
338.1

5.6
187.0
145.8
304.0

31.2
255.2
202.5
414.0

44.7
272.5
202.1
423.5

NOTE: Augmented wealth excludes employer contributions to deﬁned contribution
pension plans. Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head
of household. Key: Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth.
Retirement wealth = pension wealth + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth =
nonpension wealth + pension wealth + Social Security wealth. — = data not available.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

in 2007. In contrast, the mean tax rate of SSW rose from zero in 1983
to 6.0 percent in 1989 and then to 9.8 percent in 2001 before falling
slightly to 9.4 percent in 2007.
The projected future tax liability on pension wealth took a large
chunk out of pension wealth. The average net value of pension wealth
(that is, net of expected taxes on receipt and excluding DCEMP) among
all households was 80 percent of its gross average value in 1989 and 79
percent in 2007. Future tax liabilities took a smaller bite out of SSW.
The average net value of retirement wealth was 87 percent of its gross
average value in 1989 and 84 percent in 2007. Federal income taxes took
about the same sized bite out of expected retirement beneﬁts in 2007 as
in 1989.
As a result, while the mean value of gross retirement wealth (excluding DCEMP) among all households grew by 70 percent between 1989
and 2007, its net value increased by only 62 percent (the corresponding
ﬁgures are 68 and 62 percent when including DCEMP, as shown in
Appendix Table C.1). Likewise, while the median value of gross retirement wealth among all households increased by 49 percent (53 percent
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for RW*), the median value of net retirement wealth gained only 45
percent (49 percent for RW*).
Future income tax liabilities had less effect on private accumulations and augmented wealth. The mean value of private accumulations
was reduced by 4 percent in 1989 and 5 percent in 2007 and that of
augmented wealth by 5 percent in 1989 and 7 percent in 2007 (the effect
was about the same for PA* and AW*). As a result, the mean value of
gross augmented wealth climbed by 60 percent (and by 60 percent for
AW* as well) over the period, while the net value gained 57 percent
(57 percent also for AW*). Finally, while the median value of gross
augmented wealth advanced by 37 percent (41 percent for AW*), the
median value of net augmented wealth grew somewhat less, by 35 percent (38 percent for AW*).
As with gross pension wealth, I ﬁnd a marked slowdown in the
growth of pension wealth and augmented wealth over the two subperiods, 1989–2001 and 2001–2007, when net pension wealth is used
instead. Mean and median values of both gross and net pension wealth
(with and without DCEMP) show strong positive growth during the
earlier period but much smaller gains over the later period. Mean values
of both gross and net private accumulations (with and without DCEMP)
also show strong growth (of the order of 35 to 40 percent) during the
ﬁrst period and slower growth during the second (of the order of 17 to
19 percent). Mean and median values of both gross and net retirement
wealth (with and without DCEMP) show strong gains in the ﬁrst period
but tepid growth in the second. Mean and median values of both gross
and net augmented wealth (with and without DCEMP) indicate robust
growth in the early period and much slower gains in the second. The
results are quite similar for age groups 46 and under and 47–64, with
net values showing a slightly smaller increase over time due to the moderate increase in future tax liabilities on SSW and pension wealth.
Netting out implicit income taxes on retirement wealth had an
equalizing effect, but the effect was rather modest on pension wealth
among all households (see Table 5.8). In 2007 the Gini coefﬁcient for
pension wealth among all households was reduced by 0.014 (0.016 for
PW*). Netting out future income tax liabilities had a larger effect on
retirement wealth inequality. The Gini coefﬁcient for retirement wealth
was lessened by 0.035 and that for RW* by 0.036. The greater reduction
of the Gini coefﬁcient for total retirement wealth than pension wealth
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Table 5.8 Inequality of Augmented Wealth, Net of Federal Income
Taxes on Receipt, Both Excluding and Including Employer
Contribution to Deﬁned Contribution Plans, 1983–2007
(Gini coefﬁcients)
1983 1989
2001
2007
All households
Gini coeff. excluding employer
contributions to deﬁned contribution
plans
Net pension wealth
—
0.789 0.776 0.769
Net private accumulations
—
0.790 0.798 0.807
Net retirement wealth
—
0.458 0.458 0.479
Net augmented wealth
—
0.663 0.662 0.686
Gini coeff. including employer
contributions to deﬁned contribution
plans
Net pension wealth*
—
0.774 0.733 0.742
Net private accumulations*
—
0.779 0.776 0.792
Net retirement wealth*
—
0.472 0.460 0.485
Net augmented wealth*
—
0.657 0.650 0.677
Aged 47–64
Gini coeff. excluding employer
contributions to deﬁned contribution
plans
Net pension wealth
Net private accumulations
Net retirement wealth
Net augmented wealth
Gini coeff. including employer
contributions to deﬁned contribution
plans
Net pension wealth*
Net private accumulations*
Net retirement wealth*
Net augmented wealth*

0.641
0.692
0.345
0.573

0.701
0.721
0.424
0.618

0.708
0.759
0.423
0.638

0.698
0.762
0.433
0.652

0.641
0.692
0.345
0.573

0.699
0.718
0.433
0.617

0.689
0.750
0.431
0.634

0.685
0.753
0.443
0.648

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. Key:
Retirement wealth* = pension wealth* + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth*
= nonpension wealth + pension wealth* + Social Security wealth. — = data not
available.
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alone reﬂected the fact that the implicit tax rates on Social Security
beneﬁts are notably higher for high earners, and netting out taxes from
SSW is strongly redistributive. However, netting out implicit taxes on
pension and SSW barely affected the measured inequality of either private accumulations or augmented wealth. As a result, inequality trends
in both private accumulations and augmented wealth between 1989 and
2007 remained almost unchanged after subtracting implicit taxes from
retirement wealth.
Among middle-aged households, netting out taxes had a somewhat
larger effect on the inequality of both pension wealth and retirement
wealth than that for all households. The 2007 Gini coefﬁcient for pension wealth declined by 0.018 (0.021 for PW*), and the Gini coefﬁcient
for retirement wealth fell by 0.037 (0.040 for RW*). However, once
again, netting out taxes did not have much effect on inequality trends
for private accumulations and augmented wealth (as well as for PA*
and AW*). Thus, the central ﬁndings on trends in both private accumulations and augmented wealth remained largely unchanged when aftertax values were used instead of gross values.

UPDATE TO 2009
Following the procedures outlined in Chapter 2, I next update both
net worth and pension wealth to July 1, 2009, on the basis of the change
in the stock market and housing prices. As discussed in Chapter 2, house
prices fell by 23.5 percent in real terms and the S&P 500 index was
down by 40.9 percent in real terms. I also report in that chapter that in
2007, 40.2 percent of households held stocks through one or more pension accounts and 31.4 percent of the value of all stocks owned directly
or indirectly were held in pension funds. Additionally, 43.6 percent of
the value of DC pension plans was invested in stocks in that year.
Not surprisingly, as shown in Table 5.9, DC wealth was decimated
by the stock market crash of 2008–2009. The average value of DC plans
fell by 17 percent from 2007 to the midpoint of 2009.16 Younger households (under age 47) had a smaller share of their pensions invested in
stocks (40 percent) and consequently took a somewhat smaller hit in the
value of their pensions (16 percent), as did middle-aged households (17
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Table 5.9 Augmented Wealth, 2007 and Projections to 2009 (in thousands,
2007$)
2007
Projected 2009
All households
Mean values
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth
76.8
63.5
Pension wealth
138.0
124.7
Net worth
536.1
443.8
Private accumulations
597.5
505.0
Retirement wealth
303.3
290.0
Augmented wealth
762.8
670.3
Median values
Pension wealth
19.0
16.4
Net worth
102.5
65.4
Private accumulations
142.8
104.2
Retirement wealth
187.6
184.1
Augmented wealth
309.2
271.2
Ratio of stocks held in deﬁned contribution
43.6
plans to value of deﬁned contribution plans
Aged 46 and under
Mean values
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth
Pension wealth
Net worth
Private accumulations
Retirement wealth
Augmented wealth
Median values
Pension wealth
Net worth
Private accumulations
Retirement wealth
Augmented wealth
Ratio of stocks held in deﬁned contribution
plans to value of deﬁned contribution plans

30.7
55.3
209.9
234.5
181.0
360.2

25.6
50.3
162.3
186.9
176.0
312.7

1.8
21.8
35.0
130.5
155.8
39.7

1.6
5.4
14.6
128.8
136.7

(continued)
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Table 5.9 (continued)
2007
Aged 47–64
Mean values
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth
Pension wealth
Net worth
Private accumulations
Retirement wealth
Augmented wealth
Median values
Pension wealth
Net worth
Private accumulations
Retirement wealth
Augmented wealth
Ratio of stocks held in deﬁned contribution
plans to value of deﬁned contribution plans
Aged 65+
Mean values
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth
Pension wealth
Net worth
Private accumulations
Retirement wealth
Augmented wealth
Median values
Pension wealth
Net worth
Private accumulations
Retirement wealth
Augmented wealth
Ratio of stocks held in deﬁned contribution
plans to value of deﬁned contribution plans

Projected 2009

133.8
225.3
803.2
894.7
440.9
1,110.3

111.6
203.0
674.5
765.9
418.7
981.6

75.4
206.5
283.8
301.9
485.4
40.8

66.8
147.9
225.4
295.6
438.9

84.5
175.8
809.1
900.4
345.4
1,070.0

68.1
159.3
678.1
769.3
328.9
938.9

47.4
211.1
277.1
211.8
435.5
47.6

47.1
168.4
237.2
209.6
392.9

NOTE: The projections to 2009 assume that housing prices declined by 23.5 percent in
real terms and stock prices declined by 40.9 percent in real terms from 2007 to July 1,
2009. Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Key: Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth. Retirement wealth
= pension wealth + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth +
pension wealth + Social Security wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF.
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percent decline). Elderly households, on the other hand, had 48 percent
of their pensions invested in stocks and, as a result, suffered a 20 percent decline. These results, by the way, show the extreme vulnerability
of the DC pension system to stock market ﬂuctuations.
Mean pension wealth suffered a 10 percent drop overall. Results
were similar by age group. Mean net worth, as discussed in Chapter
2, plunged by 17 percent among all households. Younger households
experienced a larger decline, 23 percent, while middle-aged households
and elderly households were down by about 16 percent. As a result,
mean private accumulations tumbled by 16 percent overall, 20 percent
for younger households, and about 14 percent for middle-aged and
elderly ones; and mean augmented wealth fell by 12–13 percent across
the board. Declines in overall median values were even more acute
for pension wealth (14 percent), net worth (36 percent), and private
accumulations (27 percent). Similar patterns existed for younger and
middle-aged households, but among the elderly median pension wealth
fell less than mean pension wealth, and median private accumulations
declined about the same as mean private accumulations. However,
overall and for each of the three age groups, median augmented wealth
shrank about the same as mean augmented wealth. The reason that
median augmented wealth declined less than net worth is that median
retirement wealth fell only slightly between 2007 and 2009.
However, all in all, the decade of the 2000s (2001–2009) was truly
a “lost decade.” Mean net worth and augmented wealth were basically
unchanged, while median net worth dwindled by 24 percent and median
augmented wealth fell by 2.3 percent. For younger households, both
mean and median net worth crashed, and mean and median augmented
wealth sank by 12 and 17 percent, respectively. Among middle-aged
households, mean net worth fell by 4.2 percent and median net worth
by 8.2 percent, while mean augmented wealth was down by 3.3 percent
and median augmented wealth by 7.7 percent. The elderly fared a little
better, with mean net worth up by 3.9 percent and mean augmented
wealth up by 2.8 percent, but median net worth declined by 4.6 percent
and median augmented wealth slid by 7.9 percent.
In Chapter 2, I estimate a large increase in wealth inequality from
2007 to the middle of 2009, with the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth
climbing from 0.834 to 0.865. In contrast, the inequality of pension
wealth remained largely unchanged (see Table 5.10). As a result, the dis-
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Table 5.10 Inequality of Augmented Wealth, 2007, and Projections to
2009 (Gini coefﬁcients)
Projected
2007
2009
All households
Net worth
0.834
0.865
Pension wealth
0.783
0.781
Private accumulations
0.805
0.827
Retirement wealth
0.514
0.501
Augmented wealth
0.684
0.684
Aged 46 and under
Net worth
0.880
0.959
Pension wealth
0.810
0.812
Private accumulations
0.805
0.912
Retirement wealth
0.440
0.431
Augmented wealth
0.684
0.638
Aged 47–64
Net worth
0.795
0.820
Pension wealth
0.716
0.715
Private accumulations
0.758
0.776
Retirement wealth
0.470
0.457
Augmented wealth
0.650
0.649
Aged 65+
Net worth
0.784
0.795
Pension wealth
0.755
0.746
Private accumulations
0.748
0.753
Retirement wealth
0.535
0.521
Augmented wealth
0.665
0.658
NOTE: The projections to 2009 assume that housing prices declined by 23.5 percent in
real terms and stock prices declined by 40.9 percent in real terms from 2007 to July
1, 2009. Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. Key: Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth. Retirement
wealth = pension wealth + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth = nonpension
wealth + pension wealth + Social Security wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF.
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tribution of private accumulations became more unequal because of the
rising inequality in net worth. Retirement wealth became less unequal
because of the declining share of pension wealth and hence the rising
share of SSW in retirement wealth. Its Gini coefﬁcient fell by 0.013
points. As a result, augmented wealth inequality stayed unchanged.
There were two reasons for this. First, the declining inequality of retirement wealth offset the rising inequality of net worth. Second, retirement
wealth, especially SSW, which was more equally distributed than net
worth, assumed a greater share in augmented wealth. As a consequence,
retirement wealth had a greater equalizing effect on augmented wealth
in 2009 than in 2007, with the difference between the Gini coefﬁcient
of net worth and that of augmented wealth expanding from 0.150 to
0.181. Thus, the contraction of pension wealth, which was itself a consequence of the stock market slide, led to a reduction in the inequality
of augmented wealth.
Results are roughly similar for the middle-aged group as well as for
elderly households. However, for the youngest age group, we observe
a huge increase in net worth inequality from 2007 to 2009 (0.079 Gini
points), little change in pension wealth inequality, a large jump in the
inequality of private accumulations, and a decline in the inequality of
retirement wealth. However, unlike the other age groups, the inequality of augmented wealth fell by 0.046 Gini points because of the sharp
reduction in pension wealth.
When we consider the whole decade of the 2000s, we ﬁnd that the
inequality of net worth rose substantially (0.039 Gini points), that the
inequality of retirement wealth was largely unchanged, and that the
inequality of augmented wealth also rose, though by less than that of net
worth (0.023 Gini points). The pattern is similar for middle-aged households, among the elderly, the inequality of augmented wealth climbed
by about the same extent as that of net worth. In contrast, among young
households, the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth mushroomed by a staggering 0.100 Gini points while that of augmented wealth fell by 0.022 Gini
points. Thus, one unintended consequence of the stock market crash of
the late 2000s and the consequent contraction of pension wealth is that
it lessened the inequality of augmented wealth.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a marked transformation of the traditional DB pension system in favor of DC pension coverage. Have
households gained from this change? Has inequality been affected?
The chapter began with an analysis of SSW. While mean SSW
grew by 46 percent from 1989 to 2001 among all households, there was
virtually no change from 2001 to 2007. As result, mean and median
retirement wealth were up sharply over the 1989–2001 period (by 59
and 46 percent, respectively, for all households), but mean retirement
wealth grew very slowly from 2001 to 2007, and median retirement
wealth actually fell slightly in absolute terms from 2001 to 2007. Both
mean and median augmented wealth advanced strongly from 1989 to
2001. However, the growth in both mean and median augmented wealth
fell off in the 2001–2007 period. Indeed, median augmented wealth
declined in absolute terms for young households and gained only 2 percent among middle-aged households and the elderly. Thus, in terms of
the broadest measure of retirement resources, the years from 2001 to
2007 were particularly unfavorable to American households.
Thus, in contrast to the sharp rise in both mean and median net worth
during 2001–2007, we ﬁnd a notably smaller growth in augmented
wealth over these years. This was particularly the case for middle-aged
and elderly households, for whom median augmented wealth advanced
by only 2 percent, much less than median net worth. Among young
households, median net worth showed an absolute decline, and as a
consequence, so did augmented wealth. Clearly, by the period 2001–
2007, even before the ﬁnancial meltdown, the DC pension system was
not providing the boost to household well-being that it had in the 1990s.
I next considered the effects of adding expected employer contributions to DC plans (DCEMP) to pension wealth. It is ﬁrst of note that
employer contributions to DC plans appear to have peaked in the early
2000s and then retreated in the late 2000s. Younger workers were particularly hard hit during the 2000s in terms of DCEMP. All in all, there
appeared to be quite a sizable pullback in employer contributions to DC
plans after 2001. When DCEMP is added in to pension wealth, my basic
ﬁndings remain unchanged. In particular, the slowdown in the growth
of augmented wealth between the 1989–2001 and 2001–2007 periods
was about the same as when DCEMP is not included in pension wealth.
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I also considered what happened when expected future income
taxes on receipt of pension beneﬁts were netted out of both pension and
SSW. The basic ﬁndings are actually strengthened a bit, with a somewhat greater slowdown in the growth of mean and median net augmented wealth between the 1989–2001 and 2001–2007 periods than
when gross pension and SSW are used.
Another issue considered in the chapter is whether the equalizing
effects of retirement wealth lessened over time. Net worth inequality
remained essentially ﬂat from 1989 to 2007 despite a rise in income
inequality. Retirement wealth did have a marked effect on inequality.
Adding retirement wealth to net worth substantially lowered the Gini
coefﬁcient (from 0.834 to 0.684 in 2007, for example). Most of the
equalizing effect came from the addition of SSW.
Considering the period 1989–2007, I did ﬁnd that the equalizing
effect of retirement wealth diminished. While the Gini coefﬁcient for
net worth remained largely unchanged over these years, the Gini coefﬁcient for augmented wealth rose by 0.021. The differences are most
marked for middle-aged households, the group most affected by transformation of the pension system. Among that group, the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth rose by 0.020, while that of augmented wealth
advanced by 0.031. Indeed, from 1983 to 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient
for augmented wealth among this age group climbed by 0.076, while
that for net worth increased by only 0.033. In other words, the addition
of retirement wealth to net worth reduced the overall Gini coefﬁcient
among all households in 1989 by 0.169 but by only 0.150 in 2007.
Among middle-aged households, adding retirement wealth to net worth
decreased the Gini coefﬁcient by 0.187 in 1983 but by 0.145 in 2007.
When employer contributions to DC pension plans are added in to pension wealth, and when expected future income taxes on receipt of pension beneﬁts are netted out of both pension and SSW, the same pattern
holds.
A somewhat rough update to the middle of 2009 shows that DC pension wealth was eviscerated by the stock market plunge of 2008–2009.
I estimated that the average value of deﬁned contribution plans fell by
17 percent from 2007 to the midpoint of 2009. Young households were
particularly vulnerable. Their mean net worth plummeted by 21 percent
and their median net worth by 78 percent; their mean pension wealth
was down by 6 percent; and their mean augmented wealth slipped by 12
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percent, and their median augmented wealth dipped by 17 percent. The
contraction of pension wealth resulting from the stock market plunge
did have the beneﬁcial effect of reducing augmented wealth inequality,
however.
These results also help to clear up the puzzle noted at the end of
Chapter 2, namely that while income inequality surged in the 1990s and
2000s, (traditional) net worth inequality remained largely unchanged.
The results show that when the deﬁnition of net worth is expanded to
include DB pension wealth, then we do see a rise in (augmented) wealth
inequality during the 1990s and the 2000s.

Notes
1. The low value for median pension wealth in 2007, $19,000, is mainly a reﬂection of the relatively large share of households (36 percent) without any pension
wealth.
2. A small decline in both mean and median SSW for middle-aged and elderly households can be seen in the data for the period from 1983 to 1989. This seems to be
due to the number of individuals reporting Social Security beneﬁts received in
1983 as opposed to 1989. For example, among individuals 65 and over, the percentage of males reporting Social Security beneﬁts increased from 86.0 percent
in 1983 to 90.7 percent in 1989, while the share of females 65 and over reporting
such beneﬁts declined from 51.6 to 41.5 percent. Average Social Security beneﬁts (in 1989 dollars) rose from $5,685 to $6,306 for elderly males but declined
from $2,687 to $1,729 for elderly females. It is not clear whether the change for
females is due to reporting problems in the 1989 SCF or represents a real change.
For age group 47–64, the decrease in SSW might reﬂect the decline in average
real wages over the period according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ real hourly
wage series.
3. The Gini coefﬁcients of pension wealth reported in Table 5.2 differ from those
in Table 4.7 because the former refer to all households, whereas the latter are for
pension holders only.
4. The inequality of SSW ﬁrst fell very substantially from 1989 to 2001, a trend
that reﬂected primarily increasing Social Security coverage, and then rose sharply
from 2001 to 2007, though not enough to offset its fall during the 1990s. The
change over the 2000s mainly reﬂected the rising spread in (annual) earnings and,
by implication, the rise in lifetime earnings inequality among the elderly.
5. Note that a higher correlation between two components of a variable leads to a
higher coefﬁcient of variation of that variable.
6. The use of a higher (lower) discount rate in the calculation of DB pension wealth
would have lowered (raised) the value of DB pension wealth and consequently
increased (decreased) the measured inequality of augmented wealth. Correspond-
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7.

8.

9.
10.

11.
12.

13.

14.
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ingly, the use of a higher (lower) discount rate would have led to a lower (higher)
increase in the Gini coefﬁcient for augmented wealth between 1989 (or 1983) and
2007. A similar argument holds for the choice of the discount rate for the calculation of SSW.
Among elderly households, the primary reason for the rise in augmented wealth
inequality was the increasing share of net worth in augmented wealth, which rose
from 68 percent in 1989 to 76 percent in 2007. Since the level of inequality of net
worth is greater than that of retirement wealth, this shift resulted in higher inequality of augmented wealth in the later year. A secondary reason was the increase in
the correlation between nonpension wealth and retirement wealth.
The pattern is again quite similar for age group 46 and under. The ratio of DCEMP
to DC ﬁrst ballooned from 1.03 in 1983 to 3.16 in 1989 and then diminished to
1.22 in 2007, and the slowdown in percentage gains of both mean and median
pension wealth, private accumulations, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth
between the 1990s and the 2000s became even larger. In fact, mean and median
retirement wealth RW* (including employer contributions) and augmented wealth
AW* (also including employer contributions) all showed absolute declines over
the 2001–2007 period.
Recall that a larger correlation between two components of a variable leads to a
higher coefﬁcient of variation of that variable.
The story is different among younger households. In this case, the Gini coefﬁcient for PA* (including employer contributions) and AW* (including employer
contributions) showed a small decline from 1989 to 2007, while that for private
accumulations (without employer contributions) and augmented wealth (without
employer contributions) both showed an increase. For this age group, the addition
of DCEMP to pension wealth had a greater equalizing effect in 2007 than in 1989.
The exception is Roth IRAs, which are not subject to income taxes on withdrawal.
Two other taxes associated with wealth holdings are capital gains tax on the sale of
an asset and estate tax liability on inheritances. Neither DC nor DB pension wealth
are salable, so a capital gains tax would not apply to these assets. On the other
hand, estate tax liability would apply to all asset components of net worth, including DC wealth, though not generally to DB pension wealth. (The exception would
be lump-sum distributions from DB plans, which is a relatively small amount—
only 2.7 percent of total DB wealth in 2001, for example.) It is beyond the scope of
this chapter to adjust wealth holdings for capital gains or estate taxes. See Poterba
(2004) for further discussion of the tax treatment of retirement savings.
The 80 percent ﬁgure is a typical replacement rate (see Chapter 3 for a review of
the pertinent literature). I also use adjusted gross income as the income concept,
which is provided in the SCF data. The use of a higher replacement rate (say, 90
percent) would increase the marginal tax rate paid by the household and therefore
reduce the estimated value of after-tax pension wealth, SSW, retirement wealth,
and augmented wealth.
I also assume that families take the standard deduction and that the number of
exemptions is two for singles and four for married couples (this includes the extra
exemption for being 65 years of age or over). Moreover, it is assumed that tax
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exemptions and the standard deduction are ﬁxed in value over time. The latter
assumption is plausible since both exemptions and the standard deduction are
indexed for inﬂation.
15. In 1989, 2001, and 2007, Social Security beneﬁts were subject to income tax only
if AGI, excluding Social Security beneﬁts, was greater than $32,000 for a married
couple ﬁling jointly and $25,000 for singles or couples ﬁling separately. Otherwise, 15 percent of Social Security beneﬁts is excluded from taxable income. In
1983, there was no tax on Social Security beneﬁts.
16. This compares with the estimates of Butrica and Issa (2010), using the Federal
Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds, of a decline of 33.7 percent in the value of retirement accounts in real terms from the third quarter of 2007 to the ﬁrst quarter of
2009, and of 14.6 percent from the third quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of
2009 (see Chapter 2 for more discussion).
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6
Differences in Retirement
Wealth by Demographic and
Household Characteristics
How have different demographic groups fared with the transition
in the structure of the pension system? We saw an inkling of this in
Chapter 4 when we examined changes in pension coverage for different
groups of workers. We ﬁnd that female workers actually fared very well,
while men saw their pension coverage rates decline. The pension makeover also harmed younger male workers more than older ones. Black
workers were more adversely affected by the pension transformation
than white workers. Pension coverage among the college-educated was
aided by the systemic change in pensions, but coverage among lesseducated male workers was damaged. The pension transition decimated
coverage among blue-collar male workers and those in the bottom three
quintiles of the earnings distribution.
In this chapter, we look at the relative income, retirement wealth,
and augmented wealth of different demographic groups over the period
1989–2007. Because I am comparing relative gains made by different
groups, I will focus on the 1989–2007 period exclusively. The next section presents a summary of aggregate trends in retirement and augmented
wealth, and then shows results on the composition of augmented wealth
for different population segments. Following that, the chapter considers
how different demographic groups have fared with regard to retirement
and augmented wealth. I focus on three divisions of the population:
1) race/ethnicity, 2) marital status, and 3) educational attainment. The
chapter concludes with summary and concluding remarks. In Chapter
7, I will take up the issue of retirement income adequacy for the same
set of population groups.
As will be seen in this chapter, there was a remarkable turnaround in
the relative fortunes of minorities, though signiﬁcant gaps still remained
in 2007. Likewise, single females improved their position relative to
married couples in terms of total (augmented) wealth. In contrast, dif-
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ferences in wealth by educational groups have, if anything, splayed out
over the years, with college graduates in particular increasing their lead
over the other educational groups.

TRENDS AND COMPOSITION OF RETIREMENT AND
AUGMENTED WEALTH
There are three tiers of retirement savings to consider: Social Security, private pensions, and other forms of savings.1 Social Security, as
we saw in Chapter 5, has evolved into a near-universal program that
provides a basic retirement beneﬁt. Private employer-sponsored pensions would presumably supply the bulk of the additional income, and
that additional savings would round out retirement income as “icing on
the cake.” It will be clear from my ﬁgures that Social Security fulﬁlls its
role as a basic retirement beneﬁt and that its importance has even grown
in recent years. However, large holes remain with respect to employersponsored pensions. In fact, private savings outside of retirement wealth
play more than just a supplemental role, and wealth outside of retirement wealth can be a substantial addition to retirement savings.
Prior to retirement at age 65, median SSW is the largest of the three
forms of savings (see Table 6.1). This was true in both 1989 and 2007.
In 2007, households between the ages of 47 and 55 had a median SSW
of $180,000 (in 2007 dollars), almost three times median private pension wealth. We observe a similar divergence for the age group 56–64,
which had a median SSW of $216,100, more than twice as large as
median private pension wealth. Among age group 46 and under, the
discrepancy is even larger, with median SSW more than 100 times that
of median pension wealth. Among elderly households, median SSW
was almost three times median pension wealth in 2007.
Households have amassed substantial amounts of wealth outside of
retirement savings. Median augmented wealth (the sum of net worth and
retirement wealth) for households aged 47–55 was $424,300 in 2007,
compared to $270,000 in retirement wealth for the same age group.
For households aged 56–64, median retirement wealth amounted to
$364,100 in 2007, compared to a median augmented wealth of $568,200.
Among elderly households, median augmented wealth was $435,500
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Table 6.1 Household Income and Wealth, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands,
2007$)
% change,
1989
2007
1989–2007
Aged 46 and under
Mean income
61.6
67.1
8.9
Mean nonpension wealth
162.0
179.2
10.6
Mean pension wealth
34.3
55.3
61.0
Mean Social Security wealth
92.9
125.7
35.4
Mean augmented wealth
289.2
360.2
24.5
Median income
47.2
46.0
−2.4
Median nonpension wealth
24.9
11.6
−53.5
Median pension wealth
0.8
1.8
—
Median Social Security wealth
87.7
112.5
28.2
Median retirement wealth
100.4
130.5
30.0
Median augmented wealth
140.5
155.8
10.9
Aged 47–55
Mean income
Mean nonpension wealth
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean augmented wealth
Median income
Median nonpension wealth
Median pension wealth
Median Social Security wealth
Median retirement wealth
Median augmented wealth

90.9
446.0
103.3
131.0
680.3
58.5
153.9
25.7
139.3
181.4
364.0

110.2
588.9
179.4
198.2
966.4
61.0
114.3
61.0
180.0
270.0
424.3

21.3
32.0
73.7
51.2
42.1
4.2
−25.7
137.3
29.2
48.8
16.6

Aged 56–64
Mean income
Mean nonpension wealth
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean augmented wealth
Median income
Median nonpension wealth

67.8
467.7
139.3
146.3
753.3
41.8
137.6

111.7
780.6
288.6
239.9
1309.1
53.0
172.4

64.7
66.9
107.2
64.0
73.8
26.8
25.2
(continued)
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Table 6.1 (continued)
1989

2007

% change,
1989–2007

Aged 56–64
Median pension wealth
Median Social Security wealth
Median retirement wealth
Median augmented wealth

56.7
138.1
210.4
388.7

104.6
216.1
364.1
568.2

84.4
56.5
73.0
46.2

Aged 65+
Mean income
Mean nonpension wealth
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean augmented wealth
Median income
Median nonpension wealth
Median pension wealth
Median Social Security wealth
Median retirement wealth
Median augmented wealth

43.8
451.8
84.7
127.6
664.0
24.1
128.1
5.7
105.9
153.6
310.7

66.9
724.6
175.8
169.6
1070.0
29.0
191.0
47.4
132.6
211.8
435.5

52.6
60.4
107.6
32.9
61.1
20.4
49.1
738.6
25.2
38.0
40.2

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Pension
wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁned beneﬁt wealth. Retirement wealth = pension
wealth + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + retirement
wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.

and median retirement wealth was about half as much, $211,800. Nonretirement wealth was thus substantial among these age groups in 2007.
However, among younger households (46 and under), the discrepancy
was much smaller, with a median retirement wealth of $130,500 and a
median augmented wealth of $155,800.
One important aspect with respect to wealth accumulation that
deserves further attention is the distribution of wealth. Typically, all
forms of wealth are relatively unequally distributed, with the exception
of SSW (see Chapters 4 and 5). For instance, median private pension
wealth of households between the ages of 47 and 55 was only 34 percent of the average private pension wealth in that age group in 2007,
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which indicates that pension wealth was heavily concentrated among
those with substantial amounts of private pension wealth (see Chapter
4). In contrast, the SSW of the typical household in this age group was
91 percent of the average SSW of this age group. For households aged
56–64, the ratios were 36 percent and 90 percent, suggesting that private pension wealth was substantially more unequally distributed than
SSW in this age group, too.
How has the situation changed over time? Median SSW saw strong
gains from 1989 to 2007 for households between the ages of 47 and
64 (Table 6.1). Median pension wealth also saw strong increases from
1989 to 2007. For age group 47–55, the change in median private pension wealth was substantially greater than that in SSW. The same was
true for age group 56–64. Among the elderly, both median SSW and
pension wealth showed robust growth over this period as well. In contrast, among age group 46 and under, median SSW showed a large gain
from 1989 to 2007, but median pension wealth was virtually zero in
both years.2
For age group 47–55, median household income showed a modest increase in real terms from 1989 to 2007 (by 4 percent) but solid
growth for age group 56–64 (by 27 percent).3 Real median income also
showed strong growth among elderly households (20 percent) but a
slight decline among young households.
One factor that may put a damper on increases in retirement
resources is a rise in income and wealth inequality. For all ages, average incomes and average wealth increased faster than median income
and wealth over the 1989–2007 period. The divergence was most pronounced for households aged 47–55, for whom average augmented
wealth rose more than twice as fast as median augmented wealth. These
results generally accord with the calculations in Chapter 5, which show
an increase in the Gini coefﬁcient for augmented wealth among age
group 47–64 and among the elderly, but a slight decline among younger
households (see Table 5.4).
We next turn to how the composition of augmented wealth varies
by age group (Table 6.2). First, for all households, we can see how
the shares of the three major components of augmented wealth have
changed over the period 1989–2007. Nonpension wealth fell as a share
of augmented wealth, from 63 percent in 1989 to 60 percent in 2007. In
contrast, the share of pension wealth rose from 14 percent in 1989 to 18
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Table 6.2 Composition of Augmented Wealth, 1989 and 2007 (percentage
of augmented wealth)
1989
2007
Aged 46 and under
Nonpension wealth
56.0
49.7
Pension wealth
11.9
15.4
Deﬁned contribution accounts
3.2
8.5
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
8.7
6.8
Social Security wealth
32.1
34.9
Total
100.0
100.0
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Aged 47–64
Nonpension wealth
Pension wealth
Deﬁned contribution accounts
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
Social Security wealth
Total

63.8
16.9
2.9
14.0
19.3
100.0

60.3
20.3
12.1
8.2
19.4
100.0

Aged 65+
Nonpension wealth
Pension wealth
Deﬁned contribution accounts
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
Social Security wealth
Total

62.1
18.5
0.3
18.1
19.4
100.0

59.6
22.0
7.9
14.1
18.3
99.9

All households
Nonpension wealth
Pension wealth
Deﬁned contribution accounts
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
Social Security wealth
Total

62.6
14.0
2.2
11.8
23.4
100.0

60.2
18.1
10.1
8.0
21.7
100.0
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Table 6.2 (continued)
Composition of augmented wealth*: aged 47–64
Nonpension wealth
Pension wealth*
Deﬁned contribution accounts
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
Employer contributions to deﬁned contribution
pension plans
Social Security wealth
Total
Composition of net augmented wealth*: aged 47–64
Nonpension wealth
Net pension wealth*
Net Social Security wealth
Total

1989

2007

62.6
18.4
2.8
13.8
1.8

58.3
22.9
11.7
8.0
3.3

19.0
100.0

18.8
100.0

66.3
15.5
18.2
100.0

65.6
16.2
18.2
100.0

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household.
Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + retirement wealth. Augmented
wealth* = nonpension wealth + retirement wealth*. Totals may not sum to 100.0 due
to rounding.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.

percent in 2007. Of the two parts of pension wealth, DC wealth showed
a very strong gain, from 2 percent of augmented wealth in 1989 to 10
percent in 2007, while DB showed a corresponding decline, from 12 to
8 percent. The share of SSW fell slightly, from 23 to 22 percent. The
composition of augmented wealth was remarkably similar among age
groups 47–64 and 65 and older. However, among young households,
age 46 and under, the share of SSW was higher, a third or more, while
the shares of nonpension wealth and pension wealth were correspondingly lower.
When employer contributions to DC pension plans (DCEMP) are
added in to produce AW*, we see that the share of DCEMP in AW*
among middle-aged households was relatively small—between 2 and 3
percent. The inclusion of DCEMP in AW* resulted in a modest rise in
the share of PW* in augmented wealth and a corresponding decline in
the shares of the other two components. Looking at net (after-tax) AW*,
we see, not surprisingly, lower shares of net PW* and net SSW in net
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AW* and a correspondingly higher share of nonpension wealth. There
was little change over time in the shares of these three components. The
share of nonpension wealth in net AW* was about the same in 2007 as
in 1989 (66 percent), as were the shares of net PW* (16 percent) and
net SSW (18 percent).
In sum, we can now get a good idea of what the sources of retirement income are. On the basis of gross (before-tax) retirement wealth,
the share of nonpension wealth was about three-ﬁfths, that of pension
wealth about one-ﬁfth, and that of SSW also about one-ﬁfth among
all households. These shares should generally correspond to the breakdown of retirement income. The composition of augmented wealth was
very similar among middle-aged and elderly households. However,
among younger households, the share of SSW was higher, about onethird, that of nonpension wealth about one-half, and that of pension
wealth about one-sixth. On a net (after-tax) basis, the importance of
nonpension wealth was greater (about two-thirds) and that of pension
wealth smaller (about 16 percent), as was that of SSW (about 18 percent). We would also expect the make-up of augmented wealth (and
thus the sources of retirement income) to vary both by income level and
by demographic characteristic, as we shall see below.
Table 6.3 considers the composition of AW* by income quintile for age group 47–64. I have elected to use here AW* because it
gives a more comprehensive measure of pension resources than standard pension wealth. It is clear that SSW is much more important for
lower-income households than upper-income ones. In 2007, the share
of SSW in AW* was 44 percent for the bottom income quintile, 40
percent for the second quintile, 33 percent for the middle quintile, 29
percent for the fourth quintile, and only 9 percent for the top quintile.
In contrast, nonpension wealth was much more important for the top
income quintile, comprising 71 percent of AW* in 2007, compared to
a range of 38–48 percent for the lower quintiles. PW*, on the other
hand, was more important in the middle income quintiles, accounting
for 29 percent of AW* for the middle quintile and 32 percent for the
fourth quintile, compared to 9 percent for the bottom, 21 percent for the
second, and 21 percent for the top. These results indicate that SSW will
be a relatively more important source of retirement income among lowincome households, nonpension wealth will be relatively more impor-
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Table 6.3 Composition of Augmented Wealth by Income Quintile, Aged
47–64, 1989 and 2007 (percentage of augmented wealth*)
1989

2007

Bottom income quintile
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth
Pension wealth*
Social Security wealth
Total

39.5
11.1
49.5
100.0

47.8
8.6
43.6
100.0

Second income quintile
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth
Pension wealth*
Social Security wealth
Total

44.7
19.7
35.6
100.0

39.5
21.0
39.5
100.0

Third income quintile
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth
Pension wealth*
Social Security wealth
Total

46.0
24.1
29.8
100.0

38.2
29.3
32.5
100.0

Fourth income quintile
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth
Pension wealth*
Social Security wealth
Total

47.6
25.6
26.8
100.0

38.6
32.4
29.0
100.0

Fifth income quintile
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth
Pension wealth*
Social Security wealth
Total

75.7
15.0
9.3
100.0

70.6
20.5
8.9
100.0

All households, aged 47–64
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth
Pension wealth*
Social Security wealth
Total

62.6
18.4
19.0
100.0

58.3
22.9
18.8
100.0

NOTE: Augmented wealth* includes employer contributions to deﬁned contribution
pension plans. Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of
household. Income quintiles are based on income for age group 47–64 only and are
calculated separately for each year. Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth +
retirement wealth*. Augmented wealth* = nonpension wealth + retirement wealth*.
Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.
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tant among upper-income households, and pension wealth relatively
more important among middle-income households.
Except for the bottom income quintile, pension wealth’s importance
as a share of total retirement resources rose over time. For example, the
third income quintile’s share of AW* grew from 24 percent in 1989 to
29 percent in 2007. With the exception of the bottom and top quintiles,
the importance of SSW also increased. Again, for the middle income
quintile, the share of SSW in AW* advanced from 27 to 29 percent over
this period. Correspondingly, except for the bottom quintile, the share
of nonpension wealth in AW* declined over these years (from 46 to 38
percent for the middle quintile, for example). Thus, there was generally
a shift in retirement resources away from standard wealth holdings to
pension and SSW.
We next look at mean retirement wealth by wealth and income class
to determine whether gains in retirement resources have been greater at
the bottom or top. Not surprisingly, there is a big spread of retirement
wealth levels by wealth class—by a factor of ﬁve or so between the
highest and lowest (see Table 6.4). A U-shaped proﬁle is in evidence
for gains in retirement wealth over the 1989–2007 period. This is true
for all three age groups. The largest gains by far were made by the top
wealth group. The retirement wealth of the wealth class with assets of
$1,000,000 and above grew by 117 percent over the period among age
group 56–64 and by 48 percent among elderly households. The smallest
gains were made by the middle wealth class, those who have $100,000–
$249,999. The mean retirement wealth of the bottom wealth class, in
contrast, showed strong gains over the period (a 93 percent increase
among age group 56–64). Thus, while retirement wealth among the
lowest wealth group was catching up to the middle, the retirement
wealth of the highest wealth groups was also moving further ahead of
the middle. These changes reﬂected large gains in SSW at the lower end
of the wealth distribution and very big increases in DC pension wealth
at the top (see Figure 4.1a, for example).
The pattern is similar by income class (Table 6.5). Once again,
gains in mean retirement wealth over the 1989–2007 period were strong
among the top two or three income classes. There were also sizable
gains for the bottom income class (except among the elderly). The
three middle income classes ($25,000–$75,000) all experienced actual
declines in their mean retirement wealth (with one exception).
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Table 6.4 Mean Retirement Wealth by Wealth Class, 1989 and 2007
(in thousands, 2007$)
% change,
1989
2007
1989–2007
Aged 47–55
Under 50,000
115.8
166.1
43.4
50,000–99,999
196.3
234.1
19.3
100,000–249,999
239.0
273.9
14.6
250,000–499,999
329.6
362.3
9.9
500,000–999,999
355.0
470.7
32.6
1,000,000 or over
484.0
805.8
66.5
Aged 56–64
Under 50,000
104.2
200.6
92.5
50,000–99,999
260.3
223.8
−14.0
100,000–249,999
290.1
301.9
4.0
250,000–499,999
396.0
400.4
1.1
500,000–999,999
517.5
581.4
12.4
1,000,000 or over
509.7
1,106.3
117.0
Aged 65+
Under 50,000
105.6
159.8
51.4
50,000–99,999
183.0
176.8
−3.4
100,000–249,999
197.0
220.9
12.1
250,000–499,999
256.5
253.8
−1.1
500,000–999,999
422.4
378.3
−10.4
1,000,000 or over
518.6
769.1
48.3
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by net worth in 2001 dollars. Key: Retirement wealth
= pension wealth + Social Security wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.

Given all other data trends discussed so far, especially the sharp
increases in SSW, it seems reasonable to assume that the changes in
retirement wealth among households nearing retirement were driven by
two separate forces. Increases were due to gains in SSW as a result of a
strong labor market, at least through 2001, and strong returns in 401(k)
and other DC plans, also mainly up through 2001, which in turn were
due to a strong ﬁnancial market performance. Given the distribution of
ﬁnancial wealth, it is very likely that the latter was more of a factor for
higher-income households.
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Table 6.5 Mean Retirement Wealth by Income Class, 1989 and 2007
(in thousands, 2007$)
% change,
1989
2007
1989–2007
Aged 47–55
Under 25,000
73.9
91.8
24.3
25,000–34,999
140.0
138.9
−0.8
35,000–49,999
206.0
166.4
−19.2
50,000–74,999
247.9
234.2
−5.5
75,000–99,999
311.9
327.0
4.8
100,000–249,999
421.8
504.3
19.6
250,000 or over
796.2
900.6
13.1
Aged 56–64
Under 25,000
102.1
130.4
27.7
25,000–34,999
226.6
234.9
3.7
35,000–49,999
325.8
211.2
−35.2
50,000–74,999
414.0
373.9
−9.7
75,000–99,999
448.0
475.1
6.1
100,000–249,999
519.3
681.6
31.3
250,000 or over
802.1
1,536.4
91.5
Aged 65+
Under 25,000
120.2
90.1
−25.0
25,000–34,999
279.6
180.9
−35.3
35,000–49,999
285.3
263.9
−7.5
50,000–74,999
414.2
339.2
−18.1
75,000–99,999
365.5
462.1
26.4
100,000–249,999
642.4
696.1
8.4
250,000 or over
1,109.5
1,392.5
25.5
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by income in 2001 dollars. Key: Retirement wealth =
pension wealth + Social Security wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.

Disparate gains in wealth tend to reduce the overall effect of wealth
gains on retirement income adequacy, especially if households that are
likely to be already well prepared for retirement see the largest gains.
If wealth gains are concentrated among households that already have a
large amount of wealth or income, average retirement wealth increases
have less of an effect on retirement income adequacy compared to a
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situation where wealth increases are less concentrated. The results so
far show that percentage gains in retirement wealth have been generally greater at the upper ends of the wealth and income distributions as
well as the very bottom, but small in the middle. As a result, the gains
in retirement income adequacy from 1989 to 2007 were likely less than
they could have been if the gains had been more equally distributed
across wealth and income classes.
Importantly, this result holds only for retirement wealth outside of
SSW. Improvements in SSW to be appear fairly equally distributed.
Thus, it is fair to conclude that Social Security improvements had a
more broad-based effect on retirement income adequacy than improvements in private pension wealth or other private savings, regardless of
whether the changes on average were smaller or larger. In Chapter 7, we
shall analyze these factors more fully.

DISPARITIES IN RETIREMENT WEALTH BY
DEMOGRAPHIC GROUP
I next consider how different demographic groups have fared with
regard to retirement and augmented wealth. I look at three divisions of
the population: 1) race/ethnicity, 2) marital status, and 3) educational
attainment.
Race/Ethnicity
The population is divided here into two groups: 1) non-Hispanic
white households (“whites,” for short) and 2) African American and
Hispanic households (“minorities,” for short).4 In 2007 over threequarters of white households in age groups 47–55 and 56–64 held some
form of pension wealth (see Table 6.6). Over 70 percent of white elderly
households and 60 percent of white younger households (age 46 and
under) likewise owned pension wealth. In contrast, 57 percent of minority households in age group 47–55 and 59 percent in age group 56–64
held pension wealth, as did 38 percent of younger minority households
and a half of minority elderly ones.
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Table 6.6 Percentage of Households with Pension Wealth by Race/
Ethnicity and Age Class, 1989 and 2007
Non-Hispanic African American
white
or Hispanic
1989 2007
1989
2007
Aged 46 and under
Deﬁned contribution accounts
35.9
55.8
17.8
33.8
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
42.0
25.7
26.3
15.2
Pension wealth
58.5
60.5
34.3
38.2
Share of deﬁned contribution owners
77.1
64.8
81.5
75.8
who receive employer contributions
Aged 47–55
Deﬁned contribution accounts
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
Pension wealth
Share of deﬁned contribution owners
who receive employer contributions

35.5
60.3
74.1
58.1

70.1
36.3
77.7
61.8

21.2
40.4
46.6
36.2

47.5
32.5
56.8
72.4

Aged 56–64
Deﬁned contribution accounts
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
Pension wealth
Share of deﬁned contribution owners
who receive employer contributions

23.7
65.1
71.0
0.0

64.6
46.3
78.2
43.6

12.0
39.3
46.0
0.0

43.8
33.1
59.3
62.0

1.6
56.1
56.8

45.3
51.0
71.1

0.0
30.1
30.1

9.3
46.2
49.9

Aged 65+
Deﬁned contribution accounts
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
Pension wealth

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Asians and other
races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. Key: Pension wealth
= deﬁned contribution + deﬁned beneﬁt wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.
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It is at once evident that in 2007 whites were much more likely to
have a pension plan than minorities. Among age group 56–64, the difference in pension wealth ownership rates was 19 percentage points.
Differences were even higher for the other age groups—22 percentage
points among age group 46 and under, 21 percentage points among age
group 47–55, and 21 percentage points among the elderly. The main disparity was in ownership of DC accounts.5 The gap in the ownership of
DC plans was over 20 percentage points among the three youngest age
groups and 36 percentage points among the elderly. The racial gap in
entitlements to DB plans was much smaller, 4 percentage points among
age group 47–55, 13 percentage points among age group 56–64, and 11
percentage points among younger households. Among the elderly, 46
percent of minority and 51 percent of white households held DB pension wealth, with a gap of only 5 percentage points.6
The disparity in DC pension ownership widened considerably
between the two groups, as the take-up rate for DC plans grew much
faster among white workers. Among younger households, DC ownership among whites expanded from 36 percent in 1989 to 56 percent in
2007, while among minorities it grew from 18 to 34 percent; among
age group 47–55, it increased from 36 to 70 percent among the former
and from 21 to 48 percent among the latter; among age group 56–64, it
rose from 24 to 65 percent and from 12 to 44 percent, respectively; and
among the elderly, from 2 to 45 percent and from 0 to only 9 percent,
respectively. The gap in participation in DC plans between whites and
minorities thus rose among all age groups, though particularly among
the elderly (by 34 percentage points).
In contrast, the racial gap in participation in DB plans fell quite
substantially between 1989 and 2007, as participation in these plans
plummeted among both whites and minorities. As a result, the racial
gap in the share of households with pension wealth (either DC or DB)
narrowed somewhat over these years.
Despite improvements, minority households still had a lot less
wealth accumulated than nonminority households as they approached
retirement in 2007. For households between the ages of 47 and 55, the
average retirement wealth of non-Hispanic whites was about twice as
large as for minorities (Table 6.7). For households aged 56–64, the
ratio of average retirement wealth was 2.3, for households 65 and older
it was 1.4, and for households aged 46 and under it was 2.0. Similar

Wolff.indb 185

11/21/2011 9:18:55 AM

Wolff.indb 186
11/21/2011 9:18:56 AM

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of small
sample sizes. Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁned beneﬁt wealth. Retirement wealth = pension wealth + Social Security
wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.
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Table 6.7 Retirement Wealth by Race/Ethnicity and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
Non-Hispanic white
African American or Hispanic
% change,
% change,
1989
2007
1989–2007
1989
2007
1989–2007
Aged 46 and under
41.4
67.5
63.1
14.5
27.3
88.6
Mean pension wealth
106.2
144.5
36.1
50.9
79.7
56.5
Mean Social Security wealth
147.6
212.1
43.7
65.4
107.0
63.6
Mean retirement wealth
124.3
155.6
25.1
48.0
79.2
65.0
Median retirement wealth
Aged 47–55
114.8
204.5
78.1
70.2
93.6
33.4
Mean pension wealth
145.9
213.3
46.2
73.9
138.8
87.8
Mean Social Security wealth
260.7
417.8
60.3
144.1
232.4
61.3
Mean retirement wealth
193.6
304.4
57.2
95.7
166.3
73.8
Median retirement wealth
Aged 56–64
166.2
329.1
98.0
56.6
111.0
96.0
Mean pension wealth
167.9
261.1
55.5
71.2
147.6
107.3
Mean Social Security wealth
334.1
590.3
76.6
127.8
258.6
102.3
Mean retirement wealth
269.6
417.1
54.7
68.1
183.9
169.8
Median retirement wealth
Aged 65+
88.5
185.8
110.0
33.6
104.2
209.7
Mean pension wealth
141.5
171.4
21.1
56.7
149.3
163.3
Mean Social Security wealth
230.0
357.2
55.3
90.4
253.5
180.5
Mean retirement wealth
184.8
219.0
18.5
44.3
158.9
258.8
Median retirement wealth
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disparities existed for median retirement wealth. Discrepancies were
much larger for pension wealth than SSW. In 2007, the ratio of average
pension wealth was 2.5 for the youngest age group, 2.2 for age group
47–55, 3.0 for age group 56–64, and 1.8 among elderly households.
These differences reﬂect to a large extent disparities in pension ownership. In contrast, the ratio of average SSW was 1.8 for the youngest age
group, 1.5 for age group 47–55, 1.8 for age group 56–64, and only 1.2
among elderly households.
Over time, the racial gap in retirement wealth generally narrowed.
Among younger households, pension wealth and SSW both increased
faster among minorities than among whites, and the ratio of mean retirement wealth increased from 44 percent in 1989 to 51 percent in 2007
and the ratio of median retirement wealth from 39 to 51 percent. Among
age group 47–55, the story was somewhat different. In this case, mean
SSW grew faster for minorities but mean pension wealth grew slower.
On net, the ratio of mean retirement wealth stayed at around 55 percent
from 1989 to 2007, while that of median retirement wealth advanced
from 49 to 55 percent. In contrast, among age group 56–64, mean pension wealth gained about the same for both groups from 1989 to 2007,
while percentage gains in SSW were greater for minorities. As a result,
the ratio of both mean and median retirement wealth between minorities and whites showed a sizable rise, particularly the ratio of medians. Elderly minority households also fared well in relative terms. Both
mean pension wealth and mean SSW grew much faster for minorities
in this age group than among whites, and the ratio of mean retirement
wealth climbed from 39 percent in 1989 to 71 percent in 2007 and that
of median retirement wealth from 24 to 73 percent.
Even larger differences exist for total wealth. The ratio of average
total (augmented) wealth of whites to the average augmented wealth of
minorities was 2.7 for households aged 46 and under in 2007, 2.7 for
households aged 47–55, 2.9 for households aged 56–64, and 2.5 for
households 65 and older (see Table 6.8).7 Ratios of median augmented
wealth were a bit lower (except for the youngest age group): 2.7 for ages
46 and under, 2.1 for ages 47–55 and ages 56–64, and 2.0 for elderly
households. The gap in augmented wealth was uniformly smaller than
the gap in net worth, where the ratios ran from 3.5 for the youngest age
group to 4.2 for the oldest, but larger than the gap in income, where the
ratios ranged from 1.8 for the youngest to 2.6 for the oldest. The smaller
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Table 6.8 Income and Wealth by Race/Ethnicity and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
Non-Hispanic white
African American or Hispanic
% change,
% change,
1989
2007
1989–2007
1989
2007
1989–2007
Aged 46 and under
Mean income
70.9
76.4
7.7
34.2
42.3
23.8
Mean net worth
202.8
265.0
30.7
38.6
76.8
98.7
Mean augmented wealth
338.6
439.1
29.7
101.6
170.1
67.4
Median augmented wealth
195.8
215.0
9.8
48.5
80.3
65.7
Mean augmented wealth*
374.2
483.4
29.2
112.1
189.3
68.9
Mean net augmented wealth*
347.3
443.0
27.6
104.6
174.7
66.9
Aged 47–55
102.8
124.1
20.7
41.2
62.1
50.8
Mean income
543.7
822.2
51.2
106.8
222.3
108.2
Mean net worth
778.9
1,112.0
42.8
244.0
415.3
70.2
Mean augmented wealth
402.8
484.4
20.3
125.4
226.3
80.4
Median augmented wealth
Mean augmented wealth*
812.3
1,163.9
43.3
247.9
435.5
75.7
Mean net augmented wealth*
761.5
1,071.8
40.7
228.5
399.7
74.9
Aged 56–64
79.5
125.5
58.0
29.9
52.7
76.1
Mean income
595.3
1,087.8
82.7
129.7
305.1
135.3
Mean net worth
905.9
1,481.5
63.5
252.8
516.0
104.1
Mean augmented wealth
503.7
676.8
34.4
104.7
323.4
209.0
Median augmented wealth
Mean augmented wealth*
905.9
1,513.8
67.1
252.8
528.2
108.9
Mean net augmented wealth*
860.3
1,396.6
62.3
241.6
493.7
104.4
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Aged 65+
Mean income
Mean net worth
Mean augmented wealth
Median augmented wealth

49.3
539.0
766.3
375.4

72.1
877.2
1,139.5
457.1

46.4
62.7
48.7
21.8

17.9
58.9
149.2
83.2

27.8
207.2
448.5
228.2

55.2
252.1
200.6
174.1

Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample
sizes. Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + retirement wealth. Augmented wealth* includes employer contributions to deﬁned
contribution pension plans.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.
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gap in augmented wealth than in net worth is attributable mainly to
the equalizing effect of Social Security. The racial gap in augmented
wealth thus narrowed over the years. The ratio of mean augmented
wealth between minorities and whites rose from 0.30 in 1989 to 0.39 in
2007 among the 46-and-under age group, from 0.31 to 0.37 among the
47–55 age group, from 0.28 to 0.35 among the 56–64 age group, and
from 0.20 to 0.39 among elderly households.8 Relative gains made by
minorities were even more pronounced for median augmented wealth.
The closure of the augmented wealth racial gap was due to the sizable
relative gains made by minorities in net worth, which occurred for all
age groups, and to relative gains in retirement wealth, which occurred
for all age groups except for ages 56–64.9 The racial income gap also
narrowed among all age groups.10
Family Status
I next analyze levels and trends of retirement wealth and total
wealth for married couples, single females, and single males. I begin,
as before, by looking at trends in pension ownership.11 As shown in
Table 6.9, wide gaps in holdings of pension plans are evident between
married couples and both single men and single women, particularly
with regard to DC plans.
In 2007, the gap in holdings of DC pension wealth between married couples and single men was 14 percentage points for the youngest
age group, 20–22 percentage points among the middle-aged (47–64),
and 26 percentage points among the elderly. Married couples were also
more apt to have matching contributions to their DC plans from their
employers. Among the three nonelderly age groups, the gap in DC pension coverage generally remained unchanged or widened slightly. However, among the elderly, the gap mushroomed from 2 percentage points
in 1989 to 26 percentage points in 2007. In contrast, the gap in DB
plan entitlement generally narrowed over the period from 1989 to 2007
as DB plans atrophied. All told, the gap in pension wealth holdings
narrowed among nonelderly households over the 1989–2007 period,
mainly because of the sharp contraction in DB plans, but widened
among elderly households.
Results are similar when single females are compared with married couples. In 2007, the gap in ownership rates of DC plans between
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Table 6.9 Percentage of Households with Pension Wealth by Family
Status and Age Class, 1983–2007
Married
Single
Single
couples
males
females
1989 2007 1989 2007 1989 2007
Aged 46 and under
Deﬁned contribution accounts 37.8 57.4
21.0 43.4
21.5 33.9
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
45.6 25.9
29.0 19.7
24.4 15.8
Pension wealth
62.4 61.7
41.7 49.0
33.6 39.5
Share of deﬁned contribution 80.6 70.5
77.2 58.9
65.8 61.1
owners who receive
employer contributions
Aged 47–55
Deﬁned contribution accounts 41.5 74.3
19.4 52.6
17.3 51.9
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
59.9 39.3
50.7 29.5
43.7 28.6
Pension wealth
75.6 80.6
57.4 61.9
54.3 62.7
Share of deﬁned contribution 48.2 65.3
43.7 58.6
82.5 59.6
owners who receive
employer contributions
Aged 56–64
Deﬁned contribution accounts 26.7 69.7
10.5 49.6
20.2 46.1
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
70.2 46.3
45.8 43.4
39.2 37.5
Pension wealth
77.8 79.5
45.8 68.0
51.5 66.9
Share of deﬁned contribution
0.0 51.4
0.0 23.5
0.0 38.0
owners who receive
employer contributions
Aged 65+
Deﬁned contribution accounts
1.9 53.4
0.0 27.3
1.0 29.3
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
65.3 57.2
66.1 57.3
33.4 40.7
Pension wealth
65.8 78.9
66.1 70.4
34.1 55.4
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Pension
wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁned beneﬁt wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.

Wolff.indb 191

11/21/2011 9:18:59 AM

192 Wolff

married couples and single women varied between 22 and 24 percentage points across age groups. Married couples were again more apt
to have matching contributions to their DC plan from their employer
than single females. Here, too, the gap in the share of DC plan holders
generally widened over the years from 1989 to 2007 (except for age
group 47–55). The gap in DB plan entitlement was about 10 percentage
points among the three nonelderly age groups in 2007 and 17 percentage points for the oldest. These gaps in DB coverage narrowed over
the years 1989 to 2007 among all age groups as DB plans were eliminated. As a consequence, the gap in pension wealth holdings between
married couples and single females fell by 7 percentage points among
young households from 1989 to 2007, by 3 percentage points among
age group 47–55, by 14 percentage points among age group 56–64, and
by 8 percentage points among the elderly.
The results from Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show that married couples
had substantially more retirement wealth and total (augmented) wealth
than single male–headed households, and they in turn had more retirement and augmented wealth than single female–headed households in
2007. However, the ﬁgures also show that single men and single women
generally did catch up somewhat to married couples from 1989 to 2007.
The ratio of pension wealth, SSW, and both mean and median
retirement wealth between single men and married couples improved
between 1989 and 2007. This was true across all age groups. However,
even in 2007, the mean pension wealth, SSW, and retirement wealth
of single men averaged about half that of married couples, and median
retirement wealth averaged about 40 percent that of married couples.
This discrepancy is, of course, partly explainable by the fact that married couples have two adults in the household, and even if they did not
have two earners, SSW at least is higher for a single earner in a married
couple than a for single man living alone.12
In contrast, in 2007, the mean pension wealth, SSW, and retirement wealth, as well as the median retirement wealth, of single women
averaged about 33–40 percent that of married couples. From 1989 to
2007, the relative position of single women aged 47 and under and
aged 65 and older improved across the board with respect to married
couples. Among age group 47–55, there was a mild deterioration in the
relative position of single females, while among age group 56–64 the
mean retirement wealth of single females declined relative to married

Wolff.indb 192

11/21/2011 9:19:00 AM

Wolff.indb 193

Table 6.10 Retirement Wealth by Family Status and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
Married couples
% change,
2007 1989–2007
Aged 46 and under
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth
Aged 47–55
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth
1989 56–64
Aged
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth
Aged 65+
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth

Single males
% change,
1989
2007 1989–2007

Single females
% change,
1989
2007 1989–2007

45.7
122.1
167.8
140.3

70.1
160.8
230.9
175.2

53.3
31.7
37.5
24.9

23.8
47.4
71.2
51.8

43.0
69.8
112.8
72.2

80.5
47.2
58.3
39.3

12.5
49.2
61.7
50.3

23.7
69.4
93.1
70.8

89.4
41.0
50.8
40.6

131.0
161.5
292.5
214.5

229.3
251.9
481.3
365.8

75.1
56.0
64.5
70.6

56.5
65.9
122.4
77.7

125.3
111.9
237.2
144.9

121.8
69.7
93.7
86.5

44.9
71.4
116.3
89.1

78.7
108.0
186.8
130.6

75.4
51.3
60.6
46.6

186.3
195.8
382.1
310.1

385.9
311.3
697.2
493.1

107.2
59.0
82.5
59.0

71.5
75.3
146.8
107.5

198.8
134.0
332.8
208.6

178.0
78.0
126.7
94.0

69.5
72.5
142.0
82.0

114.9
128.7
243.6
174.7

65.2
77.6
71.5
113.0

138.2
206.5
344.7
282.3

265.4
248.4
513.8
352.1

92.0
20.3
49.0
24.7

59.8
87.3
147.1
125.8

124.3
110.1
234.5
157.4

107.7
26.2
59.4
25.1

34.8
55.0
89.8
56.7

81.9
91.3
173.2
102.7

135.3
66.0
92.9
81.1

193

11/21/2011 9:19:00 AM

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁned beneﬁt wealth.
Retirement wealth = pension wealth + Social Security wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.
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Married couples
% change,
1989
2007 1989–2007

Single males
% change,
1989
2007 1989–2007

Single females
% change,
1989
2007 1989–2007

Aged 46 and under
Mean income
Mean net worth
Mean augmented wealth
Median augmented wealth
Mean augmented wealth*
Mean net augmented wealth*
Aged 47–55
Mean income
Mean net worth
Mean augmented wealth
Median augmented wealth
Mean augmented wealth*
Mean net augmented wealth*
Aged 56–64
Mean income
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Mean net worth
Mean augmented wealth
Median augmented wealth
Mean augmented wealth*
Mean net augmented wealth*

77.9
217.2
372.4
222.8
412.5
381.9

85.3
272.2
464.3
241.2
511.4
468.4

9.5
25.3
24.7
8.3
24.0
22.7

46.7
177.4
243.9
73.1
255.9
244.4

44.4
123.9
210.4
83.2
238.2
214.7

−5.1
−30.1
−13.8
13.8
−6.9
−12.2

30.4
50.3
108.6
56.3
121.1
114.1

33.5
100.2
181.6
68.3
199.1
185.6

10.1
99.0
67.1
21.2
64.4
62.7

114.9
617.5
880.5
449.7
911.7
853.3

143.6
929.1
1,268.6
592.7
1,324.2
1,219.6

25.0
50.5
44.1
31.8
45.2
42.9

74.4
303.0
411.4
135.0
421.5
400.7

74.1
453.8
611.9
282.4
646.2
593.2

−0.4
49.8
48.7
109.1
53.3
48.0

31.7
120.5
233.6
141.4
251.1
238.2

42.8
226.9
375.2
192.7
396.2
367.3

35.1
88.3
60.6
36.3
57.8
54.2

90.1
665.1
1,022.6
552.3
1,022.6
972.7

155.7
1,335.0
1,797.7
833.6
1,839.1
1,695.8

72.8
100.7
75.8
50.9
79.8
74.3

42.5
242.8
382.5
228.8
382.5
364.2

58.5
541.2
773.1
392.6
785.1
723.4

37.6
122.9
102.1
71.6
105.3
98.6

30.9
215.2
343.5
154.2
343.5
324.8

38.3
281.1
471.3
301.6
478.4
449.6

24.0
30.6
37.2
95.6
39.2
38.4
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Table 6.11 Income and Wealth by Family Status and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
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Aged 65+
66.8
102.5
53.3
27.4
46.3
69.1
23.7
29.6
25.1
751.0 1,249.2
66.3
207.8
592.0
184.9
202.2
338.2
67.2
Mean net worth
1,091.3 1,627.0
49.1
354.9
769.2
116.7
291.4
481.4
65.2
Mean augmented wealth
510.2
674.4
32.2
179.2
386.9
115.9
167.1
299.5
79.2
Median augmented wealth
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + retirement wealth.
Augmented wealth* includes employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.
Mean income
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couples while median retirement wealth improved substantially. In the
case of the latter group, the widening in the mean retirement wealth
gap between single women and married couples was attributable to a
relative decline in private pension wealth since their relative SSW had
improved.
Augmented wealth also differed widely by marital status in 2007
(see Table 6.11). Single women typically had less than single men, who
had less than married couples. Single men had only about half the level
of augmented wealth (both mean and median) as married couples in
2007, while single women had about a third. Typically, single men or
women should have about half of what married couples have in retirement wealth to achieve a similar level of retirement income adequacy,
all else being equal. My ﬁgures show that, after controlling for family
size in this simplistic manner, single men had approximately the same
level of wealth per person as married couples. However, single women
had approximately two-thirds of what their married or male counterparts had in terms of wealth.
However, single women generally showed an improvement relative
to married couples with regard to augmented wealth over the period
1989–2007. Among younger households (under age 47), the ratio of
mean augmented wealth advanced from 0.29 to 0.39 and that of median
augmented wealth from 0.25 to 0.28. This improvement was attributable to relative gains in both net worth and retirement wealth. Among
age group 47–55, the ratio of mean augmented wealth increased moderately from 27 to 30 percent, and that of median augmented wealth from
31 to 33 percent. These relative gains reﬂected relative improvements
in mean net worth.
Among age group 56–64, the ratio of mean augmented wealth actually fell from 34 to 26 percent (the only case of a decline), but that of
median augmented wealth rose from 28 to 36 percent. These changes
were attributable to a sharp drop in relative mean net worth and strong
relative gains in median retirement wealth. Among the elderly, the ratio
of mean augmented wealth showed a modest improvement, from 27 to
30 percent, but that of median augmented wealth climbed from 33 to 44
percent. These trends were attributable to strong relative gains in mean
and median retirement wealth.
The story for single men is even stronger. Their position relative
to married couples in terms of retirement wealth, net worth, and aug-
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mented wealth improved across almost all age groups (except young
households) over the years 1989–2007. However, single men saw their
income relative to married couples generally decline over the period
1989–2007 (for single women the trends were mixed).
Educational Attainment
Trends based on distinctions by educational attainment are very different from those based on race and ethnicity and also those between
married couples and single women. Households with less educational
attainment had substantially less retirement wealth and total wealth in
2007 than their counterparts. In addition, they generally fell further
behind college graduates over the years 1989–2007. Indeed, retirement
wealth and total wealth splayed out over time, as college graduates
pulled ahead of other educational groups.
As shown in Table 6.12, the gap in pension ownership rates widened over time between college graduates and the less educated. Holdings of DC plans increased among all educational levels and age groups
from 1989 to 2007. Despite this, the gap in holdings of DC plans among
young households (age 46 and under) between households with less
than 12 years of schooling and households headed by a college graduate widened greatly, from 23 percentage points in 1983 to 57 percentage
points in 2007. Most of the widening took place during the 1990s, as
the take-up rate for DC plans was much higher for college graduates.
Similar trends are evident for other age groups (among the elderly, the
gap widened from 3 percentage points in 1989 to 50 percentage points
in 2007!).
Trends differed somewhat for high school graduates. The gap in
DC pension coverage between high school and college graduates was
already generally quite large in 1989 but declined over the ensuing years
among young households and those aged 47–55. However, the gap in
DC plans between high school and college graduates rose from 12 to
30 percentage points among age group 56–64, and from 4 to 29 percentage points among elderly households. The gap in DC plan holdings
between those with 13–15 years of schooling and college graduates rose
by between 8 and 35 percentage points over the 1989–2007 period.13
The percentage of households with entitlements to DB plans plummeted among all educational levels and age groups from 1989 to 2007.
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Table 6.12 Percentage of Households with Pension Wealth by Years of Schooling and Age Class, 1983–2007
Less than 12 years
16 years or more
13–15 years
1989
2007
1989
2007
1989
2007
1989
2007
12 years
Aged 46 and under
Deﬁned contribution accounts
21.1
17.5
0.0
37.8
33.0
47.7
44.4
74.4
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
26.1
5.2
78.0
50.6
44.1
21.5
45.7
34.1
Pension wealth
35.5
19.3
78.0
67.1
57.7
54.1
67.3
79.2
Share of deﬁned contribution
70.1
85.6
0.0
10.9
83.1
69.5
80.6
65.3
owners who receive employer
contributions
Aged 47–55
Deﬁned contribution accounts
20.2
36.6
32.1
57.1
43.3
70.0
59.9
80.6
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
48.2
14.9
52.4
31.2
71.8
33.7
64.1
46.3
Pension wealth
60.2
43.5
65.0
65.3
80.1
75.9
85.9
89.3
Share of deﬁned contribution
57.7
65.4
53.2
63.5
53.1
58.2
47.3
65.8
owners who receive employer
contributions
Aged 56–64
Deﬁned contribution accounts
15.4
26.7
20.8
48.2
46.2
64.5
32.7
78.4
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
47.7
12.8
61.4
40.1
73.9
50.5
81.9
51.1
Pension wealth
55.1
37.4
66.4
68.8
91.1
80.6
86.7
86.7
Share of deﬁned contribution
0.0
51.4
0.0
46.2
0.0
53.9
0.0
41.1
owners who receive employer
contributions
11/21/2011 9:19:04 AM
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Aged 65+
Deﬁned contribution accounts
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
Pension wealth

1.0
43.9
44.4

16.4
36.5
46.7

0.0
78.0
78.0

37.8
50.6
67.1

4.3
58.4
59.7

50.2
52.3
75.2

3.7
65.9
67.4

66.3
65.4
90.4

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age and education of the head of household. Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁned
beneﬁt wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.
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As a result, the gap in DB plan entitlements between college graduates and less-educated households generally fell over time. The gap
in the share of households owning one or the other form of pension
between less-educated households and college graduates rose over
time. Between those with less than 12 years of schooling and college graduates, the gap widened by 28 percentage points from 1989 to
2007 among young households, by about 20 percentage points among
middle-aged households, and by 21 percentage points among the elderly.
Between high school graduates and college graduates, the gap widened
by 23 percentage points among young households and by 34 percentage points among elderly ones, but it remained relatively unchanged
among middle-aged households.14 Between those with 13–15 years of
schooling and college graduates, the gap increased by between 4 and 17
percentage points.
Not surprisingly, households with less education had accumulated
much less pension wealth than those headed by a college graduate, and
the gap widened between 1989 and 2007 (see Table 6.13). In 2007, the
mean pension wealth of households with less than 12 years of schooling averaged less than 10 percent that of college graduates, the mean
pension wealth of high school graduates about a quarter that of college
graduates, and the mean pension wealth of those with 13–15 years of
schooling only about a third of college graduates. The mean pension
wealth among households headed by someone with less than 12 years
of schooling declined among all age groups from 1989 to 2007 (about
55 percent for age groups 46 and under, 47–55, and 56–64 and by 4 percent for those aged 65 and over), and the ratio of mean pension wealth
between this educational group and college graduates fell by between 7
and 17 percentage points.
For high school graduates, mean pension wealth remained more or
less unchanged among the youngest age group and those aged 47–55,
but declined by 12 percent among those aged 56–64 and by 27 percent among those aged 65 and over. Moreover, the ratio of mean pension wealth between high school and college graduates fell by 15–24
percentage points from 1989 to 2007. Despite the fact that the mean
pension wealth of households with 13–15 years of schooling generally
increased from 1989 to 2007, the ratio of mean pension wealth between
this educational group and college graduates also declined across all
age groups, from 9 to 29 percentage points.
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Less-educated households did relatively better in terms of SSW
than in terms of pension wealth. In 2007, the ratio of mean SSW among
households with less than 12 years of schooling was about half that of
college graduate households; the ratio between high school and college graduates varied between three-ﬁfths and two-thirds; and the ratio
between those with 13–15 years of schooling and college graduates
ranged from about three-ﬁfths to four-ﬁfths. Mean SSW grew among
all educational and age groups in 1989–2007 except among the elderly,
where it stayed unchanged or declined. The ratio of mean SSW between
those with less than a high school degree and college graduates actually
increased moderately between 1989 and 2007. However, the ratio in
mean SSW between high school and college graduates fell among all
age groups, as it did between those with 13–15 years of schooling and
college graduates.
Households with less than 12 years of schooling still had the least
amount of retirement wealth in 2007, compared to households with
more education. For instance, the typical household between the ages
of 56 and 64 with less than 12 years of schooling had $164,000 in retirement wealth, compared to $271,500 for households with 12 years of
schooling, $359,700 for households with 13–15 years of schooling, and
$565,100 for households with 16 and more years of schooling. These
differences held by and large, regardless of the age group or whether
median or mean retirement wealth is used.
The ratio of mean and median retirement wealth ranged from 23
to 33 percent in 2007 between the least educated group and college
graduates, from 33 to 48 percent between high school and college
graduates, and from 49 to 64 percent between those with some college
and college graduates. Due mainly to the increasing spread in pension
wealth between college graduates and the less educated, the ratio of
both mean and median retirement wealth between the least educated
group and college graduates fell for every age group between 1989 and
2007 (with the single exception of median retirement wealth for age
group 56–64). A similar pattern holds for the ratio between high school
and college graduates. In the case of elderly households, the ratio in
mean retirement wealth plummeted by 32 percentage points and that
in median retirement wealth by 49 percentage points. A similar story
ensues between those with some college and college graduates.
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Category
Aged 46 and under
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth
Aged 47–55
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth
Aged 56–64
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth
Aged 65+
Mean pension wealth
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Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth

Less than 12 years of schooling
% change
1989
2007
1989−2007

202

Table 6.13 Retirement Wealth by Years of Schooling and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
% change
12 years of schooling
1989
2007
1989−2007

12.8
56.3
69.1
61.8

5.5
81.7
87.1
78.9

−57.5
45.2
26.1
27.7

31.0
102.4
133.4
111.2

31.9
107.3
139.2
115.7

3.0
4.7
4.3
4.0

54.5
83.9
138.4
106.2

24.2
128.6
152.8
116.1

−55.7
53.3
10.4
9.3

94.7
160.9
255.6
203.5

92.4
166.1
258.6
219.5

−2.3
3.3
1.2
7.9

73.3
105.9
179.2
126.9

33.3
162.9
196.2
164.0

−54.5
53.8
9.5
29.2

150.5
190.7
341.2
275.2

133.2
203.5
336.7
271.5

−11.5
6.7
−1.3
−1.3

43.7
94.0
137.7
94.6

42.2
123.7
166.0
106.8

−3.5
31.6
20.5
12.8

111.8
210.1
321.9
309.5

81.9
153.6
235.5
195.0

−26.8
−26.9
−26.8
−37.0
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13–15 years of schooling

16 or more years of schooling

Aged 46 and under
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth
Aged 47–55
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth
Aged 56–64
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth
Aged 65+
Mean pension wealth
Mean Social Security wealth
Mean retirement wealth
Median retirement wealth

41.6
96.7
138.3
124.5

41.7
111.5
153.2
118.0

0.3
15.3
10.8
−5.2

63.6
134.4
197.9
169.1

113.5
177.1
290.6
239.1

78.6
31.8
46.8
41.4

111.5
150.3
261.8
250.1

137.5
168.3
305.8
241.2

23.3
12.0
16.8
−3.6

220.8
185.0
405.8
315.5

328.1
264.8
592.9
480.5

48.5
43.2
46.1
52.3

167.6
173.0
340.6
297.2

214.0
211.3
425.2
359.7

27.7
22.1
24.8
21.0

329.8
221.8
551.7
513.6

532.1
309.3
841.4
565.1

61.3
39.4
52.5
10.0

188.3
195.1
383.4
320.9

172.8
189.8
362.6
280.7

−8.2
−2.7
−5.4
−12.5

276.7
224.1
500.8
335.4

487.5
232.8
720.2
452.8

76.2
3.8
43.8
35.0
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NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age and education of the head of household. Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁned
beneﬁt wealth. Retirement wealth = pension wealth + Social Security wealth.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.
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Table 6.14 Income and Wealth by Years of Schooling and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
Less than 12 years of schooling
12 years of schooling
% change,
% change,
1989
2007
1989–2007
1989
2007
1989–2007
Aged 46 and under
Mean income
33.6
29.5
−12.2
55.6
51.1
−8.0
Mean net worth
57.6
40.8
−29.2
87.7
117.5
34.0
Mean augmented wealth
123.5
124.9
1.1
213.1
241.1
13.1
Median augmented wealth
68.7
83.2
21.1
150.0
128.0
−14.6
Mean augmented wealth*
135.4
129.7
−4.2
236.0
255.6
8.3
Mean net augmented wealth*
128.5
125.7
−2.2
219.7
239.5
9.0
Aged 47–55
Mean income
41.0
38.8
−5.5
70.4
65.1
−7.5
Mean net worth
143.4
100.4
−30.0
397.1
266.9
−32.8
Mean augmented wealth
278.4
242.1
−13.0
638.1
478.2
−25.1
Median augmented wealth
177.0
170.8
−3.5
389.8
332.0
−14.8
Mean augmented wealth*
291.0
248.3
−14.7
646.7
497.9
−23.0
Mean net augmented wealth*
277.3
238.8
−13.9
614.1
461.2
−24.9
Aged 56–64
Mean income
36.5
30.8
−15.8
64.5
56.9
−11.7
Mean net worth
198.9
123.1
−38.1
438.4
374.0
−14.7
Mean augmented wealth
369.5
298.0
−19.3
767.4
646.7
−15.7
Median augmented wealth
241.0
224.2
−7.0
532.7
424.6
−20.3
Mean augmented wealth*
369.5
300.7
−18.6
767.4
653.3
−14.9
Mean net augmented wealth*
355.5
291.6
−18.0
740.1
619.5
−16.3
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Aged 65+
Mean income
Mean net worth
Mean augmented wealth
Median augmented wealth

25.3
200.8
338.0
229.3

25.8
241.7
393.3
247.0

2.0
20.4
16.4
7.7

13–15 years of schooling
Aged 46 and under
Mean income
Mean net worth
Mean augmented wealth
Median augmented wealth
Mean augmented wealth*
Mean net augmented wealth*
Aged 47–55
Mean income
Mean net worth
Mean augmented wealth
Median augmented wealth
Mean augmented wealth*
Mean net augmented wealth*

43.5
505.9
827.7
530.8

36.9
375.7
586.2
387.8

−15.1
−25.7
−29.2
−26.9

16+ years of schooling

65.7
172.7
301.9
184.9
330.8
309.2

56.5
125.6
258.9
136.9
287.6
264.0

−14.0
−27.3
−14.2
−26.0
−13.1
−14.6

105.9
422.3
600.9
329.9
662.0
611.6

109.8
454.5
677.1
346.9
759.7
687.4

3.7
7.6
12.7
5.2
14.8
12.4

92.3
466.1
706.9
522.5
745.2
694.6

73.0
437.4
657.0
340.5
684.0
632.2

−20.9
−6.1
−7.0
−34.8
−8.2
−9.0

232.0
1,306.7
1,639.3
875.1
1,712.0
1,587.6

193.3
1,411.8
1,798.3
857.1
1,886.7
1,731.6

−16.7
8.0
9.7
−2.1
10.2
9.1
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13–15 years of schooling
% change,
1989
2007
1989–2007
Aged 56–64
Mean income
Mean net worth
Mean augmented wealth
Median augmented wealth
Mean augmented wealth*
Mean net augmented wealth*
Aged 65+
Mean income
Mean net worth
Mean augmented wealth
Median augmented wealth

16+ years of schooling
% change,
1989
2007
1989–2007

85.2
504.0
827.1
557.8
827.1
776.3

79.8
488.0
816.0
566.4
832.2
771.6

−6.3
−3.2
−1.3
1.6
0.6
−0.6

163.5
1,482.3
1,971.6
890.9
1,971.6
1,856.9

198.3
1,931.5
2,434.8
1,103.7
2,495.3
2,287.3

21.3
30.3
23.5
23.9
26.6
23.2

81.9
1,360.8
1,734.4
676.6

60.3
666.4
956.7
580.7

−26.4
−51.0
−44.8
−14.2

149.3
1,648.4
2,136.6
971.0

169.0
2,295.4
2,741.8
1,149.3

13.2
39.3
28.3
18.4

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age and education of the head of household. Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth +
retirement wealth. Augmented wealth* includes employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.
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Likewise, similar disparities exist in net worth and augmented
wealth between the less educated and college graduates (see Table
6.14). In 2007, the ratio of net worth between the least educated group
and college graduates ranged from 6 to 11 percent; that between high
school and college graduates from 19 to 26 percent; and that between
some college and college graduates from 25 to 31 percent. Mean net
worth generally declined among the less-educated groups and increased
among college graduates from 1989 to 2007, so that the ratio of mean
net worth between the three less-educated groups and college graduates
generally fell between 1989 and 2007.
Ratios of both mean and median augmented wealth between the
less educated and college graduates are generally higher than the corresponding net worth ratios. The ratio of mean and median augmented
wealth between the least educated and college graduates ranged from 12
to 24 percent in 2007; that between high school and college graduates
from 21 to 39 percent; and that between those with some college and
college graduates from 33 to 51 percent. Here, too, because of a relative
decline in both retirement wealth and net worth between the less educated and college graduates, the former groups fell further behind the
latter in terms of both mean and median augmented wealth from 1989
to 2007. This occurred for all educational groups and age groups, with
only two exceptions (median augmented wealth among the least educated aged 46 and under, and mean augmented wealth for high school
graduates aged 46 and under). The mean income of the less-educated
groups also declined relative to college graduates between 1989 and
2007. This was true for all age groups (again with two exceptions).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The chapter began with a review of time series trends in retirement wealth and augmented wealth and comparisons of the portfolio
composition of augmented wealth by age class and income quintile.
It is clear that SSW was more important for younger households than
older ones. It is also particularly important among the lowest income
quintile, accounting for almost half or more of augmented wealth in
some years. In contrast, pension wealth was a major component of aug-
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mented wealth for the third and fourth income quintiles. For the top
income quintile, nonpension net worth was by far the leading component, accounting for about 70–75 percent of augmented wealth.
When dividing households by net worth class, a U-shaped pattern
emerged between wealth class and the growth in retirement wealth from
1989 to 2007. Gains were by far the strongest at the top but also relatively strong at the bottom. They were weakest in the middle (in many
cases negative). Dividing households by income class, I also ﬁnd that
advances in retirement wealth were strongest at the top. Advances were
once again weakest in the middle and, in most cases, negative.
Dividing households by race and ethnicity, I ﬁnd large gaps in pension ownership, pension wealth, retirement wealth, and augmented
wealth between minorities and (non-Hispanic) whites. However, there
is strong evidence of relative gains made by minorities on whites in
terms of SSW, retirement wealth, net worth, and augmented wealth
from 1989 to 2007. Relative gains in net worth appear to be due to
a large expansion of the home ownership rate among minorities during the 2000s (see Chapter 2). Though a full analysis is beyond the
scope of the present volume, it is likely that the relative gains in SSW
among minorities are due to three factors: 1) some convergence in labor
earnings between minorities and whites, particularly during the 1990s;
2) more continuous work histories for minority workers over time; and
3) a reduction in the life expectancy gap between minorities and whites.
There was also a substantial gap in retirement wealth and augmented wealth between single females and married couples. Similar to
the experience of minorities, single females progressed relative to married couples between 1989 and 2007 along almost every dimension. A
similar pattern holds for single men. Their position relative to married
couples improved along almost every dimension as well.
Trends based on educational attainment are very different from
those by race and ethnicity and by family status. Households with less
educational attainment had substantially less retirement wealth and augmented wealth in 2007 than their counterparts. In addition, they generally fell further behind college graduates between 1989 and 2007 in
terms of pension wealth, retirement wealth, net worth, and augmented
wealth. Indeed, retirement wealth and augmented wealth splayed out
over time, as college graduates pulled ahead of the other educational
groups. Much of this change reﬂects the rising returns to education
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that have occurred since 1980 or so (see Goldin and Katz [2008], for
example). This pattern also shows up in relative household incomes by
schooling level, which shows increasing dispersion between 1989 and
2007.
With regard to pension wealth, the decline in DB plans was particularly detrimental to the less educated, since DB had been a bulwark of
retirement security among the less-educated, blue-collar workers up to
the 1980s. We also saw a similar pattern for current workers classiﬁed
by years of schooling (see Table 4.2).

Notes
1. Although they are quite distinct ﬁnancial instruments, we combine DC and DB
plans under private pensions, as both are employer-sponsored savings initiatives
with the explicit purpose of saving for retirement.
2. As was discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, most of the gains in both pension wealth
and SSW occurred in the 1990s, with only modest advances from 2001 to 2007.
3. In general, incomes are skewed toward high-income earners in the SCF compared
to the CPS because of oversampling of the rich and the fact that income values are
not top-coded. Thus, average income levels (and inequality) in the SCF are higher
than the corresponding ﬁgures in the CPS.
4. I combine these two minority groups because of the small sample of each. Also,
Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of their small sample
size. The race/ethnicity of the household is based on that recorded by the reference
person in the household.
5. Interestingly, of those with DC accounts, minority households were much more
likely to receive employer contributions (DCEMP).
6. Similar results are evident for (current) workers classiﬁed by race and ethnicity.
(see Table 4.2).
7. Ratios of mean AW* and mean net AW* are almost identical.
8. Trends in mean AW* and mean net AW* are once again almost identical.
9. The racial net worth ratio by age group in 2007 was 0.29 for the youngest age
group, 0.27 for age group 47–55, 0.28 for age group 56–64, and 0.24 for the
elderly. These ratios compare to an overall net worth ratio of 0.19 in 2007 between
African Americans and whites and of 0.26 between Hispanics and (non-Hispanic)
whites (see Chapter 2). The apparent inconsistency is accounted for by the fact
that there was a much higher share of minority households (notably Hispanics) in
the low-wealth youngest age group (59.8 versus 40.1 percent), and correspondingly lower percentages in the high-wealth middle-aged group 47–64 (30.0 versus
35.2 percent) and the elderly group (11.2 versus 24.7 percent).
10. Minorities made considerable advances during the 1990s (the 1989–2001 period)
as well as during the 2000s (2001 to 2007). During the 1990s, growth was strong
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11.

12.
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14.
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across the board for both whites and minorities but stronger among minority households. As a result, the gap in pension wealth, SSW, mean and median retirement
wealth, income, and mean and median augmented wealth generally narrowed,
particularly among the elderly. During the 2000s, the racial gap further narrowed.
This was true almost across the board in terms of pension wealth, SSW, mean
and median retirement wealth, income, and mean and median augmented wealth.
Among households in age group 46 and under and age group 47–55, this closure
was due to actual declines in pension wealth and SSW among white households in
contrast to positive growth among minority households. For the older age groups,
both whites and minorities generally saw positive growth, but it was higher among
minorities than among whites.
As indicated, households are divided into three types: 1) married couples, including cohabitating adults; 2) male householders without a spouse (or a cohabitating
adult) present; and 3) female householders without a spouse (or a cohabitating
adult) present.
The reason, as discussed in Chapter 4, is that Social Security beneﬁts for a single
earner qualifying for beneﬁts in a married couple are increased by 50 percent relative to beneﬁts for a single earner living alone.
Similar trends are reported in Table 4.2 for this gap as measured by the educational
level of (current) workers.
As was true among current workers, in 1989 high school graduates had a higher
rate of pension ownership than college graduates because of a higher share of
households with DB entitlements.
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Retirement Prospects
Retirement income security occupies the public debate on a regular
basis. It refers to the ability of households to provide an adequate stream
of income during the period of their retirement from the labor force.
There has been, for example, periodic discussion about the possibility
for Social Security privatization. What is largely absent from the discussion, though, is a broader perspective that puts Social Security beneﬁts in the frame of retirement income security. Social Security’s value
and thus the options to reform it can only be fully understood when it
is put in the larger context of all retirement savings. This requires an
understanding of the retirement savings that households have accumulated, how this has changed over time, and what role Social Security has
played in these changes.
The ﬁrst question is whether workers have saved enough for retirement. My results indicate that the retirement system in the United States
outside of Social Security is a system with many holes, despite large tax
incentives from the federal government for workers to save for retirement. Nearly one-ﬁfth of households nearing retirement—i.e., households between the ages of 56 and 64—had no retirement savings other
than Social Security. In contrast, almost all households can expect to
receive some beneﬁts from Social Security.
Even among the households that have private pensions, savings are
very unevenly distributed. Indeed, one of the most dramatic transformations over the last three decades has been the replacement of traditional
DB pension plans with DC plans such as 401(k)s. This changeover has
actually been detrimental to a large share of the working population.
Minorities, single women, and workers with a high school education or less have substantially less retirement wealth than their counterparts. Much of this inequality results from an uneven distribution
of retirement savings outside of Social Security. In fact, as is shown in
Chapter 5, expected Social Security beneﬁts are an equalizing force:
when Social Security wealth is included, total retirement beneﬁts are
more equally distributed than without. Moreover, the typical household
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in 2007 could expect more retirement income from Social Security than
from its private DC plan retirement savings. In addition, private pensions fell behind other private savings in the spectrum of retirement
preparedness.
How have retirement savings changed over time? Retirement savings improved from 1989 to 2007, despite the fact that large trouble
spots remain. The share of households that could expect to have retirement incomes that were less than the poverty line declined. Also, the
share of households that could hope to replace at least three-quarters
of their projected income at age 64 with beneﬁts from their savings in
retirement rose from 1989 to 2007. Moreover, minorities and the bottom quintile in terms of income saw larger improvements in retirement
preparedness than their counterparts, although they generally remained
less well prepared in 2007 than these other groups.
Social Security played an important role in the relative improvements of these two groups. Gains in Social Security beneﬁts were more
pronounced than improvements in private retirement savings among
the groups that saw disproportionately larger gains—that is, relative
improvements—in their retirement income adequacy. Social Security
was at the heart of improving retirement income security for those who
typically have less retirement wealth than their counterparts. In some
cases, improvements in SSW even helped to offset declines in private
pension wealth.
My empirical analysis involves three steps. The ﬁrst is a calculation
of how much wealth—in its various manifestations, including marketable wealth, pension wealth, and SSW—households held in 2007, and
how that amount changed compared to 1983, 1989, and 2001. These
computations of the components of augmented wealth are made in
Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The second step is a calculation of the stream
of retirement income that today’s older workers can expect from their
accumulated wealth at the time of their retirement. For this purpose,
I convert the stock of wealth into an annuity ﬂow on the basis of the
historical rate of return on household assets and on the basis of life
expectancy by age, race, and gender.
The third step is a comparison of the expected income stream generated from different wealth holdings to two standards of adequate retirement income: the poverty level income and the ratio of ﬁnal income
replaced by retirement income. These measures allow us to assess
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whether households have saved enough for retirement and how this has
changed over time. The last two topics are the focus of the present chapter, as well as an analysis of changes in retirement income security for
households with different demographic characteristics, as deﬁned by
age, gender, race or ethnicity, education, and marital status.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the methods used to measure retirement income adequacy. It then provides details on expected
retirement income over the period 1989–2007 by demographic and
household characteristic. I then make projections of the expected poverty rate at retirement by demographic and household characteristic.
The last two sections present estimates of expected income replacement
rates at retirement and offer a summary of results.

MEASURING RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY
I now turn to a consideration of how well families are prepared
for retirement. I ﬁrst discuss the method for projecting future retirement income. I then show results on three dimensions of retirement
income adequacy: 1) projected retirement income, 2) projected poverty
status during retirement, and 3) the projected income replacement rate
at retirement.
Retirement Income Projections
Retirement income is based on four components: 1) standard
nonpension wealth holdings, 2) DC pension holdings, 3) DB pension
entitlements, and 4) Social Security.1 Current holdings of nonpension
wealth are ﬁrst divided into two parts: equity in owner-occupied housing and nonhome wealth. There is some disagreement in the literature
about whether home equity should be considered part of the resource
base for retirement income. On the one hand, home equity provides
consumption services directly to the household and, as a result, does
not augment other sources of income that can be used for nonhome
consumption. On the other hand, home equity can be used to ﬁnance
current consumption through new mortgages, home equity loans, and
even reverse mortgages. In this regard, home equity can also add to
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the resource base for nonhome consumption. Because both views are
legitimate, I will compute projected retirement income both including
and excluding home equity and, as an intermediate position, including
half the value of home equity.
I then convert nonhome, nonpension wealth and owner-occupied
housing into an annuity equivalent (ANN) based on the formula
(7.1) ANNi = ri × Asset i / [1 − (1 + ri)−max(LERH,LERW)] ,
where ri is the rate of return on Asset i, LERH is the life expectancy of
the husband at year of retirement, and LERW is the life expectancy of
the wife at year of retirement. As discussed in Appendix D, each spouse
records his or her expected date (or age) of retirement in the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF). An annuity is calculated for each asset
(and debt) based on the historical rate of return on that asset. The asset
classes used for the calculation, as well as the corresponding estimated
historical rate of return, are listed in Appendix Table D.1.
The rationale for converting household wealth into an annuity to
gauge retirement adequacy is that the annuity value indicates the sustainable level of withdrawals from each asset that will last the (estimated) remainder of the person’s life (or, in the case, of a couple, the
life of the longest-living spouse) and that will totally exhaust the asset
value at time of death.2 In a sense, this is the wealth equivalent to the
concept of permanent income. The rates of return include both capital
gains and asset income like dividends and interest, so that the annuity
value replaces any projected property income. Though a family need
not actually withdraw the annuity value of its wealth each year, the
annuity value does indicate the level of potential consumption that
can be maintained over time from the family’s wealth holdings. I treat
the second component of augmented wealth, DC pension holdings, in
exactly the same way, and convert it into an annuity.
The third component, DB plan beneﬁts, is the sum of DB pension
plan beneﬁts currently received by the husband and wife and pension
beneﬁts expected in the future by the husband and wife. The former
consists of pension beneﬁts received by current retirees as well as beneﬁts currently collected from past jobs by those currently working. Up
to six pensions from past jobs and six beneﬁts from current job beneﬁts
can be recorded in the SCF (see Chapter 4 and Appendix B for more
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details). The latter consists of future expected DB pension beneﬁts as
indicated by the respondent.
The fourth component, Social Security beneﬁts, is the sum of Social
Security beneﬁts currently being received plus future expected Social
Security beneﬁts. The latter is based on a computation of the Primary
Insurance Amount, which, in turn, is based on estimated work history
for both husband and wife (see Chapter 4 and Appendix B for more
details).
I then add to current nonpension wealth holdings and DC plan holdings the estimated amount of additional wealth accumulations up to the
time of retirement. And, I estimate the future accumulations of each
asset in nonpension wealth up to time of retirement. This is based on
the historical real rate of return of each asset type (see Appendix Table
D.1).3 I also estimate the future gains on current holdings of DC pension
wealth. Moreover, in the case of DC accounts, I add on DCEMP (future
projected employer contributions to the worker’s DC plan), as well as
a new component which I call DCEMPW).4 This is the present discounted value of future employee contributions into his or her DC plan.
This is based on data provided in the SCF, which indicates what fraction
of an employee’s salary is currently contributed into the employee’s DC
account. It is assumed that the worker continues to work for the same
employer until retirement and that his or her contribution rate remains
unchanged over time.5 I then deﬁne total DC wealth, DCTOT, as the
sum of DC, DCEMP, and DCEMPW.
It should be noted that I do not try to estimate future savings rates
or wealth transfers received from gifts or inheritances. Indeed, it should
be stressed that I am not attempting to fully model the savings behavior
of households nearing retirement, as one can do in a microsimulation
model. As a result, my estimates of retirement income (and replacement
rates) should be viewed as lower bounds. However, they are useful for
comparing retirement preparedness of an age group at different points
in time, such as 1989, 2001, and 2007, to determine whether there is
improvement or deterioration.6
Retirement Adequacy
Retirement adequacy is measured in three different ways: 1) the
annual projected retirement income, 2) the percentage of households
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whose projected retirement income is greater than the poverty threshold, and 3) the income replacement rate, which is based on projected
retirement income at time of retirement and projected income up to
the year of retirement (typically age 64).7 For the latter, I use a 1.70
percent annual growth rate of real income, an estimate based on the
growth of real income for age group 47–64 over the period 1989–2007.8
It should be noted that this is a stringent measure of the replacement
rate compared to most of the literature on the subject since it compares
(projected) retirement income against (projected) preretirement income
at the eve of retirement (see Chapter 3 for a review of the pertinent
literature).9 Other studies have used a measure akin to average income
over the lifetime (or over the 10–20 years preceding retirement) or a
measure of permanent income as the basis of comparison. However, I
think a comparison of expected retirement income to projected income
received in the year just before retirement is a more meaningful comparison than of expected retirement income to some measure of permanent income, because it is the drop in income just after retirement that
most affects family well-being.

EXPECTED RETIREMENT INCOME
Table 7.1 presents a summary of results on future expected mean
retirement income both overall and by selected demographic groups.
The mean retirement income for all households in age group 47–64 is
projected to be $111,300 in 2007. This compares to the actual mean
income of this group in 2007 of $110,800. There is little difference in
projected retirement income for age groups 47–55 and 56–64. However, there is a big difference between minorities and whites, with the
latter projected to have 2.3 times the income of the former at retirement.
(This compares to a ratio of 2.9 in augmented wealth between the two
groups in 2007.)
There are also wide gaps by family type. The projected mean retirement income of married couples is $147,500, 1.9 times that of single
males and 3.5 times that of single females. Wide variation is also seen
by educational attainment. The projected mean retirement income of
college graduates in 2007 is $206,000, 2.7 times that of those with some
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Table 7.1 Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth and Expected Pension and Social Security Beneﬁts
(in thousands, 2007$)
Percentage change
1989
2001
2007
1989–2001 2001–2007 1989–2007
Aged 47–64
73.2
102.8
111.3
40.4
8.2
52.0
Aged 47–55
83.9
104.8
112.6
24.9
7.4
34.2
Aged 56–64
61.1
99.9
109.6
63.6
9.7
79.4
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
83.5
117.8
125.5
41.0
6.5
50.2
African American or Hispanica
31.2
41.6
53.8
33.3
29.5
72.6
Married couples
94.1
136.7
147.5
45.3
7.9
56.8
Single males
57.4
74.3
77.5
29.4
4.3
35.0
Single females
32.8
40.4
41.5
23.2
2.9
26.8
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
36.2
31.3
26.3
−13.5
−16.0
−27.3
12 years of schoolingb
76.5
53.7
56.0
−29.9
4.3
−26.9
13–15 years of schoolingb
86.5
70.2
76.3
−18.8
8.7
−11.8
16 or more years of schoolingb
173.9
202.6
206.0
16.5
1.7
18.4
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
12.3
22.7
24.2
84.5
6.6
96.7
Income quintile 2
33.7
37.9
39.8
12.3
5.0
18.0
Income quintile 3
52.5
60.5
66.8
15.2
10.4
27.2
Income quintile 4
71.0
93.8
99.1
32.2
5.6
39.6
Income quintile 5
200.7
310.3
335.8
54.6
8.2
67.3
217
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NOTE: Total retirement income includes expected future gains on all components of net worth. Households are classiﬁed by the age of
the head of household.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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college, 3.7 times that of high school graduates, and 7.8 times that of
those with the least schooling. There is also great variation by income
quintile. The projected mean retirement income of the top quintile in
2007 is (a huge) $335,800, 3.4 times that of the fourth quintile, 5.0
times that of the middle quintile, 8.4 times that of the second quintile,
and 13.9 that of the bottom quintile.
Projected retirement income advanced very strongly between 1989
and 2001. Among all households in age group 47–64, expected mean
retirement income increased by 40 percent. However, changes in retirement income were generally much lower from 2001 to 2007. For age
group 47–64 as a whole, mean retirement grew by only 8 percent. Relatively low growth is found for almost every group except minorities.
For households with less than 12 years of schooling, a large 16 percent
drop is projected for their mean retirement income.
Some gaps in retirement income between groups widened over time
whereas others narrowed. Retirement income for households nearer
retirement (aged 56–64) grew faster, 79 percent between 1989 and
2007, than households in age group 47–55, only 34 percent. Minorities
saw greater gains in retirement income than whites, 73 percent versus
50 percent. While mean retirement income of whites grew somewhat
faster than that of minorities over the 1990s, the reverse was true for the
2000s. Indeed, minorities were the only group with sizable gains (30
percent) in retirement income over the period 2001–2007. As a result,
the ratio of retirement income between minorities and whites, after falling from 0.37 in 1989 to 0.35 in 2001, advanced to 0.43 in 2007. (This
compares to an actual income ratio among 47-to-64-year-olds between
the two groups of 47 percent in 2007.)
Married couples experienced greater gains in retirement income
over the 1989–2007 period (57 percent) than single males (35 percent)
and, especially, single females (27 percent), and the retirement income
gaps widened among these groups. This result is consistent with the fact
that the retirement wealth and augmented wealth of middle-aged single
females declined relative to married couples between 1989 and 2007.
In 2007, the mean expected retirement income of single females was
only 28 percent that of married couples, down from 35 percent in 1989.
The only educational group with positive growth in retirement
income from 1989 to 2007 was college graduates, which saw a modest
18 percent gain. The other groups experienced negative growth, rang-
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ing from −27 percent for the least educated group and for high school
graduates to −12 percent for those with some college.10 As a result,
the gap in retirement income between college graduates and the other
groups widened over these years. In contrast, the bottom income quintile recorded the fastest growth in retirement income at 97 percent, with
the top income quintile second at 67 percent, whereas the middle three
quintiles had the lowest gains over the period.
Further details are provided in the next two tables. The ﬁrst of these,
Table 7.2, shows the percentage composition of expected retirement
income in 2007 (also see Appendix Table D.2 for details on 1989 and
1998). In 2007, 37 percent of total retirement income of all households
in age group 47–64 is projected to come from this group’s nonhome,
nonpension wealth, including expected gains, and another 14 percent
from home equity, also including expected capital gains, for a total of
52 percent from total nonpension wealth.11 In addition, 18 percent is
expected from the total value of DC plans, likewise including expected
capital gains, and 17 percent from expected Social Security beneﬁts,
while 13 percent will come from DB pension beneﬁts.12
There is a big variation in the composition of expected retirement
income among different demographic groups. These tend to mirror the
composition of augmented wealth. Expected Social Security beneﬁts
make up 27 percent of the expected retirement income of minorities in
2007, compared to 16 percent for whites, whereas the expected annuity
from nonhome, nonpension wealth constitutes 21 percent, compared to
39 percent for whites. Likewise, expected Social Security beneﬁts comprise 23 percent of the expected retirement income of single females,
compared to 17 percent for married couples, whereas income from nonhome, nonpension wealth makes up 23 percent, compared to 39 percent
for married couples. The share of expected Social Security beneﬁts in
expected retirement income falls from 49 percent for the least-educated
group to 12 percent for college graduates, while the share from nonhome, nonpension wealth rises from 14 to 44 percent. The share from
Social Security falls from 42 to 9 percent across the ﬁve income quintiles, while the share from nonhome, nonpension wealth rises from 24
to 52 percent.
Over time, DC plans are projected to become an increasingly
important source of retirement income, since they have risen from 8
percent of projected retirement income in 1989 to 18 percent in 2007.
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Table 7.2 Composition of Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and
Social Security Beneﬁts, 2007 (%)
Nonhome,
Deﬁned
Deﬁned
nonpension
Home
contribution
beneﬁt
Social
wealth
equity
plans
pensions
Security
Total
Aged 47–64
37.4
14.4
18.3
12.7
17.2
100.0
Aged 47–55
35.9
15.0
19.3
12.5
17.3
100.0
Aged 56–64
39.5
13.6
16.8
13.0
17.0
100.0
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
39.1
13.9
18.6
12.3
16.1
100.0
African American or Hispanica
21.0
19.2
15.1
17.8
26.9
100.0
Married couples
39.0
13.9
18.3
12.1
16.7
100.0
Single males
38.3
13.9
19.8
12.8
15.1
100.0
Single females
22.9
19.9
17.1
17.4
22.7
100.0
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
14.3
20.4
9.2
7.0
49.1
100.0
12 years of schoolingb
22.5
19.3
15.2
14.2
28.7
100.0
13–15 years of schoolingb
28.4
16.0
18.2
15.9
21.5
100.0
16 or more years of schoolingb
43.8
12.7
19.4
11.8
12.2
100.0
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
24.4
19.9
4.4
9.0
42.3
100.0
Income quintile 2
17.7
19.5
11.5
15.3
36.0
100.0
Income quintile 3
15.4
17.3
19.7
19.4
28.2
100.0
Income quintile 4
15.4
17.0
23.8
19.5
24.3
100.0
Income quintile 5
52.0
12.0
18.2
9.3
8.5
100.0
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Aged 47–64
1989
2001

41.6
39.2

13.9
11.7

8.1
17.0

19.0
13.8

17.5
18.4

100.0
100.0

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁt) from
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding.
Key: Home equity: net equity in owner-occupied housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁned contribution − home
equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned
contribution pension plans + present discounted value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan.
a
Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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This change reﬂects the sharp rise in the share of DC pension wealth in
the overall household portfolio and the offsetting decline in the share of
liquid assets in total household assets (see Chapter 2). Correspondingly,
DB plans will become less important, having declined from 19 percent
of projected retirement income in 1989 to 13 percent in 2007. Together,
the contribution of total pension wealth to projected retirement income
will rise from 27 percent in 1989 to 31 percent in 2007. Correspondingly, the proportion of projected retirement income from nonpension
wealth will decline over time, from 55 percent in 1989 to 52 percent in
2007, while that from Social Security will remain almost unchanged at
17 percent.
Table 7.3 shows levels of retirement income by component in 2007
(See Appendix Table D.3 for results for 1989 and 1998 and Appendix
Table D.4 for a similar set of results using a more detailed breakdown of
the sources of retirement income). In 2007, the ratio of mean expected
retirement income between minorities and whites was 43 percent. The
ratio of the expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension wealth was
much lower, at 23 percent, as was the ratio of the expected annuity
from DC plans DCTOT, at 35 percent. However, the ratio of expected
Social Security beneﬁts was much higher, 71 percent, as was the ratio of
expected DB plan beneﬁts, 62 percent, and the expected annuity from
home equity, 59 percent. This pattern mimics racial differences in pension wealth, Social Security wealth, and net worth (see Tables 6.7 and
6.8).
Similar patterns exist for other groupings. The ratio of mean
expected retirement income between single females and married couples was 0.28 in 2007. However, the ratio of the expected annuity from
nonhome, nonpension wealth was only 0.17 and that from DC plans
DCTOT was 0.26, while the ratio of expected Social Security beneﬁts
was higher, at 0.38. The expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension
wealth relative to college graduates was a mere 0.04 for the lowest education group, 0.14 for high school graduates, and 0.24 for those with
some college, and the corresponding ratios of the expected annuity
from DC plans DCTOT were 0.06, 0.21, and 0.35, respectively. In contrast, the expected Social Security beneﬁts relative to college graduates
were 0.51, 0.64, and 0.65, respectively.
The ratio of the expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension
wealth of income quintiles 1 to 4 relative to the top income quintile
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ranged from 0.03 to 0.09 and that from DC plans DCTOT from 0.02 to
0.38. On the other hand, expected Social Security beneﬁts relative to
the top income quintile were much higher, ranging from 0.36 to 0.84,
and expected DB plan beneﬁts relative to the top quintile were also
higher, ranging from 0.07 to 0.62.13
Overall, the expected retirement income of age group 47–64
climbed by 40 percent between 1989 and 2001 but advanced by only 8
percent from 2001 to 2007, for an overall gain of 52 percent (see Table
7.4). The expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension wealth grew
strongly during the 1990s, by 33 percent, but by only 3 percent from
2001 to 2007, for an overall increase of 37 percent. The expected annuity from DC plans showed a huge gain in the ﬁrst period, almost tripling
in value, and a much smaller increase in the second period, 17 percent, for an overall advance of 244 percent. Expected DB pension beneﬁts remained largely unchanged in both the earlier and later periods.
Expected Social Security beneﬁts rose sharply in the ﬁrst period, by 48
percent, and then remained largely unchanged in the second period. As
a result, the share of nonhome, nonpension wealth in total retirement
income fell from 41 percent in 1989 to 37 percent in 2007, while the
share of Social Security beneﬁts stayed fairly constant. However, the
share of DC pension wealth climbed 10 percentage points, from 8 to 18
percent, while that of DB pension beneﬁts fell 6 percentage points, from
19 to 13 percent. Of the $38,000 increase in expected retirement income
between 1989 and 2007, the increase in nonpension wealth (including
home equity) made the largest contribution, 45 percent, followed by the
growth of DC pension wealth, 38 percent (see Table 7.5).14 The growth
in Social Security wealth accounted for the other 17 percent.
The ratio of expected retirement income between minorities and
whites jumped from 0.37 in 1989 to 0.43 in 2007. The convergence was
due largely to the growth in expected Social Security beneﬁts among
minorities, which outstripped that among whites. From 1989 to 2007,
expected Social Security beneﬁts rose by 73 percent among minorities
and 50 percent among whites. The share of expected Social Security
beneﬁts in expected retirement income also rose among minorities,
from 24 percent in 1989 to 27 percent in 2007, whereas it was virtually
unchanged among whites at about 17 percent. As a result, the ratio of
expected Social Security beneﬁts between the two groups climbed from
0.54 in 1989 to 0.71 in 2007. Minorities will obtain a much higher share
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Table 7.3 Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and Social Security
Beneﬁts, 2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
Nonhome,
Deﬁned
Deﬁned
nonpension
Home
contribution
beneﬁt
Social
wealth
equity
plans
pensions
Security
Total
Aged 47–64
41.6
16.1
20.3
14.2
19.1
111.3
Aged 47–55
40.4
16.9
21.7
14.1
19.5
112.6
Aged 56–64
43.2
14.9
18.4
14.3
18.7
109.6
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
49.0
17.5
23.3
15.4
20.3
125.5
African American or Hispanica
11.3
10.3
8.1
9.6
14.5
53.8
Married couples
57.5
20.4
26.9
17.9
24.7
147.5
Single males
29.7
10.8
15.4
10.0
11.7
77.5
Single females
9.5
8.3
7.1
7.2
9.4
41.5
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
3.8
5.4
2.4
1.8
12.9
26.3
12 years of schoolingb
12.6
10.8
8.5
8.0
16.1
56.0
13–15 years of schoolingb
21.7
12.2
13.9
12.1
16.4
76.3
16 or more years of schoolingb
90.3
26.2
39.9
24.4
25.2
206.0
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
5.9
4.8
1.1
2.2
10.2
24.2
Income quintile 2
7.1
7.8
4.6
6.1
14.3
39.8
Income quintile 3
10.3
11.5
13.1
13.0
18.9
66.8
Income quintile 4
15.3
16.8
23.5
19.3
24.1
99.1
Income quintile 5
174.6
40.4
61.2
31.1
28.6
335.8
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Aged 47–64
1989
2001

30.4
40.3

10.2
12.0

5.9
17.4

13.9
14.2

12.8
18.9

73.2
102.8

SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁt) from
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied
housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁned contribution − home equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned
contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted
value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
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Table 7.4 Percentage Change in Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected
Pension and Social Security Beneﬁts, 1989–2007
Nonhome,
Deﬁned
Deﬁned
nonpension
Home
contribution
beneﬁt
Social
wealth
equity
plans
pensions
Security
Total
Aged 47–64
36.7
58.2
243.5
1.6
49.6
52.0
Aged 47–55
14.7
47.4
133.1
−0.7
42.1
34.2
Aged 56–64
73.0
72.4
801.8
4.5
59.3
79.4
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
36.5
54.4
225.4
2.0
44.2
50.2
African American or Hispanica
47.1
93.9
1,017.1
−2.4
89.9
72.6
Married couples
44.2
65.3
258.4
0.1
50.2
56.8
Single males
2.8
16.5
412.1
16.1
52.4
35.0
Single females
−6.6
47.8
102.4
2.9
46.3
26.8
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
−61.2
−12.1
−4.9
−80.0
49.4
−27.3
12 years of schoolingb
−61.1
−4.2
141.3
−35.5
−5.6
−26.9
13–15 years of schoolingb
−30.0
−10.7
57.0
−28.8
2.5
−11.8
16 or more years of schoolingb
−1.9
41.6
131.7
−14.0
41.3
18.4
Income quintile, ages 47–64
Income quintile 1
155.4
77.9
41,473.1
64.2
71.9
96.7
Income quintile 2
−15.7
30.3
317.9
−12.9
26.6
18.0
Income quintile 3
−22.8
24.7
373.5
−6.2
41.7
27.2
Income quintile 4
−16.1
70.1
222.6
−4.3
56.6
39.6
Income quintile 5
54.0
73.1
220.4
13.8
62.7
67.3
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Aged 47–64
1989–2001
2001–2007

32.5
3.1

18.2
33.8

194.6
16.6

1.6
0.0

47.8
1.2

40.4
8.2

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁt) from
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied
housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁned contribution − home equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned
contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted
value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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Table 7.5 Contribution to the Change in Expected Mean Retirement Income Made by Component, 1989–2007 (%)
Nonhome,
Deﬁned
Deﬁned
nonpension
Home
contribution
beneﬁt
Social
wealth
equity
plans
pensions
Security
Total
Aged 47–64
29.3
15.5
37.9
0.6
16.7
100.0
Aged 47–55
18.0
18.9
43.3
−0.3
20.1
100.0
Aged 56–64
37.7
12.9
33.8
1.3
14.3
100.0
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
31.3
14.7
38.5
0.7
14.8
100.0
African American or Hispanica
16.0
22.1
32.7
−1.0
30.2
100.0
Married couples
33.0
15.1
36.4
0.0
15.5
100.0
Single males
4.0
7.6
61.5
6.9
20.0
100.0
Single females
−7.6
30.5
40.9
2.3
34.0
100.1
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
60.1
7.5
1.3
74.3
−43.1
100.0
12 years of schoolingb
96.0
2.3
−24.3
21.3
4.7
100.0
13–15 years of schoolingb
91.2
14.3
−49.4
47.9
−4.0
100.0
16 or more years of schoolingb
−5.6
24.1
70.9
−12.4
23.0
100.0
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
30.2
17.7
8.9
7.2
36.0
100.0
Income quintile 2
−21.7
29.8
57.2
−15.0
49.7
100.0
Income quintile 3
−21.3
16.0
72.4
−6.0
38.8
100.0
Income quintile 4
−10.4
24.7
57.8
−3.1
31.0
100.0
Income quintile 5
45.3
12.6
31.1
2.8
8.1
100.0
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NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁt) from
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding. The
contribution made by a component such as pension wealth to the overall change in expected retirement income is deﬁned as the change
in the mean value of the component divided by the change in the mean value of expected retirement income. Key: Home equity = net
equity in owner-occupied housing.Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁned contribution − home equity. Deﬁned contribution
plans: Total deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present
discounted value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF.
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of their retirement income from Social Security than whites—27 versus 16 percent in 2007—and also a somewhat higher proportion from
pensions (DC plus DB)—33 versus 31 percent—and a correspondingly
much smaller share from nonpension wealth holdings—40 versus 53
percent.
Nonhome, nonpension wealth grew much faster among whites from
1989 to 2001 but much faster among minorities from 2001 to 2007.
On net the ratio of the expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension
wealth between minorities and whites grew slightly, from 0.21 in 1989
to 0.23 in 2007. The ratio of the expected annuity from home equity
also increased over these years, as did the ratio in the expected annuity
from total DC pension wealth.
Of the overall increase in expected retirement income from 1989 to
2007, gains in Social Security accounted for 30 percent among minorities in comparison to 15 percent among whites. In contrast, the growth
of nonhome, nonpension wealth contributed 31 percent of the overall
advance in expected retirement income for whites but only 16 percent
for minorities. Increases in DC pension wealth made a larger contribution for whites than minorities (39 versus 33 percent), while increases
in home equity were more important for minorities than whites (22 versus 15 percent).
In contrast, the expected retirement income of single females grew
much more slowly than that of married couples from 1989 to 2007, 18
versus 55 percent. As a result, the ratio in expected retirement income
between the two groups fell from 0.35 in 1989 to 0.28 in 2007. The
relative decline was due mainly to a steep drop in the expected annuity
from nonhome, nonpension wealth, from a ratio of 0.26 in 1989 to 0.17
in 2007, and in the expected annuity from DC pension wealth from 0.47
to 0.26.
All told, the share of nonhome, nonpension wealth in expected
retirement income as well as the share of expected Social Security beneﬁts remained about the same among married couples from 1989 to
2007, but the former fell from 31 to 23 percent among single females,
whereas the latter increased from 20 to 23 percent. Single females in
2007 will obtain a higher share of their retirement income from Social
Security than will married couples (23 versus 17 percent), a higher fraction from (DC plus DB) pensions (35 versus 30 percent), but a much
lower share from nonpension wealth (43 versus 53 percent).
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Advances in Social Security beneﬁts made a much larger contribution to gains in expected retirement income for single females, 34 percent, than for married couples, 16 percent, or single males, 20 percent.
In contrast, DC plan accumulations were the largest source of growth
in expected retirement income for single males, 62 percent, compared
to 41 percent for single women and 36 percent for married couples.
Increases in nonhome, nonpension wealth accounted for one-third of
the growth in expected retirement income among married couples but
made virtually no contribution to retirement income growth among single men or single women.
Absolute declines in expected retirement income were recorded for
each of the three lowest educational groups between 1989 and 2007,
whereas college graduates are expected to see an 18 percent increase.
Here, too, there were steep declines in the expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension wealth relative to college graduates from 1989 to
2007 (the ratio between high school and college graduates plummeted
from 0.35 to 0.14!), and that from total DC wealth relative to college
graduates. Less-educated households became more dependent on Social
Security, whose share in total expected retirement income more than
doubled from 24 percent in 1989 to 49 percent in 2007 among the least
educated, increased from 22 to 29 percent among high school graduates, and from 19 to 22 percent among those with some college (it also
showed a modest rise among college graduates from 10 to 12 percent).
Correspondingly, the share of expected annuities from nonhome,
nonpension wealth declined sharply among the three less-educated
groups (it also fell among college graduates). However, overall the
less-educated groups were much more dependent on Social Security
in 2007 than were college graduates (29 percent for high school graduates versus 12 percent for college graduates) but the reverse was true
for nonpension wealth holdings—42 percent for high school graduates
versus 57 percent for college graduates.
The bottom income quintile showed a slight increase in expected
retirement income relative to the top income quintile between 1989
and 2007 (from a ratio of 0.06 to 0.07), but the middle three income
quintiles each lost ground (the relative expected retirement income of
the third income quintile fell from 26 percent in 1989 to 20 percent in
2007). The expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension wealth of each
of the four bottom quintiles was very low relative to the top quintile,

Wolff.indb 231

11/21/2011 9:19:23 AM

232 Wolff

ranging from a ratio of 0.03 to 0.09 in 2007. Except for the bottom quintile, these ratios all fell between 1989 and 2007. The expected annuity
from DC plan wealth of each of the four bottom quintiles was also low
relative to that of the top quintile, ranging from a ratio of 0.02 to 0.38
in 2007, but in this case there was little change between 1989 and 2007.
Middle-income households saw an increase in their dependence on
Social Security as a source of retirement income. The share of total
expected retirement income in the form of Social Security beneﬁts rose
from 34 percent in 1989 to 36 percent for the second quintile, from 25
to 28 percent for the middle quintile, and from 22 percent to 24 percent
for the fourth quintile. Correspondingly, the importance of nonhome,
nonpension wealth in future retirement income declined for each of
the three middle quintiles. Interestingly, the share of Social Security in
expected retirement income fell for the bottom quintile, from 48 to 42
percent, and the share from nonhome, nonpension wealth rose from 19
to 24 percent.
Nonetheless, the lower-income groups were all much more dependent on Social Security than the top quintile. The share of Social Security in expected retirement income descended with income quintile,
from 42 percent for the bottom to 9 percent for the top quintile in 2007.
In contrast, the share of expected annuity income from nonhome, nonpension wealth in expected retirement income ran in the range of 15 to
24 percent for the bottom four income quintiles in 2007, in contrast to
52 percent for the top quintile. Indeed, the gain in total expected retirement income of the bottom quintile relative to the top quintile (from
a ratio of 0.06 to 0.07) can be traced largely to the faster growth of
expected Social Security beneﬁts in the bottom quintile relative to the
top (a gain of 72 percent from 1989 to 2007 compared to 63 percent). In
contrast, expected Social Security beneﬁts grew slower for each of the
middle quintiles than for the top or bottom.
Social Security was also much more important as a contributor to
the growth in expected retirement income for the bottom four income
quintiles (a range of 31 to 50 percent) than the top income quintile (only
8 percent). Gains in total DC pension wealth accounted for more than
half the growth in expected retirement income among the middle three
income quintiles, compared to 9 percent for the bottom and 31 percent
for the top. Changes in nonhome, nonpension wealth made negative
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contributions to advances in expected retirement income among the
middle three income quintiles but accounted for 45 percent of the gain
for the top income quintile.
In summary, Social Security was more important as a source
of expected retirement income among the lower-income groups—
minorities, single females, the less educated, and the lower income
quintiles—than among higher-income groups—whites, married couples, college graduates, and the top income quintile. It has thus served
as an important equalizing factor in retirement adequacy. Moreover, the
importance of Social Security beneﬁts in expected retirement income
grew over time between 1989 and 2007 for the low-income groups
indicated above. The faster growth of expected Social Security beneﬁts
among minorities largely explains the decline in the gap in expected
retirement income between them and whites from 1989 to 2007. Likewise, the faster growth of Social Security beneﬁts for the bottom
income quintile is the principal factor explaining the faster growth in
their expected retirement income relative to that of the top quintile.

THE EXPECTED POVERTY RATE AT RETIREMENT
As discussed earlier, another important concern is the percentage of
households that might be expected to fall below the poverty line after
retirement. This is an important issue in social policy since such families will be at particular risk in that they are unlikely to be able to rely
on the labor market in order to exit from poverty.
Trends in projected poverty rates at retirement tend to follow
trends in mean retirement income (see Table 7.6). In 2007, 10.2 percent of households in age group 47–64 were projected to have retirement income of less than the poverty line for their family size. The
percentage was smaller for age group 56–64 (8.2 percent) than for age
group 47–55 (11.6 percent). Only 4.8 percent of white households are
projected to fall below the poverty standard, compared to 13.9 percent
of minorities (a 9.1 percentage point difference). Differences are also
marked by marital status, with only 5.7 percent of married couples compared to 12.8 percent of single males and 19.7 percent of single females
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Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb

1989
14.8
13.2
16.7

2001
10.2
10.7
9.4

2007
10.2
11.6
8.2

3.2
48.1
7.3
11.4
33.2
26.7
1.6
0.4
5.4

4.0
21.6
3.9
11.9
24.4
23.8
10.6
6.8
5.7

4.8
13.9
5.7
12.8
19.7
28.1
9.0
9.0
6.4

1989–2001 2001–2007 1989–2007
−4.6
−0.0
−4.6
Change
−2.5
0.8
−1.6
−7.3
−1.2
−8.5
0.8
−26.5
−3.4
0.4
−8.8
−2.8
9.1
6.4
0.3

0.8
−7.6
1.8
1.0
−4.7
4.3
−1.7
2.1
0.7

1.6
−34.1
−1.6
1.4
−13.4
1.4
7.4
8.5
1.0

NOTE: Total retirement income includes expected future gains on all components of net worth. Households are classiﬁed by the age of the
head of household. Percentage changes between years may reﬂect rounding.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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falling below the poverty line. Poverty rates are smaller for the better
educated, varying between 28.1 percent for the least educated and 6.4
percent for college graduates.
Most of the poverty reduction appears to have taken place between
1989 and 2001. The projected poverty rate at retirement for the whole
age group 47–64 fell by 4.6 percentage points over these years. From
2001 to 2007 the projected poverty rate showed no change.
By and large, groups with the highest projected poverty rate in
1989 experienced the largest reduction in their projected poverty rate
at retirement. Percentage point declines were much greater for age
group 56–64, which had a higher poverty rate in 1989, than age group
47–55. In fact, the projected poverty rate was 3.5 percentage points
greater for the older age group in 1989 and 3.4 percentage points lower
in 2007. Minority households experienced a precipitous decline in their
projected poverty rate, 34.1 percentage points, while white households
experienced a slight increase of 1.6 percentage points. The gap between
the two groups fell sharply, from 44.9 percentage points in 1989 to
only 9.1 percentage points in 2007. Single females also saw a large
decline—13.4 percentage points—especially compared to married couples (a 1.6 percentage point decline) and single males (a 1.4 percentage
point increase).15
Table 7.7 shows the expected poverty rate at retirement on the
basis of current and projected net worth, total DC wealth, expected
DB pension beneﬁts, and expected Social Security beneﬁts for 2007
(see Appendix Table D.5 for details on 1989 and 2001). I have added
in these components sequentially. Of course, the results depend on the
order in which the components are included, so that these results give
particular inﬂuence to Social Security, the last component.
On the basis of current and future gains on nonhome, nonpension
wealth alone, I project a huge poverty rate at retirement of 75 percent
for households in age group 47 to 64 in 2007.16 In other words, standard
nonpension ﬁnancial wealth accumulation is quite insufﬁcient to lift
the vast majority of families out of poverty. Next, since the treatment
of housing equity, owner-occupied housing, can be ambiguous (as discussed above), I ﬁrst include only half the expected annuity on owneroccupied housing. This lowers the expected poverty rate by more than
15 percentage points, to 60 percent. Adding in the other half from home
equity owner-occupied housing lowers it another 15 percentage points,
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Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Aged 47–64
1989
2001

Nonpension
wealth
45.2
45.5
44.9

Nonpension
wealth plus
deﬁned
contribution
plans
33.2
31.7
35.3

Nonpension
wealth plus
all pensions
27.9
28.6
27.0

Total expected
retirement
income:
nonpension
wealth + pension
wealth +
Social Security
10.2
11.6
8.2

54.0
75.1
54.0
57.8
74.9
92.0
72.6
62.8
37.5

38.9
60.2
37.1
50.3
62.4
80.1
54.3
50.4
23.9

25.9
49.7
24.9
44.0
48.0
74.6
39.9
32.5
15.5

20.5
43.9
20.6
36.8
41.0
68.7
32.8
27.4
11.7

4.8
13.9
5.7
12.8
19.7
28.1
9.0
9.0
6.4

57.0
62.3

45.1
50.2

40.7
38.9

27.5
30.2

14.8
10.2

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth
75.1
76.6
72.9

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth plus
half of home
equity
59.8
59.3
60.4

70.6
88.4
70.9
72.1
86.9
94.2
86.3
80.7
56.4
67.5
71.7
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NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Home equity: net equity in owner-occupied housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁned contribution − home equity. Nonpension wealth plus deﬁned contribution plans: Total
deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present
discounted value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan.
a
Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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to 45 percent. Thus, standard nonpension ﬁnancial wealth accumulation
plus investing in a home still leaves the expected poverty rate at a very
high level.
Another 12 percentage point decline comes from adding in the
expected annuity from both the current value and the expected future
gains on total DC pension wealth, bringing the expected poverty rate
down to about one-third, and adding in DB pension beneﬁts brings
the poverty rate down a bit more, to 28 percent. Finally, adding in the
expected Social Security beneﬁt lowers the expected poverty rate by 18
percentage points, to 10 percent.
There is considerable disparity across groups in the importance of
these various components to reducing expected poverty. In 2007, nonwhites aged 47–64 were projected to have a poverty rate of 14 percent, compared to 5 percent for whites. The poverty rate on the basis
of standard nonpension wealth (including home equity) is much lower
for whites, 39 percent, than for nonwhites, 60 percent. Adding in the
expected annuity from all expected pension beneﬁts lowers the rate for
whites by 18 percentage points to 21 percent, and that for blacks by
16 percentage points to 44 percent. Adding in Social Security causes a
huge reduction in the expected poverty rate for nonwhites, by 30 percentage points, to 14 percent, compared to a 16 percentage point drop
for whites, to 5 percent.
A similar pattern holds for the comparison between married couples and single females. The expected poverty rate for the former is
37 percent on the basis of nonpension wealth alone. Adding in private
retirement wealth reduces it by 17 percentage points to 21 percent, and
including Social Security further reduces it by 15 percentage points to
6 percent. For single females, the predicted poverty rate is 62 percent
on the basis of nonpension wealth alone. It falls to 41 percent, a 21 percentage point reduction, when private pensions are included, and then
to 20 percent when Social Security is included, another 21 percentage
point reduction.
The expected poverty rate for college graduates on the basis of nonpension wealth NWX is quite low, 24 percent. Adding private pensions
lowers it by 12 percentage points to 12 percent, and then including Social
Security lowers it by 5 percentage points to 6 percent. In contrast, the
poverty rate on the basis of nonpension wealth alone varies from a high
of 80 percent for the least educated households to 50 percent for those
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with some college. Adding in private pensions reduces the expected
poverty rate by 11 to 23 percentage points, and then including Social
Security lowers it by another 18 to 41 (for the least-educated group)
percentage points. Indeed, for the least educated group, Social Security
reduces the projected poverty rate from 69 to 27 percent.
Over time, the importance of Social Security grows as a weapon to
reduce poverty among the low-income elderly. Among all households
aged 47–64, on the basis of nonhome, nonpension wealth alone, the
expected poverty rate actually increases by 8 percentage points, from
68 percent in 1989 to 75 percent in 2007. With the addition of home
equity owner-occupied housing, the expected poverty rate remains at
45 percent in 1989 and in 2007. Next, with the inclusion of private pensions, the expected poverty rate is slightly higher in 2007, at 28 percent,
than in 1989, at 27 percent. The main effect comes from Social Security. When this is included, the expected poverty rate declines from 15
percent in 1989 to 10 percent in 2007.
The effects of Social Security are even more signiﬁcant for minorities. Their expected poverty rate on the basis of private accumulations
alone (nonhome, nonpension wealth plus private pensions) is 63 percent in 1989. Adding in Social Security reduces it by 15 percentage
points to just a little less than half, 48 percent. In 2007, their expected
poverty rate from private accumulations is 44 percent, 19 percentage
points lower than in 1989, but adding in Social Security results in a 30
percentage point drop, to 14 percent.
Similar results hold for single females. On the basis of private accumulations, their expected poverty rate in 1989 is 48 percent; adding
in Social Security lowers it by 15 percentage points, to 33 percent. In
2007, the expected poverty rate from private accumulations alone is
lower, at 41 percent, but including Social Security results in a 21 percentage point fall, to 20 percent.
The results by educational group highlight the importance of DB
pensions for less-educated workers in the 1980s. In 1989, the predicted
poverty rate from total net worth for the least educated workers is 57
percent. Adding expected DB pensions lowers it by 15 percentage
points, to 42 percent. In 2007, the drop in the expected poverty rate
from including DB pensions is only 6 percentage points. Among high
school graduates, the addition of DB pensions to net worth lowers the
expected poverty rate by 13 percentage points in 1989 but only 7 per-
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centage pints in 2007. Even among those with some college, including
DB pensions reduces the expected poverty rate by 13 percentage points
in 1989 but by only 5 percentage points in 2007. In fact, in 1989, the
expected poverty rate is actually lower among high school graduates
(1.6 percent) and those with some college (0.4 percent) than among college graduates (5.4 percent), because of the greater importance of DB
pensions for these two groups than for college graduates.
The same pattern also holds with regard to the importance of Social
Security for the less-educated households. The predicted poverty rate
among the least educated workers in 1989 is 42 percent from private
accumulations alone but 27 percent when Social Security is included, a
16 percentage point reduction. In 2007, it was higher, 69 percent from
private accumulations, and also higher when Social Security is added,
28 percent, but the effect of adding Social Security is greater for 2007, a
41 percentage point reduction. For high school graduates, the expected
poverty rate from private accumulations alone is also higher in 2007
than in 1989, 27 percent versus 17 percent, but the reduction from adding Social Security is also greater, 24 versus 15 percentage points. A
similar result holds for households with some college.

REPLACEMENT RATES
The third dimension of retirement income security is the so-called
replacement rate. This concept measures expected retirement income as
a fraction of the income the household receives just on the eve of retirement. As such, it reﬂects the degree to which income during retirement
replaces prior income and is thus of major concern to the individual
household.
There was relatively little change over time in the share of households with expected retirement income greater than or equal to threequarters of projected income at retirement (the “three-quarters replacement rate”), particularly in comparison to changes in projected poverty
rates (see Table 7.8).17 The reason is that a replacement rate is a relative
standard, whereas the poverty rate is based on an absolute standard.
Changes in the replacement rate reﬂect changes in both expected retirement income, which is projected to grow on average by 2.32 percent
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Table 7.8 Percentage of Households with Expected Retirement Income Greater Than or Equal to 75 Percent
of Projected Income at Age 64, Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and Social Security
Beneﬁts, 1989, 2001, and 2007
2001
46.5
40.7
55.3

2007
49.3
43.7
57.1

1989–2001
1.2
1.9
2.3

Change
2001–2007
2.8
2.9
1.8
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1989–2007
Aged 47–64
45.4
3.9
Aged 47–55
38.8
4.9
Aged 56–64
53.0
4.0
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
49.7
50.5
53.6
0.8
3.1
3.9
35.2
37.4
41.5
2.3
4.1
6.4
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
47.3
49.7
49.7
2.4
−0.0
2.4
Single males
54.0
47.1
57.2
−6.9
10.1
3.2
Single females
37.6
38.2
44.0
0.5
5.9
6.4
42.1
44.3
34.6
2.2
−9.7
−7.5
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
47.8
44.8
42.6
−3.0
−2.2
−5.2
44.8
43.1
45.9
−1.7
2.8
1.2
13–15 years of schoolingb
52.7
51.5
61.4
−1.2
9.9
8.7
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, ages 47–64
Income quintile 1
51.8
62.2
57.3
10.4
−5.0
5.4
Income quintile 2
45.8
45.1
47.0
−0.7
1.9
1.1
Income
quintile
3
56.4
38.4
47.8
−18.0
9.4
−8.7
1989
Income quintile 4
33.6
41.3
47.1
7.7
5.8
13.5
Income quintile 5
39.2
45.1
47.3
5.9
2.2
8.1
NOTE: Total retirement income includes expected future gains on all components of net worth. Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head
of household. Percentage changes between years may reﬂect rounding.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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per year from 1989 to 2007, and preretirement income itself, which is
projected to grow at 1.70 percent per year.
In 2007, only 49 percent of all households in age group 47–64 are
expected to meet the three-quarters replacement rate. The share meeting
this standard increased slightly from 1989 to 2001 (by 1.2 percentage
points) and then showed a moderate gain from 2001 to 2007 (2.8 percentage points). This time trend differs from that found for projected
average retirement income, which shows a much greater increase from
1989 to 2001 than from 2001 to 2007.
Surprisingly, the percentage of households meeting this replacement rate standard is generally greater for the higher-income groups,
despite their higher preretirement income. The share projected to meet
the three-quarters replacement rate in 2007 is greater for the higherincome older age group 56–64, 57 percent, than the lower-income
younger age group, 44 percent. However, the younger age group experienced a somewhat greater increase in the share of households meeting this replacement standard from 1989 to 2007. Despite the higher
preretirement income of white households, the share meeting the threequarters replacement rate is 54 percent in 2007, compared to 42 percent
for minorities. However, the share of minority households meeting this
standard rose more than that of white households, 6.4 versus 3.9 percentage points between 1989 and 2007.
In similar fashion, despite the lower preretirement income of single
females, the share of this group meeting the 75 percent replacement
rate was lower in 2007, at 44 percent, than that for married couples,
50 percent, or single men, 57 percent. However, as with minorities,
single women saw the greatest improvement in retirement income
adequacy, at least if a 75 percent replacement standard is used, from
1989 to 2007, while both married couples and single men experienced
smaller gains (6.4 percentage points versus 2.4 and 3.2 percentage
points, respectively).
The share of households meeting the three-quarters replacement
rate standard was much higher among college graduates in 2007 (61
percent) than among the other educational groups (35 to 44 percent),
despite their much higher level of preretirement income. Moreover,
the share meeting the replacement rate standard climbed much more
for college graduates than for the other educational groups (indeed,
changes were negative for the two lowest educated groups), reﬂecting
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the greater gains in expected retirement income among college graduates than among the other groups (which were all negative).
The percentage of households able to meet the 75 percent replacement rate benchmark was much higher among the bottom income
quintile (57 percent) than among the other income quintiles (about
47 percent for the top four quintiles). The bottom quintile also saw an
improvement in the share able to meet the replacement rate standard
from 1989 to 2007 (5.4 percentage points), as did the fourth quintile
(13.5 percentage points) and the top quintile (8.1 percentage points),
whereas the second quintile showed no change and the share of the
middle quintile meeting the standard fell by 8.7 percentage points.
As noted above, in 2007, the percentage of all households in age
group 47–64 with a 75 percent replacement rate was projected to be
49 percent. However, the percentage of households in this age group
projected to meet this replacement rate standard is only 6 percent on the
basis of nonhome, nonpension wealth alone (see Table 7.9 and Appendix Table D.6 for details for 1989 and 2001). The share rises somewhat
to 10 percent when the annuity from home equity is also included and
then to 17 percent when total DC pension wealth is also included. The
addition of DB pension wealth raises this fraction rather sizably to 29
percent. The addition of Social Security makes an even bigger difference, raising the share to 49 percent.
As noted above, the share of households in age group 47–64 meeting the 75 percent replacement standard rose from 45 to 49 percent
between 1989 and 2007. Deﬁned contributions pensions made a larger
marginal contribution in the later year, increasing the replacement rate
by 6.8 percentage points compared to 2.2 percentage points in 1989,
whereas DB pensions made a correspondingly smaller marginal contribution, 11.7 percentage points in 2007 compared to 14.8 percentage
points in 1989. The marginal contribution of Social Security increased
between the two years as well—17.6 in 1989 versus 20.8 percentage
points in 2007.
There is a sizable gap in the share of households meeting the
replacement rate standard between whites and minorities, 14.5 percentage points in 1989 and 12.1 percentage points in 2007. Most of the
gap comes from differences in the accumulation of standard nonpension wealth, and a smaller contribution emanates from the larger total
DC wealth accumulations of whites. In 2007, the difference in expected
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Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, ages 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth
5.5
4.4
6.9

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth plus
half of home
equity
7.3
6.1
8.9

Nonpension
wealth
10.0
8.1
12.5

Nonpension
wealth plus
deﬁned
contribution
plans
16.8
14.7
19.6

Nonpension
wealth plus
all pensions
28.5
26.1
31.8

Total expected
retirement income:
nonpension wealth
+ pension wealth +
Social Security
49.3
43.7
57.1

6.1
3.9
5.1
9.9
4.1
2.2
3.2
6.1
8.1

8.2
5.0
6.6
11.2
6.9
2.5
4.6
8.3
10.3

11.0
7.8
8.7
14.9
10.5
3.1
7.6
10.2
13.9

18.9
11.4
16.5
20.8
15.4
4.4
11.7
15.2
25.7

31.2
23.2
28.4
35.8
25.1
7.5
19.9
27.5
42.7

53.6
41.5
49.7
57.2
44.0
34.6
42.6
45.9
61.4

6.7
4.8
4.0
2.1
10.1

10.4
6.5
5.7
2.8
11.2

16.8
9.3
7.6
3.2
12.9

19.4
14.8
16.0
12.4
21.5

25.6
25.1
29.2
29.2
33.8

57.3
47.0
47.8
47.1
47.3
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Table 7.9 Share of Households with Expected Replacement Income Greater Than or Equal to Three Quarters
of Projected Income at Age 64, Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and Social Security
Beneﬁts, 2007 (%)
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Aged 47–64
1989
2001

6.8
6.3

8.0
8.0

10.8
10.5

13.0
16.1

27.8
26.8

45.4
46.5

SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household.
Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁned contribution − home
equity. Nonpension wealth plus deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer
contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned
contribution plan.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
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Social Security beneﬁts between whites and minorities also contributes
to the gap. The gap between married couples and single females is large
in 1989, 9.7 percentage points. This is mainly due to the higher expected
Social Security beneﬁts of the former, which increase the percentage
of households meeting the replacement standard by 21.3 percentage
points, compared to a 12.0 percentage point increase for single females.
However, by 2007 the gap in the share meeting the replacement rate
standard between these two groups narrows to 5.7 percentage points.
Differences in the share of households meeting the replacement rate
standard are 5–10 percentage points higher for college graduates than
for the other education groups in 1989. By 2007, the differences expand
to a range of 17–27 percentage points. In 1989, the differences are due
almost entirely to the higher expected Social Security beneﬁts of college graduates. However, by 2007, the differences are ascribable almost
exclusively to the much higher value of DC pension wealth among college graduates.
In contrast, the share meeting the replacement standard is highest
for the lowest income quintile, at 57 percent in 2007. It is almost constant among the top four income quintiles, at 47 percent. In 2007, the
gap between the bottom and top quintiles is quite large, 10.0 percentage
points. Differences in the share of households meeting the replacement
rate standard are much smaller on the basis of private accumulations
(the sum of nonpension wealth and total DC pension wealth), with the
top income quintile having the highest share meeting this standard. As
a result, the relatively higher level of expected Social Security beneﬁts
for lower-income households explains almost all of these gaps.
Similar patterns exist when we look at different cut-off points for
replacement rates (Table 7.10). The share of all households aged 47–64
meeting the indicated replacement rate standard remains virtually
unchanged from 1989 to 2001 and then increases from 2001 to 2007
at the 50 and 75 percent replacement rate standards, though it is almost
unchanged at the 25 and 100 percent replacement standards. The share
meeting these standards are uniformly higher for age group 56–64 than
for age group 47–55, for whites than for minorities, and for married
couples than for single females. The percentage of households meeting the standards were also generally higher for college graduates than
for the other educational groups (particularly for 2007), and generally
higher for the bottom income quintile than for higher income quintiles.
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Table 7.10 Percentage of Households in Age Group 47–64 Meeting Minimum Expected Replacement Rate
Standards, Based on Expected Income at Retirement, 1989, 2001, and 2007

Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couple
Single male
Single female
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5

25
89.6
88.8
90.5
96.2
77.7
92.7
92.2
81.5
85.1
94.8
97.0
91.2
80.3
90.9
95.3
91.7
88.2

1989
50
75
69.4 45.4
64.7 38.8
74.9 53.0
76.6 49.7
51.7 35.2
75.0 47.3
66.3 54.0
58.0 37.6
62.6 42.1
74.9 47.8
82.5 44.8
74.1 52.7
63.9 51.8
76.6 45.8
80.9 56.4
59.9 33.6
64.1 39.2

100
27.6
22.4
33.7
30.4
20.9
26.9
40.8
24.2
24.5
30.0
25.5
35.8
33.7
26.6
31.2
24.6
22.6

25
92.2
91.3
93.5
96.9
86.9
94.3
93.0
86.2
90.4
91.3
92.7
93.3
90.6
91.8
91.8
93.1
93.7

2001
50
75
70.1 46.5
64.5 40.7
78.7 55.3
75.4 50.5
59.3 37.4
75.4 49.7
66.8 47.1
59.5 38.2
64.6 44.3
69.7 44.8
67.6 43.1
75.0 51.5
77.6 62.2
68.0 45.1
62.9 38.4
69.3 41.3
72.6 45.1

100
30.4
25.4
38.0
33.6
22.2
33.3
29.7
23.8
29.4
28.9
26.1
35.3
47.9
29.5
24.5
24.4
25.1

25
92.2
91.1
93.8
96.4
93.4
93.0
90.2
91.4
90.2
92.1
93.4
92.2
92.7
91.2
92.1
92.0
93.2

2007
50
75
73.7 49.3
70.1 43.7
78.7 57.1
78.2 53.6
70.1 41.5
75.3 49.7
72.5 57.2
70.3 44.0
61.4 34.6
70.4 42.6
72.5 45.9
80.9 61.4
78.3 57.3
67.8 47.0
75.4 47.8
75.5 47.1
71.3 47.3

100
30.9
25.9
37.8
34.2
23.7
30.1
42.1
27.0
21.2
24.6
28.7
40.5
42.2
31.7
29.9
26.8
23.6
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NOTE: Total retirement income includes expected future gains on all components of net worth. Households are classiﬁed by the age of
the head of household.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In line with the main themes of the book, a marked slowdown in the
growth of mean expected retirement income was found for age group
47–64 in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, even before the ﬁnancial
meltdown of 2008–2009. Whereas mean expected retirement income
gained 40 percent from 1989 to 2001, it advanced by only 8 percent
from 2001 to 2007. This result is consistent with our ﬁndings of a pronounced decline in the rate of growth of augmented wealth between the
1990s and the 2000s (see Chapter 5). Households in this age group also
saw a large reduction in their expected poverty rate at retirement, from
15 percent in 1989 to 10 percent in 2001. However, there was no further
reduction in the expected poverty rate from 2001 to 2007. In contrast,
the percentage of households meeting the 75 percent replacement standard rose more in the later period, from 45.4 to 46.5 percent from 1989
to 2001 and from 46.5 to 49.3 percent from 2001 to 2007.
With regard to intergroup differences, the ratio of expected retirement income between minorities and whites jumped from 0.37 in 1989
to 0.43 in 2007. The convergence was due largely to the growth in
expected Social Security beneﬁts among minorities, which outstripped
that among whites. These results are consistent with my ﬁnding of a
convergence in augmented wealth between the two groups over this
time period (see Chapter 6).
Minorities also made dramatic inroads in reducing their projected
poverty rate at retirement. This fell from 48 percent in 1989 to 14 percent in 2007, a 34 percentage point reduction. In contrast, white households saw their expected poverty rate rise by 1.6 percentage points. Still,
whites had a much lower expected poverty rate in 2007 than minorities,
5 versus 14 percent. Moreover, minorities saw slightly greater increases
in the share of households with a replacement rate of 75 percent or more
from 1989 to 2007—6.4 versus 3.9 percentage points. However, minorities still had a lower proportion who met this replacement standard in
2007—42 versus 54 percent.
In contrast, the expected retirement income of single females grew
much more slowly than that of married couples from 1989 to 2007,
by 27 versus 57 percent. As a result, the ratio in expected retirement
income between the two groups fell from 0.35 in 1989 to 0.28 in 2007.
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The relative decline was due mainly to a steep drop in the relative holdings of nonhome, nonpension wealth and total DC wealth.
Less-educated households did not fare well at all. The three lowest
groups all saw absolute declines in their expected retirement income
from 1989 to 2007. For those with a high school degree or less, expected
retirement income plummeted by 27 percent. Indeed, the only group
showing positive gains was college graduates. The less-educated groups
were much more dependent on Social Security in 2007 than college
graduates (29 percent of expected retirement income for high school
graduates versus 12 percent for college graduates), but the reverse was
true for nonpension wealth holdings—42 percent for high school graduates versus 57 percent for college graduates.
The expected poverty rate at retirement was much higher for the
least-educated group, 28 percent in 2007, compared to 6–9 percent for
the more-educated ones. However, those with 12 years of schooling
and those with some college saw the biggest increase in expected poverty, 7 and 9 percentage points, respectively. Indeed, households with a
high school degree and those with some college had by far the lowest
expected poverty rates in 1989, 1.6 and 0.4 percent, respectively. The
1989 ﬁgures reﬂected the large role played by DB pension wealth in
their portfolios.
The share of households meeting a 75 percent replacement rate
at retirement was much higher for college graduates in 2007, 61 percent, than for the other schooling groups, between 35 and 46 percent.
The percentage meeting this standard increased for college graduates
between 1989 and 2007 but declined for the least-educated group and
high school graduates and essentially remained the same for those with
some college.
Expected retirement income also varies directly with income quintile, and the gaps were quite large. The ratio of expected retirement
income of the top to the bottom quintile was 13.9 in 2007. Advances in
expected retirement income had a U-shaped pattern, with the strongest
gains at the bottom quintile and the second strongest at the top quintile.
The share of households with a 75 percent expected replacement rate
is actually greatest for the bottom quintile in 2007, at 57 percent, compared to 47–48 percent for the other income quintiles.
Social Security was much more important as a source of expected
retirement income among the lower-income groups—minorities, single
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females, the less educated, and the lower income quintiles—than among
higher-income groups—whites, married couples, college graduates,
and the top income quintile. It thus serves as an important equalizing
factor in retirement adequacy. The share of Social Security in expected
retirement income descended with income quintile, from 42 percent for
the bottom to 9 percent for the top in 2007.
Moreover, the importance of Social Security beneﬁts in expected
retirement income grew between 1989 and 2007 for the low-income
groups indicated above. The faster growth of expected Social Security beneﬁts among minorities largely explains the decline in the gap
in expected retirement income between them and whites from 1989 to
2007. Likewise, the faster growth of Social Security beneﬁts for the
bottom income quintile was the principal factor explaining the faster
growth in that group’s expected retirement income relative to that of
the top quintile.
In 2007, Social Security caused a huge reduction in expected poverty rate for low-income groups—nonwhites (30 percentage points),
single females (21 percentage points), less than 12 years of school (41
percentage points), and high school graduates (24 percentage points).
Between 1989 and 2007, the drop in the expected poverty rate from
adding in expected Social Security beneﬁts increased from 15 to 30
percentage points for minorities; 15 to 21 percentage points for single
females; 16 to 40 percentage points for the least educated; and from 15
to 24 percentage points for high school graduates.
The unraveling of the DB pension system was particularly hurtful
to those with less than a high school degree, high school graduates, and
those with 3–5 years of college or less in terms of expected poverty
rates. In 1989, high school graduates and those with some college had
the lowest expected poverty rates at retirement. The effect of adding
expected DB pension beneﬁts on the expected poverty rate fell from 15
to 6 percentage points for the least educated households from 1989 to
2007, 13 to 7 percentage points for high school graduates, and from 13
to 5 percentage points for those with some college.
Overall, the marginal effect of adding total pension wealth (DB plus
DC pensions) to nonpension wealth on the expected poverty rate actually fell a bit from 1989 to 2007 (from a 17.6 to a 17.3 percentage point
reduction) among all households in age range 47–64. Among most
demographic groups, there was little change from 1989 to 2007 in the
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marginal impact of pension wealth on the expected poverty rate. However, the drop in the marginal impact was particularly severe among
those with less than a high school education (from a 21 to an 11 percentage point reduction), though among single females the marginal impact
rose between 1989 and 2007 (from a 15 to a 21 percentage point reduction in the expected poverty rate).
In conclusion, it has been found, ﬁrst, that Social Security fulﬁlls
its expected role of a solid, broadly shared retirement beneﬁt. Second,
private savings, including home ownership, is the second most important retirement savings vehicle. Third, private pensions still leave large
holes, even after growing sharply from 1989 to 2007.

Notes
1. I am ignoring miscellaneous sources of income such as government transfer payments other than Social Security, alimony payments, and the like. These components of household income are quite small and are hard to predict many years into
the future.
2. In fact, in principle, the family could convert its net worth into an annuity plan
from a life insurance company if the plan was actuarially fair and the life insurance company made no proﬁts on the annuity.
3. The average real rate of return on gross assets for age group 47–64 on the basis
of their actual portfolio composition was 1.97 percent in 1989, 1.76 percent in
2001, and 1.79 percent in 2007. The real rate of return on net worth was much
higher because of the high debt levels of U.S households—7.33 percent in 1989,
5.32 percent in 2001, and 6.09 percent in 2007 (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of
household debt).
4. This projection is based on the assumption that the worker continues to work for
the same employer (the so-called on-going concern assumption). See Chapter 4
for more discussion.
5. DCEMPW is deﬁned in exactly analogous fashion to DCEMP except that in Equation (4.10), the term EMPAMT is replaced by EMPLAMT, or the dollar amount
of the employee contribution to the DC plan, which is assumed to remain ﬁxed
in real terms over time; and in Equation (4.11), the term EMPPER is replaced by
EMPLPER, which is the employee contribution to the DC plan as a percent of
earnings, which is assumed to be ﬁxed over time. See Chapter 4 for more details.
6. I also use an alternative method to project future retirement income. This method,
referred to as Method A, is a straightforward projection of net worth (NW, including DC, DCEMP, and DCEMPW) based on historical changes in the net worth of
age group 47–64. Using data from the SCF for age group 47–64 over the period
1989–2007, I calculate an annual growth rate of 2.59 percent for real net worth.
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7. I use the ofﬁcial U.S. poverty thresholds for this analysis and assume that the family’s marital status remains unchanged over time, and that at time of retirement
there are no children living with the parents.
8. Though it is possible to project wages and salaries at retirement on the basis of
the estimated human capital earnings functions (see Appendix B in Chapter 4 for
details), it is not easy to project other forms of income, such as property income,
government transfer income other than Social Security beneﬁts, and miscellaneous income. As a result, I use the historical growth in income as the basis for
projecting household income at retirement.
9. Scholz and Seshadri (2009), for example, used two denominators for their replacement rate calculations: the average of lifetime income up to the time of retirement
and income averaged over the top ﬁve earnings years. They computed a much
lower average replacement rate on the basis of the latter standard: 0.57 versus
0.68. My standard is closer to income averaged over the top ﬁve earnings years
than to average lifetime income.
10. These results might appear to be inconsistent with an overall gain of 39 percent
in mean retirement income for the whole age group 47–64. However, the paradox
is explained by the fact that the share of households with a college degree also
climbed sharply over the period (from 17 to 37 percent).
11. The estimated share of total expected retirement income from net worth is higher
than most other estimates because I include the expected annuitized value from net
worth in my deﬁnition of retirement income rather than expected future property
income. As a result, the shares of Social Security and DB pensions in expected
retirement income are correspondingly lower than in most other estimates.
12. Further details are provided in Appendix Table D.4. Of the 51.8 percent share of
nonpension wealth in total retirement income in 2007, 40.6 percent will come
from the current value of nonpension wealth and 11.3 percent will come from
future gains on nonpension wealth. Likewise, of the 18.3 percent share of DCTOT
in total retirement income, a little under half of this, 8.7 percent, is projected to
come from current holdings in DC plans; another 2.5 percentage points from
DCEMP, or expected future contributions into the plans from the employer; 1.4
percentage points from DCEMPW, or expected future contributions into the plans
by the employee; and ﬁnally, 5.7 percentage points from expected future capital
gains on all three components.
13. It is also of interest to compare estimates of mean retirement income using the
standard method discussed in the text with the alternative method (Method A) discussed in Note 6. The two estimates were almost identical for 1989 and very close
in the other two years (a 4 percent difference in 2001 and 2007). These results
suggest that households in this age group engaged in very little net savings (and
received relatively little in the form of wealth transfers like inheritances) other
than accumulations in DC plans and receiving returns on existing forms of wealth.
14. The contribution made by a component such as pension wealth to the overall
change in expected retirement income is deﬁned as the change in the mean value
of the component divided by the change in the mean value of expected retirement
income. This term shows what share of the gain in expected retirement income is
attributable to increases in the value of that component.
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15. There is no clear pattern by educational group.
16. It should be noted that the poverty rates reported in Table 7.7 are household poverty rates, not individual (head count) poverty rates.
17. A 75 percent replacement rate is the standard most often used in the relevant literature on the subject. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this issue. Moreover, it should
be noted that the replacement rate computed here is based on the ratio of expected
retirement income and projected income during the year before retirement.
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8
Conclusions and Policy
Recommendations
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the unraveling of the traditional DB
pension system in favor of DC pension coverage. The study in this book
addresses three key questions. First, have U.S. households in general
gained from this transformation? Second, if not, which groups gained
and which groups lost out? Third, has the transformation of the pension
system lowered or raised overall wealth inequality?
The main ﬁnding is that DC plans did very well during the 1980s
and 1990s, when the stock market boomed, and that they more than fully
compensated for the decline of DB pension plans. The overall value of
pension wealth rose sharply over these two decades, and overall pension coverage increased, at least during the 1990s. However, between
2001 and 2007, when the stock market slackened, there was a marked
slowdown in the growth of both DC and overall pension wealth, and
overall pension coverage dipped slightly. Moreover, when the stock
market tanked from 2007 to 2009, there was a sharp projected drop in
DC pension wealth. Indeed, from 2001 to 2009, there was virtually no
change in average DC pension wealth and in average overall pension
wealth.
I begin the study using conventional net worth in order to provide
a backdrop to the analysis of retirement wealth. Over the 2001–2007
period, median net worth grew by 19 percent, even faster than during
the 1990s (and 1980s). Wealth inequality was also up very slightly from
2001 to 2007. The most notable ﬁnding for the 2001–2007 period was
the sharply rising debt-to-income ratio, which reached its highest level
in almost 25 years at 119 percent in 2007 for all households. The debtequity ratio also climbed, from 14.3 percent in 2001 to 18.1 percent in
2007. Among the middle three wealth quintiles there was a huge increase
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in the debt-income ratio, from 100 to 157 percent from 2001 to 2007,
and an almost doubling of the debt-equity ratio, from 32 to 61 percent.
I also updated the wealth ﬁgures to July 1, 2009, on the basis of
changes in housing and stock prices. My projections indicate that while
mean wealth (in 2007 dollars) declined by 17 percent from 2007 to
2009, median wealth plunged by 36 percent. The projections also suggest a steep rise in wealth inequality, with the Gini coefﬁcient advancing from 0.834 to 0.865.
The racial disparity in wealth holdings was almost exactly the same
in 2007 as in 1983, with a ratio of average net worth holdings of 0.19
and a ratio of median wealth of about 0.07 in both years. In contrast,
Hispanic households made progress relative to white (non-Hispanic)
households, with the ratio of average net worth holdings rising from
0.016 in 1983 to 0.026 in 2007 (there was little change in the ratio of
median wealth). Young households (under the age of 45), after some
relative gains from 1983 to 1989, saw their relative wealth position
deteriorate over the years 1989 to 2007.
In 2007, 56 percent of male workers (currently employed) under the
age of 65 had some type of DC account, 19 percent had some form of
DB entitlement, and altogether, 62 percent had some form of pension
coverage. Corresponding ﬁgures for female workers were only slightly
lower than those for men. Pension coverage was lower for workers
under age 47 than those aged 47–64: 53 versus 75 percent. Figures for
female workers were very similar to those for men.
From 1989 to 2001, overall coverage rose moderately, by 3.2 percentage points for male workers and 3.9 percentage points for females.
However, trends were very different for DC and DB coverage. Deﬁned
contribution coverage climbed by 13 percentage points for men and 10
percentage points for women, while DB coverage plummeted by 12
and 11 percentage points, respectively. However, from 2001 to 2007,
male pension coverage fell by 6.4 percentage points, while female pension coverage increased by 1.7 percentage points. As a result, whereas
in 1989 and 2001 there was about a 10 percentage point gap in pension coverage between male and female workers, by 2007 the gap was
almost completely eliminated. The loss in pension coverage for men
from 2001 to 2007 was almost all from the decline in DB coverage,
which, in turn, was likely due to the continuing decline in manufacturing jobs. Gains in coverage for female workers, in contrast, were all
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in the form of expanded DC plan coverage, which likely reﬂected the
continuing movement of women up the occupational ladder and from
part-time to full-time work.
On the household level, there were spectacular gains in the proportion of households covered by DC plans from 1983 to 2001, but the
coverage rate stabilized from 2001 to 2007. However, the DB coverage
rate plummeted from 1989 to 2001, and though it remained steady from
2001 to 2007, the overall pension coverage rate slipped by 1.4 percentage points from 2001 to 2007, to 64 percent, after rising by 10 percentage points from 1989 to 2001. Due mainly to the stock market boom
and rising DC coverage, average DC pension wealth increased spectacularly from 1989 to 2001 (by 80 percent). It continued to increase
from 2001 to 2007 but at a much slower pace (only 14 percent). Projections to mid-2009 suggest that DC wealth was eviscerated by the stock
market plunge of 2007–2009. The average value of DC plans tumbled
by 17 percent from 2007 to the midpoint of 2009. Over the years from
2001 to 2009, mean pension wealth was virtually unchanged. In all,
2001–2009 was truly a “lost decade.” The results also illuminate the
fact that DC pension wealth does well only when the stock market performs spectacularly.
While there were marked improvements in both mean and median
net worth from 1983 to 2007, mean private accumulations (the sum of
net worth and DB pension wealth) grew slower than mean net worth, as
did median private accumulations in comparison to median net worth.
This pattern also held for middle-aged and elderly households.
Mean Social Security wealth grew by 46 percent from 1989 to 2001
among all households, but there was virtually no change from 2001
to 2007. As a result, mean and median retirement wealth surged from
1989 to 2001 (by 59 and 46 percent, respectively, for all households)
but mean retirement wealth grew very slowly from 2001 to 2007 and
median retirement wealth fell slightly in absolute terms. Both mean and
median augmented wealth (the sum of net worth and retirement wealth,
the most comprehensive measure of retirement resources) advanced
strongly from 1989 to 2001 (39 and 23 percent gains, respectively).
However, the growth in both mean and median augmented wealth dissipated from 2001 to 2007. Indeed, median augmented wealth advanced
by only 2 percent among middle-aged households and the elderly.
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Clearly, by the decade of the 2000s, the DC pension system was not
providing the boost to household well-being that it had in the 1990s.
There was also a marked slowdown in the growth of mean expected
retirement income for age group 47–64 in the years 2001–2007 in comparison to the period 1989–2001, even before the ﬁnancial meltdown
of 2007–2009. Whereas mean expected retirement income climbed
40 percent during the earlier period, it advanced by only 8 percent in
the later one. This result is consistent with the ﬁnding of a pronounced
decline in the growth of augmented wealth between the 1990s and the
2001–2007 period. These households also experienced a substantial
reduction in their expected poverty rate at retirement, from 15 percent
in 1989 to 10 percent in 2001, but there was no further decline in 2001–
2007. The percentage of households with replacement rates of 75 or
more percent of their projected income at age 64 rose somewhat more
in the later period than the earlier one (because preretirement income
slowed). Still, in 2007, less than half of households could meet this
replacement rate criterion.
Because of the switchover from lower-inequality DB plans to
higher-inequality DC plans, pension wealth inequality among pension
holders rose from 1989 to 2007. The Gini coefﬁcient was up by 0.020
points among all households, 0.018 points among young households,
0.039 points among middle-aged ones, and 0.036 among the elderly.
The addition of DB pension wealth to net worth to obtain private
accumulations reduces measured wealth inequality. In 2007, the Gini
coefﬁcient for net worth among all households was 0.834 while that
for PA was 0.805, for a 0.029 difference. This difference is due to the
smaller level of inequality in DB pensions than in net worth. However, the inequality-reducing effect of DB pensions declined from 0.039
in 1989 to 0.029 in 2007. This change was largely due to the declining share of DB wealth in total private accumulations. This effect on
inequality is most notable among middle-aged households, the group
that was most subject to the transition of the pension system. The difference in the Gini coefﬁcients of net worth and private accumulations
dwindled from 0.073 in 1983 to 0.036 in 2007.
When we next include Social Security wealth in retirement wealth,
we ﬁnd that the addition of retirement wealth also lowers wealth inequality. Adding retirement wealth to net worth lowered the Gini coefﬁcient
for 2007 from 0.834 to 0.684. Most of the equalizing effect came from
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adding in Social Security wealth. However, the equalizing effect of
retirement wealth, like that of DB pension wealth, also fell off from
1989 to 2007. The addition of retirement wealth to net worth reduced
the overall Gini coefﬁcient in 1989 by 0.169 but by only 0.150 in 2007.
Among middle-aged households, the difference in the Gini coefﬁcient
between net worth and augmented wealth fell off from 0.187 in 1983 to
0.145 in 2007.
As might be expected, younger households suffered the most damage from the transition from the DB to the DC system in terms of pension wealth. Among households aged 46 and under, DC pension coverage dropped by 4 percentage points from 2001 to 2007 and overall
pension coverage dipped by 6 percentage points. Average DC wealth
declined by 7 percent from 2001 to 2007, and overall pension wealth
was up by only 4 percent over this period, compared to a 56 percent rise
in the 1990s. This marked slowdown in pension wealth growth bodes ill
for the future retirement security of this generation.
Moreover, among young households, mean net worth and mean private accumulations grew very slowly from 2001 to 2007, and median
net worth and median private accumulations actually declined in absolute terms during both the 1990s and the 2000s. Mean augmented
wealth was largely unchanged over these years, and median augmented
wealth fell by 6 percent.
Young households were particularly vulnerable to the stock market
crisis in 2007–2009. From 2001 to 2009, their mean net worth plummeted by 21 percent, and their median net worth by (an incredible)
78 percent. Their pension wealth, retirement wealth, and augmented
wealth were all down over these years. Starting in 2007, young households, who had already slipped in terms of net worth and augmented
wealth during the early and mid-2000s before the ﬁnancial meltdown,
got hammered by the stock market crash of the late 2000s.
Middle-aged households also experienced deleterious effects from
the transformation of the pension system, though many were still protected under the older DB system. After rising 34 percentage points
from 1989 to 2001, DC coverage barely moved in the 2000s, and the
overall pension coverage rate, after advancing by 8 percentage points in
the 1990s, declined by 2 percentage points in the 2000s. Mean DC pension wealth, after exploding in the 1990s (by 76 percent), grew much
more slowly in the 2000s (only 6 percent).
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The elderly were by and large fully protected from the transition of
the pension system. In particular, those with DB pensions were sheltered because of “grandfather” provisions and pension legacies. Their
DC accumulations also experienced strong growth during the 1990s. As
a result, their overall pension coverage rate advanced in both the 1990s
and the 2000s. However, gains in mean pension wealth also slowed
down from 79 percent in the 1990s to a still respectable 16 percent in
the 2000s.
In 2007, there was a 12 percentage point gap in pension coverage
between black and (non-Hispanic) white male workers and a huge 30
percentage point gap between Hispanic and (non-Hispanic) white male
workers. Racial and ethnic differences in pension coverage were very
similar for female workers as well. The racial and ethnic gap in pension coverage increased from 1989 to 2007. On the household level,
there were also large gaps in pension coverage, pension wealth, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth between minorities and (nonHispanic) whites in 2007. However, minorities made strong relative
gains on whites in terms of Social Security wealth, retirement wealth,
net worth, and augmented wealth from 1989 to 2007, particularly from
2001 to 2007. Among age group 47–55, the ratio of mean augmented
wealth advanced by 10 percentage points from 2001 to 2007 and that of
median augmented wealth by 16 percentage points.
The ratio of expected retirement income between minorities and
whites also climbed, from 0.37 in 1989 to 0.43 in 2007. The convergence was due largely to the growth in expected Social Security beneﬁts among minorities, which outstripped that among whites. It is likely
that the relative gains in Social Security wealth among minorities are
due to three factors: 1) some convergence in labor earnings between
minorities and whites, particularly during the 1990s; 2) more continuous work histories for minority workers over time; and 3) a reduction in
the life expectancy gap between minorities and whites.
Minorities also made dramatic inroads in reducing their expected
poverty rate at retirement, from 48 percent in 1989 to 14 percent in
2007. Still, whites had a much lower expected poverty rate in 2007
than minorities, 5 versus 14 percent. Moreover, minorities saw slightly
greater increases in the share of households with a replacement rate of
75 percent or more from 1989 to 2007. However, minorities still had a
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lower proportion who met this replacement standard in 2007—42 versus 54 percent.
There was also a substantial gap in retirement wealth and augmented
wealth between single females and married couples in 2007. However,
similar to the experience of minorities relative to whites, single females
generally made modest gains on married couples between 1989 and
2007 in terms of pension, retirement, and augmented wealth. However,
despite this, the ratio of expected retirement income between the two
groups dropped from 0.35 in 1989 to 0.28 in 2007.
In 2007, only 22 percent of male workers without a high school
degree had some form of pension coverage, compared to 51 percent
of those with a high school degree, 62 percent of those with some college, and 79 percent of college graduates. The gap in pension coverage
between college graduates and the other educational groups widened
substantially from 1989 to 2007. The reason is not that pension coverage grew strongly among college graduates but rather that it dropped
among the other educational groups. Here, too, results are similar for
female workers.
Households with less educational attainment had substantially less
retirement wealth and augmented wealth in 2007 than those with more
education. Moreover, they generally fell further behind college graduates over the years from 1989 to 2007 in terms of pension wealth, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth. Indeed, retirement wealth and
augmented wealth splayed out over time, as college graduates pulled
ahead of the other educational groups. With regard to pension wealth,
the decline in DB plans was particularly detrimental to the less educated, since DB coverage had been a bulwark of retirement security
among blue-collar workers up through the 1980s.
Less-educated households did not fare well at all with regard to
expected retirement income. The three lowest educational groups aged
47–64 all experienced absolute declines in this dimension from 1989 to
2007, and the only group showing positive gains was college graduates.
Likewise, the share of households meeting a projected 75 percent or
better income replacement rate at retirement was much higher for college graduates in 2007, 61 percent, than for the other schooling groups,
between 35 and 46 percent. The expected poverty rate at retirement was
likewise much higher for the least educated group, 28 percent in 2007,
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compared to the more educated ones. In contrast, households with a
high school degree and those with some college had by far the lowest expected poverty rates in 1989, 1.6 and 0.4 percent, respectively,
because of their high level of DB coverage.
Pension coverage was also much higher among the top earnings
quintile than the bottom—94 versus 40 percent for male workers in
2007 and 86 versus 46 percent among female workers. However,
among male employees in 1989, overall pension coverage rates were
over 90 percent among the top four earnings quintiles. This was attributable to the concentration of DB plans in the middle of the earnings
distribution. During the 1980s, the DB pension system shored up the
middle class. However, with the decline of the DB system, a growing gap in pension coverage emerged between the top earnings quintile
and the bottom three. Expected retirement income varied directly with
(household) income quintile, and the gaps were quite large. The ratio
of expected retirement income of the top to the bottom quintile was 14
in 2007. However, gains in expected retirement income had a U-shaped
pattern, with the strongest gains at the bottom quintile and the second
strongest at the top quintile.
Social Security was a much more important source of expected
retirement income among the lower-income groups—minorities, single
females, the less educated, and the lower income quintiles—than among
higher-income groups – whites, married couples, college graduates, and
the top income quintile. It thus serves as an important equalizing factor
in retirement adequacy. The share of Social Security in expected retirement income was much higher for the lowest income quintile (42 percent) than the top quintile (8 percent). Moreover, in the lowest income
quintile, Social Security wealth accounted for almost half or more of
augmented wealth in some years.
Social Security beneﬁts became more important as a source of
expected retirement income for the low-income groups indicated above
between 1989 and 2007. The faster growth of expected Social Security beneﬁts among minorities largely explains the decline in the gap
in expected retirement income between them and whites from 1989 to
2007. Likewise, the higher growth of Social Security beneﬁts for the
bottom income quintile was the principal factor accounting for relatively faster growth in their expected retirement income compared to
that of the top quintile.
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In 2007, Social Security beneﬁts substantially lowered the expected
poverty rate among these low-income groups—30 percentage points
for nonwhites, 21 percentage points for single females, 41 percentage
points for those with less than 12 years of school, and 24 percentage
points for high school graduates. Between 1989 and 2007, the reduction
in the expected poverty rate from adding in expected Social Security
beneﬁts to other sources of retirement income climbed from 15 to 30
percentage points for minorities; 15 to 21 percentage points for single
females; 16 to 40 percentage points for the least educated; and from 15
to 24 percentage points for high school graduates.
The unraveling of the DB pension system was particularly hurtful to non–college graduates in terms of expected poverty rates. In
1989, high school graduates and those with some college had the lowest expected poverty rates at retirement. The effect of adding expected
DB pension beneﬁts to nonpension wealth on the expected poverty rate
declined from 15 to 6 percentage points between 1989 and 2007 for
the least educated households, from 13 to 7 percentage points for high
school graduates, and from 13 to 5 percentage points for those with
some college.
It is thus found that Social Security fulﬁlls its expected role of a
solid, broadly shared retirement beneﬁt. In contrast, private pensions
still leave large holes, even after showing strong improvements from
1989 to 2001. Indeed, in 2007, many households still had to rely on
Social Security as the sole source of their retirement income. Onequarter of all households nearing retirement (aged 47–64) had no private pension plans in 2007. In fact, private pension wealth still remained
below the level of other private savings for households nearing retirement. The impact of private pensions on retirement income adequacy
is further reduced by the fact that private pension wealth remained very
unevenly distributed. Whites, the more highly educated, married couples and single men, and college graduates had substantially larger pension wealth accumulations than their respective counterparts.
Most of the groups with less wealth narrowed the gap in retirement
income adequacy somewhat from 1989 to 2007. Most of these gains
were due to improvements in Social Security wealth and not private
pension wealth. Social Security offers almost universal coverage. Also,
Social Security’s beneﬁts depend solely on one’s earnings record. Thus,
as the labor market improved throughout the economic expansion of
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the 1990s, Social Security wealth also saw large gains (though there
was some retrenchment during the 2000s). Moreover, these gains were
more equally distributed than income gains or other wealth gains due
to the fact that Social Security redistributes wealth to lower lifetime
earners. In other words, as many new job opportunities opened up for
low-wage workers in the late 1990s, Social Security wealth increased,
though some of these gains were modestly reversed in the 2000s.
Still, the data include a sobering note with respect to retirement
income adequacy. Assuming that a replacement ratio of 75 percent of
preretirement income is a threshold for retirement income adequacy,
less than half of all households in age range 47–64 in 2007, 42 percent
of minority households, 44 percent of single women, and only 35 percent of the least educated households will likely meet this target.
Young households, in particular, appear to face a daunting future.
The share of households under the age of 47 with a DC account already
fell by 4 percentage points from 2001 to 2007, before the ﬁnancial crisis
hit, and the share with any pension wealth was down by 6 percentage
points. Though mean pension wealth was up by 4 percent over these
years, mean retirement wealth fell by 0.5 percent and median retirement wealth by 4 percent. Mean net worth and mean augmented wealth
were both up slightly but median net worth tumbled by 10 percent and
median augmented wealth dropped by 6 percent.
The “Great Recession” of 2007–2009 hit this group particularly
hard, with mean net worth plummeting by 23 percent, mean augmented
wealth by 13 percent, median net worth by another (incredible) 75 percent, and median augmented wealth by another 12 percent. By 2009
young households, according to my projections, had likely slipped way
behind where they were in 2001. Though the fortunes of young households may be reversed to some degree when the stock market rebounds
(as it basically has partially as of November 2010, when I am writing
this chapter) and housing prices recover (which may take much longer),
it may take a decade or more for this group to fully recover the 2001
levels of their pension wealth, net worth, and augmented wealth.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Against this backdrop, how do we think about the most effective
policies to recommend? We have already seen that even in 2007, before
the ﬁnancial meltdown, replacement rates with respect to preretirement
income just before retirement were low. Assuming that a replacement
rate of 75 percent is a threshold for retirement income adequacy, slightly
less than half of all households in age range 47–64, 42 percent of minority households, 44 percent of single women, and only 35 percent of the
least educated households will likely meet this target.
Much work is still left to do for public policy. First and foremost,
retirement income adequacy cannot depend solely on Social Security,
despite the fact that it is an important source of retirement income and
of gains in retirement wealth for vulnerable groups. In fact, in 2007
Social Security by itself accounted for only 17 percent of projected
retirement income, on average, among age group 47–64. Nonpension
wealth picked up another 52 percent on average, though, as we saw in
Chapters 2 and 4, it is very unequally distributed.
Pension wealth accounted for the remaining 31 percent on average,
though it also, as we saw in Chapter 4, is quite unequally distributed, as
are its increases over time. In fact, in 2007, only 45 percent of households (and 70 percent of pension holders) in age range 47–64 had pension wealth worth $100,000 or more (including DB wealth). A $100,000
balance would generate only about $700 in retirement beneﬁts per year.
This high degree of inequality in pension wealth is to a large extent a
consequence of the transformation of the private pension system from
traditional DB plans to the newer DC plans such as 401(k)s. Thus, private pension coverage needs to be broadened, and future improvements
in retirement income adequacy will likely depend on ensuring more
widely held private pension wealth with higher account balances.
In 2007, as we saw in Chapter 4, only 74 percent of households in
age group 47–64 had any pension coverage (including IRAs and Keogh
plans). Moreover, of those with pension coverage, many, as I just indicated, had very small pension balances. In fact, the pension coverage
rate had already slipped a bit between 2001 and 2007. It is quite likely
that the downturn of 2007–2009 caused even further slippage in the
pension coverage rate, particularly as ﬁnancially distressed families
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cashed out their DC plans. As we saw in Chapter 5, it is also likely the
downturn resulted in a large reduction in average pension balances.
As the country moves toward universal health coverage, the next
logical step may be universal pension coverage. For current workers, I
argue in favor of guaranteed employer pension coverage for all workers
in the company. For nonworkers below the age of retirement, I advocate
a mixture of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and Individual
Development Accounts (IDAs) supported, and in some cases, subsidized by the federal government. For nonworkers under retirement age
without any preexisting DB or DC pension account, one or the other
retirement account should be mandated by law.
It is unlikely that the country will be able to return to the “golden
age” of DB plans. Moreover, it is not clear that the DB system is all that
desirable. There are many problems associated with the DB system, particularly for younger workers. First, DB systems have vesting requirements. As a result, workers who switch jobs frequently (particularly
younger ones) often do not work long enough at a company to become
vested. Second, correspondingly, DB pensions as they are set up now
are not portable, so that those workers who switch jobs before vesting
lose the beneﬁts of the time worked at the company. Third, even among
workers who become vested but leave a company early in their work
careers, the accrued beneﬁts from the DB system are often very small.
Indeed, the DB system is designed to encourage long-term employment
at a company. Fourth, DB plans are expensive and seem to work best
for high-wage, high-productivity employees. As a result, requiring an
employer to provide a DB plan may result in substantial dislocations of
low-wage and low-skilled workers.
Fifth, DB systems have, historically at least, been subject to many
funding problems. By the same token, their funding is often heavily
dependent on movements in the stock market. With the collapse of the
stock market in 2008 and 2009, many private pension funds and, particularly, state and local government pension funds, found themselves
severely underfunded. Though beneﬁts from private pensions are
largely guaranteed (at least up to a cap) by the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the PBGC itself is (as of March 2011) in
ﬁnancial trouble, with its reserves severely depleted.
Though it may be possible through legislation to shore up the DB
system and to encourage employers to offer such plans (or, at least, to
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not discontinue existing plans) through a combination of tax incentives
and tax credits, it seems to be the case that many of the same advantages
of the DB system can be garnered by a DC system. Moreover, the DC
system has the advantage of portability and can be extended to lowincome workers without creating an employment disincentive for the
company (at least to the same degree as a DB plan would).
With regard to the DC pension system, there appear to be four
major goals in reforming and improving the present system. The ﬁrst
is to increase participation rates so that pension coverage is universal.
The second is to increase the amount contributed into the system. The
third is to increase the returns on retirement accounts. The fourth is to
stabilize the returns on these accounts and reduce the risk associated
with such accounts.
There have been many proposals to accomplish these four objectives. With regard to the ﬁrst objective, one common proposal is to
change the default option at work for enrollment in a retirement plan to
“opt out” rather than to “opt in” to the retirement plan. Automatically
enrolling employees in a retirement plan unless they opt out is a useful objective. However, one problem with this approach is that a lot of
low-income workers simply cannot afford a 401(k) or even an IRA. The
same is true for young workers. Changing the default option is therefore
likely to have only a modest impact on the take-up rate of these retirement plans for these groups of workers.
Another proposal is that tax incentives need to be changed. Under
existing law, high-income employees receive the largest tax subsidy,
while low-income ones receive the lowest. As a result, replacing the
current tax deduction for retirement plan contributions with a tax credit
would still provide everyone with a tax incentive but would shift the
beneﬁt down the income ladder. This should presumably increase the
savings of low-income workers and increase their take-up rate for an
employer-provided retirement plan.
I would, in fact, make the amount of tax credit dependent on family income and would turn the tax credit into a refundable tax credit
in the case of low-income families. This would mean that the government would subsidize low-income workers for part of the savings in a
retirement account, much like the way an IDA works (see, for example,
Sherraden 1991). Moreover, a special tax credit might be provided to
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young families as well in order to boost their take-up rate of retirement
accounts.
Another recommendation is to push for comprehensive retirement
coverage, an emphasis at least early on in the Obama administration.
Less than half of employees have a retirement plan at work. The socalled universal IRA advanced by Barack Obama during the presidential campaign would help make a retirement account available to all
workers (see Mandell et al. [2009] for a discussion of this proposal).
Personally, I would make an even stronger proposal: universal,
guaranteed employer pension coverage (much like one would propose
for health care). The ﬁrst step is to make participation universal within
a ﬁrm, so that all workers are covered. Second, it should not be necessary to require employee contributions in order to have funds provided
(or matched) by the employer. Instead, employer contributions should
be mandatory. A certain minimum contribution should be required from
each employer (in much the same way as minimum standards should
be drawn up for an employer-provided health policy). Employee contributions, in turn, should be voluntary. Third, the provisions should be
universal within a ﬁrm. The plans should be the same for rank-and-ﬁle
workers as for top management.
In addition, nonworkers under the age of retirement would be
required to have an IRA unless they have a preexisting DB or DC plan
from earlier employment. In the case of low-income and young households, the contribution to the IRA should be subsidized by the federal
government in much the same way as an IDA. This subsidy would take
the form of a refundable tax credit like the Earned Income Tax Credit.
Low-income households would receive a tax credit (or actual payment
from the government) as a percentage of their contribution to the IRA,
where the credit would vary inversely to household income (starting as
high as 100 percent for a household with no income). A minimum contribution would also be required—perhaps $1,000 per year in the initial
year, indexed for inﬂation over time.
With regard to the second objective, increasing balances in retirement accounts, it is ﬁrst of note that a 2009 New York Times editorial
reports evidence from Fidelity Investments that from the ﬁrst quarter
of 2008 through the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 more employees reduced their
contributions to 401(k) plans than increased them. By the second quarter, employees were still contributing less of their pay than they did in

Wolff.indb 268

11/21/2011 9:19:45 AM

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 269

2008. Moreover, some employers cut their 401(k) matching contributions as well. Indeed, some recent reports indicate that many large companies were suspending their matches entirely for employee retirement
accounts.1
With this in mind, I would propose that employers be required to
contribute a minimum percentage to the retirement accounts of the
workers in their employ. I favor a minimum of 3 percent of worker pay.
Moreover, a minimum dollar amount should be stipulated by law, say,
$1,000 in the initial year and indexed for inﬂation over time. This would
help insure adequate accumulations in retirement accounts among lowwage workers. As noted above, a similar minimum pay-in should be
required for nonworkers into their IRAs.
Another proposal is that preretirement payouts from retirement
accounts should be discouraged (I would even say prohibited), except
in cases of real hardship like disability. This proposal is important in
light of the Great Recession of 2007–2009, during which many ﬁnancially distressed families “cashed out” a large part or even all of their
retirement accounts. One method of implementing this proposal would
be to require that employees roll over a 401(k) or similar retirement
account into a new account when they change jobs. I would also add
that loans against retirement accounts like 401(k)s should be severely
limited, since these also reduce the payout from these plans at the time
of retirement.
The third and fourth objectives enumerated above are to increase
the returns on retirement accounts and to reduce the risk associated with
such accounts. These objectives are particularly germane in light of the
2007–2009 years, when DC plans were devastated by the stock market crash. In light of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, should we think about
limiting the stock market exposure of DC plans? Should we mandate a
guaranteed rate of return on pension assets?
In order to avoid wide variations in payouts from retirement plans
at the time of retirement, one possibility would be to develop a savings
plan in which the federal government shared the risk. This could be
implemented by providing a guarantee that returns would not fall below
a certain level. A similar proposal has been advanced by Ghirladucci
(2007, 2008), which she calls a Guaranteed Retirement Account. In her
proposal, participation in the program is mandatory except for workers
participating in an equivalent or better employer DB plan. Contribu-
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tions are set equal to 5 percent of earnings, split equally by employer
and employee. Participants are guaranteed a minimum 3 percent annual
rate of return adjusted for inﬂation. The guarantee is provided by the
federal government.2
I support such an approach only in part. I think that a ﬁxed rate of
return should be mandated (and guaranteed) for only a ﬁxed amount (or
percentage) of pension assets. To achieve this, one possibility is to offer
federal bonds with ﬁxed yields. Such bonds actually already exist as
Treasury Inﬂation-Protected Securities, though the yields have historically been quite low. Another possibility is to have the federal government or company make up the difference between the actual yield on a
retirement account like a 401(k) and some preset minimum. This plan,
however, would require some further reﬁnement. However, we should
give individuals the freedom for speculation and risk-taking on the
remaining part of their pension accounts if they so desire. This would
allow individuals to invest part of their pension accounts in equities, for
example, where, at least historically, rates of returns have been higher
than on bonds and other ﬁnancial securities.
Though this book is about the pension system and not Social Security, it might be helpful to say a few words about Social Security as
well. I think that in general the current Social Security system should
be left largely intact. For example, the periodic discussions over beneﬁt
cuts for middle-class families as part of Social Security privatization
seem to be misplaced, since it would hurt middle-class families, for
whom private pensions have not ﬁlled the supplemental income role
that they were always intended to play. Indeed, this should give pause to
those who want to carve up Social Security through privatization, since
Social Security has proven to be superior to private retirement beneﬁts
in many ways. It is universal and it has risen faster than other forms
of retirement savings for those households who need additional retirement beneﬁts the most. It also has a pronounced equalizing effect on the
distribution of (augmented) wealth. As a result, it would be most desirable to protect Social Security as much as possible and ﬁll the holes
in the retirement savings system outside of Social Security, so that a
decent standard of living in retirement as a reward for a life of hard
work becomes a reality for America’s middle class and working poor.
Though no major overhaul of the Social Security system is needed,
there may be small ﬁxes required to keep the system ﬁscally in bal-
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ance. I have three recommendations. First, as life expectancy rises, split
the difference with regard to the normal retirement age. In particular,
for each 12-month rise in life expectancy, raise the normal retirement
age for that birth cohort by some ﬁxed fraction (perhaps one-third).3 A
similar proposal is voiced by Turner (2009) in the case of DB pension
plans. Second, gradually raise the earnings cap (without a corresponding increase in Social Security beneﬁts at the top). Third, make the
Social Security tax more progressive (currently it is a regressive tax).
Last, because large improvements in retirement income adequacy
resulted primarily from more Social Security wealth as a result of a
tight labor market in the late 1990s, and because these gains may have
been largely dissipated by the Great Recession and the high unemployment rate of this period, public policy should also focus on increasing
employment and lowering unemployment as a way not only to lift current living standards, but also the living standards of future retirees.

Notes
1. See, for example, Munnell and Quinby (2010), who report that in 2008 and 2009,
over 200 employers suspended their 401(k) matches, affecting 5 percent of active
401(k) participants.
2. A critique of a guaranteed rate of return plan is provided in Munnell et al. (2009).
3. One proposal before Congress as of November 2010 is to gradually raise the age
of full Social Security beneﬁts from the current 67 to 69.
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Appendix A
Sources and Methods Used for the
Survey of Consumer Finances Data
CHOICE OF WEIGHTS
In some years, the SCF supplied alternative sets of weights. For the 1983
SCF, I use the “Full Sample 1983 Composite Weights” because this set of
weights provides the closest correspondence between the national balance
sheet totals derived from the sample and those in the Federal Reserve Board
Flow of Funds. For the same reason, results for the 1989 SCF are based on the
average of SRC-Design-S1 series (X40131 in the database itself) and the SRC
design-based weights (X40125). Results for the 2001 and 2007 SCF rely on
the Designed-Base Weights (X42001)—partially design-based weights that are
constructed on the basis of original selection probabilities and frame information and adjusted for nonresponse and that account for the systematic deviation
from the CPS estimates of homeownership rates by racial and ethnic groups.

ALIGNMENT WITH THE FLOW OF FUNDS DATA
The Federal Reserve Board imputes information for missing items in the
SCF. However, despite this procedure, there still remain discrepancies for several assets between the total balance sheet value computed from the survey
sample and the Flow of Funds data. Because of this, the results presented in
Table A.1 are based on my adjustments to the original asset and liability values
in the surveys. This takes the form of the alignment of asset and liability totals
from the survey data to the corresponding national balance sheet totals. In most
cases, this entails a proportional adjustment of reported values of balance sheet
items in the survey data (see Wolff [1987a, 1994, 1996, 1998] for details). The
adjustment factors by asset type and year are as follows:
No adjustments were made to other asset and debt components, or to the
2001 or 2007 SCF.
It should be noted that the alignment has very little effect on the measurement of wealth inequality—both the Gini coefﬁcient and the quantile shares.

273

Wolff.indb 273

11/21/2011 9:19:47 AM

274 Wolff
Table A.1 Asset Adjustment Factors by Asset Type and Year
1983 SCF
1989 SCF
Checking accounts
1.68
Savings and time deposits
1.50
All deposits
1.37
Financial securities
1.20
Stocks and mutual funds
1.06
Trusts
1.66
Stocks and bonds
Nonmortgage debt
1.16
NOTE: Blanks = not applicable.

However, it is important to make these adjustments when comparing changes
in mean wealth, both overall and by asset type.

CHOICE OF PRICE INDEX
I use the standard price deﬂator, the CPI-U, which the BLS has been computing since 1947, to deﬂate wealth values. The CPI-U has been criticized for
overstating the rate of inﬂation. As a result, the BLS also provides an alternative consumer price series called the CPI-U-RS (the RS stands for research
series). The CPI-U-RS series makes quality adjustments for housing units and
consumer durables such as automobiles and personal computers and employs
a geometric mean formula to account for consumer substitution within CPI
item categories. As a result, the CPI-U-RS deﬂator is not subject to the same
criticisms as the CPI-U series. Indeed, the CPS data are now normally deﬂated
to constant dollars by the U.S. Census Bureau using the CPI-U-RS price index.
While the CPI-U-RS deﬂator incorporates quality and other adjustments,
the adjustments are made only from 1978 to the present. The CPI-U index is
used for years prior to 1978. The CPI-U-RS shows a much slower rate of inﬂation after 1973 than the CPI-U: 288 versus 238 percent. If we use the CPI-U-RS
deﬂator, then constant dollar median family income would show a 22 percent
growth between 1973 and 2000, in comparison to the 6 percent growth rate on
the basis of the CPI-U deﬂator.
While the use of the CPI-U-RS will show a higher growth in real incomes
(and wealth) since 1978, it is not clear that the degree of bias in the CPI has
risen in recent years. If similar adjustments were made on the pre-1978 price
data, it is possible that the inﬂation rate over the 1947–1978 period would be
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adjusted downward by a similar amount as the post-1978 inﬂation rate. Since
my aggregate time-series data on wealth began in 1922 and I have made calculations of household wealth trends on the basis of microdata beginning in
1962, I have elected to use the CPI-U series to convert nominal values to real
dollars to be consistent with my earlier work on the subject, since the CPI-U
series is the only consumer price series that runs from 1922 to the present (see,
for example, Wolff [1987a, 1994, 2002a]).
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Appendix B
Estimation of Pension and
Social Security Wealth
I generally follow the methodology laid out in the 1983 SCF codebook.
However, even though estimates of both pension and Social Security wealth
are provided in the 1983 SCF, I reestimate the values of both to be consistent with later years. The computations of retirement wealth use the following
steps:

DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION WEALTH
Deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth consists of two main components.1
1) The present value of DB pensions from past jobs: The sum of the
present value of past DB job pensions for head and spouse.
2) The present value of DB pensions from current jobs: The sum of the
present value of current job nonthrift beneﬁts for head and spouse.
Expectations data are used for calculations.
The procedure is as follows. Pension coverage is ﬁrst ascertained for current jobs. There are ﬁve possible categories:
1) covered and vested, anticipates beneﬁts;
2) covered but not vested yet, anticipates beneﬁts;
3) covered but not vested yet, does not anticipate beneﬁts;
4) not covered but anticipates will be (the age when expected to be covered is ascertained); and
5) not covered, never will be.
For those who are covered by a pension plan or expect coverage, the person is asked how many distinct pension plans he or she is covered by. For each
plan, the age at which the pension beneﬁts are expected to be given is then
asked.
The actual expected annual retirement beneﬁt is then determined by the
following steps. First, the age at which the respondent will be vested in each
plan is determined. Second, the age at which the respondent could retire with
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full beneﬁts is ascertained. Third, the respondent was asked the nature of the
formula used to determine the retirement beneﬁts. There are six possibilities:
1) retirement formula based on age,
2) retirement formula based on years of service,
3) retirement formula based on meeting both age and years of service
criteria,
4) retirement formula based on the sum or age and years of service,
5) retirement formula based on meeting either age or years of service
criteria, and
6) other combinations or formulas.
Fourth, the age at which the respondent could retire with some beneﬁts
was asked. The same six choices of the formula used were then given. Fifth,
the age at which the respondent expected beneﬁts to start was then asked.
Sixth, the expected retirement beneﬁt was computed depending on the
type of formula. This consists of three possibilities:
1) The annual pay in the ﬁnal year of the job was computed. This variable, used in pension beneﬁt calculations, is computed by projecting
current pay to the year respondents say they will leave the job or
retire. This projection is based on human capital earnings equations
detailed below and a real discount rate of 2.0 percent. Wage growth
is based on the historical change in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
mean hourly wages series for nonsupervisory workers for the period
and of hours worked per week from 1979 to 2007.2
2) In some cases, the respondent reported expected retirement beneﬁts.
This variable is the expected dollar retirement beneﬁts in the ﬁrst
year of eligibility as answered by the respondent. For some observations the dollar amount was reported directly, but for others it was
computed by multiplying reported beneﬁts as a percentage times the
calculated projected ﬁnal wage. The variable is given as an annual
amount except when a lump sum is expected (in which case the lump
sum amount is given).
3) In some cases, the respondent reported expected retirement beneﬁts
as a percentage of ﬁnal pay. This variable is the expected retirement
beneﬁts in the ﬁrst year of eligibility as answered by the respondent,
expressed as a percentage of their projected wages in their ﬁnal year
of work. For some observations the percentage was reported directly,
but for others it was computed by dividing the reported dollar beneﬁt
by the calculated projected ﬁnal wage.
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Seventh, on the basis of the responses above, the present value of pension
beneﬁts from each current and past plan applicable to both head and spouse
was then computed. This variable is measured assuming an annual (or lump
sum) pension beneﬁt as given above, starting in the year of ﬁrst beneﬁts. Beneﬁts for that and each succeeding year are adjusted for the probability of death
and are discounted back to the survey year. For this, I have used mortality
rates by age, gender, and race in the computation of the present value of both
pensions and Social Security wealth.3 These are capped at 109 years. Spousal
survival beneﬁts are assumed to be opted for 75 percent of the time and are
randomly assigned when appropriate. Spousal survival beneﬁts are also adjusted for death probabilities. Beneﬁts are discounted at a real discount rate of
2 percent.
Eighth, pension wealth was also computed for those individuals currently
receiving pension beneﬁts from past jobs. This was based on the following
responses: number of years receiving beneﬁts, and amount of pension beneﬁt
pay received in the year preceding the survey year. For pensions already being received, the nominal value of the pension is assumed to be ﬁxed, and is
indexed to the year it started by the actual price changes observed, as measured
by the CPI. The present value of pension beneﬁts from each job is then measured, assuming an annual pension beneﬁt from the survey year onward. Beneﬁts for that and each succeeding year (adjusted for probability of survival) are
discounted back to the survey year. As before, I have used mortality rates by
age, gender, and race in the computation of the present value of both pensions
and Social Security wealth. These are capped at 109 years. Spousal survival
beneﬁts are assumed to be opted for 75 percent of the time and are randomly
assigned when appropriate. Spouse mortality tables are also used, and beneﬁts
are discounted at a real discount rate of 2 percent.

SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH
The present value of Social Security beneﬁts is deﬁned as the sum of the
present value of Social Security beneﬁts for head and spouse. Social Security
formulae and current receipts are used for calculations.
Among current Social Security beneﬁt recipients, the steps are as follows.
First, the respondent was asked which kind of Social Security beneﬁt he or she
received. (The possibilities are retirement, disability, both retirement and disability, and other.) Second, the respondent was asked the number of years he
or she had received Social Security beneﬁts. Third, both head and spouse were
asked the amount received in the survey year.
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Among future recipients, the steps are as follows. First, both head and
spouse were asked to report the age at which they expected to receive Social Security beneﬁts (zero if he or she does not expect beneﬁts). Second, the
number of years until the start of Social Security beneﬁts was determined.
Third, the respondent was asked the total number of years he or she had spent
working on jobs covered by Social Security to the current date. If this was not
answered, then an estimate of Social Security coverage was used, summing
over current and three possible past jobs. Fourth, an estimate of future years
on Social Security jobs was computed from retirement years indicated by head
and spouse.
Fifth, data on the number of years on Social Security jobs, wage rates for
each known job, estimates of retirement dates, and dates of starting beneﬁts
were used as inputs to Social Security formulae to compute beneﬁts. Sixth,
estimates of Social Security beneﬁts were provided. A calculated value was
based on current job wage. All persons were assumed to work continuously until their stated age of full-time retirement, and then part-time until their stated
age of ﬁnal retirement. All persons were assumed to retire no later than 72, or
age plus one if currently over 72. Persons not currently working and over 50
were assumed not to work again. Wages were calculated by projecting current
wages by the same method used to calculate ﬁnal wages. This projection is
based on human capital earnings equations detailed in the following section
and a real discount rate of 2.0 percent. Wage growth is based on the historical
change in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ mean hourly wage series for nonsupervisory workers for the period and of hours worked per week from 1979
to 2007. Part-time years (if currently working full time) were assigned wages
equal to one-half the projected full-time wages or the maximum amount for
full beneﬁt receipt allowed by Social Security, whichever was smaller.
Seventh, the Social Security AIME used as the basis for calculating the
Social Security beneﬁt base was computed. The variable is the average covered Social Security earnings per month (including zero) for all years from
1951 or age 22–60 (whichever is later). These are indexed by a Social Security
wage index to the year the respondent is 60. Years after 60 can be substituted at
nominal value. The ﬁve lowest years are dropped before an average AIME is
computed. These procedures are mimicked using the SCF data on job earnings
and future retirement plans to estimate an AIME value. Past and current job
wages are projected back (and forward) to estimate earnings for each known
year of work. As before, these projections are based on human capital earnings equations detailed below and a real discount rate of 2.0 percent. Wage
changes are based on the historical change in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
mean hourly wages series for nonsupervisory workers for the period and of
hours worked per week from 1979 to 2007. Other years of unknown jobs are
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ﬁlled in with terms from the closest known job to ﬁll in the total number of
Social Security covered years. Wages are then capped at the actual or projected
Social Security maximum and minimum coverage amounts. The AIME was
then computed using actual or projected Social Security wage indices. The
variable is currently estimated for all persons projected to have future Social
Security beneﬁts.
Eighth, the Social Security Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) on an annual
basis is the basis of the calculation of Social Security beneﬁts. It is computed
from the AIME. In 1982 the monthly PIA was computed as 90 percent of the
ﬁrst $254 of AIME plus 32 percent of the next $1,274 plus 15 percent of the
amount above that. Calculations here take into account legislatively planned
changes in this formula. The PIA is currently computed for all nonreceivers
projected to have future Social Security beneﬁts.
Ninth, the present value of Social Security beneﬁts is then determined assuming an annual beneﬁt as given by the PIA estimate and starting in the year
of ﬁrst beneﬁts (or the survey year). Beneﬁts for that and each succeeding year
(adjusted for probability of receipt) are discounted back to the survey year. As
before, I have used mortality rates by age, gender, and race in the computation
of the present value of Social Security wealth; these are capped at 109 years.
Beneﬁts are discounted at a real discount rate of 2 percent.
Tenth, spousal beneﬁts are also assumed at 50 percent of the primary beneﬁt if a spouse is present. However, this variable will be zero if no spousal
beneﬁts are expected (such as when the individual’s own beneﬁts are larger
than his or her spousal beneﬁts). The age at which spousal beneﬁts begin is
estimated. Spouse mortality tables are also used for these calculations. The
age at which widow’s beneﬁts ﬁrst could be drawn is also estimated. It is an
estimate of the age at which the individual could start to receive Social Security widow’s beneﬁts upon the death of the spouse. This variable will be zero
if widow’s beneﬁts could never be drawn. An adjustment is also made if it appeared that the recipient’s beneﬁts had been reduced because of work. Beneﬁts
are discounted at a real discount rate of 2 percent.

HUMAN CAPITAL EARNINGS EQUATIONS
The regression equations used to compute future and past earnings are as
follows:
Human capital earnings functions are estimated by gender, race, and
schooling level. In particular, the sample is divided into 16 groups by the following characteristics: white and Asian versus African American and Hispanic;
male and female; and less than 12 years of schooling, 12 years of schooling,
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13–15 years of schooling, and 16 or more years. For each group, an earnings
equation is estimated as follows:
ln(Ei)=b 0+b1 ln(Hi)+b2 Xi+b3 Xi2+b4 SEi +Σj bjOCCUPij +b10 MARi +b11 ASI +εi ,
where ln is the natural logarithm; Ei is the current earnings of individual i; Hi is
annual hours worked in the current year; Xi is years of experience at current age
(estimated as age minus years of schooling minus 5); SEi is a dummy variable
indicating whether the person is self-employed or working for someone else;
OCCUP is a set of ﬁve dummy variables indicating occupation of employment:
1) professional and managerial; 2) technical, sales, or administrative support;
3) service; 4) craft; and 5) other blue-collar, with farming the omitted category;
MAR is a dummy variable indicating whether the person is married or not married; AS is a dummy variable indicating whether the person is Asian (used only
for regressions on the ﬁrst racial category); and ε is a stochastic error term. Future earnings are projected on the basis of the regression coefﬁcients.4

QUESTIONS ON WORK HISTORY
Following is a sample of questions on work history drawn from the 1989
SCF codebook that is used to calculate the earnings proﬁle of both head and
spouse and to calculate the AIME for each:
1) Including any periods of self-employment, the military, and your
current job, since you were 18, how many years have you worked
full-time for all or most of the year?
2) Not counting your current job, have you ever had a full-time job that
lasted for three years or more?
3) I want to know about the longest such job you had. Did you work for
someone else, were you self-employed, or what?
4) When did you start working at that job?
5) When did you stop working at that job?
6) Since you were 18, have there been years when you only worked
part-time for all or most of the year?
7) About how many years in total did you work part time for all or most
of the year?
8) Thinking now of the future, when do you expect to stop working full
time?
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9) Do you expect to work part time after that?
10) When do you expect to stop working altogether?

QUESTIONS ON DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS
1) Does your employer make contributions to this [DC] plan? Does the
business make contributions to this plan?
2) What percentage of pay or amount of money per month or year does
your employer currently contribute?

Appendix Notes
1. A third though minor component is also provided: pensions from other nonspeciﬁed sources.
2. These ﬁgures are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) hourly wage series. The source is Table B-47 of the Economic Report, available at http://www
.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables09.html. The BLS wage ﬁgures are converted to constant
dollars on the basis of the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPIU). I use the BLS series rather than one of the alternatives to project future wages
because it likely corresponds closest to changes in the Social Security wage base
over time, due to the cap on Social Security earnings that enter the Social Security
beneﬁt formula.
3. The source is U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract, various years and table
numbers. I use the mortality tables as of the survey year (or the one nearest to the
survey year).
4. This implicitly assumes that deviations from the regression line in the current year
are a result of a transitory component to current income only. This procedure follows
the conventions of the 1983 SCF codebook.
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Table B.1 Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Race,
Education, Age, and Gender, 1989, 2001, and 2007
1989
Male Female

2001
Male Female

2007
Male Female

45.3
35.4
64.2

40.9
23.7
51.5

60.2
18.1
66.1

48.4
15.1
55.4

53.1
14.0
56.9

52.0
12.8
57.7

37.8
33.0
56.6

33.3
37.2
53.6

50.8
17.2
61.2

45.3
15.1
53.6

47.1
15.3
50.7

37.9
8.6
42.7

15.2
22.6
34.0

13.6
23.5
33.2

28.4
11.7
32.7

26.2
12.1
34.4

29.2
6.9
32.1

28.6
9.1
34.1

66.4
45.1
82.8

56.6
38.8
71.8

69.1
40.1
81.4

65.2
27.2
75.3

71.9
29.6
79.4

67.9
22.8
75.3

28.8
45.0
63.3

20.8
46.5
52.9

47.7
46.2
73.9

52.4
21.7
61.5

43.4
28.3
59.6

50.3
25.7
61.1

44.6
34.5
57.1

36.3
34.1
57.4

48.1
24.9
58.5

31.0
21.2
42.6

42.8
11.1
49.8

35.1
10.3
45.3

By educational attainment
Aged 46 and under
No high school diploma (or GED)
All DC accounts
17.6
All DB plans
20.3
DC and/or DB plans
32.5

21.0
13.7
32.0

21.4
6.6
25.8

21.4
1.6
23.0

14.0
1.2
15.2

14.2
0.3
14.5

By racea
Aged 46 and under
Non-Hispanic whites
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB Plans
(Non-Hispanic) African Americans
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Hispanics
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whites
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
(Non-Hispanic) African Americans
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Hispanics
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
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Table B.1 (continued)

By educational attainment (cont.)
Aged 46 and under (cont.)
High school diploma (or GED)
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Some college
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
College degree
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Aged 47–64
No high school diploma (or GED)
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
High school diploma (or GED)
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Some college
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
College degree
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans

1989
Male Female

2001
Male Female

2007
Male Female

34.7
32.4
55.7

29.0
23.0
44.3

48.2
15.3
55.4

34.6
10.7
41.4

35.9
12.0
40.3

34.0
10.2
40.5

42.8
33.5
61.8

37.5
25.1
48.4

49.7
19.5
59.1

37.5
11.0
43.5

51.2
11.6
54.9

42.9
10.2
48.3

53.3
39.1
71.7

51.9
30.5
61.9

74.7
20.7
78.8

63.4
22.1
72.6

70.3
17.6
73.9

62.3
15.2
68.7

41.6
38.2
68.3

26.6
31.3
50.7

33.3
37.9
60.0

18.8
14.1
33.0

33.9
7.9
40.1

35.0
7.0
39.2

55.4
38.6
73.9

44.0
35.1
61.7

60.6
33.1
72.6

54.2
19.0
66.2

55.4
26.6
67.0

55.7
18.7
63.0

63.5
46.5
83.5

53.3
37.0
69.2

61.9
31.5
72.8

67.9
21.4
71.6

68.5
29.7
75.6

64.7
18.8
70.9

78.0
50.3
87.6

72.1
47.9
85.2

78.6
45.5
90.2

72.4
35.2
82.9

80.0
30.5
86.2

74.9
28.8
84.1

NOTE: The table includes only current workers aged 64 and under.
Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of their small sample size.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

a
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Table B.2 Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Industry,
Occupation, Employment Status, and Age, 1989, 2001, and 2007

By industry of employmenta
Aged 46 and under
Goods-producing industries
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Wholesale and retail trade
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Nongovernmental services
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Public administration
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Aged 47–64
Goods-producing industries
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Wholesale and retail trade
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Nongovernmental services
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Public administration
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
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1989
Male Female

2001
Male Female

2007
Male Female

40.2
28.6
55.1

37.5
25.4
53.3

52.0
17.4
58.9

53.1
11.2
56.0

38.1
7.8
41.2

51.9
7.0
53.8

35.4
15.8
44.5

22.4
12.3
29.4

45.7
7.6
47.8

33.3
4.9
35.9

46.4
6.1
47.5

27.8
3.9
30.0

43.9
39.9
65.6

40.3
25.7
52.4

62.5
17.1
67.7

46.2
16.0
54.9

56.7
11.1
59.8

50.9
11.4
56.7

41.4
76.5
96.2

52.0
59.6
77.0

72.2
51.2
93.8

53.0
45.7
73.9

73.8
57.9
86.1

62.1
52.8
88.9

58.6
46.2
79.6

45.7
22.7
51.3

62.7
37.3
78.3

54.6
25.0
62.5

59.8
21.7
66.9

67.5
7.9
70.3

51.6
14.5
60.9

45.3
21.7
60.2

62.5
28.6
74.0

53.7
13.7
59.1

66.3
15.9
69.4

63.9
12.1
67.0

65.3
49.7
82.5

53.5
43.7
72.8

68.4
38.9
79.8

63.5
27.3
74.5

72.0
30.2
80.2

63.5
24.5
72.5

80.7
64.3
96.9

34.8
67.6
70.1

82.0
74.6
100.0

66.4
36.5
78.4

70.5
55.1
89.8

73.2
57.4
88.7
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Table B.2 (continued)
1989
Male Female
By occupation of employment
Aged 46 and under
Professional and managerial
56.7
All DC accounts
40.6
All DB plans
75.0
DC and/or DB plans
Technical and clerical
42.5
All DC accounts
23.6
All DB plans
55.3
DC and/or DB plans
Service workers
30.9
All DC accounts
43.2
All DB plans
63.8
DC and/or DB plans
Craft, operative, and agricultural
30.5
All DC accounts
31.2
All DB plans
50.0
DC and/or DB plans
Aged 47–64
Professional and managerial
78.2
All DC accounts
55.5
All DB plans
91.8
DC and/or DB plans
Technical and clerical
57.5
All DC accounts
25.2
All DB plans
71.8
DC and/or DB plans
Service workers
27.9
All DC accounts
48.4
All DB plans
61.2
DC and/or DB plans
Craft, operative, and agricultural
51.7
All DC accounts
40.1
All DB plans
72.2
DC and/or DB plans

2001
Male Female

2007
Male Female

51.7
33.9
64.8

70.0
18.5
74.4

56.6
21.3
66.6

67.7
13.7
70.1

57.4
15.0
63.8

37.0
23.6
49.4

58.7
14.4
62.7

44.7
11.7
50.5

53.4
11.0
56.0

47.4
8.4
52.1

19.1
13.3
28.0

35.2
22.5
48.2

20.7
7.2
25.5

38.4
26.5
47.9

21.8
9.4
27.3

24.9
24.7
41.0

46.3
16.4
53.6

42.2
8.4
46.9

35.7
8.7
38.8

31.5
9.8
38.2

73.3
39.9
83.1

77.2
40.6
87.1

71.3
30.1
80.3

79.3
31.8
86.6

67.7
27.4
77.4

53.5
45.5
75.9

74.8
32.7
81.2

63.5
22.4
71.8

68.5
22.4
73.6

71.5
20.1
77.4

19.9
34.0
44.8

53.3
54.8
76.1

39.6
20.1
52.7

56.2
43.4
73.3

35.8
15.7
42.9

28.5
17.1
35.6

53.5
36.3
71.0

40.1
24.6
55.7

53.5
20.4
61.5

58.2
7.2
60.6

(continued)
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Table B.2 (continued)

By work statusa
Aged 46 and under
Part-time, full-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Full-time, part-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Part-time, part-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Full-time, full-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Self-employed workers
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Aged 47–64
Part-time, full-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Full-time, part-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Part-time, part-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
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1989
Male Female

2001
Male Female

2007
Male Female

17.4
24.3
35.2

24.1
8.8
29.8

27.5
7.5
31.8

31.4
8.3
35.5

37.0
2.7
37.0

32.7
4.1
35.6

33.0
26.6
47.9

42.9
41.8
64.1

49.8
11.8
53.3

42.9
31.6
63.5

34.9
10.4
38.3

57.8
20.6
67.8

18.7
15.3
27.1

35.8
10.1
42.8

19.8
1.2
20.1

34.5
8.7
38.7

30.9
17.7
40.3

33.0
9.5
38.1

43.1
34.9
62.5

40.7
30.1
55.0

58.8
18.6
65.4

49.9
14.7
56.7

51.9
13.4
55.5

50.8
12.8
56.9

31.3
9.9
34.6

52.1
20.3
62.0

40.6
6.7
43.2

46.4
11.5
50.9

31.3
1.3
32.4

37.6
12.6
40.8

58.8
25.4
70.9

31.1
24.1
46.7

48.2
37.3
64.1

48.0
16.8
57.1

60.2
17.9
64.1

50.6
17.0
54.9

70.5
37.1
81.8

54.2
72.1
91.0

66.7
42.5
83.4

64.4
48.5
87.3

55.8
30.0
66.8

58.6
32.3
73.6

46.9
8.8
46.9

50.7
14.0
55.7

72.8
49.7
84.7

65.1
23.3
72.6

72.2
24.1
78.7

60.5
18.8
63.1
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Table B.2 (continued)

By work statusa (cont.)
Aged 47–64 (cont.)
Full-time, full-year
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Self-employed workers
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans

1989
Male Female

2001
Male Female

2007
Male Female

60.5
46.9
80.0

54.8
42.2
72.3

67.8
38.4
80.4

63.8
24.5
72.1

68.2
28.0
76.3

68.8
22.6
76.9

58.8
12.3
63.7

44.8
20.9
50.4

63.6
20.5
71.2

49.8
22.6
62.1

54.1
11.1
57.6

48.2
20.3
52.4

NOTE: The table includes only current workers aged 64 and under. Industries are
grouped into four classiﬁcations: 1) agriculture, mining, and manufacturing; 2) wholesale and retail trade; 3) communications, information services, ﬁnance, insurance, real
estate, repair services, transportation, utilities, professional services, and personal services; and 4) public administration.
a
Part-time = less than 35 hours per week; part-year = less than 50 weeks per year. Selfemployment may be part-time or full-time.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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Table B.3 Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Age and
Earnings Quintile, 1989, 2001, and 2007

Aged 46 and under
Bottom earnings quintile
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Second earnings quintile
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Third earnings quintile
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Fourth earnings quintile
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Top earnings quintile
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Aged 47–64
Bottom earnings quintile
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Second earnings quintile
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Third earnings quintile
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
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1989
Male Female

2001
Male Female

2007
Male Female

32.4
29.3
51.3

34.2
22.8
46.8

37.4
8.8
42.7

36.6
11.4
43.3

26.7
6.3
29.8

32.7
6.9
37.9

75.3
47.5
92.8

71.7
64.6
87.0

67.9
22.3
76.0

67.4
23.1
76.3

58.6
15.6
64.0

61.4
20.4
71.5

64.6
57.8
89.2

98.8
40.3
99.8

79.5
32.7
88.2

82.9
31.9
92.3

71.6
18.4
75.0

85.6
19.0
89.4

89.8 100.0
28.0
11.8
89.8 100.0

88.1
24.3
89.2

95.7
8.8
95.7

85.0
27.1
88.0

81.4
27.2
83.6

67.7 99.5
72.5 96.5
96.4 100.0

91.3
26.4
91.8

57.7
29.1
78.2

93.2
19.2
93.5

85.0
6.0
85.0

52.4
35.7
72.2

47.7
36.6
65.5

55.9
31.5
70.3

53.0
20.2
62.9

49.2
17.3
57.4

52.8
16.7
60.1

73.9
63.3
92.4

84.9
69.6
96.4

68.1
41.5
80.7

78.6
36.3
89.9

68.2
32.6
78.6

76.5
31.2
88.0

89.9
71.2
98.3

96.4
62.7
99.9

71.4
55.6
92.1

78.5
39.4
87.5

75.1
34.2
84.6

85.6
32.9
92.1
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Table B.3 (continued)

Fourth earnings quintile
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans
Top earnings quintile
All DC accounts
All DB plans
DC and/or DB plans

1989
Male Female

2001
Male Female

2007
Male Female

93.3
55.3
93.3

91.6
44.4
92.5

92.3
40.1
92.3

84.9
36.4
90.7

85.7
26.2
89.1

91.2 95.6
31.5 48.4
94.9 100.0

96.0
25.1
96.5

85.4
15.2
85.4

99.8
49.2
99.8

91.4 100.0
52.7
0.0
99.9 100.0

NOTE: The table includes only current workers age 64 and under. Self-employed are
excluded from this table. Earnings quintiles are based on the combined distribution of
annual earnings for men and women.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

Wolff.indb 291

11/21/2011 9:19:59 AM

Wolff.indb 292

11/21/2011 9:20:00 AM

Appendix C
Augmented Wealth Including
Employer Contributions to
DC Plans and Net of Taxes
Table C.1 Augmented Wealth, Net of Federal Income Taxes on
Receipt and Including Employer Contribution to DC Plans
(DCEMP), 1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
1983
1989
2001
2007
All households
Mean values including DCEMP
Net pension wealth*
—
68.3
119.7
132.0
Net private accumulations*
—
367.4
502.1
591.5
Net retirement wealth*
—
171.0
262.0
276.8
Net augmented wealth*
—
470.0
644.4
736.3
Median values including DCEMP
Pension wealth
—
10.6
34.2
33.7
Private accumulations
—
122.4
138.7
158.6
Retirement wealth
—
124.2
185.6
184.5
Augmented wealth
—
227.1
287.3
312.5
Aged 46 and under
Mean values including DCEMP
Net pension wealth*
Net private accumulations*
Net retirement wealth*
Net augmented wealth*
Median values including DCEMP
Pension wealth
Private accumulations
Retirement wealth
Augmented wealth

—
—
—
—

49.7
211.7
134.4
296.3

78.2
250.1
189.5
361.4

74.3
253.5
185.2
364.3

—
—
—
—

4.5
60.1
100.8
148.5

18.3
62.4
141.5
178.5

6.3
54.3
131.0
167.6

(continued)
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Table C.1 (continued)
1983

1989

2001

2007

Aged 47–64
Mean values including DCEMP
Net pension wealth
Net private accumulations
Net retirement wealth
Net augmented wealth

75.2
503.1
233.8
661.6

106.6
563.2
231.8
688.4

188.2
204.0
775.6
873.4
373.3
389.7
960.7 1,059.1

Aged 47–64
Median values including DCEMP
Pension wealth
Private accumulations
Retirement wealth
Augmented wealth

39.1
202.6
196.1
359.6

41.2
212.1
176.2
364.0

77.8
253.2
275.6
448.1

84.9
287.3
279.2
471.2

NOTE: Augmented wealth includes employer contributions to deﬁned contribution
pension plans (DCEMP). Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of
the head of household. Key: Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension
wealth. Retirement wealth = PW + SSW. Augmented wealth = NWX + PW + SSW. —
= data not available. Augmented wealth* includes employer contributions to deﬁned
contribution pension plans.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

Wolff.indb 294

11/21/2011 9:20:01 AM

Appendix D
Extended Results on
Retirement Adequacy
Table D.1 Average Annual Real Rates of Return Used in
Annuity Calculations

Asset type
Owner-occupied housinga
Business and nonhome real estateb
Liquid assetsc
Financial assetsd
Deﬁned contribution accountse
Mortgage debt
Nonmortgage debt
Inﬂation rate (CPI-U average)f

Average rates of return (%)
Period
Period
available
chosen
Nominal Real
1968–2007 1968–2007
5.96
1.39
1953–2007 1960–2007
6.96
2.63
1965–2007 1965–2007
5.48
0.88
1955–2007 1960–2007
7.54
3.19
1986–2007 1986–2007
6.72
3.58
1960–2007
0.00
−4.04
1960–2007
0.00
−4.04
1960–2007
4.21
1965–2007
4.55
1968–2007
4.58
1986–2007
3.03

NOTE: Real Rate of Return = (1 + Nominal Rate) / (1 + ΔCPI) − 1.
Owner-occupied housing: U.S. Census Bureau (2009, Table 943). Updated with data
from the National Association of Realtors, Washington, DC: Median Sales Price of
Existing Single-Family Homes for Metropolitan Areas, at www. Realtor.org/research.
b
Business and nonhome real estate: Holding gains (taken from the Flow of Funds table
R.100) divided by equity in noncorporate business (taken from the Flow of Funds
Table B.100).
c
Liquid assets: The weighted average of the rates of return on checking deposits and
cash, time and saving deposits, and life insurance reserves. The weights are the proportion of these assets in their combined total (calculated from the Flow of Funds
Table B.100). The assumptions regarding the rates of return are zero for checking
deposits, the rate of return on a one-month CD (taken from the table “H.15 Selected Interest Rates,” published by the Federal Reserve and available at http://www
.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm) for time and saving deposits, and one plus
the inﬂation rate for life insurance reserves.
d
Financial assets: The weighted average of the rates of return on open market paper,
Treasury securities, municipal securities, corporate and foreign bonds, corporate equities, and mutual fund shares. The weights are the proportion of these assets in total
a
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Table D.1 (continued)
ﬁnancial assets held by the household sector (calculated from the Flow of Funds Table
B.100). The assumption regarding the rate of return on open market paper is that it
equals the rate of return on one-month ﬁnance paper (taken from the Table H.15 “Selected Interest Rates,” published by the Federal Reserve and available at http://www
.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm). The data for the rates of return on other
assets are taken from the Economic Report of the President 2005, Table B.73. The
assumptions regarding Treasury securities, municipal securities, corporate and foreign bonds, and corporate equities are, respectively, the average of Treasury security
yields, high-grade municipal bond yields, the average of corporate bond yields, and
annual percent change in the S&P 500 index. Mutual fund shares are assumed to earn
a rate of return equal to the weighted average of the rates of return on open market
paper, Treasury securities, municipal securities, corporate and foreign bonds, and corporate equities. The weights are the proportions of these assets in the total ﬁnancial
assets of mutual funds (calculated from the Flow of Funds Table L.123).
e
Pension (deﬁned contribution) accounts: Net acquisition of ﬁnancial assets (taken
from the Flow of Funds Table F.119c) divided by total ﬁnancial assets of private
deﬁned-contribution plans (taken from the Flow of Funds table L.119c).
f
Inﬂation rate: Calculated from the CPI-U, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
SOURCE: Wolff, Zacharias, and Masterson (2009).
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Table D.2 Composition of Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension
and Social Security Beneﬁts, 1989, 2001, and 2007 (%)
Home
equity

Deﬁned
contribution Deﬁned beneﬁt
plans
pensions

41.6
42.0
40.9

13.9
13.7
14.2

8.1
11.1
3.3

43.0
24.6
42.4
50.4
31.1
26.8
42.3
35.8
52.9

13.5
17.1
13.1
16.1
17.1
16.9
14.8
15.8
10.6

18.8
24.8
25.4
25.7
56.5

22.0
17.7
17.6
14.0
11.6

Social
Security

Total

19.0
16.9
22.4

17.5
16.3
19.2

100.0
100.0
100.0

8.6
2.3
8.0
5.2
10.7
7.1
4.6
10.2
9.9

18.1
31.5
19.0
14.9
21.5
25.4
16.1
19.6
16.3

16.8
24.4
17.5
13.4
19.7
23.9
22.2
18.5
10.2

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

0.0
3.2
5.3
10.3
9.5

10.8
20.8
26.3
28.4
13.6

48.4
33.5
25.4
21.7
8.7

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
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1989
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth
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2001
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5
2007
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
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Table D.2 (continued)
39.2
36.6
43.4

11.7
11.8
11.4

17.0
18.6
14.4

13.8
14.7
12.4

18.4
18.3
18.5

100.0
100.0
100.0

40.9
20.6
40.7
32.5
35.6
17.2
26.6
31.3
45.8

11.6
12.9
11.0
12.7
15.6
15.7
13.6
14.5
10.2

17.2
14.6
17.2
18.1
13.6
9.2
14.9
15.6
18.4

13.0
21.8
12.8
20.6
13.3
16.8
15.8
15.2
12.6

17.4
30.0
18.3
16.1
21.9
41.1
29.1
23.4
13.0

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

14.1
14.9
15.8
24.5
53.8

15.3
16.5
13.2
14.5
9.5

9.3
11.1
13.0
20.5
17.9

13.1
18.2
28.7
15.8
9.6

48.3
39.2
29.3
24.6
9.1

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

37.4
35.9

14.4
15.0

18.3
19.3

12.7
12.5

17.2
17.3

100.0
100.0
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Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5

39.5

13.6

16.8

13.0

17.0

100.0

39.1
21.0
39.0
38.3
22.9
14.3
22.5
28.4
43.8

13.9
19.2
13.9
13.9
19.9
20.4
19.3
16.0
12.7

18.6
15.1
18.3
19.8
17.1
9.2
15.2
18.2
19.4

12.3
17.8
12.1
12.8
17.4
7.0
14.2
15.9
11.8

16.1
26.9
16.7
15.1
22.7
49.1
28.7
21.5
12.2

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

24.4
17.7
15.4
15.4
52.0

19.9
19.5
17.3
17.0
12.0

4.4
11.5
19.7
23.8
18.2

9.0
15.3
19.4
19.5
9.3

42.3
36.0
28.2
24.3
8.5

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁt) from
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding.
Key: Home equity: net equity in owner-occupied housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁned contribution − home
equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned
contribution pension plans + present discounted value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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1989
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth

Home
equity

Deﬁned
contribution
plans

Deﬁned
beneﬁt
pensions

Social
Security

Total

Total:
Method A

30.4
35.2
25.0

10.2
11.5
8.7

5.9
9.3
2.0

13.9
14.2
13.7

12.8
13.7
11.7

73.2
83.9
61.1

73.1
80.6
64.4

35.9
7.7
39.9
28.9
10.2
9.7
32.4
31.0
92.1

11.3
5.3
12.4
9.2
5.6
6.1
11.3
13.7
18.5

7.2
0.7
7.5
3.0
3.5
2.6
3.5
8.9
17.2

15.1
9.8
17.9
8.6
7.0
9.2
12.3
17.0
28.3

14.0
7.6
16.4
7.7
6.4
8.6
17.0
16.0
17.8

83.5
31.2
94.1
57.4
32.8
36.2
76.5
86.5
173.9

81.4
34.4
90.9
59.7
34.2
37.0
75.8
81.4
166.1

2.3
8.4
13.4
18.2
113.4

2.7
6.0
9.2
9.9
23.3

0.0
1.1
2.8
7.3
19.1

1.3
7.0
13.8
20.2
27.3

6.0
11.3
13.3
15.4
17.5

12.3
33.7
52.5
71.0
200.7

14.6
33.9
50.9
67.4
190.6
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2001
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5

12.0
12.4
11.4

17.4
19.4
14.3

14.2
15.4
12.4

18.9
19.2
18.4

102.8
104.8
99.9

99.2
99.1
99.3

48.2
8.6
55.7
24.1
14.4
5.4
14.3
22.0
92.7

13.6
5.4
15.1
9.5
6.3
4.9
7.3
10.2
20.7

20.2
6.1
23.5
13.4
5.5
2.9
8.0
11.0
37.2

15.3
9.1
17.4
15.3
5.4
5.3
8.5
10.7
25.6

20.5
12.5
25.0
12.0
8.9
12.9
15.6
16.4
26.3

117.8
41.6
136.7
74.3
40.4
31.3
53.7
70.2
202.6

112.9
39.9
130.7
70.4
40.5
31.9
52.1
67.3
191.4

3.2
5.7
9.6
23.0
166.9

3.5
6.2
8.0
13.6
29.6

2.1
4.2
7.9
19.3
55.6

3.0
6.9
17.4
14.8
29.8

11.0
14.9
17.7
23.1
28.3

22.7
37.9
60.5
93.8
310.3

23.2
36.9
57.9
88.0
293.0

41.6
40.4
43.2

16.1
16.9
14.9

20.3
21.7
18.4

14.2
14.1
14.3

19.1
19.5
18.7

111.3
112.6
109.6

106.9
106.5
107.4
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2007
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64

40.3
38.4
43.3

Wolff.indb 302

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth

Home
equity

Deﬁned
contribution
plans

Deﬁned
beneﬁt
pensions

302
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Social
Security

Total

Total:
Method A
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Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
49.0
17.5
23.3
15.4
20.3
125.5
119.9
11.3
10.3
8.1
9.6
14.5
53.8
52.5
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
57.5
20.4
26.9
17.9
24.7
147.5
140.8
Single males
29.7
10.8
15.4
10.0
11.7
77.5
74.6
Single females
9.5
8.3
7.1
7.2
9.4
41.5
40.5
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
3.8
5.4
2.4
1.8
12.9
26.3
27.0
12 years of schoolingb
12.6
10.8
8.5
8.0
16.1
56.0
54.2
13–15 years of schoolingb
21.7
12.2
13.9
12.1
16.4
76.3
73.3
16 or more years of schoolingb
90.3
26.2
39.9
24.4
25.2
206.0
193.9
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
5.9
4.8
1.1
2.2
10.2
24.2
25.3
Income quintile 2
7.1
7.8
4.6
6.1
14.3
39.8
39.4
Income quintile 3
10.3
11.5
13.1
13.0
18.9
66.8
62.5
Income quintile 4
15.3
16.8
23.5
19.3
24.1
99.1
91.6
Income quintile 5
174.6
40.4
61.2
31.1
28.6
335.8
317.7
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁt) from
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied
housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁned contribution − home equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted value
of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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Table D.4 Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth Holdings, Expected Pension Beneﬁts, and Expected
Social Security Beneﬁts, by Detailed Component, 1989, 2001, and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$)
Actual
Actual
Expected Expected
annuity Expected
plus
plus
annuity annuity
Total
from
annuity Expected expected expected Expected Expected
from
from
Total
expected
nonhome,
from
annuity
annual
annual
annuity
annuity
future
future
expected retirement
nonpension home
from
deﬁned Soc. Sec.
from
from
gains
gains in retirement income:
wealth
equity DC plans beneﬁt
beneﬁt
DCEMP DCEMPW in NWX DCTOT income Method A
23.0
24.0
21.9

8.4
8.7
8.0

1.6
1.5
1.7

13.9
14.2
13.7

12.8
13.7
11.7

1.2
2.2
0.0

0.9
1.8
0.0

9.2
14.0
3.7

2.2
3.8
0.4

73.2
83.9
61.1

73.1
80.6
64.4

27.2
5.8
30.0
22.3
8.0
7.5
23.9
22.5
70.8

9.3
4.5
10.1
7.7
4.8
5.3
9.1
10.8
15.2

1.9
0.1
2.0
1.1
0.8
0.6
1.0
1.3
5.6

15.1
9.8
17.9
8.6
7.0
9.2
12.3
17.0
28.3

14.0
7.6
16.4
7.7
6.4
8.6
17.0
16.0
17.8

1.5
0.1
1.4
0.6
1.0
0.7
0.3
2.2
3.2

1.1
0.2
1.3
0.2
0.5
0.4
0.9
1.6
2.1

10.7
2.7
12.2
8.1
3.0
3.1
10.6
11.4
24.6

2.7
0.3
2.9
1.0
1.2
0.9
1.3
3.8
6.3

83.5
31.2
94.1
57.4
32.8
36.2
76.5
86.5
173.9

81.4
34.4
90.9
59.7
34.2
37.0
75.8
81.4
166.1

1.8
6.4
10.4
14.1
85.2

2.4
5.1
7.6
8.2
18.9

0.0
0.2
0.3
2.0
5.6

1.3
7.0
13.8
20.2
27.3

6.0
11.3
13.3
15.4
17.5

0.0
0.2
0.6
1.4
3.8

0.0
0.3
0.7
1.2
2.5

0.9
2.9
4.6
5.9
32.7

0.0
0.4
1.2
2.6
7.2

12.3
33.7
52.5
71.0
200.7

14.6
33.9
50.9
67.4
190.6
(continued)
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1989
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Expected
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5
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Actual
Actual
Expected Expected
annuity Expected
plus
plus
annuity annuity
Total
from
annuity Expected expected expected Expected Expected
from
from
Total
expected
nonhome,
from
annuity
annual
annual
annuity
annuity
future
future
expected retirement
nonpension home
from
deﬁned Soc. Sec.
from
from
gains
gains in retirement income:
wealth
equity DC plans beneﬁt
beneﬁt
DCEMP DCEMPW in NWX DCTOT income Method A
2001
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Expected
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5

31.3
27.0
37.8

9.4
8.9
10.2

8.3
7.4
9.7

14.2
15.4
12.4

18.9
19.2
18.4

2.6
3.2
1.7

0.8
1.2
0.3

11.7
14.9
6.7

5.7
7.7
2.6

102.8
104.8
99.9

99.2
99.1
99.3

37.3
6.5
43.2
18.5
11.1
4.3
10.9
17.4
71.7

10.8
3.9
11.9
7.3
4.9
4.1
5.7
7.9
16.2

9.9
1.9
11.6
5.3
2.5
1.4
3.6
5.0
18.0

15.3
9.1
17.4
15.3
5.4
5.3
8.5
10.7
25.6

20.5
12.5
25.0
12.0
8.9
12.9
15.6
16.4
26.3

3.0
1.3
3.3
2.7
1.0
0.5
1.2
1.7
5.6

0.9
0.5
1.1
0.7
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
1.7

13.7
3.5
15.7
7.8
4.6
1.9
5.0
6.9
25.6

6.5
2.3
7.5
4.8
1.8
0.8
2.8
3.7
11.9

117.8
41.6
136.7
74.3
40.4
31.3
53.7
70.2
202.6

112.9
39.9
130.7
70.4
40.5
31.9
52.1
67.3
191.4

2.4
4.3
7.5
18.0
129.3

3.0
4.9
6.2
10.3
23.3

0.9
1.8
3.3
8.9
27.5

3.0
6.9
17.4
14.8
29.8

11.0
14.9
17.7
23.1
28.3

0.4
0.8
1.4
2.7
8.2

0.1
0.3
0.5
1.3
2.1

1.3
2.8
3.8
8.3
44.0

0.7
1.4
2.6
6.4
17.8

22.7
37.9
60.5
93.8
310.3

23.2
36.9
57.9
88.0
293.0
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2007
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5

32.5
28.2
38.2

12.6
12.2
13.2

9.7
7.9
12.1

14.2
14.1
14.3

19.1
19.5
18.7

2.8
3.3
2.0

1.5
2.0
1.0

12.5
16.9
6.7

6.4
8.6
3.3

111.3
112.6
109.6

38.3
8.6
45.0
22.7
7.5
2.8
9.7
16.6
70.8

13.8
7.8
16.1
8.2
6.7
4.2
8.4
9.6
20.7

11.3
3.2
12.9
7.0
3.3
1.1
3.9
6.7
19.2

15.4
9.6
17.9
10.0
7.2
1.8
8.0
12.1
24.4

20.3
14.5
24.7
11.7
9.4
12.9
16.1
16.4
25.2

3.1
1.3
3.6
2.1
1.0
0.4
1.1
1.7
5.6

1.7
0.9
2.1
1.0
0.5
0.2
0.8
1.2
2.8

14.3
5.3
16.9
9.6
3.7
2.2
5.3
7.6
24.9

7.2
2.7
8.3
5.2
2.2
0.8
2.8
4.4
12.4

125.5
53.8
147.5
77.5
41.5
26.3
56.0
76.3
206.0

106.9
106.5
107.4
0.0
119.9
52.5
140.8
74.6
40.5
27.0
54.2
73.3
193.9

4.6
5.8
8.1
11.8
136.1

4.0
6.2
9.1
12.8
31.9

0.5
2.5
5.6
10.9
29.9

2.2
6.1
13.0
19.3
31.1

10.2
14.3
18.9
24.1
28.6

0.2
0.5
1.9
2.7
8.7

0.1
0.3
1.1
2.6
3.6

2.1
2.8
4.7
7.5
46.9

0.3
1.2
4.5
7.4
18.9

24.2
39.8
66.8
99.1
335.8

25.3
39.4
62.5
91.6
317.7

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁt) from the
current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁned contribution − home equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned contribution
wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted value of future
employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan.
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.

a

b

305

11/21/2011 9:20:08 AM

Wolff.indb 306

Nonhome,
FWX
NWX plus
nonpension plus half of Nonpension DC plans
wealth home equity wealth
(DCTOT)
1989
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb

11/21/2011 9:20:09 AM

2001
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64

Total
expected
Marginal
retirement
effect
NWX
income:
of all
plus all NWX + PW pensions,
pensions + Soc. Sec.
1989

Marginal
effect
of all
pensions,
2007

67.5
64.9
70.6

57.0
50.8
64.1

45.1
40.4
50.7

40.7
32.1
50.7

27.5
23.6
32.1

14.8
13.2
16.7

−17.6
−16.8
−18.6

−17.3
−16.9
−17.9

60.5
91.1
64.5
59.4
77.5
82.4
60.2
51.9
42.3

47.8
87.5
49.8
56.5
73.5
75.9
47.1
37.0
25.8

35.1
77.3
36.8
45.9
63.7
62.9
34.9
22.3
20.2

30.1
74.0
33.2
44.1
56.3
57.4
29.6
19.8
18.5

15.9
63.0
19.0
23.3
48.4
42.4
16.9
7.3
9.7

3.2
48.1
7.3
11.4
33.2
26.7
1.6
0.4
5.4

−19.2
−14.4
−17.8
−22.6
−15.3
−20.5
−18.0
−15.0
−10.4

−18.4
−16.3
−16.5
−13.5
−21.4
−11.4
−21.5
−23.1
−12.2

71.7
71.6
71.7

62.3
62.1
62.6

50.2
49.0
52.0

38.9
35.9
43.5

30.2
29.0
32.0

10.2
10.7
9.4
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Non-Hispanic whitea
67.1
56.9
43.5
31.5
22.8
4.0
86.0
78.5
69.7
59.5
49.7
21.6
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
65.4
55.3
41.3
29.3
21.7
3.9
Single males
77.6
66.7
53.4
44.0
32.0
11.9
Single females
82.9
76.3
69.7
58.7
49.9
24.4
91.8
87.3
78.7
72.2
59.4
23.8
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
83.2
72.5
63.1
48.6
36.6
10.6
71.8
63.7
47.8
34.2
25.9
6.8
13–15 years of schoolingb
52.7
41.0
27.9
18.5
14.2
5.7
16 or more years of schoolingb
2007
Aged 47–64
75.1
59.8
45.2
33.2
27.9
10.2
Aged 47–55
76.6
59.3
45.5
31.7
28.6
11.6
Aged 56–64
72.9
60.4
44.9
35.3
27.0
8.2
Aged 47–64
70.6
54.0
38.9
25.9
20.5
4.8
Non-Hispanic whitea
88.4
75.1
60.2
49.7
43.9
13.9
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
70.9
54.0
37.1
24.9
20.6
5.7
Single males
72.1
57.8
50.3
44.0
36.8
12.8
Single females
86.9
74.9
62.4
48.0
41.0
19.7
94.2
92.0
80.1
74.6
68.7
28.1
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
86.3
72.6
54.3
39.9
32.8
9.0
12 years of schoolingb
80.7
62.8
50.4
32.5
27.4
9.0
13–15 years of schoolingb
56.4
37.5
23.9
15.5
11.7
6.4
16 or more years of schoolingb
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁt) from
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied
housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁned contribution − home equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned
contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted
value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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1989
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, ages 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth plus
half of home
equity

Nonpension
wealth

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth plus
DC plans

Total expected
Nonhome,
retirement
nonpension
income:
wealth plus NWX + PW +
all pensions
Soc. Sec.

6.8
6.7
6.9

8.0
7.7
8.3

10.8
8.8
13.1

13.0
11.9
14.2

27.8
23.6
32.6

45.4
38.8
53.0

8.3
1.6
7.0
10.9
4.8
3.9
11.0
9.5
8.4

9.5
2.8
8.7
10.9
5.2
4.6
13.7
11.5
8.6

13.1
2.8
10.8
22.0
6.5
6.9
16.3
12.8
14.1

16.0
2.8
13.2
22.0
9.1
8.9
17.0
17.6
17.1

31.7
16.4
26.0
44.2
25.6
23.8
28.0
30.4
37.8

49.7
35.2
47.3
54.0
37.6
42.1
47.8
44.8
52.7

2.5
7.7
3.6
5.8
14.1

6.3
7.7
5.3
6.4
14.2

12.4
10.1
6.1
10.7
15.1

12.4
10.1
8.6
15.4
19.1

22.9
23.2
32.5
28.2
32.0

51.8
45.8
56.4
33.6
39.2
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2001
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica
Married couples
Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5

8.0
6.5
10.4

10.5
8.6
13.4

16.1
14.0
19.3

26.8
24.3
30.7

46.5
40.7
55.3

7.6
2.0
6.9
4.9
5.6
2.3
5.1
6.1
9.2

9.7
2.2
8.4
8.2
6.9
4.3
5.9
9.6
10.3

12.7
3.0
10.9
10.8
9.4
7.6
7.9
10.8
13.7

19.5
4.9
17.6
18.0
11.4
9.6
12.4
15.4
22.8

30.9
14.3
28.5
30.9
19.9
17.2
21.7
24.5
37.4

50.5
37.4
49.7
47.1
38.2
44.3
44.8
43.1
51.5

7.5
5.1
3.1
5.0
10.9

12.1
5.3
3.6
7.3
11.8

17.0
7.9
4.5
9.6
13.3

19.2
12.0
9.6
17.6
22.3

28.1
24.4
20.8
27.5
33.7

62.2
45.1
38.4
41.3
45.1

5.5
4.4
6.9

7.3
6.1
8.9

10.0
8.1
12.5

16.8
14.7
19.6

28.5
26.1
31.8

49.3
43.7
57.1

6.1
3.9

8.2
5.0

11.0
7.8

18.9
11.4

31.2
23.2

53.6
41.5
(continued)
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2007
Aged 47–64
Aged 47–55
Aged 56–64
Aged 47–64
Non-Hispanic whitea
African American or Hispanica

6.3
4.9
8.4

Wolff.indb 310

Single males
Single females
Less than 12 years of schoolingb
12 years of schoolingb
13–15 years of schoolingb
16 or more years of schoolingb
Income quintile, aged 47–64
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Income quintile 5

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth
9.9
4.1
2.2
3.2
6.1
8.1

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth plus
half of home
equity
11.2
6.9
2.5
4.6
8.3
10.3

Nonpension
wealth
14.9
10.5
3.1
7.6
10.2
13.9

Nonhome,
nonpension
wealth plus
DC plans
20.8
15.4
4.4
11.7
15.2
25.7

6.7
4.8
4.0
2.1
10.1

10.4
6.5
5.7
2.8
11.2

16.8
9.3
7.6
3.2
12.9

19.4
14.8
16.0
12.4
21.5

Total expected
retirement
Nonhome,
nonpension
income:
wealth plus NWX + PW +
all pensions
Soc. Sec.
35.8
57.2
25.1
44.0
7.5
34.6
19.9
42.6
27.5
45.9
42.7
61.4
25.6
25.1
29.2
29.2
33.8

57.3
47.0
47.8
47.1
47.3

NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁned contribution − home equity. Total deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution
wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans.
a
Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes.
b
Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household.
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF.
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